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PART ONE
Oliphant and the Invisible Colleges
of the Early Atomic Age

INTRODUCTION

The weapon first created by atomic scientists of the 1940s was unprecedented in its power and
potential to kill. Not only can it destroy infrastructure and all living things over a wide area, it
leaves a haunting invisible footprint of radiation that can continue to harm long after its heat has
dissipated. The atomic bomb was first conceptualised, proven and built by civilian scientists and
overseen by an ambitious military and wary bureaucrats. The scientists belligerently lobbied their
governments to take the potential of atomic weaponry seriously and it is hence not surprising
that they are often portrayed as ghoulishly mad savants who strung the bow of mass
destruction.1
The atomic bomb proved such an effective killing machine that it provoked the AngloAustralian physicist, Sir Ernest Titterton, to include a chapter in his 1956 book, Facing an Atomic
Future, entitled ‘The Economics of Slaughter’.2 Titterton presented grotesque calculations that
suggested atomic weaponry could kill for as little as ‘2½ d [pence] per man, woman and child’.3
The atomic bomb, as we know, played a decisive hand in the end of the world’s most deadly
war—World War Two. During the Cold War the role of the atomic bomb—and its even more
devastating offspring, the thermonuclear hydrogen bomb—caused tension, anxiety and outright
fear as the world’s superpowers faced off in an arms race in which all-out conflict could have
resulted in the end of humanity.
The story of the twentieth century is, in many respects, the story of the atom. During the
early years the investigations into the structure of the atom were centred in powerful European
nations such as Britain, Germany and France. But during the war the United States borrowed
scientists and the knowledge from Europe and combined it with resources and enterprise to
efficiently produce the technology for the final vanquishing moments of World War Two. This rise
of American atomic utility continued into the Cold War arms race. In addition, postwar, industry
looked in wonderment at the technology achieved during the war and saw how productive large
groups of collaborating scientists could be. The postwar technological age was, in part, a product

1

For example see: Jazan Wild and Jonathan Elias, "Atomic Dreams - the Lost Journal of J. Robert
Oppenheimer," (Carnival Comics, 2009); Lawrence Badash, "From Security Blanket to Security Risk:
Scientists in the Decade after Hiroshima," History and Technology 19, no. 3 (2003); Stewart Cockburn and
David Ellyard, Oliphant: The Life and Times of Sir Mark Oliphant, 1 ed. (Australia: Axiom Books, 1981),
Biography, 220-21.
2
E.W. Titterton, Facing the Atomic Future (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1956), 306-09.
3
Ibid., 306.
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of a change of mode in scientific research from the university to government, military, and private
enterprise.
The origins of the atomic age can be traced to Henri Becquerel and Marie and Pierre
Curie’s discovery of radiation in the late nineteenth century; Albert Einstein’s Special Theory of
Relativity in 1905; and Ernest Rutherford’s proof on the structure of the atom in 1909.4 The
atomic age reached a crescendo with the dropping of atomic bombs that smote Japan in August
1945. There are several names that history links particularly to the atomic bomb, including the
Germans Otto Hahn and Friedrich Strassman, who split the uranium atom in 1938; Austrians Lise
Meitner and Otto Frisch, who first explained this as nuclear fission in 1939; the Hungarian Leo
Szilard, who theorised an uncontrolled nuclear explosion in the same year; Enrico Fermi, the
Italian who built the first nuclear reactor; and the eccentric American polymath, Robert
Oppenheimer, who led the Manhattan Project to build the first bombs. Yet in the background
was Mark Oliphant—a remarkable Australian scientist whose intellect, likeable and roguish
personality, and international friendships helped stitch together this vast patchwork of scientists
that made the bomb possible.

Marcus (Mark) Laurence Elwin Oliphant, 1901–2000
Mark Oliphant was born in Kent Town in Adelaide in 1901.5 He was raised alongside his four
younger brothers by his politically-active and pacifist, theosophist parents, Harold and Beatrice.
After finishing high school in 1918 he worked first at a jewellery shop and the city’s library, during
which time he studied part-time at the University of Adelaide. Oliphant’s proficiency with
apparatus became apparent and in late 1919 he was offered a cadetship at the university’s
physics department.6
In 1927 Oliphant left Australia to join the New Zealander, Ernest Rutherford, at the famed
Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge University. Completing his PhD in 1929, Oliphant continued at
Cavendish where he worked on hydrogen isotopes. This resulted in the science that later became
known as nuclear fusion.7 In 1937 Oliphant left Cambridge and became the head of physics at the
University of Birmingham. Oliphant spent the early years of World War Two perfecting radar
technology. His work on short-wavelength generating cavity magnetrons with Phillip Moon and
Randall Boot, allowed radars to be miniaturised from units that were commonly the size of
4

John Campbell, "Ernest Rutherford Bibliography," http://www.rutherford.org.nz/.
J.H. Carver et al., "Marcus Laurence Elwin Oliphant, 1901–2000," Historical Records of Australian Science
14, no. 3 (2003).
6
Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, 20-21.
7
Marcus L. Oliphant, P Harteck, and E Rutherford, "Transmutation Effects Observed with Heavy Hydrogen,"
Nature 133, no. 3359 (1934).
5
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houses to an object that was small enough to be fitted to an aircraft, and thus gained significant
advantage for allies against the Luftwaffe.
In April 1940 Oliphant was invited by a fellow Cavendish alumnus, George Thomson, to
join a committee, code-named MAUD, that was investigating the potential of a very conceptual
theory—the atomic bomb.8 The prospect of a bomb that released energy as per Einstein’s famous
E=mc2 equation was, at the time, considered at best an impractical weapon and by most, a
fanciful and incredible concept. However, Oliphant’s Birmingham colleagues, Otto Frisch and
Rudolf Peierls, handed him a memorandum in which they determined that if the rare uranium235
isotope was used, a small critical mass of just a few kilograms would be all that was required to
start a nuclear chain-reaction that would run away with a huge explosive force.9 Frisch and Peierls
proved, mathematically at least, that the atomic bomb was a practical and feasible weapon.
Facing the threat of German invasion, the MAUD Committee elected to send its findings including
the Frisch-Peierls memorandum, to the United States. When Oliphant visited Washington in
September 1941 to discuss some of his work on radar with American government scientists, he
was dismayed to learn that little progress on the atomic bomb had been made, and that the
Frisch-Peierls memorandum had been locked in a safe by the senior American scientific
bureaucrat, Lyman Briggs.10 Oliphant headed to the University of California, Berkeley to explain
the science to his friend, Ernest Lawrence—a recently anointed Nobel laureate. Lawrence invited
his Berkeley colleague, Robert Oppenheimer to the meeting and Oliphant convinced them that
action and a concerted effort was required to advance atomic science. Lawrence and
Oppenheimer promptly attended a meeting with other academics and government officials in
Schenectady, New York, resulting in a secret project which eventually came to be known as the
Manhattan Engineers District Project (or the Manhattan Project).11
Between 1943 and 1945 Oliphant worked directly on the Manhattan Project, principally
on the electromagnetic method at Berkeley and the construction of large scale alpha track
calutrons at Oak Ridge in Tennessee. In early 1945 Oliphant wrote to General Leslie Groves, the
military head of the Manhattan Project, proudly announcing that they were producing enriched
uranium at capacity, his work was done, and he was returning to Britain.12 The next time Oliphant
received news of the Manhattan Project was whilst on holiday in Wales with his family. There, on
the Denbighshire coast, he opened a newspaper to read of the destruction of Hiroshima—a

8

Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, 95.
Ibid., 98-99.
10
Sabine Lee, "In No Sense Vital and Actually Not Even Important’? Reality and Perception of Britain's
Contribution to the Development of Nuclear Weapons," Contemporary British History 20, no. 2 (2006).
11
J. Robert Oppenheimer, interview by Stephane Groueff 1965.
12
Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, 117.
9
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sobering conclusion to an esoteric meeting that he, himself, had convened four years earlier.13
In the year that followed the war, the United States government recommended 96
international scientists receive the Congressional Medal of Freedom. Only Oliphant was to receive
it with the highest possible order of the ‘Gold Palm’.14 Yet the Australian government blocked
him from receiving the award (which he did not learn of until 1980).15
Oliphant returned to Australia in 1950 and became the foundation chair of Physical
Sciences at the Australian National University (ANU). He described himself as a ‘belligerent
pacifist’16 and contributed to the political message of the scientists of the ‘peaceful atom’.17 It
was perhaps because of these politics, and in a move that was astonishingly contrary to his
wartime service and his nomination for the Medal of Freedom, Oliphant was, in 1954, denied
entry to the United States. At the same time he was politically smeared and suspected of being a
communist sympathiser, which prevented his involvement in British atomic bomb tests and
government work such as the Australian Atomic Energy Commission.18 Despite this Oliphant was
bestowed a knighthood in 1959 and retired as the head of ANU’s Physical Sciences in 1965. In
1971 he became governor of South Australia, a position he held until 1976. Sir Mark Oliphant died
in 2000, aged 98.

Thesis argument and aims
This thesis examines the interplay of science and politics and, particularly, the contribution of
Mark Oliphant between 1940 and 1965. Oliphant made a seminal contribution to the Manhattan
Project, but he also played a role in geopolitics as governments scrambled to gain knowledge of
atomic science. Whilst an advocate of atomic energy, Oliphant became an antagonist of
authorities with his involvement in the postwar scientific peace-movement.19
The exchange of knowledge between atomic scientists during and after the war was
frequently hampered by politics, most notably the application of wartime secrecy provisions and
the rise of postwar anti-communist concerns. Oliphant and others were able, to a significant
degree, exchange knowledge and advance science due, in a large part, to the existence of
transnational scientific networks. This became initially evident in the 1940s, when Oliphant’s
network in Britain, which included European refugees, transferred crucial knowledge to networks

13

Ibid., 123.
Ibid., 196-97.
15
Ibid., 197.
16
Joseph Rotblat, "Obituary Mark Oliphant (1901–2000)" Nature 407, no. 6803 (2000).
17
"Early Days of Pugwash," in Physics Today Online (2001).
18
Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, 182-201.
19
Rotblat, "Obituary Mark Oliphant (1901–2000)"
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in the United States. It could be considered that the Manhattan Project was a product of this
knowledge transferal. Yet as atomic science and the war advanced, its scientists were faced with
acute moral dilemmas. Scientists confronted the pervasive attempts at censorship that threated
to disrupt the effectiveness of their networks. Oliphant’s own engagement with scientific
networks, in Australia and abroad, must be understood in these contexts.
The intention of my research is, therefore, to appraise the politics surrounding atomic
science and scientists in the 1940s and 1950s, notably that of Britain, and the United States as it
informed the Manhattan Project, and the subsequent postwar scramble for atomic knowledge by
smaller nations such as Australia. It is also my particular intention to determine the degree to
which Oliphant’s own position within transnational scientific networks shaped the outcomes of
atomic science in the 1940s and 1950s.
This work uses small-world network mapping more commonly used in sociological
research, to interpret the historical relationships of Oliphant and his colleagues. The notion of the
‘invisible college’ was first devised by Robert Boyle in the seventeenth century20 and was later
explored as a latent social function of science by Diana Crane in the 1970s.21 It has since become
an accepted means to interpret scientific collaboration. The small-world network, on the other
hand, has been examined closely by scholars such as Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz, both of
whom helped develop it as a method to visualise and understand relationships.22 The application
of a framework, in which small-world networks and invisible colleges are mapped, explains the
progress of mid-century atomic science. The framework improves our understanding of critical
dilemmas in atomic science, including the moral quandary of scientifically-founded weaponry, the
complicity of scientists in war, and peaceful resistance to scientific censorship. Importantly,
Oliphant’s own role in mid-century atomic science is made evident by mapping those networks.
Accordingly, it is the aims in this thesis to:
i.

apply modelling of small-world networks to map and interpret transnational invisible
colleges of mid-century atomic scientists, and particularly those of Oliphant;

ii.

identify the effect of scientific networks, and of Oliphant himself, on the agency of atomic
science—including the growth of scientific understandings, the wartime creation of an
atomic weapon, and also the rise of the atomic science peace movement;

20

Marie Boas, Robert Boyle and Seventeenth Century Chemistry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1958), 7.
21
Diana Crane, Invisible Colleges: The Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific Communities (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1972).
22
Duncan J. Watts and Steven H. Strogatz, "Collective Dynamics of 'Small-World' Networks," Nature 393,
no. 6684 (1998); L. A. N. Amaral et al., "Classes of Small-World Networks," Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 97, no. 21 (2000).

6

Introduction
iii.

determine the forms of political censorship and suppression that Oliphant and other
atomic scientists experienced in Australia, Britain and the United States in the 1940s to
the 1950s;

iv.

evaluate how critical issues faced by Oliphant and his colleagues shaped their response to
political interference, and the risks posed to scientific freedom by political crises;

v.

consider the degree to which the sociological network of scientists influenced the moral
dimensions of their involvement with atomic science (and with the Manhattan Project,
specifically); and finally to

vi.

determine whether the operation of the sociological networks of science changed during
mid-century atomic science, and whether this effectively explains Oliphant’s actions and
influence on mid-century atomic history.

As a result, this thesis contributes new understandings of the role played by Oliphant in atomic
science and geopolitics, notably his occasional role in bridging politics and science. Importantly, it
assesses the degree to which scientists such as Oliphant employed their sociological networks to
advance science, collaborate across national borders, exchange knowledge, and, when necessary,
resist censorship. It is true that the rapid rise in the utility of atomic science, particularly after the
first bombs were detonated in 1945, shifted the dynamics of international collaboration.
Oliphant, himself, noted the dark choice faced by scientists between scientific truth and national
security.23 He was not alone: in 1961 President Eisenhower observed, similarly, that scientific
practice had been changed by the massive growth in the military-industrial complex. ‘The
prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment,’ he declared upon
leaving office, ‘is gravely to be regarded’.24
Oliphant’s experience of the invisible college and the long reach of government will be
compared to that of other scientists, who also careened headlong into the desperate ideological
struggles of the Cold War and the reality of a multilateral atomic arms-race. Oliphant not only
provided a scientific contribution to the atomic age, but he also interceded in political debates on
atomic weapons and scientific freedoms. Through this research it will be argued that Oliphant’s
motivations for his regular dalliances into politics were driven by a motivation to advance science,
irrespective of national political interests. Insofar as he did not desire for the world to encounter
its Armageddon in atomic warfare, it will be argued that he feared the monopolisation of atomic

23

"Science and Mankind: The Crisis Today: Mr. Oliphant's Address." The Hindu (sourced copy from Library of
Congress, Washington, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, REF MSS35188, Box 53), March 25 1955, 6.
24
Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Dwight D. Eisenhower Farewell Address, Delivered 17 January 1961," American
Rhetoric, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/dwightdeisenhowerfarewell.html.
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technologies and fought to preserve scientific research as an internationalist pursuit capable of
promoting peace for the benefit of science and humanity. Moreover, Oliphant’s response to
attempted censorship and secrecy of atomic science can provide an historic example from which
we can draw comparison to contemporary governments’ influence on modern science.

Structure & method
This thesis is arranged in three parts. Part One appraises previous research on Oliphant and how
we understand his personality and his role in history (Chapter One, which is the Literature
Review). Also in Part One, scientific networks of the atomic age are introduced with the use of
social network mapping, which is used to argue the importance of transnational networks of
scientists (Chapter Two). Thus, small-world network mapping of mid-century atomic science is
introduced, and the foundation is laid for the achievement of our first aim.
Part Two evaluates Oliphant’s agency in science and politics from his early advancements
in atomic science in the early 1940s to his retirement from ANU in 1965. The second aim of this
thesis is realised within Chapters Three and Four, in which the creation of an atomic weapon is
achieved by Oliphant’s scientific network, and in which the complex relationship between science
and the state is first examined. It is, as the Manhattan Project was nearing its zenith, that we see
the scientific peace movement gaining momentum. The effect of its collision with government(s)
is then considered closely in Chapters Five and Six, the discussion of which therefore delivers the
third aim of this thesis.
Part Three examines conceptual issues that arise from the application of small-world
network modelling to Oliphant’s story. The use of FBI and ASIO dossiers in Chapter Seven reveal
the political interference in post-war atomic science, and attempts to censor the scientific
networks of the period. By examining the response of Oliphant and his colleagues to such
censorship, the fourth aim of this thesis is achieved. Chapter Eight explores the degree to which
the sociology of science might help explain the approach taken by atomic scientists to moral
dilemmas, and particularly by those engaged in the Manhattan Project. It considers, also, the
problematic post-war challenge of reconciling nationalist loyalties with the quest for truth (that,
which Ralph Waldo Emmerson calls the ‘highest law’ of our being25), and resolves the fifth aim of
this thesis. Finally, in Chapter Nine, I return to the application of small-world network modelling,
demonstrating that the framework of sociological mapping reveals significant changes in the
transnational research of atomic science from the 1930s to the 1950s. As a result, the sixth aim
of this thesis is achieved, while our first aim is also concluded.
25
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Introduction
Part One: Oliphant and the invisible colleges of the early atomic age

Much previously published research into the mid-twentieth century atomic age has focussed on
important organised activity such as the American Manhattan Project and Britain’s Tube Alloys
Project.26 The functionality and effectiveness of government led scientific endeavour, however,
brought together scientists that already had a history of collaboration. Indeed, the ‘sociology of
science’—or, the social conditions within which scientific activity is conducted—addresses
modern scientific interaction including the latently formed links that enable the dissemination of
knowledge and breakthroughs in scientific research. Yet the role of these latently formed
‘invisible colleges’ has not been previously investigated to establish whether they had substantive
influence on historical outcomes during the mid-twentieth century atomic age. With Oliphant as
the central figure throughout, this thesis seeks to examine the social community of science and
scientific interaction to assess the relevance of transnational networks at a time when nations
were at war and governments sought to control the flow of information. Understanding the social
community of science, and Oliphant’s position within it, provides an appropriate with which to
analyse the motivations of scientists as they entered the political and moral discourse on atomic
weapons.
The theoretical frameworks of the collaborative environment of science, as presented in
scholarly studies of the sociology and philosophy of science, are analysed in detail in the literature
review of Chapter One. In addition, the final theme of this secondary source literature review
examines scholarship on how the social networks of science came under pressure with attempted
censorship during the late 1940s and 1950s. This is described as the ‘McCarthyist period’ in the
United States, but there was then also a similar response to perceived communist activity in
Australia and Britain.
In introducing the formation of the knowledge networks of science, Chapter Two provides
historical context to the transnational networks of atomic science that formed in the first half of
the twentieth century and thus presents the landscape of scientific collaboration in the lead up to
the political interference of science starting in the tumultuous 1930s. In following the contours of
this sociological landscape, the changing structures of science, including the formation of invisible
colleges, and particularly Oliphant’s role in these colleges, is investigated. It is argued that
Oliphant and his generation of scientists formed strong networks whereby knowledge was
distributed in spite of, and with disregard to, national rules.
The aims of this work are, in part, to investigate relationships of scientists and groups of
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scientists as they can be understood in a sociological method. Whilst the analysis of an individual
or a group is a familiar trope to all historians, an analysis of ‘connectedness’ of clusters or
individuals in a sociological context is less frequently considered. In the past two decades,
‘network science’ has become a key tool for the analysis of connections and relationships and is
now regularly applied to the understanding of all kinds of networks from nervous systems,
computer networks, transportation routes, and social networks. Network science is, in its
simplest, the study of connectivity.
Techniques such as small-world mapping, as developed by Watts and Strogatz,27 explain
how the connectedness in networks is not usually egalitarian. Often some individual ‘nodes’ act
as the important conduits that improve the efficiency of a network. Watts, Strogatz, Nick
Crossley28 and Laszlo Barabasi29 revealed that there are common patterns to networks, even if the
subject of the network is very different—for example, social networks versus computer networks.
Network maps for data, knowledge, emotions or people show similar patterns in which some
nodes are considerably more connected than others, and thus become important as the most
efficient path to connect individuals.30 By mapping a small-world network it is possible to assess
which nodes are the most important. It appears, however, that the analysis and visualisation
techniques developed by network science are only recently being applied to the investigation of
history.31 Whilst it is possible to animate changes to networks over time, small-world network
mapping generally looks at a particular population at a moment in time. There appears to be a
lack of examples that apply temporal variables to assess how relationships vary over time. It is for
this reason, perhaps, that historians have not previously embraced such mapping and
visualisation techniques. In order to better understand relationships in science, this work takes
the techniques developed in network science and applies them to discrete moments in time
when crucial interactions between scientists took place. By mapping the relationship of
individuals, it is possible to assess the degrees of separation and hence the degree to which
apparent strangers are linked through a small number of connected acquaintances.
The process for network mapping is to first build a list of ‘nodes’, which in the cases
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presented in this work, is commonly a list of scientists relevant to an event. For each node, a
series of first-order connections are established. The lines of connection, in network science, are
commonly called ‘edges’. The first-order connections are those other ‘nodes’ that a particular
individual is connected to via an ‘edge’. For example, in 1941, Oliphant was connected with a first
order relationship to his immediate colleagues at Birmingham; the other members of the MAUD
Committee; and to Lawrence in Berkeley with whom he had a strong collaborative relationship.
Lawrence, for example, was connected to Oppenheimer (as colleagues at Berkeley). This
therefore makes Oliphant-Lawrence a first order connection and Oliphant-Oppenheimer as a
second order connection (via Lawrence). However, a later event, after Oliphant and Oppenheimer
developed a working relationship, will present them with first order connectivity.
For this process of mapping relationships, ‘Gephi’, a network mapping software is used.32
Gephi is open-source and public domain. This software allows the inputting of a list of nodes and
first order connections for each node. The product provides a ‘hub and spoke’ diagram that maps
all the connections and edges that extend beyond the first order connections as schematically
illustrated in Figure 1, below. As developed by Watts and Strogatz, connectivity is a log-function
of the number of nodes in a network and the degrees of separation.33
There are a number of different ways to graphically represent a small-world network map
in order to illustrate both connectivity and the edges. This work uses a model in which the size of
the node illustrates connectedness. Hence the connectivity (influencing the size of the node as
visualised) is a function of all connections, but with a decreasing influence of connectivity based
on the order and degree of separation. The mathematics behind Gephi is a little more complex
than presented here and use logarithmic functions, but in the simplest sense, with an inverse
function, connectedness can be therefore expressed as an equation:
C = (d1/1)+( d2/2)+(d3/3)….
In which C = connectivity; d1= the number of first order relationships; d2 = the number of second
order relationship; d3 = the number of third order relationships and so on and so forth.34 Simply
put, if Tom knows Harry he has a connectivity of 1. However, if Tom knows Harry and Harry
knows Dick, Martha, Jane and Michael (4 other connections) then the influence of the second
order connections still factors into Tom’s connectivity which is (1/1) + (4/2)=3; whereas Harry’s
connectivity is (5/1)=5. If Martha knows David and Sarah; then Tom’s connectivity is increased

32

www.gephi.org 1
Watts and Strogatz, "Collective Dynamics of 'Small-World' Networks."
34
These can also be a logarithmic function. For further explanation of the mathematics refer: Amaral et al.,
"Classes of Small-World Networks.", M. E. J. Newman, D. J. Watts, and S. H. Strogatz, "Random Graph
Models of Social Networks," ibid.99, no. Suppl 1 (2002); Watts and Strogatz, "Collective Dynamics of 'SmallWorld' Networks."
33

11

Introduction

Figure 1 'Schematic illustration of a hub and spoke diagram used in social network analysis', illustration by
Darren Holden.

further, but only marginally due to the diminishing influence of the third order connections and is
expressed as (1/1)+(4/2)+(2/3) = 3.666. Tom has the same connectivity as Dick, Michaela and
Jane. So even though we started the mapping with Tom, in this scenario it is Harry that is the
most connected and Martha is the second most connected (Figure 1).
Network science and network mapping is commonly used in building sociological
networks of populations of related individuals and in this case is referred to as ‘social smallworlds’.35 In this sense, researchers often build their databases of nodes and edges with surveys
or interviews to establish which individuals are connected to whom. As a technique used for
history research, however, there are challenges and it is difficult to assess all the connections of
an individual without a detailed biographical study of every individual in the network. In order to
avoid the need for such detailed analysis of each individual, this work isolates and simplifies
connections to those that are relevant to a particular event such as a meeting or the

35

Crossley, "Small-World Networks, Complex Systems and Sociology."

12

Introduction
dissemination of a particular idea. As such it has been possible, through this work, to map out
relevant connections and assess those individuals that formed as the key hubs/nodes through
which information passes at a moment in time. It is argued that by using these techniques, it is
easier to analyse the role of individuals in the dissemination of knowledge. These techniques are
applied in the mapping exercises presented in chapters two, three, and eight with a discussion
presented in Chapter Nine.
The main limitation of small-world network mapping when used for historical analysis, is
that it places an inevitable bias on the individual being researched—and in this case, on Oliphant.
As the network maps trace the connections of one individual, they will invariably show that
individual as being the most connected within a social network. Whilst this work uses such
network maps to illustrate connectivity of scientific researchers during particular events, it is
done so to supplement the archival research and the development of Oliphant’s role throughout
mid-century atomic science. Furthermore, it may be understandably disquieting for some to
portray human relationships by mathematical formulas. It is not possible, in small-world network
mapping, to reliably illustrate the strength of a social bond and whether a relationship is purely
professional or includes close friendships. However, the method does establish links between
professional (intra-institutional) colleagues and identifies the degrees of separation to those in
other institutions or organisations (inter-institutional). Beyond the small-world mapping, Chapter
Two also reviews other factors that may forge sociological connections. Indeed, generation (age),
commonality of interest and simple human-friendship all play a significant role in developing
trusting working relationships.

Part Two: Oliphant and the atom

There is a small amount of scholarly and popular literature on Oliphant and his role in twentiethcentury politics and a review of that literature is undertaken in Chapter One of this work. In
continuance of the sociological investigation initiated in Part One it is necessary, throughout Part
Two, to revisit some previously well-researched historic events. For example, both Albert
Einstein’s letter to President Roosevelt and the 1940 atomic bomb equations written in Oliphant’s
laboratory in Birmingham by Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls are familiar events to historians of
atomic science. However, it is necessary to revisit these events to not only provide context
around Oliphant’s history and the atomic bomb project, but also to seek clues to the sociological
framework in which the scientists were operating. The re-investigation of some familiar tropes is
required to establish who was communicating with who and how those interactions were
formed.
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In addition to that which is discussed in the Literature Review, Part Two analyses a number of
primary archival sources, much of which has been referenced for the first time in this work. These
sources therefore enable new understandings of Oliphant’s engagement with scientific networks
and research, and also reveal how he was perceived by war-time and post-war governments.
The National Archives of Australia contains relevant historical archival government
documents including Oliphant’s security files from the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation (ASIO). Oliphant’s ASIO archive is approximately 300 pages and is contained in three
volumes and more than 150 individual documents. Much of the ASIO archive was de-classified
after his death in 2000, and hence provides considerable new information, which was not
previously included in Oliphant’s biographical works. These files follow Oliphant’s return to
Australia in 1950. The National Archives (UK) held in Kew, London, contain relevant
documentation relating to the MAUD Committee and Oliphant’s involvement as an advisor/agent
of the British government during the Manhattan Project and the immediate post-war years. In
total 106 documents relevant to Oliphant were received from the National Archives (UK) and they
date from 1940 to 1948. Sir Mark Oliphant’s archive (1927–1983) includes personal
correspondence and scientific works donated to the Barr Smith Library at the University of
Adelaide by Oliphant and his family. 36 Stewart Cockburn was co-author of Oliphant’s 1981
biography and his archive is also held at the Barr Smith Library. 37 In total, 105 documents from
the Barr Smith Library that were deemed relevant to this politically focussed narrative, were
copied and used in this research and date from 1946 to 1983. Ernest Lawrence’s archive is held at
the Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley and a search was conducted on
correspondence between Oliphant and Lawrence. A total of 84 documents were sourced from the
Lawrence archive dating from 1934 to 1951. Robert Oppenheimer’s archive is held at the Library
of Congress in Washington and a search on documents relevant to Oliphant recovered 10 letters
and notes between the two scientists from 1946 to 1963. Oliphant’s file from Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) was sourced under the United States Freedom of Information provisions, and
five documents were received, though these are heavily redacted.
The analysis of archival documents is presented principally in Part Two (Chapters Three,
Four, Five, and Six) of this work. Where possible and relevant, multiple-sources from the different
archives for the same time period are examined to analyse for consistencies or contradictions in
order to present new interpretations. In continuance of the sociological investigation initiated in

36

Marcus L. Oliphant, "Sir Marcus Laurence Oliphant (1901–2000): Papers 1927–1983," in Series 1 to 26,
ed. The University of Adelaide (Adelaide: Barr Smith Library, 1927–1983).
37
Stewart Cockburn, "Papers Collected by Stewart Cockburn in Researching Sir Mark Oliphant Biography,"
in Cockburn Papers, ed. The University of Adelaide (Adelaide: Barr Smith Library, 1981).

14

Introduction
Part One it is necessary, throughout Part Two, to revisit some previously well-researched historic
events. For example, both Albert Einstein’s letter to President Roosevelt along with the 1940
atomic bomb equations written in Oliphant’s laboratory in Birmingham by Otto Frisch and Rudolf
Peierls, are both familiar events to historians familiar with atomic history. To review these events
is to not only provide context around Oliphant’s history and the atomic bomb project, but also to
seek clues to the sociological framework in which the scientists were operating. The reinvestigation of some familiar tropes is required to establish who was communicating with who
and how those interactions were formed.
Oliphant’s first involvement in policy discussions in the early part of World War Two are
traced mainly through documents sourced from the National Archives (UK) and these are
presented in chapters three and four. In these chapters, it is argued that Oliphant, even in war,
attempted to circumvent security protocols in order to advance science and to preserve openness
in science. In addressing the aims of this thesis, the attempted interference of science by politics,
and conversely the interference in politics by scientists, is balanced by the use of both
government archives, such as the National Archives (UK) and the National Archives of Australia, as
well as personal archives such as Oliphant’s own correspondence and notes and particularly his
correspondence with Ernest Lawrence and Robert Oppenheimer.
After the war Oliphant hoped that the secrets of the atom would be liberated and
returned from the secretive military installations to academic research and this optimism clashed
with the American, British and Australian governments in the early Cold War period. Whilst the
struggle for the open-spirit of science is investigated in detail throughout Part Two, a crucial
period, in the first years after the war from 1945 to 1950, is detailed in Chapter Five. This includes
how the British and the Australian governments fought to secure the services of scientists such as
Oliphant. In 1946 Oliphant became an advisor to the Australian Foreign Minister, Herbert Evatt, at
the United Nations conference on atomic energy. Oliphant’s role at the 1946 conference
positioned him alongside former colleagues from other nations. It is argued that during this
period Oliphant attempted to re-form a transnational invisible college and it is possible to
compare the actions of scientists and their willingness to cooperate across national divides, to
politicians whom served only their national interest.
Oliphant’s rejection of military and commercially-funded secret science saw him move
towards a philosophical contribution, to the peace-movement in the 1950s, and his actions are
examined in Chapter Six. The new modus operandi of research structures and the split between
the military, industrial and academic research are appraised in the context of Oliphant’s changing
invisible colleges. In particular, it is argued that the rise of the scientist led peace-movement, of
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which Oliphant was a staunch contributor, was a new form of scientific invisible college. This was,
again, a transnational college that was developed by those scientists whom had contributed to
the war-effort, but after the war were exiled, by their governments, back to their ivory tower38 of
esoteric research.
Using oral history as part of the method of this work,39 evidence drawn from a select
number of oral history interviews has augmented information gained from archival sources in
Part Two of this work. An interview with Oliphant, conducted by Clarence Larson in 1980 was
used to assist in understanding Oliphant’s own version of historic events.40 In addition, an
interview with Oppenheimer, conducted in 1965 by Stephane Groueff provides insight to the
early United States atomic bomb project and Oliphant’s influence in bringing Oppenheimer
himself into the project.41
Adding to the primary archival and secondary source history of Oliphant, I also conducted
interviews with individuals who knew Oliphant or who were familiar with his work. As there were
no living persons identified that knew Oliphant before 1960, these interviews focussed on the
topics of the postwar restrictions and censorship of Oliphant and other scientists. The interviews
provided valuable insight into the personality and values of Oliphant. They were conducted under
a submission approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Notre
Dame Australia (HREC approval reference 016176F). Five participants were interviewed as listed
in Table 1 below. Interviews were recorded digitally and are stored at the University of Notre
Dame Australia.
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Table 1 Oral History Interviews
Interviewee

Capacity and Background

Dr John Harries

Ms Margot Mackie

Former research scientist at the
Australian Nuclear Science and
Technology Organisation
Former student of Oliphant at ANU
and a physics professor.
Oliphant biographer, and
researcher.
Oliphant’s secretary in the 1960s

Professor Monica
Oliphant

Oliphant’s daughter-in-law and
also a Physics professor

Professor Ian
Falconer
Dr David Ellyard

Date of
Interview
3 December
2016

Length of
Interview
97 minutes

Location of
interview
Engadine, NSW

3 December
2016
3 December
2016
12 February
2017
4 January
2018

96 minutes

Sydney, NSW

105 minutes

Sydney, NSW

117 minutes

Armidale, NSW

98 minutes

Adelaide,
South Australia

The interview with John Harries was conducted to understand some of the background on
Australia’s atomic programs. Dr Harries did not work directly with Oliphant, but he worked at the
Lucas Heights reactor for the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation for a large
part of his career. Dr Harries had worked with Clarence Hardy (now deceased), who wrote a
history of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission.42 Having been a scientist on the inside of
atomic energy programs in Australia, Dr Harries presented a candid account of the controversies
surrounding the attempts to build a nuclear reactor at Jervis Bay on the New South Wales coast,
and the public perception of atomic science and scientists following the Royal Commission into
the British nuclear tests in the 1980s.
The interview with Professor Ian Falconer was conducted to understand how Oliphant
operated with his students. Professor Falconer was a student of Oliphant at the Australian
National University (ANU) in the 1950s. Professor Falconer gave an interesting account of
Oliphant at ANU and how Oliphant drifted away from experimental research and spent a
considerable amount of time travelling overseas. Oliphant’s students, such as Falconer,
considered Oliphant ‘god-like’ in status but some struggled to develop meaningful connections
with him.
David Ellyard was one of the co-authors of the 1980 biography on Oliphant and also
completed a Doctor of Philosophy thesis on Oliphant’s time in Birmingham.43 Dr Ellyard had met
Oliphant several times and had interviewed him for the biography. The interview conducted with
Dr Ellyard was used, in part, to discuss some of my findings in my research that appeared to be
different to that which presented in Ellyard’s work. For example, I was interested as to whether
Oliphant had received permission from the British government to discuss the atomic bomb with
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Ernest Lawrence in September 1941. Ellyard noted that he and his co-author had not thought to
ask that question and he suspected that I was right in my assessment that Oliphant had knowingly
breached security protocols.
Margot Mackie was Oliphant’s personal secretary whilst at ANU and for his first years as
governor of South Australia. Ms Mackie provided considerable insight into Oliphant’s charming
personality and his ability to explain complex science to the laity.
Professor Monica Oliphant was Oliphant’s daughter-in-law and a fellow physicist. Monica
Oliphant provided considerable context around Oliphant’s later years including his compassion
and peace-loving nature via his advocacy for the Australian Euthanasia Society and through caring
for his wife, Rosa, who suffered from dementia. Monica Oliphant also spoke at length on how
Oliphant seemed quite naïve on security issues and she did not believe that he knew he was
under surveillance by government security services.

Part Three: Discussions on the state and science and the changing states of science

In addressing aims of this thesis,44 Part Three of this work includes discussions on scientific
censorship in the mid-century; the moral dilemmas that atomic scientists faced; and how the
structures of social networks in science varied over time. The three chapters (chapters seven,
eight and nine) of Part Three present view the narrative of Part Two through a different lens in
that they discuss aspects of Oliphant’s history that may not have been directly familiar to
Oliphant himself. For example, Chapter Seven contains a detailed documentation and source
analysis of the restrictions, sometimes unknowingly, placed on Oliphant (and other scientists) by
security services.
In order to expand investigation into Oliphant’s role in the peace-movement presented in
Chapter Six, Chapter Eight seeks to appraise the philosophy of moral dilemmas and particularly to
conflict of scientists’ who strive for new knowledge eventhough the knowledge may be
contradictory to personal values. Indeed, moral questions are generated by dangerous scientific
discoveries, and scientists themselves underwent personal anguish and attempted to justify their
role in weapons of mass destruction.
Chapter Nine draws together all the sociological models presented throughout this work
in order to compare against known models developed within the scholarship of sociology and
small-world network analysis. By comparing formalised and organised networks with latent
networks, it is possible to view how science was altered and affected by war. As a result, it is
argued that the changing structure of science is a way to explain Oliphant’s varying actions and
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reactions to the moral dilemmas and government policies of the mid-twentieth century.

Statement of Significance
This work makes use of archival and oral history evidence that, in some cases, has not previously
been accessed by researchers. Previous biographical work on Oliphant and other mid-twentieth
century atomic scientists, such as Robert Oppenheimer, often casts them as individualistic
thought-leaders.45 Conversely, this work seeks to determine that Oliphant’s history, and atomic
science history more broadly, can be understood through a sociological framework of networked
relationships. By using this sociological lens, this work identifies the importance of transnational
networks in not just achieving scientific aims, but also to enable resistance to political
interference in science.
Oliphant’s life followed the topology of the twentieth century from the advent of the
atomic age, through war and into the uneasy tension of the Cold War. By examining Oliphant and
his networks, it is possible to identify the awakening of scientists to perceived and actual
censorship, as well as their efforts to circumvent it. Oliphant not only contributed to science, he
also entered the discourse on morality, industry and the politics that surrounded atomic science.
Oliphant spanned both the British and American stories in the pursuit of atomic weaponry, but
his return to Australia also provides further insight into how smaller nations scrambled for
knowledge of the atom and sought to place themselves amongst the maelstrom of the atomic
age. The international transcendence of Oliphant’s history presents his experience as the par
excellence of examples of the advent of the atomic scientist from esoteric ivory towers of
academia, through the utility of war and into peace.
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CHAPTER ONE
Literature Review: Scientific collaboration,
understandings of Oliphant, and scientific censorship

This literature review explores previous scholarly work within three principal themes: the
collaboration of science and scientists; our understandings of Mark Oliphant; and the attempted
restriction and censorship of science. These topics were chosen as they best reflect the aims and
argument of this thesis.
The collaboration of science and scientists is understood through a review of historical,
sociological, and philosophical works. Drawing from these different disciplines provides a
breadth of literature with which to understand the foundations and meanings of collaboration in
science. In particular, the recent advances in the application of network science, to understand
social structures, addresses several of the aims of this work. Oliphant, as the central figure to
this work and one of Australia’s most notable scientists, has been the focus of a reasonable
amount of previous historical research. Appraising this literature on both Oliphant’s personality
and his role in the history of the atomic age assists with presenting a core narrative. The
literature on the attempted restriction and censorship of scientists is reviewed in order to assess
how politics and science clashed. These clashes were most fervent from the late 1940s through
to the 1950s, when McCarthyist policies in the United States, and the sly tactics of security
services in Australia and Britain, shaped how scientists were treated by their governments and
perceived by the public.

Collaboration in science
From the literature and general histories of science, such as Stephen Mason’s A History of the
Sciences, science was not, historically, a collaborative pursuit.1 As Mason showed, it was during
the scientific revolution, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, that a new wave of
curiosity about the natural world emerged.2 These early scientists, such as Nicolaus Copernicus
(1473–1543) and Isaac Newton (1643–1727), generally worked in isolation in their respective
institutions with little international collaboration. The Royal Society of London for Improving

1
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Natural Knowledge (the Royal Society) was founded 1663 by Robert Boyle’s ‘invisible college’, to
promote scientific endeavour and interaction between researchers. The Royal Society, however,
has a motto, Nullius in Verba (take nobody’s word for it), that is suggestive of using methods of
evidence rather than trust.3 In his Essays Concerning Human Understanding (1690) John Locke
even went so far as to actively distrust others whilst making scientific observations:
Our real knowledge is measured by how much truth and reason we
have taken in. Floating other men’s opinions in our brains makes us
not a bit more knowing, even if the opinions happen to be true. In the
sciences, what you possess is what you really know and comprehend;
what you only believe and take on trust is merely shreds; however
valuable the whole fabric of which they are shreds, gathering them
piecemeal won’t add much to your stock. Such borrowed wealth is like
fairy-money: even if it was gold in the hand from which you received it,
when you come to use it for yourself you’ll find it is nothing but leaves
and dust.4
Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries national scientific traditions developed and
these are documented in scholarly history of science texts such as Mason’s work5 and William
Dampier’s A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy and Religion.6 As both Mason
and Dampier noted, science emerged as national-based philosophies that developed within
borders and without international collaboration. Dampier argued that international
collaboration in science started to rise from the mid-nineteenth century with the increased
facility of transport and the publication of the first science journals.7 Dampier’s view, that prenineteenth century scientists were isolated from collaboration, is not entirely shared by other
historians of science. Simon Schaffer, for example, noted that the astronomer Edmond Halley
visited France and Italy in 1680.8 Yet Schaffer also wrote of Isaac Newton’s lack of will to travel
anywhere.9 Newton, whose book Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Principia) is
considered a founding text on mathematics of the physical world, was published originally in
Latin in 1687, perhaps to make it more transnational.10 As Anand Kandaswamy explained, for
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such a seminal work, it still took 18 years from the publication of Principia for the German
mathematician Gottfried Leibniz to protest that he had formulated calculus first.11 There was
not an accepted French translation of Newton’s work until after his death in 1731.12
It is clear, however, that a rise of modern international collaboration, as outlined by
Dampier,13 can be placed alongside the emergence of the first international journals in the mid
to late nineteenth century. Journals such as the London-based Nature was widely distributed
from 1869.14 Physikalische Zeitschrift (from 1899) was a German language physics journal which
took international contributions, including several papers from the atomic physicist Ernest
Rutherford in 1901 and 1902.15 Rutherford, a pioneering scientist, led the Cavendish laboratory
at Cambridge University from 1919 to 1937. As David Wilson documented, Cavendish became
one of the key loci of collaborative research and is of great importance to this exploration of
atomic scientists and their history.16 Oliphant wrote of these halcyon days of freedom and
discourse in his 1972 book, Rutherford: Recollections of the Cambridge Days.17 Oliphant’s book
is a gentle reflection and series of anecdotes and avoids some of the more controversial
moments such as Rutherford’s ‘moonshine’ quote that implied that utility of the atom was not
possible. It may have been disquieting for Oliphant to suggest that Rutherford, his supervisor
and mentor, lacked vision for the usefulness of atomic energy. Other authors, such as Sabine
Lee18 and Richard Garwin,19 have, however, used Rutherford’s ‘moonshine’ quote to illustrate
that some early atomic scientists envisioned that only esoteric discovery would result from
investigations into atomic energy. John Jenkin, on the other hand, suggested an alternate
reading—that Rutherford was secretly advising the British government on the potential
usefulness of atomic science.20 In addition, David Ellyard, one of Oliphant’s biographers, shared
a similar view to Jenkin—that Rutherford fully understood that utility is born initially from
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arcane discoveries.21
In the first half of the twentieth century international scientific collaboration increased
and the atomic physicists collaborated across political borders. In particular considerable
interaction increased between laboratories in Germany, Britain and the United States in the
inter-war years. The advent of the first formal physics conferences, such as the Solvay
conferences from 1911, increased scientific communication. Solvay was an invite-only event to
ponder the esoteric new concepts such as the mysteries of the atom. Jagdish Mehra presented a
history of the Solvay conferences.22 Mehra chose to focus on documenting the researchers and
science presented at the conference and he did not investigate, in detail, the controversies and
conflicts. Valia Allori, however, noted the importance of the Solvay conferences in debating a
position on the landscape of the philosophy of science.23 Allori stated that the Solvay conference
was host to some of the great debates of the atomic age. She alluded to the egalitarian nature
of the conference and that it did not necessarily have the hierarchy of an academic institution.
As an example, Allori referenced the 1927 Solvay conference and inter-generational battle over
the behaviour of light. This intellectual contest pitted a senior French aristocratic
mathematician, Louis De Broglie, against two German researchers, Wolfgang Pauli and Werner
Heisenberg.24
Solvay was not the only conference of the inter-war years that sought to bring together
the rush of new ideas of physics. Colloquia, such as those hosted by Niels Bohr in Denmark in
the early 1930s and documented by Gino Segrè in Faust in Copenhagen,25 is a further example of
how physicists sought out collaboration and discussion. Segrè argued that Bohr fostered a
relaxed environment where competitiveness was embraced and the scientists critiqued
themselves with a parody of Johan Wolfgang Von Goethe’s Faust. Segrè only touches upon the
irony in the quantum physicists’ use of Faust and does not directly compare their comedic
rendering with the moral questions that Goethe presented in his play. Whereas others, such as
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Kathryn Keeble,26 Ken Young27 and Gregg Herken28 further delved into scientists’ pursuit of
knowledge in analysis of the concept of the Faustian bargain.29 As suggested by Keeble and
Young, the Faustian bargain is a core precept with which to understand how scientists became
so engrossed in their work that they could put moral dilemmas of their science to one side. Yet
Herken quoted the physicist II Rabi: ‘those who compare the making of the atomic bomb to a
Faustian bargain, have never read Faust.’ Herken clarified this statement by suggesting that
scientists were motivated to build a bomb to halt a ‘world-threatening dictatorship.’30 In another
work by Herken, The Brotherhood of the Bomb, he investigated the varying motivations of three
scientists, Ernest Lawrence, Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller.31 Herken examined the
trio’s scientific motivations that were entwined with personal and political philosophies. This
entanglement of pure science and philosophy played a role in how the three aforementioned
scientists both collaborated and fought with each other in their efforts to advance their science.
In his influential 1962 book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn coined
the phrase ‘paradigm shift’ to describe a new leap in understanding.32 Whilst for the most part
Kuhn cites examples from before the twentieth century, such as the Copernican revolution,33 he
considered that his philosophy was consistent with all scientific revolutions. Kuhn
demonstrated that as a research community collectively ‘shifts’ to the new paradigm, scientists
and institutions all move forward from, effectively, the same starting point. A paradigm shift
therefore acts as a great leveller, being productive of a situation in which the graduate student
and the professor all commence research based on the new paradigm at the same time and with
the same base knowledge about the specific problem. As a result, new experiments and
discoveries often emerge simultaneously, as a cohort of scientists, often large and
geographically dispersed, makes similar and connected discoveries.34 In this process,
collaboration between individuals and institutions increases. Allori, in analysing Kuhn, argued
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that the quantum mechanics paradigm of the 1930s was not a single paradigm (like Einstein’s
theory of relativity for example), but a series of related and intertwined concepts that
collectively constituted a Kuhnian paradigm shift. This presents an implicit critique to Kuhn’s
definition—collaboration can cause a new paradigm rather than being the result of one
individual thought leader.35 John Gribbin, on the other hand, refuted the idea that there are any
revolutionary step changes in science as he saw science in ‘essentially, step-by-step terms’.36
Undoubtedly each new generation of scientists carries forward and advances the knowledge
gained by a previous generation. Yet Gribbin, an astrophysicist, dismissed historians and
sociologists’ attempts to interpret science history as artistic truth.37 Instead he preferred to view
science as objective truth with hardened certitude around the breakthrough discoveries. As
typified by Gribbin and the aforementioned work by Mehra, science history is often presented
thematically on scientific subjects, and chronologically on scientific discovery.38 Gribbin only
attempts to humanise scientists by telling of quirky anecdotes surrounding their relationships,
rather than analysing scientists’ relationships in detail. Sociologists, however, have viewed
science as an inherently social activity.
Robert Merton is considered a twentieth-century founder of the study of the sociology
of science. Merton identified how groups of scientists operate with unwritten rules of
collaboration and social interaction. An early and influential text was Merton’s 1938 Science and
the Social Order, in which he predicted that looming war would result in scientists having to
transition from their isolated arcane pursuits and involve themselves more in the utility of war.39
Merton’s other works, representing more than fifty years of scholarship, have considered other
important topics such as the age when scientists are at their most productive, and how
European protestantism and pietism influenced the structure of science to focus on the
aesthetics of their craft over usefulness.40 In considering Merton’s theses, Helen Longino
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summarised the importance of trust between scientists.41 She argued that, as the thinking and
making of science has become more complex, it has also become impossible for a single
individual to possess all the knowledge or capacity to be successful. Therefore, scientists form
trust-based networks that include local team members, thought leaders in other institutions,
and researchers from other disciplines. These, as a number of contemporary philosophers of
science have reminded us, rely on an ethics of trust and peer review.42 For collaboration then,
philosophers such as Karen Frost-Arnold and Kristina Rolin stressed the linking of the concepts
of morality and trust as the epistemological foundations of twentieth-century scientific
collaboration.43
Despite the traumas of the Great War, the atomic laboratories in the United States,
Germany and Britain worked collaboratively as well as competitively through the 1920s and
1930s. In a review of work by Andrew Brown, Roger Stuewer noted that James Chadwick,
despite spending part of the Great War as a prisoner of war in Germany, spent the 1920s and
1930s travelling between Berlin, to work with Hans Geiger, and his home base of Cambridge to
work with Rutherford (and Oliphant).44 Oliphant himself wrote of his collaboration with
Chadwick in a 1982 paper for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.45 Andrew Brown has also
presented letters between Chadwick and Lawrence at the University of California Berkeley.
Brown’s work suggested that there was a warm-regard and spirit of collaboration between the
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two scientists commencing in 1935.46 Whereas Michael Hiltzik, in his investigation of Lawrence’s
laboratory, has interpreted there was an intellectual competitiveness and bitter feud between
Cambridge and Berkeley in the mid-1930s.47 Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard documented
the foundations of Oliphant’s own collaborations with Lawrence as emerging only after the
death of Rutherford.48 In a similar argument to Hiltzik, Ellyard and Cockburn imply that
Rutherford scoffed at and dismissed Lawrence’s discoveries in early to mid-1930s.
From 1933, with the establishment of the Third Reich in Germany, the collegiate
relationship between Europe’s laboratories began to splinter. Germany’s new government
referred to certain branches of atomic physics as ‘Jewish Physics’, and, as described by Mark
Walker, discredited aspects of atomic research in favour of Werner Heisenberg’s home-grown
‘Deutsche Physik’.49 As a consequence, a number of German Jewish physicists fled to other
countries such Britain and the United States and thus substantially reduced Germany’s domestic
scientific capacity. The German brain-drain is covered in Gerald Holton’s The Migration of
Physicists to the United States.50 Richard Garwin,51 and Willem Lanouette and Bela Silard52 also
documented these migrations in biographical work on the Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard. In the
1930s, Szilard became an important proponent to collaboration as he assisted persecuted
scientists to find sanctuary outside of Axis countries.53 Similarly to the aforementioned work by
Andrew Brown, historian Sabine Lee has also presented correspondence spanning several
decades between Rudolf Peierls and Hans Bethe who were both refugee physicists from Nazi
Germany.54 Lee’s work is yet another illustration of how informal and latent interaction and
trust is built between scientists operating in different institutions. Lee detailed the ‘BirminghamCornell Pipeline’ and this would also fit under the definition of an invisible college as the
personal friendship of two scientists in different universities and countries enabled a interinstitutional bridge of knowledge.55
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The Manhattan Project was staffed with scientists from around the world, including
several German émigrés determined to beat the Nazis to the creation of the atomic bomb. The
scientists, of multiple nationalities, brought the philosophy of open knowledge and collaboration
to the Manhattan Project. This deeply disturbed the military head of the project, General Leslie
Groves, who saw it as a huge security risk. As a result he instigated strict security provisions such
as the ‘compartmentalisation’ policy. Stanley Goldberg described compartmentalisation as
contrary to the forms of collaboration, which were by then, normal to scientists.56 Yet new
sociological models show that compartmentalisation may have enhanced rather than restricted
communication and knowledge transfer. Incorporating concepts introduced in the 1960s and
1970s by psychologist Stanley Milgram,57 and the sociologist Mark Granovetter,58 researchers
such as Nick Crossley59 have developed models that show that ‘weak tie’ linked networks can
actually enhance the flow of information. Alexander Bird, as a philosopher of science on the
other hand, suggested that scientific knowledge is part of a collective social memory rather than
being held by individuals.60
Compartmentalisation, whilst frustrating for the scientists, gave birth to a new model
for collaborative research, now known as ‘Big Science’. This modern practice is for groups of
scientists, often located apart, to work on different aspects of a problem to collectively reach a
conclusion. The advent of Big Science, including references to the first of its kind in the
Manhattan Project, is noted by Longino61 and Gian Francesco Giudice.62 Whilst there is
considerable scholarship on scientific collaboration, including the requirement for trust and
morality to allow effective scientific research, there has been little exploratory research on how
these concepts influenced the creation of the international peace movement of atomic
scientists in the postwar period. Crossley does, however, make reference to the organisation of
geographically dispersed activists.63 Yet Crossley does not consider the special situation of
activist scientists who are accustomed to international collaboration, and thus potentially
brought the strength and practice of well-formed networks into the postwar peace movements.
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Understandings of Mark Oliphant
Mark Oliphant’s first decade in physics research was notable only to his fellow physicists. Atomic
science before World War Two was largely an obscure and abstruse folly undertaken in the
laboratories of academia. Oliphant was, however, among the scientists that had to descend
from the Mertonian ivory tower of esoteric research64 and provide their services to the
technology of war. Such was his contribution in World War Two, his functional scientific role has
been mentioned throughout the scholarly literature of the bomb. Undoubtedly Oliphant rose to
become one of the more famous scientists of the early British atomic effort. In addition, his
postwar meddling in the politics of science has been appraised in varying degrees in the atomic
history of the United States, Britain and Australia. This section of the literature review examines
the previous work on Oliphant and attempts to understand the key themes that other
researchers have focused on.
Oliphant’s role in the early atomic bomb project is well-known and is often told with the
story of Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls’ memorandum written from inside Oliphant’s Birmingham
laboratory in 1940. Jeremy Bernstein clearly saw the importance of Frisch and Peierls
memorandum in his A memorandum that changed the world.65 A meeting that Oliphant had
with Lawrence at Berkeley in September 1941 has also become part of the folklore on the
atomic bomb. The official American government report on the atomic bomb project by Henry
Smyth, published only days after the bombs fell on Japan, referred to the Berkeley meeting as
one of ‘the many less formal discussions held’.66 Smyth also mentioned Oliphant a further six
times, emphasising his efforts at the Oak Ridge uranium separation plant.67 Richard Hewlett and
Oscar Anderson’s The New World, 1939–1946: A History of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, also covers Oliphant’s efforts during the Manhattan Project. Hewlett and Anderson
focused primarily on Oliphant’s scientific contributions with only passing reference to his
belligerent meddling in policy.68 Britain’s official account of their wartime atomic project,
Margaret Gowing’s Britain and Atomic Energy: 1939–1945 published in 1964, mentioned that
Lawrence was ‘impressed’ with Oliphant in September 1941 and also documented his

64

Merton, "Science and the Social Order."
Jeremy Bernstein, "A Memorandum That Changed the World," American Journal of Physics 79, no. 5
(2011).
66
Henry De Wolf Smyth, "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes (the Smyth Report)," 12 August 1945.
67
Ibid.
68
Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, The New World, 1939–1946: A History of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission, vol. 1 (Pittsburgh: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), 43-45, 16566, 280-82.
65

29

Chapter One
contribution to the engineering of uranium separation.69 Recent American texts include Tom
Zoellner’s Uranium: War, Energy and the Rock That Shaped the World which mentioned
Oliphant in passing;70 and Michael Hiltzik’s Big Science: Ernest Lawrence and the Invention that
Launched the Military Industrial Complex which referenced Oliphant and his close working
relationship with Lawrence.71 In some of these texts, such as Zoellner’s work, Oliphant is
portrayed as only a supporting cast member in atomic bomb history. Kai Bird and Martin
Sherwin’s biography of Robert Oppenheimer, American Prometheus does not mention Oliphant
at all72—a remarkable exclusion considering that Oliphant brought Oppenheimer into the bomb
project in the first place and the two became close friends and correspondents after the war.73
The American-centric viewpoint of much of the history of the Manhattan Project was
analysed by Sabine Lee, in her 2006 article for the journal British Contemporary History but she
also only touched upon Oliphant’s important 1941 visit to America.74 It appears that much of
Oliphant’s seminal contribution and his harrying demands for structural changes to the project
have been overlooked.75 Graham Farmelo’s recently published British focussed Churchill’s Bomb,
however, dedicated a whole chapter to Oliphant’s ‘bustling’ in the United States in 1941.76
Farmelo saw clearly that Oliphant’s role, in bringing the Americans into the bomb project, was
vital in laying the foundations for a larger British mission and wartime cooperation between the
allies.
Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard, in 1981, published the most comprehensive
biographical work on Mark Oliphant.77 The biography, Oliphant, is a detailed narrative of his life
from his childhood to his tenure as governor of South Australia ending in 1976. Cockburn and
Ellyard based their research on archival documents and from extensive interviews conducted
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with Oliphant and his associates.78 Whilst not an authorised biography, and Oliphant claimed
never to have read it,79 the authors found Oliphant helpful in their research.80 Indeed, Oliphant
proudly attended the 1991 re-issue of the biography to celebrate his 90th birthday.81
On matters relevant to this thesis, Cockburn and Ellyard explored Oliphant’s first
‘journey into the atom’ in the 1930s; his role on the Manhattan Project; and his postwar
emergence as a public figure, respected scientist, and thorn in the side of governments.82 From
early in their biography the authors focussed on Oliphant’s grand personality, his bombast and
directness and how this was influenced by the ‘heroic father figure’83 of Rutherford who helped
shape the wide-eyed PhD student from Adelaide into a belligerent harrier of bureaucracy.
Cockburn and Ellyard argued that Oliphant was connected to Rutherford due to their common
‘Antipodean background and shared traits of plain speaking, plain dealing, and taking everything
on its merits’.84
When Cockburn and Ellyard’s biography was written a large amount of British and
American government documents were still classified as secret, and as such the biography does
not mention that Robert Oppenheimer was at the Berkeley meeting in September 1941, nor
that the meeting was potentially a breach of British secrecy rules by Oliphant.85 Cockburn and
Ellyard were, however, alerted to other breaches of security protocols by later letters exchanged
between Oliphant and his associate Hedley Marston held in Oliphant’s archive in Adelaide.86
Oliphant’s Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) files were not declassified and
released to the National Archives of Australia until after Oliphant’s death in 2000, and hence the
biography does not discuss ASIO’s suspicions of Oliphant’s alleged communist sympathies.
Cockburn and Ellyard maintained that Oliphant had a reasonable relationship with the
Australian prime minister Robert Menzies and that Menzies was a supporter of the sciences.87
Contradicting this, however, is Elizabeth Tynan’s recent work on the British bomb tests in
Australia. Tynan claimed that Menzies would have been alerted to Oliphant as a potential
security risk by the British in 1950.88 This is also covered, though superficially, by David
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McKnight’s Australia’s Spies and Their Secrets. Knight contended that Menzies was informed of
potential spies operating out of Oliphant’s ANU department in 1952.89 Perhaps it was
Cockburn’s previous role as Menzies’ press-secretary that constrained him, not wanting to
overly critique the relationship between Menzies and Oliphant.90
Cockburn and Ellyard reviewed many of Oliphant’s collegiate relationships and, for
example, provided a detailed analysis of Oliphant’s 1950s feud with the University of Sydney
physicist Harry Messel.91 On Oliphant’s relationship with his long-term colleague, Ernest
Titterton, the biographers are a little more circumspect. They chose to use comparisons of
Titterton’s involvement in the British atomic tests in Australia and Oliphant’s exclusion as a
reason for the rumoured breakdown of their relationship.92 It was the report of the Royal
Commission into the British bomb tests in Australia,93 released three years after the biography
was published that suggested a deeper and conflicting ideological stance between Oliphant and
Titterton. The Royal Commission identified several reasons why Oliphant had been excluded
from involvement in the tests. Elizabeth Tynan also presented the view that Oliphant and
Titterton fell out during the British bomb tests.94
Overall Cockburn and Ellyard’s biography is an accurate and factual documentation of
Oliphant’s life and focussed on his scientific and administrative contribution with some
references to his peace work and disdain of politics. It is important to note, however, that it was
written at the time, about a living person. As such, it focused on glorious recollections of
Oliphant’s fine contribution, but is gentle on criticism. The biography is at its strongest on
Oliphant’s time following his return to Australia in 1950, in which Oliphant’s own archive
provided a comprehensive insight into his professional and personal relationships. However, the
sections of the biography that cover Oliphant’s wartime work and his last years in Britain, along
with his perceived security risk in the 1950s, do not detail several of his indiscretions and
backroom dealings with politicians and military.95
While Cockburn and Ellyard were gentle on critique, Sue Rabbitt Roff, a Scotland-based
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researcher, has been less so. In August 2018 Rabbit Roff presented an updated narrative on
Oliphant based on archival research and posted it on her personal website, The Rabbitt
Review.96 She also produced an extensive essay for the Meanjin Quarterly in early 2019 in which
she described an interview she held with Oliphant in 1993—in which both she and her
companion felt that Oliphant was ‘stepping from one porky to another’.97 She considered him to
be ‘domineering’, which she blamed for his evasion of her questions,98 and presented him as
duplicitous for being both for and against atomic weaponry.99 Perhaps if viewing Oliphant in
isolation of the network of atomic scientists and their war-time activities, as Rabbitt Roff does, it
easy to reach such conclusions. The truth is perhaps more complex. Further, it is difficult to
interrogate Rabbit Roff’s argument: one item is a sparsely referenced blog in which the reader
must assume that the archival research fits the narrative, while the other contains a ‘created
monologue’ that can only be considered as an imaginative retelling.
Ellyard followed up his contribution to Oliphant’s biography with a 2012 PhD thesis at
the University of New South Wales, focussing on the period from the late 1930s until his return
to Australia in 1950 and his attempts to build a proton synchrotron at the University of
Birmingham.100 Ellyard once again made considerable reference to the ‘force-of-nature’ of
Oliphant in comparing him to his peers of the stuffy British scientific establishment. He wrote,
‘Chadwick was as cautious and conservative as Oliphant was outspoken and sometimes
intemperate.’101
The Birmingham synchrotron struggled to achieve its goals, and similarly, Oliphant’s
homopolar generator and synchrotron at the Australian National University (ANU) had similar
shortcomings. Stephen Foster and Margaret Varghese in their 2009 book, The Making of the
Australian National University, presented the unhappy outcomes of the grandly visioned but
flawed large-scale projects at the ANU as a failure of Oliphant’s leadership.102 Kathryn Keeble’s
2018 paper in the Historical Records of Australian Science readdressed Oliphant’s contribution
to postwar technology. She is much more sympathetic to Oliphant and outlined how the
aspersions cast at him were balanced by the views from international physicists, who considered
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Oliphant’s ANU projects to be courageous and pioneering.103 Keeble also considered Sir Paul
Hasluck’s foreword to the 1981 Cockburn and Ellyard biography, where he described Oliphant as
having ‘an incredible naiveté with respect to politics’.104 To Keeble, this was nothing more than
the right side of politics criticising someone on the left.105
Keeble, who publishes through the lens of creative writing as much as history, has
published other papers on Oliphant. Her 2010 ‘Mark Oliphant’s Adventures in Atomic
Wonderland’, presented aspects of her Brechtian theatrical play, Ion Man’s Adventures in
Atomic Wonderland, in which she introduced Oliphant as the conflicted anti-hero holding ‘two
oppositional views, both pro and anti-atomic weapons research.’106 Keeble’s 2013 paper ‘‘The
end is terrific…I prefer the middle’ Badiou, Beckett and Oliphant’s atomic bomb’ published in
Double Dialogues, is equally eloquent.107 Here Keeble drew on versions of Brecht’s Galileo from
before and after World War Two. She described the tragedy of Manhattan Project scientists and
the forlorn figure of a censored Robert Oppenheimer in the 1950s. She also presented Oliphant
as a tragic, yet dramatic figure, whose strong personality acted as an engine for progress. As
mentioned previously, Keeble touched upon the ‘Faustian bargain’ in which physicists
compromised their beliefs in exchange for vast resources that were made available to make the
atomic bomb. This re-presented a trope that others have also used that is suggestive of
scientist’s self-serving aims.108 It seems that, in the historiography, the post hoc soul-searching
of physicists became a more interesting history filled with human frailties and uncertainties than
the hardened certitude of the science itself. Keeble’s investigation of a tortured Oliphant adds
an Australian example to the well-told stories of Americans such as Oppenheimer.109
Tim Sherratt’s PhD thesis from the ANU also used the ‘atomic wonderland’ motif in its
title: Atomic Wonderland: Science and Progress in Twentieth Century Australia.110 Here, the
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‘wonderland’ is an Australian landscape, both geographical and political and Sherratt contends
that the optimism of Oliphant is exemplified by his return to Australia in 1950 with the promise
that we could make verdant our vast deserts with this new atomic energy.111 Combined with our
nation’s abundant resources of uranium112 and the isolated locations such as Maralinga for
testing British weapons, Australia was qualified to enter the atomic club.113 However Sherratt
uses the phrase, ‘atomic wonderland’ ironically because the British bomb tests in Australia
constituted an environmental disaster, a slew of cover-ups, and were shaped by the
prevarications of the Atomic Weapons Safety Committee chair, Oliphant’s colleague, Ernest
Titterton. This topic has received a modern retelling by Tynan in Atomic Thunder: The Maralinga
Story.114 Tynan investigated the Royal Commission into the British atomic tests in Australia and
documented the early British requests for Oliphant to be excluded from the British tests.115
Much of the work on Oliphant, such as the texts by Keeble, Rabbit Roff, Gowing,
Farmelo, and Cockburn and Ellyard, placed considerable emphasis on Oliphant’s personality and
physical presence. Unlike the softly spoken and frail Oppenheimer, Oliphant was imposing,
belligerent, direct and bombastic. Stuart Macintyre also drew upon this familiar description
when he wrote, ‘Oliphant was a tall, imposing man, with a booming laugh, but limited tact’.116
Macintyre also described Oliphant as a disputant in a 1950s squabble against the vice chancellor
of the ANU, Douglas Copland, and the push to bring social science studies to the university.117 He
suggested that Oliphant was a figure of authoritative snobbishness:
Oliphant and other scientists could see the value of leavening the
experimental sciences with the civilising influence of the humanities.
They were less sympathetic to the claims of social scientists to share
their authority or compete for public largesse.118

This opinion of a scientist arguing against the pretension of social sciences to be real science is
an echo of 1950s America upon which David Kaiser wrote that ‘too much theoretical physics and
mathematics had come at the expense of liberal arts’.119 Kaiser also documented the media
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descriptions of the physiognomy of physicists in the 1950s which described them almost as
though they were their own species: ‘serious and shy’, ‘self-effacing’, ‘of feeble physique’ and
with ‘thin, sallow complexioned, with stooping shoulders and weak brown eyes’.120 Oliphant’s
height, broad shoulders and extroverted personality could not be further from this stereotype.
There are, however, contrasting descriptions of Oliphant. Joseph Rotblat, the Nobel Peace
Laureate, described him as a ‘genial extrovert’.121 Carver et al in Oliphant’s biographical memoir
for the Historical Records of Australian Science, described him as a man of compassion for
humanity whose hobbies included gentle pursuits such as woodwork.122 These differing
descriptions further emphasise the multi-faceted Oliphant. In the laboratory he was a calm,
skilful and measured physicist, while outside he was the impatient antagonist and a tactless and
blunt academic administrator. Politically and scientifically he was, at times, unwavering in the
pursuit of destructive atomic weaponry, yet in the postwar anti-atomic weapon peace
movement and private life he was compassionate and caring.
The literature therefore suggests Oliphant was a character of complexity who
experienced both the brightest and darkest times of the twentieth century. Whilst much of the
work on Oliphant documents events and his relationships, researchers have not deeply
questioned why he pushed for the atomic bomb and why he became a convert, campaigning
against its use. Perhaps by placing Oliphant amongst the social networks of science, as this work
attempts to do, we can better understand his priorities and how they evolved and changed
throughout his life.

Attempted restriction and censorship of atomic scientists
Whilst there is some scholarship on the subject of postwar censorship of science in Australia,
there is considerably more analysis on censorship of science in the United States. This is likely
due to the plethora of material deriving from the fervent anti-communism of the late 1940s and
1950s, and the way it seized control of public and political discourse on science and politics.
From the mid-1940s and into the 1950s, the United States government fought what was
perceived as subversive domestic communism with several instruments. These included the
House Un-American Activities Committee (a committee of members of the United States House
of Representatives 1945–1975); a repressive Internal Security Act (1950); and the anticommunist crusade of the demagogue, Senator Joseph McCarthy, who led the charge of
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paranoia. McCarthyism’s influence on science is well covered in literature.123 Lawrence Badash,
in his 2000 paper Science and McCarthyism argued that whilst McCarthyist investigations
restricted the scientists and affected their work, it also resulted in scientists developing an
increased political maturity.124 Scientists’ growing awareness of the machinery of politics,
fostered by the rear-guard action of those persecuted during the era, saw scientist-led societies
campaigning on not just the atomic bomb, but on a number of more contemporary topics
including opposition to the Vietnam war and equal human-rights.125 Badash further expanded
this theme with his 2003 paper that documented the postwar plight of many of the Manhattan
Project scientists.126 He presented a chronology of change in how the public perceived
scientists.127 David Kaiser also charted these varying public perceptions of the atomic
scientists.128 As Kaiser and Badash both explained, the public’s view of scientists changed in the
first years after the war as they went from being ‘messiahs’129 who brought a bloody war to an
early end, to ‘Frankensteins’130 whose ghoulish alchemy wrought a weapon of unimaginable
horror. By the late 1940s they were recast again, as ‘closet Reds’ and the ‘weakest links’ in
national security.131 Indeed, suspicions of scientists were not completely unfounded. Several
former Manhattan Project personnel, including two from the British mission, Klaus Fuchs and
Alan Nunn May, were later identified as spies and jailed for espionage.132
Jessica Wang in American Science in the Age of Anxiety has documented how the
McCarthyist period in the United States involved multiple investigations into scientists’
backgrounds.133 She presented a series of case studies on scientific restriction and argued that
lesser-known scientists, without established scientific reputation and the back-up support of an
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academic institution, suffered the most. Even when guilty only by association, or when
accusations were dropped mid-investigation, scientists still suffered.
As Wang argued, by just naming a scientist in a public hearing there was an associative
assumption of guilt. Even in absence of inconclusive findings—mere insinuation provided
enough of a shadow to affect scientists’ careers.134
After the war, and riding on the plaudits of having been the scientific leader on the
Manhattan Project, Robert Oppenheimer became one of the most famous scientists in the
United States. In 1954, however, even Oppenheimer was pilloried when, following a Senate
investigation and his coerced acknowledgment that he had communist associations before the
war, his government security clearance was revoked.135 Oppenheimer is perhaps the most
famous of all the scientists who suffered McCarthyist persecutions. His experience was
documented in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists136 and more recently in Kai Bird’s and Martin
Sherwin’s 2005 book, American Prometheus.137 As Harry Kalven wrote, there was no evidence
presented that suggested that Oppenheimer was anything but a loyal citizen. 138 Yet he lost his
security clearance, as Robert Erwin explained, mainly because of his associations with
communists and failure to truthfully notify authorities that he had been approached by the
Soviets via his friend Haakon Chevalier.139
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, is one of the best sources for the history of postwar
attacks on American scientists. By 1946 the Bulletin, as it is often simply referred to, had
evolved from being a University of Chicago newsletter into an internationally published journal.
It rapidly became the soapbox of scientists of the peaceful atom. The Bulletin, charted the rise of
the scientific postwar conscience and provides much detail of the circumstances in which the
scientists felt the world’s governments should exercise restraint in the escalating arms race.
Patrick Slaney argued, in his study of Eugene Rabinowitch, the first editor of the Bulletin, that
the Bulletin was an attempt at protecting internationalism in science.140 But the Bulletin was
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essentially devoted to political protest. In order to attempt some balance, as well as papers from
peacenik scientists, the Bulletin, published some justifications for atomic weapons. For example,
Henry Stimson, United States Secretary of War (1940–1945), in a 1947 article openly defended
and convincingly justified the United States government’s position on why the bombs were
dropped on Japan.141
Oliphant, himself, authored several papers for the Bulletin, including one in 1958 on
which he described the arms race as ‘fanaticism’;142 another in 1966 that documented a trip to
communist China’s research facilities;143 and, in 1989, his own review of the history of the
United Nations’ attempt to control atomic weaponry in 1946.144
In 1955, the British philosopher and scientist Bertrand Russell wrote a manifesto signed
by Albert Einstein and eleven other scientists warning the world of the peril of nuclear
weaponry.145 This manifesto prompted the foundation of a new annual conference named after
the Nova Scotian location of the first conference: the Pugwash Conferences.146 Between the
Bulletin and the Pugwash Conferences the scientists of the peaceful atom had two media to
voice their views. Yet, whilst the Bulletin documented the rise of the scientific peace
movement, there is little analysis of the root causes of why scientists, who had generally
avoided politics and political collectivism, organised themselves so rapidly into an international
peace movement after World War Two. It seems, at least in the pages of the Bulletin, that when
censorship and restrictions to internationalism were imposed on atomic scientists they parried
the blows by publishing accounts of their roadblocks. Michael Polanyi’s endeavour to gain a visa
for entry to the United States147 and the details of Oppenheimer’s security clearance
investigation148 are potent examples of the use of publication as an act of resistance to what the
scientists considered the absurdity of censorship. And by the 2000s, the Bulletin started to
recognise its own history and role in the atomic science peace movement. In 2015, Kaiser and
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Benjamin Wilson wrote on the history of the Bulletin,149 and charted progress from the first
political campaigns of the ‘weary, earnest veterans of the Manhattan Project’, through the
McCarthyist censorship and restrictions of the 1950s and into the modern day. So the journal
itself had begun to set out the history of its early years in shaping the protestations of the
scientists. Kaiser and Wilson wrote of how scientists, by the late 1950s, abandoned the overt
political collectivism of organisations such as the Federation of American Scientists, and
replaced it with ‘quiet diplomacy’.150 Despite political pressures, the Bulletin endured and
scientists played a role in the Limited Test Ban treaty in 1963. In the modern day, the Bulletin’s
mission is ‘to serve as a vital forum of informed and impassioned ideas’ for topics such as
climate change, synthetic biology and other technological threats.151
As paranoia and innuendo gripped the United States in the late 1940s, Australia also
started to consider the threat of domestic communism. Philip Deery and Jean Buckley-Moran
noted that Australia followed the United States’ example in viewing domestic communism as a
threat.152 Yet, the instances of government restrictions on scientists in Australia are less well
analysed than those of their United States’ counterparts. Nevertheless, several of Deery’s
works, some with his colleague, Lachlan Clohesy, provide examples of restriction and censorship
of Australian scientists that are, in some ways, comparable to those inflicted in the United
States.153 Whilst much of the investigations into scientists were not carried out, as in the United
States, in public and senate hearings, Australian scientists were still blacklisted and harangued.
As Deery and Clohesy argued, organisations such as the Australian Association of Scientific
Workers (AASW), was ill-prepared for the postwar security investigations of the Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).154 Jean Buckley-Moran also analysed how the AASW
was perceived by the authorities as a leftish union of dangerous intellectuals and subjected to
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several investigations.155 She argued that organisations such as the AASW positioned themselves
to contribute to the political discourse on matters such as atomic technology, but were quickly
suppressed by Robert Menzies’ government in the 1950s:
With the advent of the ‘atomic age’ the acerbic and sustained assault
on scientists was not an isolated attempt to quell dissent among a now
strategically placed professional group. The attacks provided a political
key for confirming the premises of the cold war in Australia. They also
provided a springboard for generalising the attack to other intellectual
vanguard groups.156

David McKnight wrote of overall investigations of Australian academia in the 1950s in his 1994
book, Australian Spies and Their Secrets.157 McKnight argued that Menzies was alerted to the
risks posed by left-wing academics and he authorised the Australian security services to conduct
a review of all Australian universities.158 From ASIO’s point of view, the risks that the academics
posed was not that they were potentially agents of the Soviet Union, but that they had access to
influence the fertile and impressionable minds of students.159 Wayne Reynolds in Australia’s Bid
for the Atomic Bomb also wrote of how Oliphant’s department at the Australia National
University (ANU) came under scrutiny by the ASIO chief, Charles Spry.160 Reynolds noted that
Spry had been tipped off by the British spy agency, MI5, about a group of nuclear physicists with
communist sympathies that migrated with Oliphant from Birmingham to Canberra in the early
1950s. The aspersion cast on the ANU, Reynolds argued, resulted in both the American and the
British governments requesting that ANU scientists who were not under ‘full government
control’ be excluded from receiving any military information.161
Oliphant certainly suffered during this period. Cockburn and Ellyard described how in
1946, he was appointed to Australia’s delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission, but in the same year he was secretly blocked by the Australian government from
receiving the prestigious United States Congressional Medal of Freedom with Gold Palm.162 They
show, moreover, that during the 1950s Oliphant was denied entry visas to the United States
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with little explanation given.163 Roger Cross in his biography of Hedley Marston maintained, that
in a letter from Oliphant to Marston, Oliphant admitted to a security breach whilst he was on
the Manhattan Project that caught attention of the United States security service.164
Oliphant, despite being the most senior atomic scientist in the country, was denied
access to the British atomic tests in Australia in the 1950s. This occurred even though his
colleague at the ANU, Ernest Titterton, was welcomed as an observer and member of the
Atomic Weapons Safety Committee.165 Elizabeth Tynan in Atomic Thunder, quoted the British
High Commissioner at the time remarking that ‘Oliphant is unquestionably talkative and would
give the impression (whether true or not) that he was in possession of all the secrets. It is
therefore in the general interest that he should be kept away.’166
Overall the literature on the topic of scientific censorship in the McCarthyist period, and
the equivalent period in Australia, focuses on both the desire to root out communists in
academia, and to attempt to silence the growing contribution that scientists made to political
discourse. Yet the research, particularly on the Australian government response to free-talking
scientists in the Cold War, is rather sparse, which could lead to the conclusion that much more
could be done.

Literature Review Summary
The literature on the philosophy, history and sociology of science documents the
epistemological components of scientific collaboration. By linking works that focus on
collaboration in science with associated sociological models it is possible to explore the rise of
the scientists’ collectivism on both scientific endeavour as well as their protestations in postwar
politics. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Pugwash Conferences are considered here
as both potentially primary and secondary sources in documenting the political collectivism of
the scientists.
The censorship of the atomic scientists in the United States during the early Cold War is
well documented with a wide body of scholarship. Whilst some historians, including BuckleyMoran, Deery and Clohesy have sought to better document anticommunism investigations of
Australian scientists, the Australian narrative is less well covered in secondary source literature.
Much of the literature on the motivations behind the censorship of scientists focuses on
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explanations involving espionage and risks to security. Alternative readings are, however,
presented. For example, that governments, for a range of other reasons involving both domestic
and international politics wished to discredit and silence an intelligentsia based peacemovement.
We are fortunate to have a reasonable body of work on Oliphant with his biography
from 1981 being the most detailed. In recent years there has been a renewed interest in
Oliphant and in particular the force purveyed by his grand personality. We can understand
Oliphant through these works and see him not as the stereotypical sallow mad-scientist, but as a
strong and boisterous contributor to the discourse in the politics of science. His nuances, such as
how he appeared both for and against atomic utility, is illustrative of a complexity of character
but also of a rationalist—he was prepared to vary his opinion in light of new evidence. Through
his life Oliphant certainly became more reasoned in his political debate. Yet as those who have
researched him have noted, he maintained a belligerent and forthright personality throughout
his career. It is clear that Oliphant can be positioned, as a part of a wider cohort, in some of the
most controversial and crucial debates around the rise and use of atomic science.
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CHAPTER TWO
Paradigms, networks and invisible colleges
in the early atomic age

Of all the enterprises of mankind the acquisition of Natural Knowledge
pays least attention to the divisions of men. We have national
industries, national trade, national literature, national art, national
characteristics, even national religion, but there is only one Nature for
us to know. One could wish that the seasonal interchange of men to
show to other nations what new illumination was dawning in this or
that subject of enquiry could be firmly established and honoured by
the emphatic recognition of the academies and indeed of the State
itself. No greater gift could be made by one people to another than an
illuminating idea; it would deserve a people’s welcome.1

In early 1927, Mark Oliphant, aged 26, busied his days with a small working stipend in the
physics laboratory at the University of Adelaide. He and his new wife Rosa lived comfortably by
the sea in Glenelg.2 This sleepy existence was a world away from Europe, where revolutionary
new changes in atomic physics were occurring and Oliphant was keen to awaken and enter the
new age. There was then only one Great Exhibition scholarship awarded each year to a young
Australian aspiring for a doctoral thesis in the sciences at a British university, and on the basis of
his adeptness proven in the laboratory, the 1927 award went to Oliphant. He chose Cambridge
to work with the renowned Ernest Rutherford.3 Oliphant was not the first University of Adelaide
physicist to leave for Cambridge—William Lawrence Bragg had also departed in 1909 and was
awarded the 1915 Nobel Prize for Physics.4 Oliphant likely dreamed of similar accolades.
When Oliphant arrived in Cambridge to start his doctoral thesis with Rutherford he
entered an exciting new world. Scientists had, by then, got their heads around Einstein’s
Relativity, new theories of quantum mechanics were being devised, and the previously
indivisible atom was now known to be made up of smaller sub-atomic particles. The invisible
1
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energy of radiation, first detected in the late nineteenth century, had been observed to relate to
some elements trying to naturally change to other elements. This elemental shapeshifting was
not engineered by alchemists, but by nature itself with the realisation that atomic instability was
proof of an impermanent universe.
Rutherford, in the early 1930s, famously declared that ‘anyone who expects a source of
power from the transformation of these atoms is talking moonshine’.5 Rutherford’s phraseology
is often taken as a laughable irony in the history of the atomic age. This is also suggestive that
scientists were, in the 1920s and 1930s, still focussed on observing the nature of atoms and did
not consider that they may have useful application.6 But as John Jenkin argued, Rutherford
harboured a suspicion that atomic energy may actually be possible and he was advising the
British government to ‘keep an eye on the matter’.7
When Oliphant arrived at Cambridge, he joined a college of physicists which was one of
just several centres of European research. Others such as the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin,
Berlin University, the University of Göttingen, and Marie Curie’s laboratory in Paris were also
making major breakthroughs in atomic knowledge. Researchers had begun to comprehend the
complexity of atomic science and new relationships between various institutions and academics
were starting grow. This chapter is to focus on the development of the collaborative
environments of atomic science from the late nineteenth century and into the first forty years of
twentieth century. As well as providing historical context to Oliphant’s entry into atomic science,
the aim of this chapter is to investigate the changing sociological framework of science through
this time. Insofar as this thesis is investigating social networks of atomic science, and Oliphant’s
position within them, it is important to review, at least in part, the known and previously welltold early history of the atomic age to seek clues as to the origins of scientific collaboration. It is
these environments of scientific collaboration that will provide the vehicle for the carriage of
knowledge behind the atomic bomb, the foundation and structure of the Manhattan Project
during World War Two, and the postwar rise of the atomic science peace movement.

The early atomic age: 1890 to Solvay 1927
As the last decade of nineteenth century started, the laws of physics were generally known and
understood. After all, since Isaac Newton in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century,
the same mathematical equations held true for the fall of an apple and the path of the planets
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around the sun. And when James Maxwell wrote his equations for electromagnetism in the midnineteenth century, the picture of the forces of nature seemed complete, with little left to do
other than tidy up around the edges. Scientists turned their activity to chemistry rather than
physics.8
In Paris, in the mid-1890s, Henri Becquerel, working with Pierre and Marie Curie
discovered an unusual curiosity: a uranium bearing rock, that when rested on a photographic
plate, left a shadow even in the absence of light—the rock itself was emitting invisible rays.9
Around the same time, Wilhelm Röntgen in Wurzburg discovered a new ray that was beyond
ultra-violet on the light spectrum and being short of a name he simply called them ‘x’-rays.10
Meanwhile, in Cambridge, J.J. Thomson had discovered the electron and devised its basis as
fundamental particle of chemical reactions.11 Whilst these discoveries were made principally in
the field of chemistry, they implied that the atom itself was capable of emitting invisible forces
and was possibly not, as previously assumed, an inert and indivisible mass. The physicists were
required once again to write new laws of the behaviour of the world. In Berlin in 1900, Max
Planck started to build on the discovery of radiation with a series of new physics experiments to
prove that the energy emitted from radiation was not a gradual scale but consisted of discrete
packets of energy of specific quantities. Radiation was ‘quantized’ and this study would
eventually become known as quantum mechanics.12
In 1905, Albert Einstein wrote his Special Theory of Relativity which he followed up later
with his General Theory.13 Einstein’s work set about to explain the origins of the fundamental
forces of nature such as gravity and electromagnetism.14 Einstein was originally working in
isolation and not attached to an institution, but Planck invited him to Berlin to continue his
work.15
New Zealander, Ernest Rutherford, working at the University of Manchester in 1909,
exploded the belief that the atom was indivisible. In his gold-leaf experiment he proved that
nearly all the mass of an atom lies in a very small, positively charged nucleus orbited at great
distance by electrons—the atom is made up principally of space.16
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Figure 2 'The first Solvay Conference on Physics, Brussels', photograph, 1911. Courtesy of Solvay Institute,
Brussels.
Seated left to right: Walther Nernst, Marcel Brillouin, Ernest Solvay, Hendrik Lorentz, Emil Warburg, Jean
Perrin, Wilhem Wien, Marie Curie, Henri Poincare. Standing left to right: Robert Goldschmidt, Max Planck,
Heinrich Rubens, Arnold Sommerfeld, Frederick Lindemann, Maurice de Broglie, Martin Knudsen, Friedrich
Hasenohrl, Georges Hostelet, Edouard Herzen, James Jeans, Ernest Rutherford, Heieke Kamerlingh-Onnes,
Albert Einstein, Paul Langevin. Image: Supplied courtesy of the Solvay Institute 2018.

In 1911, the first international conference on physics, the Solvay Conference, was held
in Brussels. The Solvay Conference was the brainchild of Belgian industrialist Ernst Solvay. The
conference became a triennial event and continues in the modern day.17 The first conference
brought together 24 scientific leaders from across Europe including Curie, Planck, Einstein, and
Rutherford.18 Frederick Lindemann, the Oxford physics professor, also joined the British
delegation. Lindemann, later known as the Viscount Cherwell, would surpass his contribution to
physics with his efforts as a government scientific administrator and confidant of Winston
Churchill during World War Two which, as is documented in Part Two of this work, met with the
meddling agitations of Oliphant.
The Solvay Conference was a first for the world of science. Until this time many distally
located scientists likely only knew of each other’s work through publication or through their own
17
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inter-institutional movements. The 1911 conference saw the beginning of international
collaboration across the political boundaries with representatives attending from Britain,
France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark.19 The second Solvay conference was in 1913,
after which the Great War caused a hiatus. The first time the conference reconvened after the
war was in 1921. German scientists were barred from attending the 1921 conference, but
Einstein was resident in Berlin at the time and was invited on account of his Swiss citizenship.
Out of protest that his fellow German scientists were not allowed, he boycotted the
conference.20 By 1923 the conference was in full swing again, just in time to ponder a crisis in
atomic physics—the ‘quantum crisis’.21 Niels Bohr of Copenhagen had, by then, expanded on
Rutherford’s and Planck’s work by mathematically proving that only particular levels of orbits of
electrons around a nucleus were possible and the level of energy fitted particularly defined
‘quanta’ rather than being a sliding scale. Bohr’s work was contrary to the assumption that the
orbit of electrons was, in a Newtonian way, like the orbit of planets around the sun.
Furthermore, light itself seemed to operate as both a particle, defined by Einstein with zero
mass (because mass and energy are interchangeable), and also as a wave. It appeared that on a
sub-atomic scale the laws of mechanics did not apply and new laws had to be devised. In 1927
Werner Heisenberg, a 26 year-old German graduate student, devised the Uncertainty Principle
which stated that it was impossible to measure both the momentum and speed of a particle at
the same time. This work came on the back of Wolfgang Pauli’s Exclusion Principle (1925) and
contradicted Erwin Schrödinger’s quantum mechanics wave equations (1926). In 1928, Paul
Dirac, a theoretical physicist at Cambridge, added his eponymous equations that unified the new
quantum mechanics principles and also made them consistent with Relativity.22 These new
breakthroughs devised our current and as-yet unrefuted principles of quantum mechanics and
combined for a paradigm shift that would eventually lead to the breakthroughs in atomic energy
in the late 1930s.23
The 1927 Solvay conference photograph has been referred to as the ‘most intelligent
picture ever taken’24 and featured 17 attendees who were, at the time, current or future Nobel
laureates. Their names were synonymous with the great era of Relativity and radiation physics
including Einstein, Planck, Curie, Rutherford, Bragg, Schrödinger, Bohr and Max Born. Joining the
19
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Figure 3 'The 1927 Solvay Conference', photograph, 1927. Courtesy of Solvay Institute, Brussels
Back: Auguste Piccard, Émile Henriot, Paul Ehrenfest, Édouard Herzen, Théophile de Donder, Erwin
Schrödinger, JE Verschaffelt, Wolfgang Pauli, Werner Heisenberg, Ralph Fowler, Léon Brillouin. Middle: Peter
Debye, Ernest Rutherford, William Bragg, Hendrik Anthony Kramers, Paul Dirac, Arthur Compton, Louis de
Broglie, Max Born, Niels Bohr. Front Irving Langmuir, Max Planck, Marie Curie, Hendrik Lorentz, Albert
Einstein, Paul Langevin, Charles-Eugène Guye, CTR Wilson, Owen Richardson. The picture contains 17 Nobel
laureates and is referred to as the most intelligent photograph ever taken. Source: Supplied courtesy of the
Solvay Institute.

Europeans for the first time was an American, Arthur Compton, who had just won the 1927
Nobel Prize in Physics.25 This was an elder force of brilliance and experience, but also
conservatism and some delegates struggled to grapple with the visualisations of the quantum
world and worked on the assumption that they must be missing a link to unify quantum
mechanics with the observable universe. Einstein, for example, famously said ‘God does not play
dice with the universe’ and this is taken as his disapproval of using probability in physics and
illustrated his scepticism of Heisenberg and the new generation. Vasant Natarajan has contested
this interpretation and suggested that Einstein was searching for a grand unified theory to
merge the physics of the cosmos with that of the quantum world.26 However, most of the 1927
Solvay delegation were part of the senior cohort of atomic physics that were struggling to
maintain relevance in light of the new quantum mechanics paradigm led by the younger
generation. Indeed, in reference to generational change, Solvay delegate Max Planck is quoted
to have said ‘new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making
them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die and a new generation grows

25

"Arthur H. Compton - Biographical," Nobel Media AP,
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1927/compton-bio.html.
26
Vasant Natarajan, "What Einstein Meant When He Said “God Does Not Play Dice …”," Resonance 13, no.
7 (2008).

49

Chapter Two
up that is familiar with it.’27
So it was the students of this old-guard who would go on to make arguably a greater
impact on science with the application of theory to the applied development of atomic energy.
The 1927 Solvay conference photograph (Figure 3) appears to have captured these
intergenerational differences. On the back row, third from the right of the photograph below is
Heisenberg. The old physicists are scowling serious-faced, but Heisenberg is grinning boyishly.
He is standing alongside Pauli who looks down, not in wonderment but disdain at Louis De
Broglie and Einstein who were failing to grasp quantum mechanics. Amongst this flurry of
discoveries in quantum mechanics, Oliphant arrived in Cambridge to commence his doctoral
research. The timing was perfect. The laws of physics were being rewritten and a generational
shift was occurring.

Solvay 1933, to Nuclear Fission, 1938–39
The 1930 Solvay Conference focussed on magnetism rather than atomic physics. However, the
1933 conference theme was ‘the structure and properties of the atomic nucleus’ and saw a
gathering of both theoretical and experimental atomic physicists. The conference would have
been buzzing with news that James Chadwick, a colleague of Oliphant’s at Cambridge, had
accounted for the remaining mass of the atomic nuclei in his discovery of the neutron a year
earlier.28 It had been more than 40 years since Becquerel and the Curies had discovered
radiation, 35 years since Thomson had discovered the electron, and nearly 25 years since
Rutherford had defined the nucleus. The 1933 conference photograph, in comparison to 1927,
shows a marked change in the generations with a newer and younger generation emerging from
behind the gowns of their illustrious supervisors.29 Joining Heisenberg and Pauli, as the new
bright sparks, were names that would become synonymous with the discovery of nuclear fission
and atomic energy, including Chadwick, Dirac, Enrico Fermi, Rudolf Peierls, Ernest Lawrence,
Frederic Joliot, and Irene Joliot-Curie. This new generation careened headlong through the
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Figure 4 'The 1933 Solvay Conference', photograph, 1933. Courtesy of Solvay Institute, Brussels
Seated (left to right): Erwin Schrödinger, Irène Joliot-Curie, Niels Bohr, Abram Ioffe, Marie Curie, Paul
Langevin, Owen Willans Richardson, Lord Ernest Rutherford, Théophile de Donder, Maurice de Broglie,
Louis de Broglie, Lise Meitner, James Chadwick. Standing (left to right): Émile Henriot, Francis Perrin,
Frédéric Joliot, Werner Heisenberg, Hendrik Kramers, E. Stahel, Enrico Fermi, Ernest Walton, Paul Dirac,
Peter Debye, Nevill Mott, Blas Cabrera, George Gamow, Walther Bothe, Patrick Blackett, M.S. Rosenblum,
Jacques Errera, Ed. Bauer, Wolfgang Pauli, Jules-Émile Verschaffelt, M. Cosyns, E. Herzen, John Cockcroft,
Charles Drummond Ellis, Rudolf Peierls, Auguste Piccard, Ernest O. Lawrence, Léon Rosenfeld. Source:
Supplied courtesy of the Solvay Institute.

1930s and devised all manner of new experiments to bust open the nucleus.30

In late 1933 Leo Szilard, a Hungarian physicist, was in London. When reading an article in the
newspaper that quoted Rutherford as being dismissive of the possibility of ever releasing atomic
energy, Szilard theorised a nuclear chain reaction. He considered the possibility of useful atomic
energy and even attempted to patent a nuclear reactor, though he thought that lighter
elements, such as lithium and hydrogen would have the greatest potential, rather than heavy
elements such as uranium.31 In 1934, Enrico Fermi and his team in Rome reported the results of
neutron bombardment of the nucleus, to produce artificial radiation—essentially the process
that would become the trigger for nuclear fission.32
The year 1933, in European history, is known less for a gathering of physicists in
Brussels, and more for the formation of the Third Reich. Germany was one of the centres of
atomic research and many of the great discoveries in quantum mechanics had arisen from the
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work of its scientists. The Nazis discredited aspects of atomic research and particularly those
related to Einstein, calling it ‘Jewish physics’, in favour of Heisenberg’s home-grown ‘Deutsche
Physik’. As Mark Walker explained, this was the first perversion of physics by meddling
governments, but was done for the sake of ideology, not military gain.33 From 1933, as antiSemitism grew in Germany, Jewish physicists fled, inadvertently creating a migration of
knowledge to what were to become the Allied powers. One of the first scientists to fear the
portent of Nazism was Szilard, a Hungarian Jew who had become a German citizen in 1930 and
had worked with Einstein in Berlin. In late 1933, after the rise of the Third Reich, Szilard left
Germany for London and started a campaign to find academic homes for other refugee
scientists.34 Einstein emigrated to work at Princeton, also in 1933. Hans Bethe found refuge at
Cornell University, New York, in 1935. Lise Meitner was secretly smuggled out of Germany and
into Sweden in 1938.35 Her nephew, Otto Frisch, who went initially to Copenhagen in 1934,
found himself stranded in Britain when he was on a lecture tour when war broke in 1939. Frisch
found sanctuary in Oliphant’s laboratory in Birmingham.36 This migration was not restricted to
German-based scientists. Fermi, whose wife was Jewish, used the receipt of the 1938 Nobel
Prize in Stockholm to get a travel pass for him and his family to flee fascist Italy for the
University of Chicago.37 The Solvay Conference was not held in 1936, and would not be held
again until 1948, but this did not stop the collaboration of atomic scientists.
In 1938, Otto Hahn and Friedrich Strassmann, working at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in
Berlin repeated some of Fermi’s earlier work and bombarded the uranium nucleus with
neutrons. These scientists were not physicists but were chemists and were less interested in the
energy produced and more interested in the chemistry of the reaction’s products. Upon
analyses of the post-bombardment material they were shocked to have produced barium
instead of the expected next element in the transuranic series—radium. The mass difference
between uranium and barium is large, and the results did not make sense under the accelerated
natural transuranic decay. Before heading for the Christmas break, the two German chemists
sent their results to their former colleague, Meitner, who was by then in exile in Sweden.
Meitner was joined over the Christmas break by her nephew, Frisch, who was visiting from
Bohr’s institute in Copenhagen. Meitner and Frisch contemplated the results from Hahn and
33
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Strassmann and came to an extraordinary conclusion: the nucleus did not decay and transmute
to the next element in the transuranic series, it had in fact split into two much lighter
elements—barium and krypton. The mass difference was converted to energy and Einstein’s
previously theoretical equation of E=mc2 had been demonstrated in the laboratory for the first
time.38
At the beginning of January 1939 Meitner and Frisch sent their discovery to Nature.39
Their work cited Hahn and Strassmann; Fermi, who was by then in Chicago; Bethe, at Cornell;
Bohr, in Copenhagen; and Irene Joliot-Curie, in Paris. The ‘letters to’ section of Nature is
reserved for rapid publication of short-form articles on breakthrough discoveries and undergo
only an initial review, often by those whom are cited in the work.40 Publication was likely
expected within weeks. However, the news was to spread more rapidly and before Nature’s
editors could publish. Frisch communicated the results to Bohr’s laboratory in Copenhagen.
Bohr was preparing for a visit to the United States and arrived in New York in mid-January,
where he communicated the discovery to Szilard. Szilard that same month, had been invited to
join Columbia University.41 Columbia University physicists, along with Fermi at Chicago, and
others at the Carnegie Institute in Washington verified the results. Two weeks before the
publication in Nature, on page 18 of the 31 January edition of the New York Times the discovery
was reported and named 18 scientists, working from seven institutions across five countries.42
The collaborative environment and communication of physicists was clearly operational despite
the schism enforced by Hitler. The news of fission had, however, largely bypassed Britain and
their scientists, such as Oliphant, would not learn of the discovery of fission until the scientific
publication in February 1939.43

The sociology of science in the atomic age
Robert Merton (1910-2003) is a founding father of the branch of the philosophy of science
known as the sociology of science. In his paper Science and the Social Order published in 1938 he
deconstructed the organisation of science. Through its ‘cult of intelligibility’,44 he wrote that
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Figure 5 'Vast Energy Freed By Uranium Atom ', The New York Times, 31 January 1939

science had sailed off to its own utopia leaving behind a befuddled and confused laity. He
warned that fascism, with its distinct racism and functional centralisation of state, ‘intensifies
sources of revolt against science which in a liberal structure remains unorganised, diffuse and
often latent’.45 The first forty years of the twentieth century had seen several major leaps in
scientific knowledge, notably in the journey into the nucleus of the atom. Yet, as noted in the
second paragraph of the quote from Merton below, scientists could hide behind the fact that
their work lacked practical application.
Although it is customary to think of the scientist as a dispassionate,
impersonal individual—and this is not inaccurate as far as his technical
activity is concerned—it must be remembered that the scientist, in
company with all other professional workers, has a large emotional
investment in his way of life, defined by the institutional norms which
govern his activity. The social stability of science can be ensured only if
adequate defences are set up against changes imposed from out-side
the scientific fraternity itself.
…The persistent repudiation by scientists of the application of
utilitarian norms to their work has its chief function the avoidance of
this danger, which is particularly marked at the present time. A tacit
recognition of this function may be the source of that possibly
apocryphal toast at a dinner for scientists in Cambridge: To pure
45
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mathematics, and may it never be of any use to anybody!46

Merton’s 1938 paper positioned scientists in their self-serving utopia but warned that changes
were required due to the gathering storm of war. Shortly after Merton’s paper was published, in
late 1938, nuclear fission was discovered. The potential for war meant that the scientists had to
climb back down, from what Merton described as the ‘ivory tower’, and step back into a world
where technology and science could mean the difference between victory and defeat.
Thomas Kuhn, in 1962, coined the phrase ‘paradigm shift’ to describe major step in
scientific understanding.47 A paradigm is simply a common way of working but can result in a
log-jam in which accepted theory has been critiqued to the extent that it is considered only to
be valid to certain situations and not others. Scientists park up to the log-jam and cannot
seemingly find a way past. Often a single scientist (or a small group) has that eureka moment
that clears the jam—the ‘paradigm shift’. Kuhn wrapped scientific method into major
revolutionary step-changes and his work is a treatise of how knowledge revolutions follow a
new paradigm’s radical theoretical changes.
By the Kuhnian definition, a paradigm shift is preceded by a ‘crisis’ whereby the
accepted theory provides a framework for some, and not all, of the observations and scientists
collectively reach a log-jam. In the atomic age there are a number of potential events that could
be classed under Kuhn’s definition of a paradigm. Einstein, for example, initially worked in
isolation when he came up with his theories of Relativity in 1905, and he may have easily been
dismissed as being a crackpot if it were not from the curiosity of a more notable scientist,
Planck, in Berlin.48 Certainly, post-Relativity, there was a flourishing of research into quantum
mechanics and the atom which fostered a new generational series of breakthroughs by
scientists including Rutherford and Bohr.
The greater crisis and subsequent paradigm shift of the atomic age, however, was the
quantum mechanics crisis of the 1920s. The wave-particle duality of light and Bohr’s defined
quantum orbits of electrons indicated that world of the atom contradicted traditional
mechanics. The shift that broke the log-jam was not, as Kuhn would generalise with scientific
revolutions, a single eureka moment. But it is was a series of new equations and theorems that
were made jointly and severally by scientists working across multiple institutions. The quantum
mechanics paradigm, unlike Newton or Einstein’s paradigms, is not credited to one person but
to a collective of geographically dispersed scientists. This paradigm shift resulted in a marked
46
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generational shift with relatively young physicists becoming the new thought leaders that would
carry forth the science into the 1930s. This is self-evident in comparing the Solvay 1927
conference delegation which was dominated by the older Relativity and radiation generation,
with the 1933 conference delegation with a new younger cohort who emerged during and after
the quantum mechanics crisis. This younger and more dynamic cohort was beginning to develop
their transnational networks and, possibly due to the increasing complexity of their work, was
collectively sharing knowledge in what could be defined as an ‘invisible college’.

Invisible colleges and small-world-network analysis
The term ‘invisible college’ was coined in the seventeenth century by Robert Boyle to describe
the sharing of knowledge between ‘men of so capacious and searching spirits’.49 Boyle’s own
invisible college eventually became the Royal Society,50 and the term was expanded into a
sociological theory by Diana Crane in 1972. She posits that an invisible college describes
situations in-which there is not a formal research agreement between institutions, but where
scientists nevertheless develop informal but deeply collaborative trans-institutional
relationships.51 The concept of the invisible college is broadly accepted by sociologists with
much of the research that has followed Crane investigating the mechanisms of formation,
function and advantages or disadvantages. Members of an invisible college communicate
directly with each other, sharing ideas and testing each other’s hypotheses and typically bypass
the usual formal channels dictated by their institutions.52 The first motivation of forming an
invisible college is self-interest, suggesting that one can advance their science more rapidly by
drawing on the expertise of another operating elsewhere.53
Crane makes note of how ‘generations’ of the ‘high-producing’ scientists form invisible
colleges.54 Other researchers such as Harriet Zuckerman and Merton,55 and Stephen Cole56 note
also how age and scientific performance are linked with scientists being at their most productive
before they reach their forties. As noted by Natarajan, Einstein, for example, did not make
another meaningful contribution to new scientific theory after he published his Theory of
49

Boas, Robert Boyle and Seventeenth Century Chemistry, 7.
Ibid., 14-15.
51
Crane, Invisible Colleges: The Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific Communities.
52
Joseph Ben-David and Teresa A. Sullivan, "Sociology of Science," Annual Review of Sociology 1, no. 1
(1975).
53
John Carey, "Faculty of 1000 and Vivo: Invisible Colleges and Team Science," Issues in Science and
Technology Librarianship 65, no. Spring 2011 (2011).
54
Crane, Invisible Colleges: The Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific Communities, 83-84,86,141.
55
Harriet Zuckerman and Robert K. Merton, "Age, Aging, and Age Structure in Science," in Aging and
Society, ed. M.W. Riley, M. Johnson, and A. Foner (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972).
56
Stephen Cole, "Age and Scientific Performance," American Journal of Sociology 84, no. 4 (1979).
50

56

Paradigms, Networks and Invisible Colleges in the Early Atomic Age
General Relativity in 1915, aged 36.57 Whilst the correlation between age and collaboration was
contested by Mark Oromaner in a 1977 paper,58 contemporary researchers such as Liming Liang
et al59 have provided evidence to support productivity and collaboration between young and
socially compatible scientists. As such, the latent egalitarian nature of invisible colleges means
that members are often a similar age, at a similar stage of their career and may have more in
common than just science (such as family life, social life, or personal interests).
The invisible college is, by definition, a series of second-order relationships (with the
first-order being one’s own immediate colleagues). However, the bonds of trust developed in
second-order relationships, as argued by Mark Granovetter, are often equal to or even greater
than first order relationships.60 Without formal research agreements, individuals must seek to
strengthen their wider network and their own influence by developing personal and trusting
friendships rather than relying on forced organisational structure dictated in a single
institution.61
The advancement of science by invisible colleges becomes an extension of the scientific
method. Mathematicians and physicists are particularly suited to the formation of transnational
invisible colleges as their own mathematical language transcends conventional linguistics.
Imagine scientists from Germany, France, Hungary, England and the United States who are
members of an invisible college. Unless there was an expert linguist or translator in their midst
one would think it would be tricky for them to share knowledge. However, their common
language consists of a universally accepted series of mathematical symbols (which are mainly
Greek letters) and they are able to easily communicate through the presentation of a series of
problems and their ‘proofs’. Scientists are, therefore, bound by the common pursuit of
knowledge and truth, which transcends borders and, commonly, national interests. William H.
Bragg put it eloquently as the President of the Royal Society in 1937:
Of all the enterprises of mankind the acquisition of Natural Knowledge
pays least attention to the divisions of men. We have national
industries, national trade, national literature, national art, national
characteristics, even national religion, but there is only one Nature for
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us to know.62
Material gains or wealth, beyond what is required for academic survival, is rarely a motivator.
Scientists are rewarded by receiving funding related to their work and thus continue to satisfy
their innate curiosity. Funding flows to the most productive of scientists and publication in
peer-reviewed journals and subsequent citation of work are key indicators of scientific
performance.63 The scientific reward system, as Cole argued, flows from the combination of
funding and the publication of the research which reinforce and satisfy the goals of the
individual scientist.64 So scientists are left with a dilemma: they need to collaborate, as assisted,
often informally by invisible colleges; but they must also publish which is an inherently
formalised activity. As a result, scientists must find trustworthy collaborators who will not steal
ideas, and will give correct acknowledgement other’s work. In considering collaborative science,
the formation of trust is fundamental to ensure that the reward system is not compromised.65
An ethics of trust has become an essential condition of good scientific collaboration. For
efficient collaboration then, philosophers such as Karen Frost-Arnold and Kristina Rolin stress
the linking of the concepts of morality, trust and the reward system as the epistemological
foundations of twentieth-century scientific collaboration.66 Moral trust involves not only a
mutual trust for scientists to honour the tradition of authorship and citation, but also what the
discovery or research will be used for. As Frost-Arnold writes, this requirement for shared moral
virtues is not just desirable, it is necessary for collaboration:
Moral trust in the character of scientists laid the foundation for
collaboration. In an environment in which it would be counterproductive to rely on the detection and punishment mechanisms
promoted by RSI [reliance on self-interest], members of the scientific
community can search for evidence of moral motivations in their
colleagues. Moral trust, therefore, can provide reasons for
collaboration when mere reliance fails.67

So how do scientists stumble upon or search for trustworthy companions in which to form their
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collaborative invisible college? The concept of ‘six degrees of separation’ is fairly simple to
understand. If everyone knows 45 people, and each of them in turn also know a different 45
people, then all people on the planet are easily linked with only six degrees of separation (456 =
7.2 billion). The initial investigations into this phenomena, such as experiments on
connectedness by social psychologist Stanley Milgram in the 1960s, assumed a randomness of
the connections and that the interconnectivity flowed equally between members of a social
network.68 In more recent work, led by researchers such as Duncan Watts, a merging of
mathematics and sociology has resulted in a new branch of scholarship called ‘network
science’.69 This science seeks to map relationships in sociological networks. By mapping, with
hub-and-spoke diagrams, and scaling individuals for their connectedness, it is possible to
visualize a social group and assess which connections are the most important. A small-world
network is thus visualised.70 As computational data systems have increased in recent years, it
has been observed that connectivity and connectedness flourish as a result of a small number of
well-connected individuals rather than a population of equally connected individuals.71
Identification of a small-world network can be established by interviewing individuals on their
connections, or as Beatrice Millard did in 2014, by mapping citations and co-authorship of
publications to establish the most influential people in a dispersed group.72
National traditions in science were a key driver of scientific collaboration from the
nineteenth century and into the early part of the twentieth century.73 With the advent of the
Solvay Conference from 1911 and international peer reviewed journals such as Nature,
transnational collaboration between scientists became more apparent. The atomic scientists of
Oliphant’s generation and those before, can be mapped according to these small-world
frameworks. The relationship of those present at the 1933 Solvay conference, provide an
excellent example of the method’s application. Figure 6 demonstrates the evident network at
the Solvay conference in 1933 and is based on the following rules:
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Figure 6 'Small-world network map: atomic science at Solvay 1933', illustration by Darren Holden. First order
connections were established based on nationality and collaboration within scientists’ own institutions.
Scientists were also connected to others based on their attendance at previous Solvay Conferences.

Figure 7 'Small-world network map: The pathway of knowledge on the discovery of fission in 1939',
illustration by Darren Holden. First order connections were established by (i) assessing which scientists
had previously or currently worked together within their institution (e.g. Meitner with Hahn); (ii) familial
relationships (e.g. Meitner and Frisch); and (iii) those that were cited in Meitner and Frisch’s 1939 paper
(e.g. Fermi, Bethe, Bohr and Kalckar).

i.

individuals within a university / or national tradition are connected to each other

ii.

individuals whom attended previous Solvay Conferences are connected to each other

iii.

Nobel laureates, (as members of a rather exclusive club) are connected to each
other.
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The degree of connectedness is visualised with the size of the circle for each individual. It is
important, however, to note that Figure 6 (and subsequently Figure 7) is, by no means, complete
and have focused only on the first-order and second-order connections of scientists considered
relevant to the moment illustrated.
As visualised (Figure 6), Schrödinger, Curie, and Rutherford are the most connected of
the atomic scientists in 1933, as they are linked by their multiple attendances at previous Solvay
conferences, are all Nobel Laureates and were leaders within their national scientific
institutions. Bohr, Compton and De Donder have the next level of connectedness. Yet whilst
Bohr was a recognised leader in the field and of similar fame to Rutherford, Curie and
Schrödinger, the Copenhagen school was relatively small compared to Britain, Germany and
France’s research. Bohr, however, hosted a regular colloquium and invited the likes of
Heisenberg and Pauli, to Copenhagen.74 Similarly, Arthur Compton had received the Nobel Prize
in 1927 and in 1933 was at his second Solvay conference,75 and was accompanied by only one
other American, Ernest Lawrence.
Our principal subject, Oliphant, was not at Solvay 1933 even though Rutherford and
other colleagues were in attendance. Oliphant did, however, benefit from the conference
indirectly, in that he met Ernest Lawrence for the first time when Lawrence passed through
Cambridge after the conference.76 The remaining scientists had a low-level of connectedness in
1933, but the conference was the place where many met for the first time.
On the discovery of nuclear fission in late 1938 and early 1939, the speed in which the
knowledge of the information flowed is remarkable—in only a month it went from a laboratory
observation in Berlin, via Stockholm, Copenhagen, and to the United States, where it was
reported in the New York Times.77 The small-world network map for the pathway of the
knowledge of fission is shown in Figure 7.
In analysing Figure 7, it is clear that the most connected individuals were Meitner, who
had, since leaving Berlin in 1938, firmed up her links to Bohr in Copenhagen, as well as Fermi
and Szilard who had migrated to the United States. More importantly, Meitner’s nephew, Frisch
visited her at Christmas 1938. He was, at the time, under the supervision of Bohr in
Copenhagen. Bohr was preparing for a visit to the United States when Frisch contacted him
about the discovery and Bohr excitedly carried the news to the United States, where it was
distributed and tested by Szilard and Fermi. Szilard and Fermi were also highly connected
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individuals. Their contacts, due to their migration, spanned the Atlantic. Rutherford died in 1937
and thus, compared to Figure 6, a hub in Britain was removed. Figure 7 does not, therefore,
include a path of knowledge to Britain and this possibly explains why Oliphant, for example, did
not learn of the discovery of fission until after the readers of the New York Times.78

Lawrence and Oliphant as joint deans of an Invisible College
The cyclotron is a behemoth of physics apparatus and despite even a small one weighing several
tonnes its sole use is to accelerate infinitesimally small atoms and sub-atomic particles to almost
the speed of light and bombard them on a target. All manner of experiments can be conducted
in the apparatus, which was first built and patented by Lawrence in Berkeley in 1932. Compared
to the small hand-made laboratory equipment and tiny beam generators used in the
laboratories of Europe, the cyclotron was the industrial scale epitome of American utility—big,
bold and brash.79 The cyclotron and its variations are still in use today for generating radiation
for therapy in hospitals and enriching nuclear fuels. One of the variations of the cyclotron, the
synchrotron which Oliphant led the development of, is the basis for the Large Hadron Collider
that fills a 20 kilometre giant loop on the Swiss-French border.80
In 1933 Ernest Lawrence was one of only two Americans invited to the Solvay
conference in Brussels. His invitation had been granted on the basis of a new sub-atomic particle
he called a ‘deuton’ liberated from hydrogen.81 Lawrence’s breakthroughs were significant, and
during 1932 and 1933 resulted in him receiving several American prizes. With great confidence
he strode into the Solvay conference to take his seat with Europe’s elite. However, he found
himself the subject of considerable unexpected inquiry and critique. What Lawrence considered
novel and new, the cynical European scientists had been unable to replicate. The conclusions
that Lawrence had drawn were not, in the view of several attendees such as Rutherford and
Chadwick, definitive.82 Rutherford and Chadwick, who had discovered the nucleus and the
neutron respectively, were snobbish towards American science, and they scoffed at the brash
scale of the cyclotron and dismissed Lawrence’s claims to have liberated energy.83 Rutherford
and Chadwick’s intellectual squabble with American science, which Michael Hiltzik in his book
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Big Science referred to as the ‘Deuton Affair’,84 meant that there was little collaboration
between Cavendish and Berkeley in the early to mid-1930s.
In order to possibly subject Lawrence to more inquiry, Rutherford invited him to
Cavendish after the Solvay conference in 1933. Lawrence presented a talk at the Kapitza Club—
an informal gathering of physicists that was founded by Peter Kapitza, a Russian research fellow
in Cambridge.85 Oliphant was a regular at the club, and whilst there was healthy scepticism of
the ‘deuton’, Oliphant was intrigued by the cyclotron that Lawrence had invented. In March
1934, Oliphant wrote to Lawrence to suggest that Lawrence’s detection of the ‘deuton’ was just
a molecule-thin film of heavy water left on the apparatus.86 By April 1934 Oliphant, Rutherford
and Phillip Harteck submitted their results of the investigation of hydrogen isotopes to the
journal Nature for publication and snubbed Lawrence with a failure to cite his work at all.87 In
June 1934, Lawrence replied in detail to Oliphant’s letter and firmly provided further results
from new experiments along with considerable peer review and analysis from fellow American
scientists.88 Chadwick’s frostiness towards Berkeley started to thaw with renewed
communications from the mid-1930s.89 Oliphant attempted to further breakdown the barriers
and communicated with Lawrence in 1936 about possibly building a cyclotron at Cavendish and
he ended up arguing with Rutherford that their laboratory must think big or was in danger of
being left behind. Rutherford disagreed.90
Rutherford died in 1937, and Oliphant, who had that same year left Cavendish for
Birmingham, stepped out from the shadow of his mentor. Oliphant, whose love of apparatus
was equal to his ambition, was keen to build a cyclotron and to put the University of
Birmingham at the vanguard of European experimental atomic research. On 19 July 1938
Oliphant wrote to Lawrence for the first time in four years and expressed his interest in building
his own cyclotron in Birmingham.91 Oliphant’s letter was short, formal and cautiously toned. He
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stated his plans; how he would like to visit Berkeley later that year; and how he felt he could
achieve even higher energies than currently demonstrated by Lawrence’s machine. The
response written by Lawrence on 2 August 1938 was in an entirely different tone. Whether it
was the death of Rutherford; or that Lawrence had recently been recognised by British scientific
elite at the Royal Society with the Hughes Medal;92 or even that imitation is a sincere form of
flattery; Lawrence was entirely receptive to the renewed contact. He wrote warmly to Oliphant
starting with ‘Dear Professor Oliphant, I am delighted to hear you are planning to build a large
cyclotron. I quite share your views regarding the maximum energy attainable.’93 The letter
outlined considerable detail and also an agreement to send blueprints and photographs of the
Berkeley machine to Birmingham. Lawrence ended his letter with ‘It is good news to all of us
here that there is a possibility that you will visit us early in the New Year. Needless to say, a most
cordial welcome awaits you, and we will do everything we can to make your stay with us
pleasant and profitable. With kindest personal regards, sincerely EOL’.94
Oliphant, Lawrence and Lawrence’s colleague Donald Cooksey continued to
communicate regularly from August to November 1938. With each successive communication
the trust and enthusiasm for collaboration rose.95 Cooksey sent the blueprints for the new
medical cyclotron, and Oliphant wrote a reference for Lawrence who was seeking funding for his
new giant cyclotron. Lawrence and Cooksey’s cyclotron designs were, in turn, made available to
Oliphant, who modified them for his own purposes and helped secure a substantial endowment
of £250,000 from Lord Austin (the British car manufacturer).96
Lawrence and Oliphant were, in many respects, kindred spirits. They were born two
months apart in 1901, and had been both been raised in fairly humble conditions. Neither of
them could have been considered ‘establishment’ and both found their way into physics by
demonstrating an adeptness for apparatus. They both became heads of department of newschool universities before they reached forty. In December 1938, the same month that Hahn
and Strassman were experimenting on the uranium nucleus, Oliphant visited Berkeley for the
first time and viewed the cyclotron. In the new-year Oliphant left Berkeley and headed back to
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Britain via Columbia University in New York. Basking in the after-glow of his excellent visit to
Berkeley, Oliphant wrote to Lawrence from New York.97 His handwritten letter is a remarkable
illustration of how the two scientists had become great friends. Oliphant commenced the letter
with two apologies: first, that he took with him a set of the laboratory keys,98 and second, that
he had left Berkeley without paying his account at the Faculty Club. He wrote enthusiastically of
his time in Berkeley and even went so far as to compare the laboratory and Lawrence with
Cavendish and Rutherford.
I find it very difficult to thank you for the instructive time which I had
in Berkeley. It was truly fine of you to be so liberal of time and of
thoughts on my behalf. I know of no laboratory in the world at the
present time which has so fine a spirit or grand a tradition of hardwork. While there, I seemed to feel again the spirit of the old
Cavendish, and to find in you the fine qualities of a combined
camaraderie and leadership which endeared Rutherford to all who
worked with him. The essence of the Cavendish is now in Berkeley. I
am sincere in this and for these reasons I intend to visit someday, and I
hope soon.99

The ghost of Rutherford and the Deuton Affair had been exorcised.100 Had Oliphant remained at
Columbia for a few more days he would have been in attendance for the arrival of Bohr and
Szilard, who carried the news of the discovery of nuclear fission.
Oliphant invited Lawrence to a conference in Britain set for August 1939.101 Lawrence
declined the invitation due to pressing engagements relating to a funding drive for his new giant
cyclotron. Lawrence, not wanting to snub Oliphant, instead sent his brother, John Lawrence, a
medical physicist—a decision that proved fateful.102 John Lawrence’s visit to Britain was hosted
by Oliphant with the same grace that Lawrence had shown Oliphant the previous year. On 1
September 1939, the day Germany invaded Poland, John Lawrence boarded the SS Athenia in
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Glasgow for his return trip to the United States. Four days later the Athenia became the first
British vessel sunk by Germany in the war. In the scramble for information of his brother’s
plight, Lawrence sent a cable to Oliphant: “IS JOHN SAFE? EX-ATHENIA”. Oliphant used his
contacts to locate John’s whereabouts and cabled back, “JOHN SAFE, ADDRESS BERESFORD
HOTEL GLASGOW”.103 The war, it seemed, had reached the scientists almost immediately and
Lawrence and Oliphant knew that, in times of crisis and when they needed help, they could rely
on each other. Their friendship continued until Lawrence’s early death in 1956, and Oliphant
exchanged regular letters with Lawrence’s widow Molly for a further thirty years.104
The relationship between Oliphant and Lawrence sees them positioned as joint deans of
an invisible college of scientists. Whilst friendship is a universal human emotion, the ties that
bound the physicists formed from a commonality of interest and enabled a trans-Atlantic bridge
that transcended national interests. And as explained in Chapter Three, Lawrence’s American
associates such as Arthur Compton and Robert Oppenheimer, and Oliphant’s Birmingham
colleagues, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls were all enveloped into this unified circle of trust
which enabled key secrets of bomb physics to be safely communicated.

Chapter conclusions: understanding social interaction in the atomic age
Atomic physics made great leaps forward from the discovery of radiation in the late 1800s to the
discovery of nuclear fission in 1938. Whilst there are some exceptions, the operation and
interaction of scientists, in the early part of the twentieth century was, at first, generally
clustered within individual countries: the French, led by Curie, focused on radiation; the British
led by Rutherford concentrated on sub-atomic physics; and the Germans explored theoretical
physics such as Relativity led by Einstein and quantum theory led initially by Planck, Bohr,105 and
Schrödinger. By the 1930s, the discovery of fission as well as the Oliphant-Lawrence relationship
demonstrate that collaboration of scientists—the invisible colleges—transcended national
boundaries.
The complexity of quantum theory and its demolishing of classical Newtonian mechanics
took science beyond the visualisation and perception of the laity. The mysterious world of the
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inner atom became one of uncertainty and probability in which the physicists saw that a particle
could be in different places at the same time, that energy had the ability to convert to matter
and vice versa, and that the inner workings of all things formed their own unique set of laws.
This complexity drove a new community of scientists who communicated with each other
through their own lingua franca of equations, Greek symbols and technology. This interaction
was a grand invisible college in which knowledge was pursued and shared rapidly. Even the rise
of the Nazis in the 1930s did not curtail the interaction and communication of the scientists.
Indeed it had the opposite effect—refugee scientists carried knowledge from Nazi Germany and
to the neutral and allied countries including Sweden, Britain, France and the United States.
Rutherford formed a key British hub for the flow of information in the 1930s. His death
in 1937 came around the time that Oliphant was spreading his wings and moved to Birmingham.
Rutherford’s death immediately removed a hub from the established small-world network and
broke the spokes on which knowledge travelled to Britain. The discovery of fission in late 1938
spread rapidly like a contagion, within weeks, from Germany to Sweden to Denmark and to the
United States. It is conceivable that the void left by Rutherford meant that knowledge of fission
did not make it to Britain until February 1939 with the publication in Nature. This demonstrates
the importance of maintaining the relationships in the network. However, the death of
Rutherford ended a squabble between British and American scientists. British links into
American science were beginning, at this time, to be re-forged in part by Oliphant who, with
Lawrence, had developed an invisible college between Birmingham and Berkeley that was built
on mutual research interests in giant machines; shared enthusiasm; and a friendship formed
from a commonality of age, career stage and trust. Oliphant’s concern and effort to help
Lawrence’s family when the Athenia was torpedoed should not be underestimated. This crisis
must have further increased the trust between Lawrence and Oliphant and, as is investigated in
Chapter Three, when Oliphant needed assistance in transferring knowledge, he bypassed the
correct channels to call upon Lawrence for help.
The mapping of small-world networks can chart the generational shift between the
Solvay scientists of 1927 to 1933. The quantum mechanics crisis is an exemplar of the postparadigm levelling of knowledge and allowed the new generation to take the lead from the
older generation of physicists. Combining this leveller with the complexity of quantum
mechanics and the international migration of knowledge, a new generation of scientists
emerged that would ultimately converge with a pooling of knowledge in the Manhattan Project
to build the first atomic bomb.
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PART TWO
Oliphant and the Atom

CHAPTER THREE
The Indiscretion of Mark Oliphant, 1941

Most secrets are secrets of the mouth. Gossip shared and small
scandals whispered. There secrets long to be let loose upon the world.
A secret of the mouth is like a stone in your boot. At first you’re barely
aware of it. Then it grows irritating, then intolerable. Secrets of the
mouth grow larger the longer you keep them, swelling until they press
against your lips. They fight to be let free.1

In a 1965 interview, Robert Oppenheimer, the idiosyncratic former scientific leader of the
Manhattan Project, was asked about the project’s early origins. ‘I was not brought into it until
perhaps September of ‘41,’ he said, ‘and then by an indiscretion, an eminent English visitor
started talking to Lawrence and me’.2 The ‘eminent English visitor’ was Mark Oliphant and the
meeting was held at the University of California, Berkeley, on 22 and 23 September 1941.
The Berkeley meeting between Oliphant, Lawrence and Oppenheimer is part of the
folklore of the atomic bomb and is noted in several of the more detailed works on the
Manhattan Project. The official American government report on the Manhattan Project by
Henry Smyth, published only days after the bombs fell on Japan, referred to the Berkeley
meeting as one of ‘the many less formal discussions held’.3 In Richard Hewlett and Oscar
Anderson’s The New World, 1939–1946: A History of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, they asserted that Oliphant’s visit was to explain the relevance of the British
research, almost in an academic way, to the National Academy of Science.4 Furthermore,
Britain’s official account, Margaret Gowing’s Britain and Atomic Energy: 1939–1945, published in
1964, mentioned that Lawrence was ‘impressed’ with Oliphant in September 1941, and she
suggested that the Americans were receptive to the British research.5 Recent American texts
such as Tom Zoellner’s Uranium: War, Energy and the Rock That Shaped the World mentioned
the meeting in passing,6 while Michael Hiltzik’s Big Science: Ernest Lawrence and the Invention
1
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that Launched the Military Industrial Complex has several references to the Berkeley meeting
and includes how Lawrence immediately took action on Oliphant’s recommendation.7 Graham
Farmelo’s British-focussed Churchill’s Bomb dedicated a whole chapter to Oliphant’s adventures
in the United States in 1941 and he emphasised that Oliphant was direct and outspoken with
both the American and British authorities.8 With the exception of Farmelo’s work, the
aforementioned texts do not mention that Oppenheimer was in attendance at the September
1941 meeting. Similarly, Oppenheimer’s biography, American Prometheus by Kai Bird and
Martin Sherwin suggested Oppenheimer only came into the bomb project on the insistence of
Lawrence in October 1941.9 Historian Sabine Lee, in her 2006 article for the journal British
Contemporary History, reviewed how the British contribution to the Manhattan Project had
generally been overlooked or downplayed, and noted that Oliphant goaded the Americans into
action with an approach to the National Defense Research Council (NDRC) Uranium
Committee.10 Oliphant lamented, in a 1986 letter to the foreign editor of the Advertiser in
Adelaide, that the importance of the early British participation in atomic bomb development
had been downplayed in historical accounts.11 Oppenheimer had himself chosen not to name
Oliphant in the interview conducted by Stephane Groueff. When Oppenheimer described the
intervention of an indiscreet Englishman, Groueff queried ‘Was that Oliphant?’, and
Oppenheimer replied: ‘You shall have to provide the name, as I will not.’12
At the time of the meeting, Oliphant was a member of the MAUD Committee, the British
government group investigating the concept of an atomic bomb. By then MAUD had made great
advances on the concept of an aircraft-portable atomic bomb. In early 1941 the committee was
advancing plans to build the bomb themselves, though the risk of German invasion and
compromised British industrial capacity meant they looked instead to the United States. The
September 1941 meeting came about after British reports on the bomb were being largely
ignored in the United States. In discussions with Oliphant’s biographer, David Ellyard, who
interviewed Oliphant in 1980 on the topic, I asked directly whether he knew if Oliphant had said
whether the Berkeley meeting was sanctioned by the MAUD Committee. Ellyard’s response was
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to apologetically state ‘It never occurred to me to ask that question, on whose authority he did
it?’13
It is important to note that the United States, in September 1941, had not yet joined the
war and was providing mainly tacit logistical support and supply to the British. Formal
collaboration between the United States and Britain was underway on the radar project,14 and
several British based scientists were in correspondence with associates in the United States.15
The United States was, however, a refuge for physicists fleeing Axis countries, many of whom
maintained their links with colleagues in Europe while circumstances of the war allowed.16 So,
whilst scientific interaction occurred on many levels, including the preparation for wartime
technologies, the United States government remained reluctant to involve itself in the European
war. The refugee physicists knew well that Germany was the most technologically advanced
war-machine of Europe, and knew of knowledge of physicists such as Werner Heisenberg who
were actively engaged in atomic research.17 These concerns presented a clear and present
threat and were a key motivator for United States-based scientists to make themselves available
for war-time technology work.
Some historians suggest that the Manhattan Project was conceived as a response to the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.18 Evidence suggests otherwise. Oppenheimer stated, in his
1965 interview with Groueff, that the decision to proceed with the project was taken on 6
December 1941—remarkably, the day before the attack on Pearl Harbor:
Oppenheimer: The decision was actually made on December 6, to take
the thing seriously.
Groueff: ’41?
Oppenheimer: Right.
Groueff: After Pearl Harbor?
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Oppenheimer: Before Pearl Harbor.19
President Truman also acknowledged the early origins of the bomb project when he informed
the world in August 1945 of the destruction of Hiroshima. Truman declared that British and
United States cooperation had started before Pearl Harbor:
Beginning in 1940, before Pearl Harbor, scientific knowledge useful in
war was pooled between the United States and Great Britain, and
many priceless helps to our victories have come from that
arrangement. Under that general policy the research on the atomic
bomb was begun. With American and British scientists working
together we entered the race of discovery against the Germans.20
This chapter will analyse the relevance of the September 1941 meeting and will argue that it was
truly, as Oppenheimer euphemistically called it, ‘an indiscretion’. By examining the events in the
lead up to the meeting, and its resulting outcomes, it will be argued that Oliphant’s meeting at
Berkeley illustrates his belligerent nature and preparedness to bypass secrecy provisions, and
will exemplify the importance of cooperation between scientists. Oliphant approached
Lawrence as a fellow member of an invisible college. Whilst their meeting was just one in a long
line of scientific endeavours, it propelled a rapid escalation in atomic research that ultimately
led to the design and construction of the atomic bomb.

Foundations of the bomb: MAUD & the Frisch-Peierls Memorandum
In January 1939 the extraordinary energies produced by uranium under neutron bombardment
were explained by Austrian physicists Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch, who had both previously
worked in Berlin. Being Jewish, by 1939 they were in exile in Sweden and Denmark
respectively.21 Their breakthrough was the result of a progression of atomic physics that
followed from the 1933 Solvay Conference. With the phenomenon of fission now explained,
physicists got to work on defining and maturing the science.
There are two properties to the uranium element that are relevant here. First, with 92
protons and 146 neutrons it has the largest and heaviest nucleus of the naturally occurring
elements. Secondly its nucleus is so heavy that it is unstable and it naturally emits alpha
radiation as it transmutates to thorium. Nuclear fission involves splitting the uranium nucleus
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with a neutron. An atom’s nucleus is tiny, relative to its overall size,22 so the larger the nucleus,
the easier it is to hit. Shooting a neutron, as an infinitesimal bullet, requires an element of luck
to hit the heart of the atom.23 As the uranium atom decays, in an instant flash, two lighter
elements (krypton and barium) are created, other neutrons are released and the mass
differential is converted to energy and Einstein’s famous equation E=mc2 comes into effect.24
The epiphany of using the left-over neutrons from fission to start a chain reaction with
huge explosive force is credited to the Hungarian émigré physicist, Leo Szilard. In mid-1939
Szilard considered the probability of a jettisoned neutron finding another nucleus. If a critical
mass of material is combined then the chances of neutrons finding another nucleus, in the vast
space within atoms, would increase to a probabilistic certainty, the chain reaction would
become inevitable, and the conversion of mass to energy would let out a blinding flash of light
and an almighty explosion.25
Szilard had fled his research laboratory in Germany following the rise of Nazi antiSemitism in 1933.26 Knowing that German laboratories were at the centre of advanced atomic
research, the prospect that they might successfully create an all-powerful bomb gripped him
with fear. With it he believed the Nazis would be unstoppable. Arriving in the United States in
1939, Szilard teamed up with Eugene Wigner, a fellow émigré who was working at Princeton.
Wigner and Szilard worried whether they could convince the authorities of the enormous
potential and scale of an atomic bomb—they needed an ally with a higher profile to do their
bidding. Szilard paid a visit to the most famous scientist in the world, and fellow Jewish refugee
from Europe—Albert Einstein. He was immediately convinced and wrote to Franklin Roosevelt.27
Einstein, due to his reputation, did not need to go into technical detail on the inner workings of
the atom, because being the most famous scientist in the world his opinion would be trusted.
He merely stressed three important facts, that: (i) a new bomb would be extremely powerful
(beyond current imagination ‘to destroy a whole port and some of the surrounding territory’);
(ii) the United States lacked the necessary raw material and was hence already disadvantaged;
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and (iii) Germany had secured the raw materials, had commenced work under political
influence, and was, hence, already advantaged. Einstein did not detail the expertise and the
leading edge of quantum physics that was born out of the laboratories of Germany. He also did
not point out that American science was then lagging. Instead, he stated that work by Enrico
Fermi and Szilard was underway. Fermi and Szilard, at this point, had barely been in the United
States for six months. Einstein politely provided a possible structure for increased activity.
Einstein’s letter is often considered the start of the American bomb project.28 Roosevelt
authorised the formation of the Uranium Committee under the National Defense Research
Council (NDRC) to be overseen by the council’s director, Vannevar Bush, who placed a
bureaucrat in charge, Lyman Briggs. The funding to America’s university-based nuclear physics
laboratories increased. Szilard’s estimations involved the use of the common uranium238 isotope,
which would require tens of tonnes of material to make the critical mass for an explosion. Such
a bomb, Einstein pointed out, would be too heavy for transportation by air.
Therefore this bomb, if its science proved possible, would require a large payload sailed into a
harbour by a suicidal crew. This fanciful concept was, at best, an impractical weapon and meant
that, until 1941, America’s proposed bomb was not taken overly seriously by government. As
per Einstein’s recommendations, universities received increased funding for fission experiments,
but were largely isolated and collaborated little.29
Szilard was right on one important matter though. Others, including Germany, were
thinking about the bomb. Whilst the relationships of the atomic physicists interleaved open
discussion across political divides for most of the 1930s, the borders of Europe were closing.
However, the simplicity of the science of fission had been laid bare for all to see since the
beginning of 1939.30 The possibility of a super bomb was even being reported in the mainstream
media when London’s Sunday Express ran a related article in April 1939.31 In May and July 1939,
Oliphant and Lawrence exchanged letters discussing the topic. Oliphant was not yet convinced
that an explosion was possible. Lawrence seemed equally sceptical, though pondered whether a
clue might be found in the isotopes of uranium, rather than in the natural element itself.32
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The British government set up the MAUD Committee to investigate prospects of an
atomic bomb in 1940.33 The committee code name was originally attributed to a message that
the Danish scientist Niels Bohr had sent to Frisch in Birmingham in early 1940, which read ‘Tell
Cockcroft and Maud Ray Kent’. The phrase, Maud Ray Kent, was considered by Frisch and fellow
physicist, John Cockcroft, to be coded garbled message relating to an anagram of radium. Maud
Ray was, in fact, a real person from Kent who was the Bohr children’s governess before the
war.34 The original MAUD Committee, also known as the ‘Sub-Committee on the Uranium
Bomb’, held its first meetings in April 1940 and fell under the larger Committee for the Scientific
Survey of Air Warfare of the Ministry of Aircraft Production. The founding members were
exclusively Cavendish alumni. The committee was chaired by Professor George P. Thomson of
Cambridge University. Other members included Professor James Chadwick, the discoverer of the
neutron and at this point at the University of Liverpool; John Cockcroft, the Assistant Director of
Scientific Research at the Ministry of Supply; and Oliphant who was, by then, at the University of
Birmingham.35
The MAUD Committee was not Oliphant’s first dalliance with war work. He had
previously been focused on the miniaturisation of radar, also through the Committee for the
Scientific Survey of Air Warfare. Whilst radar had been in operation since the mid-1930s, it was
cumbersome and heavy equipment that was generally mounted in purpose-built radar stations.
Oliphant was drafted into the top-secret radar project in 1938.36 The problem with which
Oliphant and his colleagues were tasked was the shortening of the wavelength of radio waves to
less than one metre. This would allow the waves to pass through atmospheric conditions, such
as cloud, and bounce off hidden aircraft at some distance. In addition, the radio waves might not
be overly inhibited by sea water and, therefore, detect submarines below the surface. These
new devices were required to be fitted to aircraft and hence had to be small and light. Oliphant
sought advice on this problem from Lawrence in his letter of 11 January 1939, sent from
Columbia University on his way back to Britain after visiting Berkeley the first time.37 Despite the
project attracting the highest level of secrecy within the British government, Oliphant’s letter
was sent by standard post, rather than secure channels. It was also indiscreet, spelling out the
problem frankly, and its military application:
I find a letter from the Defence Department in England asking whether
I will enquire about the generation of large power and very short
33
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radio-waves. As I think I told you, they are used to obtain reflection off
from aircraft, and about 1 metre wavelength is feasible. I believe the
klystron has been developed for this purpose. I am familiar with the
general principle [but] cannot find out how it is initiated. I shall be
grateful if you know this and can pass it on, without betraying
confidence, if you will tell me how it is done. Four kilowatts of the
energy is required to obtain good positions of enemy aircraft by the
monitor of reflected waves.38
The workings for the klystron had not been made public as the invention was subject to a
pending commercial patent. However, Lawrence contacted Professor Webster at Stanford who
had worked on the device, who then wrote to Oliphant with details and design of the klystron.39
Oliphant, obviously, did not care for keeping secrets if they might delay the
advancement of science.40 The subsequent invention of the cavity magnetron led by Oliphant
and Phillip Moon, who directed their colleagues John Randall and Albert Boot, was a massive
breakthrough in aircraft technology. The new equipment was the size of a dinner plate and
could be fitted to small fighter or reconnaissance aircraft, and came just in time to help the
Royal Air Force stave off sustained Nazi air raids.41 The romantic, propagandistic image of the
civilian corps air observer standing on a rooftop, backed by London’s skyline, is likely distant
from the truth.42 The sounding of air-raid sirens and the scrambling of Spitfires were, in fact, the
result of urgent notifications issued by bunkered operators, many of who were members of the
Women’s Air Force Auxiliary,43 reading pips from radio waves generated by the cavity
magnetron developed in Oliphant’s Birmingham laboratory.
The war-time radar work was so top secret that two of Oliphant’s eager refugee
physicists were excluded from it due to their Austrian and German origins. In order to keep
them busy, Oliphant set Rudolf Peierls and Frisch on to a less secret and more fancifully
theoretical project—the atomic bomb.44 World War Two was rapidly becoming the first war
fought as much in the skies as on the ground or the seas. The key problem that faced Frisch and
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Peierls was, as with radar technology, the means to fit such a bomb on to an aircraft. Frisch was
familiar with the physics, having worked with his aunt, Lise Meitner, over the Christmas of 1938,
on first explaining the energy created by uranium under neutron bombardment and then
coining the term ‘fission’.45 Just as Szilard had conveyed to Einstein, the critical mass required of
uranium was several tonnes— the laws of quantum mechanics and probability simply did not
allow enough neutrons to find enough nuclei to cause a chain reaction without the need for a
very large mass. To use the common element uranium in creating an air-portable uranium
atomic bomb was not just difficult technology, it was then a scientific impossibility.
Naturally occurring uranium is made up of two isotopes, 99.3% of which is uranium238.
The remainder is uranium235. Possibly elicited by the letter from Lawrence to Oliphant in June
1939,46 Frisch and Peierls hypothesised that if uranium235 was used instead of the more common
isotope uranium238 a smaller critical mass would be required. They crunched the numbers,
checked their remarkable results, wrote a report, and handed it to Oliphant in March 1940.
Using the uranium235 isotope, they argued that a critical mass of only a few kilograms would be
required. Providing that enough uranium235 could be enriched, the potential to build an airportable atomic bomb was now a theoretical possibility.47
The energy is liberated in a small volume, in which it will, for an instant
produce a temperature comparable to that in the interior of the sun.
The blast from such an explosion would destroy life in a wide area. In
addition, some part of the energy set free goes to produce radioactive
substances and these will emit very powerful and dangerous
radiations.48
Oliphant took the Frisch-Peierls memorandum to the April 1940 meeting of the MAUD
Committee at Burlington House in Piccadilly. The breakthrough was intended to be heartening
news for the other committee members. There was, however, more worrying news. A French
agent who had recently escaped the advance of the Nazis brought news that the Germans were
securing supplies of uranium from Czechoslovakia, and would shortly have access to heavy
water (hydrogen isotopes) from Norway.49 The MAUD Committee members discussed that they
had to push on with atomic weaponry and beat the Germans to it.50
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If the British were to beat Germany to the bomb, the biggest challenge would be the
complicated industrial process of separating uranium235 from uranium238. Oliphant’s designs for
a particle accelerator, ‘the synchrotron’, a variation of Lawrence’s cyclotron, was the kind of
technology that would be required to be built on a huge industrial scale. For the remainder of
1940 and into 1941 the MAUD Committee activity included design work with the arms
manufacturer, Metropolitan Vickers. In addition, they began to procure enough scientific brain
power to build the weapon.51 MAUD was always a secret committee, but Oliphant had, just as
he did with radar, reached out to outsiders to help solve its problems. Frisch and Peierls were
not permitted to join the committee and, despite their breakthrough discovery, were kept at
arm’s length. This continued throughout the year with a constant debate on whether refugee
Germans in Britain working in various universities should be involved. Thomson, the chair of the
MAUD Committee, forbade any Axis émigré from the committee’s work and Oliphant frequently
spoke in the defence of scientific freedoms and how, without a concerted multi-disciplined
effort involving the maximum brain power available, progress would be stalled.52
In early 1941 the MAUD Committee received 550 pounds of uranium oxide on loan from
the Department of Scientific Research, which Oliphant signed for.53 It is unclear from where the
uranium was procured, but it most likely came from somewhere in the Empire such as Australia
or Canada. In fact, in Oliphant’s home state of South Australia, the Radium Hill mine had been
producing uranium in small quantities for medical x-rays since its discovery by another famous
Australian scientist, Douglas Mawson, in 1906.54 The amount of material loaned to Oliphant
would have contained around 1.5 kilograms of uranium235, and whilst barely enough for a bomb,
it enabled further scientific testing.
The updated MAUD report and feasibility study for the industrial facilities was
completed in the spring of 1941 and was sent to the British Imperial Committee of Defence (the
Hankey Committee). The enquiries for procurement of parts and choosing of sites commenced
and the industrial powerhouse, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) was contacted.55 Britain, it
seemed, was pushing on with the bomb itself. Yet there were a number of impediments to
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Britain building the atomic bomb. Through the winter of 1940–41 the industrial centres of
Britain were under near-nightly attack from German bombers. The power infrastructure and
sourcing of raw materials provided a present threat to completion, not to mention that an
uranium235 concentration factory could be built in two years and destroyed in a night by an air
raid. In May 1941, D.G. Pye, the Director of Scientific Research attached to the British military
and the MAUD Committee, sent a letter to Dr Hans Halban in Cambridge who was working on
experiments on behalf of MAUD. Halban was a Frenchman and another refugee scientist, having
worked with Frederic Joliot and Irene Joliot-Curie in Paris up until the German invasion.56 The
letter informed Halban that the MAUD Committee, subject to Cabinet approval, would be
sending all the results and findings to the United States. Halban was instructed to complete his
work as fully as possible in preparation for the transfer. The letter also detailed that a mission
would be sent to the United States in order to present the work.57
The MAUD Committee minutes from 3 July 1941 included considerable discussion on
the transfer of the entire project across the Atlantic. Oliphant was vocal on the risks of persisting
with the project in Britain:
Professor Oliphant considered that the time had come to take a
decision regarding the future of the work since it must be at least two
years before any possible results can be expected. He considered that
the work could not be profitably done in this country for this war and
suggested that it would be desirable to send Halban and his team to
Canada and work on a co-operative effort between the United States
and Canada. Mr [?]58 said, that the proposal was in general accordance
with the Government’s attitude. A distinction should, however, be
drawn between the industrial and the research aspect. The work at the
Universities in this country on the latter should be continued. It was
pointed out that since the co-operation between the various groups in
this country was so good, it would be desirable to take all the
collaborators to America if the work was to be transferred there.59
Despite the progress and collaborative environment that the MAUD Committee had fostered,
the British were now understanding the magnitude of building an atomic bomb in Britain. The
suggestion that not just one or two researchers should attend to work in the United States, but
a large contingent should migrate across the Atlantic, was a portent for the eventual British
mission to the Manhattan Project.
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The form and rules of engagement with the United States had been drawn up in a
memorandum on 30 June 1941 and focussed on how the exchange of information was to occur
between British agencies and committees and their American counterparties.60 The
memorandum was prefaced with an acknowledgment that interaction between scientists was
influenced by ‘historical and personal factors that will tend to direct informal correspondence in
a more or less arbitrary manner’.61 To have reference to the ‘direct and informal
correspondence’ is a recognition that scientists, not just Oliphant, had a reputation for being
rather untameable around formal channels and is a nod to the sociological construct of the
invisible college. Whilst secrecy was not particularly referenced, the memorandum explicitly
stated and reaffirmed that the correct channels must be used and permission must be received
from a relevant home department prior to any interaction occurring.
At the 18 July 1941 MAUD Committee meeting a secret intelligence report was
presented that detailed the project funding and areas of research of every atomic scientist of
significance in the United States. It is unlikely, due to America’s secrecy provisions that this
information was sent freely to the British. The list was most likely compiled with the assistance
of the British scientists by reviewing their existing ‘invisible college’, but also included details of
Standard Oil’s secret heavy water plant under construction in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and
hence suggests that the British had agents actively reviewing scientific and industrial progress in
the United States. Also noted in the report is that Lawrence, Oliphant’s long-term collaborator,
was working on the newly discovered element numbered ‘94’, later named plutonium, which
would also provide a second possible fissile element for atomic bomb construction. 62
On 5 August 1941, two years after Einstein wrote to Roosevelt detailing the possibility of
an atomic bomb, Oliphant climbed aboard a B-24 Liberator bomber for the 16-hour flight from
Prestwick in Scotland to Gander in Newfoundland.63 The official purpose of his mission was to
present radar business to the NDRC.64 It seems, however, that given the July discussions at the
MAUD Committee meeting, other purposes of the visit were to enquire on progress of the NDRC
Uranium Committee, and to blaze a trail for British atomic scientists to relocate to the United
States. The NDRC had received MAUD Committee reports for some time, but had returned to
Britain very little information on its own progress.
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On 8 August, Oliphant went with Charles Darwin (the grandson of the author of the
Origin of Species), who was the British scientific attaché to Washington, to visit Briggs, the
chairman of the NDRC Uranium Committee. In correspondence on this and the subsequent
meetings, Oliphant referred to the American committee also as the ‘MAUD Committee’, possibly
to codify the purpose of both committee’s work, or because the vernacular had become his
proper noun to describe any committee focused on the uranium bomb. Oliphant wrote to
Thomson on 9 August, perplexed at the fact that the British MAUD report was locked in a safe
and Briggs was having ‘mild mania about the secrecy business’.65 This was potentially a
sideswipe at Thomson himself, who also operated the MAUD Committee with more secrecy
than Oliphant liked.
It appears that some of the information sent over from England is put
in a safe by Briggs when it arrived and is not released to all members
of the committee. He has a mild mania about the secrecy business. The
list of information forwarded given me by Dickins, has been handed to
Darwin, who will [attempt] to trace the separate items. A meeting of
the MAUD Committee here is to be called in about two weeks, and I
will make a point of attending.66

On 26 August Oliphant joined the NDRC Uranium Committee meeting in New York as a guest.
The meeting included Briggs, Szilard, George Pegram, Harold Urey and others. Having refugee
scientists, such as Szilard, involved in the American committees would have met with the
approval of Oliphant given that he had, with futility, argued for German and Austrian Jewish
émigrés resident in Britain to join the British committee.67 While there was considerable secrecy
around the NDRC Uranium Committee, the United States was not then at war.
The functionality of work being conducted under the auspices of the Uranium
Committee was, however, poor and the liaison with the American Academy of Science seemed
to also lack direction. Oliphant was scathing of the ‘rather ineffective chairmanship of Briggs’
and the structure of the committee that excluded ‘those who mattered or did the work, like
Fermi or Urey or Dunning68 were either left off the Committee or deprived by the inertia of the
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Chair of all ability to hustle things’.69
Oliphant’s report back to the MAUD Committee in Britain also outlined all of the
scientific intelligence that he gathered and the details of what the American scientists were
working on. This included details of Fermi’s graphite pile (essentially the world’s first nuclear
reactor) that was being built in a squash court at the University of Chicago; the news of the new
element ‘94’ (plutonium); and Briggs’ scepticism of the use of uranium235. It seemed that whilst
there was some progress, individual groups and institutions were working on different parts of
the uranium problem with none of the organised and rigorous effort that was being carried out
by the British. Furthermore, the American research was still focused more on the esoteric
aspects of fission and was not specifically focussed on the bomb itself. Even at this point Fermi,
probably the most experienced of the American resident scientists, had not seen the FrischPeierls memorandum and did not believe that a sustained chain reaction would produce an
explosion at all.70
American activities were slow, suffered disunity, and were largely ineffectual.
Oppenheimer later described this early work as ‘a series of desultory committees’.71 There was
little urgency and direction amongst the American researchers. It is hardly surprising that the
British had a greater sense of urgency. The Americans had not, at this point, joined the war, and
if Germany was working on an atomic bomb, there was not, in any event, an aircraft capable of
carrying the device directly from Europe to America’s cities. In contrast, the British were under
attack by the Luftwaffe and were still under threat of invasion. Oliphant had sent his family back
to the apparent safety of Australia in 1940.72 Intelligence reports from occupied Europe
indicated that the Nazis had already secured raw materials by its conquest of Czechoslovakia
and Norway, and British scientists knew of the expertise of Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg, Fritz
Strassmann and others located in Berlin.
On 12 September Oliphant reported the outcomes of his visit via a secure diplomatic
bag from the office of the British Scientific Mission in Washington. Oliphant had, at this stage,
visited major cities in eastern North America, including Washington, New York, Chicago and
Ottawa. He was clearly infuriated about the progress of atomic science in the United States,
including its science restricted by secrecy. It was not the reception he had expected.
Oliphant was, by this time, one of the most respected scientists in the field. He was a
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noted raconteur, had the ability to explain complex problems simply, and as a result was also an
expert promoter of science. He would often speak his mind with passion and without the stuffy
politeness of the British establishment.73 His charming and disarming personality made him a
perfect candidate for the trip to the United States. It must have, therefore, been humbling and
frustrating to him that the Americans were aloof and seemed to treat him as an annoyance.
Some, such as Briggs, seemed unimpressed with the British work and certainly did not express
the same degree of excitement that the British did over the Frisch-Peierls memorandum. The
American based scientists that were even slightly aware of the British work, were putting more
effort into trying to prove the British wrong.74 This was not consummate with a scientific spirit of
cooperation and certainly not a path that would achieve an outcome for Britain if Germany
made an atomic bomb and threatened its use in the war in Europe.
By mid-September Oliphant had been away from home for six weeks. He could have
easily turned around and returned frustrated to Britain. He had done everything that had been
asked of him, but had made little headway. It seemed that if Britain was invaded by the Nazis
then its atomic science research would likely halt or fall into the hands of the Germans. As had
been discussed in the MAUD meeting on 3 July 1941, America provided the hope and possible
sanctuary for transferring the British project and its scientists in its entirety, but that thought
must have, at this point, seemed an unlikely outcome.
As Oliphant had demonstrated in the development of the cavity magnetron, he was
prepared to go around secrecy provisions in order to advance science.75 Oliphant later suggested
that his own lack of patience with American scientists spurred his personal decision to head to
Berkeley.76 The slight opening that Oliphant saw was that there were potential changes to the
structure of the NDRC committee on the horizon. Seemingly the American Academy of Science
was to become more involved in the organisation of the committee and its sub-committees.77
Rather than having a bureaucrat like Briggs as its leader, Arthur Compton of the University of
Chicago was the presumptive nominee to become the chair of the new Academy-led committee.
Compton and Oliphant had never met but they would have undoubtedly been aware of each
other’s work. Compton had, in the early 1920s, been at Cavendish and returned to the United
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States long before Oliphant’s arrival in Cambridge from Australia.78
What Oliphant did next changed the course of the atomic bomb development and
commenced a series of events that eventually resulted in the construction of the atomic bombs
used on Japan. In search of a trusted ally, and someone who may have more clout amongst
authorities such as the American Academy of Science, he boarded a train,79 crossed the vast
continent of the United States, and arrived at Berkeley to knock on the laboratory door of his old
friend, Lawrence.

The Berkeley Meeting, 23–24 September 1941
Oliphant arrived at Berkeley on 21 September 1941. There are a number of reasons why
Oliphant would have sought a visit to Lawrence. The most obvious is that he did not want to
leave the United States without making progress on the atomic bomb issue. He may also have
longed to see Lawrence’s partially-constructed giant cyclotron. After all, the machine was being
constructed with funds that Oliphant had assisted Lawrence in securing. Throughout the
National Archives (UK) files relating to the MAUD Committee there is no reference to the
meeting before the fact, and no evidence to suggest that Oliphant had sought the prior approval
of Thomson or the British authorities. Nevertheless, in his indomitable style, Oliphant sent
notice to Lawrence and barrelled over to Berkeley. Lawrence was on summer holidays in
southern California, but took time out and Oliphant arrived in San Francisco in time to meet
Lawrence at the Oakland Airport on 22 September.80
Oliphant presented Lawrence with the Frisch-Peierls memorandum and explained the
work completed in Britain, which had been kept secret from other Americans by Briggs. Whilst
Lawrence was engaged in active research on the atom, and his group had discovered plutonium,
Lawrence was not directly involved with the NDRC Uranium Committee. Instead he had
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reported his findings through the American Academy of Science committee.81

Figure 8 Mark Oliphant, 'Letter to George Thomson, 9 August 1941'.page 1, National Archives UK,
AB15/6077
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Oliphant wrote a report of the meeting and sent it directly to Thomson. Its opening
paragraphs recorded that Lawrence was not happy at being kept out of strategic discussions in
the United States. In a further dig at the American committee and its structure, Oliphant
referred to American secrecy as ‘excessive’, which was at the expense of scientists of ‘real
calibre’:
Owing the excessive secrecy, which cut off from the work every man of
real calibre in nuclear physics, the fantastic situation developed in
which workers outside the scheme, like the Berkeley group, Fermi,
etc., were holding open discussions in the normal way to talk over the
problems of fission.82
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, scholarly literature generally suggests that
Oppenheimer was not in attendance at this meeting. Oliphant mentioned Oppenheimer in his
report only insofar as to say that Lawrence recommended that Oppenheimer check the
numbers. Oppenheimer, however, in the 1965 interview with Groueff acknowledged that he
was at the meeting.83 In the Oppenheimer archive at the Library of Congress in Washington
there is a memorandum written by Oliphant dated 25 September 1941.84 This memorandum
does not exist in the Lawrence archive, suggesting that it may have only been sent to
Oppenheimer. The document is a summary of the key issues discussed by the scientists. It
contains an initial discussion of scientific aspects of bomb feasibility and included a mention of
priorities assessed by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) if a bomb was to be constructed in
Britain. In a clear nod to Oliphant’s desire to bring the project to the United States, he included a
reference that he and other MAUD Committee members were sceptical of ICI’s potential
involvement. The science, however, serves as an introduction to the second part of the
memorandum with an urgent supplication on collaboration, politics and action:
I would like to say that the preparation of a nuclear bomb, if this be
possible, should be undertaken at once and on the very highest
priority. We cannot afford to neglect even a probability that the
scheme will work successfully. Whichever nation is first to succeed in
this quest will undoubtedly be master of the world. If peace were to
81
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come tomorrow it would still be necessary to obtain the answer first,
at all costs, for in the hands of a resentful or unscrupulous nation such
power would be dangerous.85
It appears that Oliphant, who himself was invested in the political discourse in Britain through
the MAUD Committee, had found a welcome ally in Oppenheimer. Whereas Oliphant and
Lawrence had a commonality on the science and cyclotrons, Oliphant and Oppenheimer both
saw the political priorities for activity. Oppenheimer, similarly to Oliphant, was a charismatic
leader and had the ability to convince authorities, and whilst Oliphant’s trip to Berkeley was to
convince Lawrence of the science, it had the conclusion of bringing Oppenheimer, for the first
time into the atomic bomb project. The memorandum that Oliphant sent to Oppenheimer was
not an official document and is not found in the British archives. Oliphant even concluded his
correspondence with a clear statement that this was not an official document:
While I have discussed the MAUD Committee and have made very
definite statements in this memorandum, it must be made perfectly
clear that I speak as an individual and without any official status or
authority in this matter.86
Oliphant’s meeting with Lawrence and Oppenheimer, and the subsequent communication with
Oppenheimer, is perhaps his first example of using the trust-based network, formed originally as
an invisible scientific college, to gain transnational political activity. This action, including and
especially the bringing of Oppenheimer into the discussion, prompted a renewed activity in the
United States.
Cockburn and Ellyard, in their 1981 biography on Oliphant also provide a further
example of indiscreet behaviour in September 1941 noting that Oliphant divulged the atomic
potential to an Australian government representative in Washington to possibly assist with
finding mineral resources of uranium or even to provide a back-up option to relocate the project
should his mission to the United States fail.87
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Figure 9 Franklin Roosevelt, 'Letter to Winston Churchill, 11 October 1941'. National Archives UK,
PREM3/139/8A

Renewed activity and action: September to December 1941
Oliphant’s visit to Berkeley was a resounding success. The frustrations he had experienced while
dealing with American bureaucrats were now behind him and the escalated activity that
followed the meeting in September 1941 was remarkable. Oppenheimer and Lawrence
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attended a meeting of the Academy of Science in Schenectady, New York in early October. The
two Berkeley men travelled east and explained the Frisch-Peierls memorandum and the
significance of the work completed in Britain. They also revealed that the Germans were
working on the bomb and claimed that the United States itself could come under threat from a
Nazi weapon of this kind.88 Urgency was required and Compton, as the chair of the National
Academy of Science committee, began to sideline the bureaucratic Briggs and the NDRC
Uranium Committee. The scientists designed a structure in which several groups spread across
the country would work on the applied methods of the uranium problem and, in particular,
focus on work on the atomic bomb. Fermi and his team were to continue work on their ‘pile’
reactor and to build a larger new reactor in the Argonne Forest near Chicago; Compton was to
head the metallurgical laboratory in Chicago; and Lawrence would focus on the separation of
uranium235 via the electromagnetic method at Berkeley.89 On 6 December 1941 the decision was
made to start, what would come to be known as, the Manhattan Project.90
Oliphant’s meeting brought in Oppenheimer who had, up until this point, been part of
the chorus line of theoretical physicists and had certainly not been involved in applied bomb
research. Oppenheimer was a theoretical physicist and his noted clumsiness in the laboratory
had generally kept him outside of practical applications. Oppenheimer’s lack of practical and
experimental physics was clearly offset by his charisma and his famous ability to explain complex
concepts to the laity. He gained the confidence of General Leslie Groves, the military head of the
Manhattan Project, and was eventually appointed as scientific head of the project. Within days
of the Schenectady meeting, and only a fortnight after Oliphant left Berkeley, Franklin Roosevelt
was made aware of the renewed progress and the importance of Britain’s work to date. In a
letter to Winston Churchill (Figure 9) he flung open the door of cooperation and invited Britain,
its scientists, and its atomic science endeavour to the United States.91 Oliphant had blazed the
trail for the British. But at home this news was not totally welcomed.

Oliphant in trouble?
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Thomson, the chair of the MAUD Committee, arrived in North America in early October 1941.
He met briefly with Oliphant, shortly before Oliphant sailed for Britain. Thomson would have
been aware of some of Oliphant’s adventures in the United States, but remembering that
Oliphant travelled principally on radar business he may have arrived with the belief that
Oliphant had been cautious and conducted his activities with discretion and as per the
guidelines.92 Oliphant handed Thomson his report on the meeting at Berkeley.93 Thomson, in
writing to D.G. Pye, at the Ministry of Aircraft Production in Britain, on 7 October, presented a
concern that he had regarding Oliphant’s secrecy. It appears that Oliphant had bypassed Briggs,
and Thomson wrote, ‘it looks as though Oliphant may have told people of the main proposals to
the Hankey committee and if Bush94 gets to hear of this, it may lead to trouble.’95
Whilst the MAUD Committee, with support of the senior British bureaucrats, had
discussed the transfer of information to the Americans, the discussions were specifically
instructed to pass via the officially designated channels and via the NDRC. It seems Oliphant’s
discussion at the Berkeley meeting was not sanctioned. Immediately following the receipt of
Roosevelt’s letter to Churchill, an urgent memorandum was sent to all the members of the
MAUD Committee reminding them of their responsibility to maintain secrecy.96 Attached to the
memorandum, in the National Archives (UK) file, is a note that Oliphant’s secrecy declaration
could not be found. This creates the inference that Oliphant breached secrecy provisions and
this is what prompted the immediate clamp down on the British atomic scientists.97

The death of MAUD
The summer in which Oliphant was in the United States was a period of relative inactivity for the
rest of the MAUD Committee members and associates. Its scientists had spent the holidays
waiting on a response to the reports submitted in July to the Hankey Committee. Britain was, of
course, still at war, but the blitz of 1940–41 was largely over and Adolf Hitler had, by then,
turned his attention eastwards towards the Soviet Union. By October the government was ready
to make decisions around the recommendations of the MAUD Committee. Imperial Chemicals
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Industries Ltd (ICI) had, however, not suffered the same summer malaise. Its chair, Lord
Melchett, and CEO, Sir Wallace Akers, spent the late summer lobbying the government to take
over control of the bomb project.98 Wallace Akers was an old-Oxfordian chemist who wished to
wrest control from the Cavendish alumni and extensively lobbied the Hankey Committee
chairman Sir Edward Appleton.99 The decision to hand control of the bomb project to ICI came
down in late October. Oliphant was furious and wrote to Appleton stating categorically that
‘commercial representatives [are] completely ignorant of the essential nuclear physics upon
which this is based’.100 He compared the decision to the ineffectual programs in the United
States with ‘this organisation is tantamount to that which exists in the United States where, as
you will know from my report, the whole [control] is in the hands of non-nuclear physicists and
is therefore badly mismanaged’.101
Oliphant was ignored, the MAUD Committee was disbanded, and ICI took control under
the auspices of the new codename ‘Tube Alloys’. Despite his objections, Oliphant was left with
little option other than to make himself available to Tube Alloys, and was invited to join the new
project’s technical committee. Much to his disgust, he was barred from the policy committee,
but given the ire he had raised in his breaches of secrecy it was of little surprise that the policy
would be controlled purely by the more reliable knights and lords of the British establishment
and those associated with and trusted by ICI.102

Chapter conclusions: the importance of meeting Ernest
To a degree, American scientists had been isolated from the work of the British in the early
1930s due to the intellectual snobbery of the Deuton Affair. With the death of Rutherford in
1937, Oliphant began to spread his wings. Taking up the role of head of department at
Birmingham in 1937, Oliphant was provided a clean slate, secured the services of several
refugee scientists, and desired that his new department would become the vanguard of
experimental physics in western Europe. In order to do so he had to build a cyclotron similar to
what was at Berkeley and hence needed to build his relationship with Lawrence. In Lawrence,
Oliphant found kinship. By the time the war came to Europe, Oliphant and Lawrence had a close
working relationship, built on mutual trust and a spirit of cooperation. When Frisch and Peierls
deduced the formulas for a uranium bomb, Oliphant was restricted by the secrecy provisions of
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the MAUD Committee. As his frustration regarding progress grew, he turned again to Lawrence.
The relationship of Oliphant and Lawrence laid the pathway for the contagion of knowledge of
bomb physics. This knowledge spread from European science, bypassing the American
government bureaucracy, and into the hands of Lawrence, Oppenheimer and then to Compton
and the American Academy of Science.
A small-world network diagram of some of the atomic scientists in 1940–41 is presented
in Figure 10. It is evident that Oliphant’s importance in networks of atomic science grew rapidly
between the 1933 Solvay Conference (Figure 6) and the early work on an atomic bomb in 1940–
41. The increase in his role is even more apparent when comparing networks after the discovery
of nuclear fission in 1938–39 (Figure 7), when Britain was largely not in the loop of
communication at all.
Oliphant and Lawrence were friends. While their minds met at an intellectual level, they
also had a personal connection formed from a commonality of background and a similar
outlook. It would therefore be reasonable to suggest this friendship may explain why Oliphant
chose to call on Lawrence when he had been met with frustration in Washington.
While friendship is a universal human relationship, the ties that bind scientists have the
ability to cross borders and transcend nationalist interests.103 In light of sociological studies of
the interaction of dispersed scientists, the relationship of Oliphant’s and Lawrence’s laboratories
formed a network we can describe as an ‘invisible college’. Oliphant and Lawrence’s relationship
and roles position them as the joint deans of an invisible college that linked key components of
British and American research. In order to propel his research forward, Oliphant was motivated
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Figure 10 'Small-world network map on the transferal of knowledge of the bomb', illustration by Darren Holden. First
order connections were established by assessing (i) those scientists had previously collaborated; for example Oliphant &
Lawrence; Pauli-Heisenberg-Schrodinger-Bohr (ii) those scientists working together at that time (e.g Frisch-PeierlsOliphant); and (iii) members of government committes such as the MAUD committee and the American Academy of
Science committee on uranium.

originally by self-interest in reaching out to Lawrence to gain a better knowledge of the
cyclotron and emulate its success. As Karen Frost-Arnold argued in her 2013 paper on trust in
scientific collaboration, self- interest is usually balanced by a moral concern of not taking
advantage of a fellow collaborator. As a result, collaborators rationally place trust in the moral
motivations of each other.104 The invisible college network included those within the orbits of
Oliphant and Lawrence. Oliphant brought the work of Frisch and Peierls into the invisible
college, whereas Lawrence brought Donald Cooksey (whom Oliphant was also close to), and, at
the Berkeley meeting, Oppenheimer. Insofar as the Oliphant-Lawrence network formed an
‘invisible college’ between their respective colleagues, it could also be argued that it was part of
a much larger college in which their friendship was the key bond that linked the wider British
research to the American scientific elite and the authorities. Fermi, for example, did not believe
in the potential of a nuclear explosion when Oliphant first explained it to him. However,
Lawrence and Oppenheimer re-presented the work to Compton (Fermi’s senior colleague at
Chicago), and Fermi began to take it more seriously.105 The role of the invisible college in science
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involves the putting aside secrecy or self-interest and is simply what Oliphant referred to as
‘open discussions in the normal way’ in his memorandum to Thomson on the Berkeley
meeting.106 As explained by sociologists Shirley Laska and Steve Kroll-Smith in their 2014 paper
‘Invisible Colleges and Mashups, Some Thoughts’,107 trust-based networks or relationships can
be further strengthened in response to disaster. Hence the trust between Oliphant and
Lawrence was likely deepened when Lawrence’s brother was in danger aboard the SS Athenia in
the first days of the war and Oliphant assisted in locating his whereabouts.108
The Berkeley meeting was not Oliphant’s first breach of secrecy provisions. He had also
broken secrecy rules in the development of radar when he had communicated British military
research to American scientists. In that earlier event, the outcome was an accelerated progress
in development and the later event, in the September 1941 Berkeley meeting, had a similar
outcome.
Oliphant had made no effort to conceal the Berkeley meeting and was unabashed in his
condemnation of the NDRC Uranium Committee. His impatient nature and self-confidence saw
him charge down the doors of bureaucracy, even if they were locked by the key of secrecy. It
could therefore be assumed that his indiscretion illustrates a carelessness or disregard of rules.
But Oliphant was not careless, and it is difficult to understand how any physicist, who bases his
or her life’s work on disciplined experiments, natural laws, and mathematical proofs, could
flagrantly disregard rules. Oliphant would have known that breaking the rules was personally
risky but that risk could be mitigated if the final outcome was that which the MAUD Committee
had desired when they asked him to enquire on American progress. The friendship Oliphant had
with Lawrence was based on deep trust, and as a result, Lawrence also trusted the Frisch-Peierls
work that Oliphant tabled. Similarly, Oliphant could trust the eccentric Oppenheimer, whom
Lawrence brought into the room. Those links of trust, through the invisible college, spread to
Compton and Fermi, who had earlier dismissed the work and the NDRC Uranium Committee
chair, Briggs, who had kept it secret.
Oliphant’s decision to go to Berkeley had two very important outcomes for the atomic
bomb project. First, he easily convinced Lawrence that British research and the Frisch-Peierls
memorandum was sound and that a bomb was possible. Secondly, and possibly as important,
Oliphant brought the eccentric charisma and intellect of Oppenheimer, who was already
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politically in opposition to the Nazis,
on to the side of immediate action.
Oliphant shifted Oppenheimer from
the shadows of theory and into the
light of practicality, and thus began
his passage towards his place in
history. Oliphant and Oppenheimer,
however, may have reached an
agreement to protect each other, for
neither ever named the other as
being at the Berkeley meeting.109
When queried about Oliphant’s
involvement in 1965, Oppenheimer
was still carrying the scars of his own
security investigations in the
1950s,110 and would have also known
Figure 11 'Mark Oliphant and Ernest Lawrence, 21 September
1941', photograph, Donald Cooksey. Ernest O. Lawrence
papers, BANC MSS 72/117c. Carton 14. Courtesy of the
Bancroft Library, University of California,Berkeley.

that Oliphant had been considered a
risk to the United States when he
was denied an entry visa in 1954,111

and may have hence been attempting to protect him. Similarly, Oliphant may not have
mentioned Oppenheimer was at the 1941 meeting to prevent any unnecessary suspicion of
Oppenheimer who was, at that early stage, not involved in any meaningful atomic bomb
research at all.
Oliphant’s two month absence in the United States cost the MAUD Committee at home
one of its most vociferous protagonists and inadvertently allowed ICI to gain influence. The Tube
Alloys project led by ICI men, as Oliphant predicted, limped along for several years. Roosevelt
laid out the red-carpet to British scientists and, despite not even yet being at war, was a keen
supporter of Anglo-American atomic collaboration. It is therefore an irony that as the British
project slowed, Oliphant was able to generate momentum in the United States to kick start the
atomic weapons programs, and set the course towards the world’s largest ever concentrated
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scientific effort, the Manhattan Project.
In 1943, Britain and the United States reached agreement for the official British
participation in the Manhattan Project.112 Oliphant returned to Berkeley and then to Oak Ridge,
Tennessee where he and Lawrence led the teams to build the massive alpha-track calutrons that
refined the uranium for the Little Boy Bomb that fell on Hiroshima. When the Allies ultimately
won the first atomic arms race in August 1945, it was therefore through scientific social
networks that were built on friendship and trust. As much as Oliphant’s contribution to the
atomic bomb is presented as one of a long-line of torch bearers and a vast compendium of
bright-minds, his belligerence, impatience and trust in fellow scientists, irrespective of secrecy
provisions, paved the way for an accelerated development of atomic warfare.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A Weapon of Math Construction, 1942–1945

“The day before the bomb, I went for a swim. In the morning, I was
eating peanuts. I saw a light. I was knocked to little sister’s sleeping
place. When we were saved, I could only see as far as the tram. My
mother and I started to pack our things. The neighbors were walking
around burned and bleeding. Hataya-san told me to run away with
her. I said I wanted to wait for my mother. We went to the park. A
whirlwind came. At night a gas tank burned and I saw the reflection in
the river. We stayed in the park one night. Next day I went to Taiko
Bridge and met my friends Kikuki and Murakami. They were looking for
their mothers. But Kikuki’s mother was wounded and Murakami’s
mother, alas, was dead.” Toshio Nakamura (aged 10).1

The savants of American science had listened to Oliphant in September 1941. On the 6
December 1941 the American Academy of Science committee and the National Defense
Research Committee, combined under the auspices of the code name S2. The decision was
made to begin a coordinated project on the atomic bomb2 and the Japanese attacked Pearl
Harbor the following day. The two events, coincidentally timed, became immediately entangled
like a pair of quantum particles, and despite the separation and subtlety would spin
paradoxically for four years before colliding together in Hiroshima in August 1945.3
The decision to move the project forward at a faster pace was a milestone on the path
of atomic science. This path led from Henri Becquerel and Pierre and Marie Curie’s discovery of
radioactivity; Wilhelm Roentgen’s x-rays; Albert Einstein’s Relativity; Ernest Rutherford’s
nucleus; James Chadwick’s neutron; Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Wolfgang Pauli, Paul Dirac
and Erwin Schrödinger’s quantum mechanics; Otto Hahn, Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch’s
discovery of fission; Leo Szilard’s theory of the bomb and to Frisch and Rudolf Peierls’
memorandum. But all the scientists held in 1941, was simply a piece of paper with a series of
mathematical formulas that were completely unintelligible to anyone other than themselves.

1

John Hersey, "Hiroshima," New Yorker, 31 August 1946.
Oppenheimer, "Interview Whilst Researching 'Manhattan Project, the Untold Story of the Making of the
Making of Atomic Bomb' by Stephane Groueff ".
3
Hersey, "Hiroshima."
2

98

A Weapon of Math Construction, 1942 – 1945
This was less so a weapon of mass destruction and more of a weapon of math construction. But
rather than pass on the formulas to the military technologists and retreat back to the laboratory,
the American based atomic scientists climbed out of their ivory tower of natural philosophy and
made the decision to become the armourers in a war even before their government had
declared one. Yet war was coming to the United States and its vast natural resources, large
population and wealth would come to bear. Whilst American scientists had relied upon British
scientists to provide several technological breakthroughs in radar and atomic science, the
United States had, itself, developed technology such as Ernest Lawrence’s cyclotron and had
laboratories that were bursting with home-grown and refugee physicists.4
This chapter aims to understand Mark Oliphant’s position amongst the maelstrom of
connections and invisible colleges of the atomic bomb. In analysing Oliphant’s involvement as a
leading member of the Manhattan Project, it is possible to also understand his motivations that
led him to continue to harry the scientific administrators and politicians that oversaw the
project. In particular, Oliphant once again broke secrecy protocols to attempt to protect the
opennes of science.

Oliphant in 1942
When Oliphant returned to Britain in October 1941 he was to find that progress on the bomb
had stalled. The Tube Alloys project, which replaced the British MAUD Committee, limped into
1942 and Oliphant found himself somewhat sidelined. Japan entered the war with its blow to
the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor allowing a straightforward advance of their forces down
through south-east Asia and the Malay Peninsula. By February 1942, the fortress of Singapore
had fallen and Oliphant’s homeland, Australia, was under imminent threat.
Two years earlier, amidst the blitz of 1940, Oliphant’s wife Rosa and their two children,
Michael and Vivian, had left Birmingham, fearing the potential invasion of Britain, and had
returned to safety in Australia.5 With the Japanese advance now threatening Australia, and
knowing that for the time-being he had done all he could do to help Britain, Oliphant turned to
consider if he could help with the defence of Australia. On 20 March 1942, Oliphant boarded the
troop ship SL4 for the perilous ten-week journey to Australia. The high seas were dangerous
places in 1942, and it was not just in the north Atlantic that German raiders and U-boats had
committed thousands of tonnes of allied sea craft to the deep. The HMAS Sydney, for example,
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had been sunk in the Indian Ocean off Western Australia in November 1941. Oliphant rode the
oceans from Glasgow to Cape Town and Bombay, and then eventually to Australia. Landing in
Fremantle on 27 April 1942, Oliphant telephoned Rosa in Adelaide to announce he was safe. He
was back on Australian soil for the first time since leaving as a wide-eyed postgraduate student
in 1927, and was on his way to cross the Nullarbor to be reunited with his family for the first
time in two years.6
Oliphant’s 1942 trip to Australia was, however, not entirely focussed on family. He was
being seconded to the Australian government’s Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR)7 to transfer knowledge of microwave radar manufacture for the defence of Australia. It is
likely that he briefed David Rivett, the CSIR head, on the concept and progress on the atomic
bomb.8 Once the download of his knowledge was complete, Oliphant considered his return to
Birmingham. He had not communicated with Ernest Lawrence since late 1941, and would have
likely wondered if the Americans had acted on his advice and started work on the atomic bomb.
With the decreased risk of a Nazi invasion, Britain seemed no less safe than Australia and in
October 1942 the whole Oliphant family boarded a merchant ship in Melbourne and returned to
Britain. They arrived in Britain on 29 February 1943. Oliphant had been gone for nearly a year,
but from the point of view of the British bomb project, little progress had been made. The
Americans had, however, gained momentum.

The Manhattan Project to the Quebec agreement, 1942–43
Much has been written of the Manhattan Project, its structure, and its design.9 The Manhattan
Project was, as far as scientific experiments go, what we now consider the first of ‘Big Science’.
At its height over 150,000 people were working on the project and spread across multiple sites
in the United States.10
As Oliphant was away from Britain, the Americans worked on more focussed research
projects. Henry Stimson, the United States Secretary of War, had been handed top-level control
of the project and started to bring in the engineers and the military. The challenge of building
6
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the bomb was not the theoretical science. Even though a self-sustaining chain reaction had not
yet been proven in the laboratory, the scientists were certain of their calculations. But was the
success of an atomic bomb proven? In mathematics, to provide a proof, is to prescribe a series
of equations and balancing of theorems that converge upon a single answer. The scientific
method, as codified in the sixteenth century by Francis Bacon, and based on processes of
experimentation of the ancient Greeks, is apparently formulaic—a hypothesis is drawn, an
experiment is devised, and findings of the experiment either result in an acceptance or a
refutation of the hypothesis.11 The concept of a mathematical proof largely follows the same
process as an experimental one, but uses mathematics instead of physical experiments.
Nevertheless, scientists may themselves consider a ‘proof’ as equally valid between theoretical
and the experimental. Similarly, there are two broad types of physicists—the experimental and
the theoretical. The experimentalist is the practical one who looks outwardly to measure the
dance of the fires of nature and deduce the reason for the flame. The theoretician, on the other
hand, is the internalised poet whose swish of a pen writes the elegant mathematical language of
the universe. The theoretical must delve into logic and philosophy. For example, the square of
the number two (2x2) equals four—always and every time. Therefore the square root of the
number four must equal two—always and every time, right? Wrong. The square root of four can
equal both two and minus two (-2)—there is ambiguity, and hence not proof. Gravity is another
example of the theoretical being unproven by experiment. This mysterious force of the universe,
described by Newton in the fall of an apple, contains experimental ambiguity. The gravitational
force of a small dense object nearby is the same as a faraway less dense object. Einstein, a
theoretician, did not demonstrate in a practical way that gravity is functioned with energy and
time in which he moved the objects of the universe. He devised it purely in his head by staring
out of his Bern office window at the town’s clock.
Many experiments, even in tight laboratory conditions, just serve the purpose of
deriving new hypotheses and since the complexity of science had increased following the
chemical revolution, only rarely did a new experiment result in a conclusive proof. Experiments
often simply result in a half-acceptance and the deduction of further experiments. The FrischPeierls memorandum on the use of uranium235, was proven only by mathematics. Engineering
on a grand scale would be required to convert this mental energy into real energy for the use in
war.
Stimson and his Top Policy Committee spent the early to middle part of 1942 devising a
structure and gathering the information required from the scientists to build the bomb that
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Roosevelt’s administration assumed had already been proven.12 By August 1942 the United
States Army Corps of Engineers had been assigned the task, which they named after the location
of their office base in mid-town Manhattan—the Manhattan Engineer District Project. In
September 1942, Brigadier Leslie Groves was appointed as its head and was quickly promoted to
General.13
For the first part of 1942, Groves had been busy in Washington. He had been in charge
of the construction of a new office building for the War Department’s 40,000 employees. Partly
due to its five-sided sequential design which allowed modular construction, and partly due to
Groves’ famous efficiency and practicality, the first of the office workers were moving into the
Pentagon in August 1942, less than a year after breaking ground.14 Groves was a florid and
practical military man. He established very short chains of command that gave him immediate
access to information.15 After touring the various atomic science laboratories, Groves became
concerned at the number of foreigners involved in the project.16 Whilst the metallurgical
laboratory in Chicago was being run by Compton, an American, the practical experiments were
in the control of Fermi, an Italian. At Columbia University the German, Hans Bethe, was in
charge, while the eccentric Hungarian Leo Szilard was spreading paranoia of a German bomb
with considerable hubris.17 At Berkeley, Lawrence seemed solely focussed on the construction of
his powerful cyclotron. The atomic physicists had spent the past two decades devising concepts
of quantum mechanics that were completely unintelligible to practical people. Groves needed a
leader but, most importantly, someone who would indulge him with careful and clear
explanations.18 Whilst visiting Lawrence at Berkeley, Groves was impressed with Robert
Oppenheimer who had, from his experience in undergraduate teaching, the ability to explain
science. Also, as a scholar of poetry, Oppenheimer knew the art of interpretation, and as a
speaker of multiple languages, he could translate the nuance and subtlety of complex concepts
to plain English.19
Since the December 1941 decision to rapidly escalate atomic bomb design,
Oppenheimer had been afforded the position title ‘Coordinator of Rapid Rupture’ and led the
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theoretical group that sought to ensure neutrons could find their nuclei targets fast enough so
sufficient matter could be turned into energy without first fizzing itself apart. Groves’
appointment of Oppenheimer as the scientific lead on the entire project was a controversial
decision.20 Fermi, Compton, Lawrence, and Bethe were Nobel laureates and clear leaders in
experimental physics, whereas Oppenheimer was a theoretician who was unlikely to have even
assembled a Bunsen burner since he was an undergraduate. Oppenheimer’s experience did not
suggest that he had any ability to lead a team to build industrial facilities and engineer a bomb.
The ability to communicate and articulate complexity, however, was vital if the marriage of
mathematics with concrete and steel was to be achieved with military precision. There was,
also, a question mark over Oppenheimer’s security clearance as he had been a ‘fellow traveller’
in the pre-war intellectual socialist movement.21
In the autumn of 1942 Groves began to pick out sites for the Manhattan Project. In the
Tennessee Appalachians, on a ridge of black oaks on the banks of the Clinch River, the Army
purchased land that had good access to water, power and rail routes.22 The site of Oak Ridge
would become, over the next two years, a secret city of more than 100,000 people and the site
used for the separation of uranium235.
At the same that the Oliphant family was en route to Britain, Fermi was building a cube
of graphite bricks in a squash court beneath the college football stadium of Stagg Field in
Chicago. Amongst the graphite he interlayered small quantities of partially enriched uranium
and inserted lead control rods to inhibit the unwanted flow of neutrons. On 2 December 1942,
Fermi gradually removed the control rods. The voltmeters started to detect an increase in
energy which, as per the theoretical prediction, became a self-sustaining chain reaction.23
Szilard’s concept of a chain reaction was proven experimentally for the first time.24 Fermi’s pile
was, in essence, the first nuclear reactor and he had a second one under construction in the
Argonne Forest outside of Chicago that could also produce small quantities of the element 94.
Uranium had been named from the Roman God of the sky, Uranus, and hence element 94 would
become named from the next planet, Pluto. Plutonium was as fissile as uranium235 and a
separate site on the bank of the mighty Columbia River at Hanford in Washington State was
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designated for a reactor to refine that element for use in a bomb.25
With the Metallurgical Laboratory established in Chicago, and Berkeley’s Radiation
Laboratory to lead the experimental efforts on electromagnetic magnetic separation, there was
one site that was yet to be established—the one for theoretical physics and ordnance, where
the bomb itself was to be made. The Oppenheimer family owned a tract of land in the Pecos
wilderness of New Mexico, and as a child and young man Oppenheimer had found great solace
and beauty in the region.26 Oppenheimer and Groves, together, chose the site of an agricultural
boarding school, 20 miles from Santa Fe, for its remoteness. Construction of the famed Los
Alamos, which remains today a national laboratory, began in 1942.
The British were, however, not informed of such progress in the United States. Wallace
Akers had visited Lawrence in February 194227 but had returned to Britain to lead the Tube
Alloys project, which suffered lack of resources and concentrated effort. There was little or no
communication between Lawrence and Oliphant for most of 1942. On his return to Britain in
February 1943, Oliphant found a wedding invitation from John Lawrence that was nearly a year
old.28 John Lawrence reported Oliphant’s late apology to his brother Ernest.29
In 1943, Lawrence would have been sworn to the bonds of secrecy regarding progress of
the Manhattan Project, and could not write a technical update for Oliphant. On 5 May Oliphant
wrote to Lawrence and stated it will be ‘a great day when it is again possible to visit you and
discuss things in detail’.30 Lawrence responded to Oliphant, lamenting the lost year in their
relationship and clearly longing to have his old friend’s input on all manner of work underway.
Insofar as Lawrence was restricted by secrecy provisions and could not invite Oliphant back to
Berkeley, his response suggested hope that Oliphant could ‘drop in’ on them. Obviously, in a
world at war, the concept of Oliphant simply ‘dropping in’ was in itself ludicrous and was
possibly therefore a code to Oliphant that he should make every effort to visit Berkeley.
There is a cloudiness around what prompted the renewed relationship between Britain
and the United States on the atomic bomb in late 1943. Documented histories on the topic such
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as Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson’s The New World, or Margaret Gowing’s Britain and
Atomic Energy: 1939–1945 document the attempts at collaboration but seem equally unsure as
to whether the Americans reached out to the British, or vice-versa.31 Winston Churchill had
remained circumspect after receiving the invitation to collaborate from Franklin Roosevelt in
October 1941.32 In a meeting between the two leaders in June 1942 it was agreed that scientific
research into the bomb was best conducted in the United States.33 From an American
perspective, the recruitment of scientists from across the country had gone well and the
intellectual capacity of the Manhattan Project was burgeoning. Following Fermi’s demonstration
of energies from the pile, committee members Vannevar Bush and James Conant agreed with
Groves to limit British input and attempt to ensure a postwar monopoly on atomic energy.34
On a practical level, though, the progress towards a bomb was less than satisfactory.
Groves had seen the frustrating issues around the conversion of laboratory science to industrialscale plants. The method of uranium enrichment that was most likely to succeed was still
unknown, and given the time frame required, Groves could not wait for the scientists to tell him
which was best. He authorised that the Oak Ridge plant be constructed to allow for three
separate techniques: gaseous diffusion, thermal diffusion, and the electromagnetic method. In
mid-1943 no methods seemed to be working well. Nature’s challenges on this problem are
immense. Uranium238 and uranium235 are the same element, with the same number of protons
and electrons and are chemically identical. The only difference is three neutrons. Gaseous
diffusion involves converting the uranium into a uranium-fluorine gas and passing it through fine
membranes with the hope that the infinitesimally smaller uranium235 is separated. Thermal
diffusion uses the thousandth of a fraction of a degree boiling point on the two isotopes to
separate them. The electromagnetic method involves accelerating uranium atoms using a
cyclotron variant with the lighter isotope concentrating on the inside of the spiral. Using the
electromagnetic method, Lawrence had only managed to isolate one millionth of a gram of
uranium235.35 It would have been a fearful concept that millions of dollars were being spent on
building a giant version of the machine in Oak Ridge, when the efficiencies were not proven, so
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the Americans certainly needed help. The British bomb project, on the other hand, was
languishing from lack of resources.36
In early August 1943, Sir John Anderson, the Lord Council of the Privy Seal and
Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote to Vannevar Bush with the terms of an agreement on nuclear
cooperation.37 The memorandum attached to Anderson’s letter stipulated who information
might be passed between. The very first item of the memorandum dealt with the
electromagnetic method:

Electromagnetic method: interchange to take place between the
American and British groups to the extent proposed by E.O. Lawrence
and M.L Oliphant, the leaders of the respective groups.38

As suggested in the quote above, Oliphant and Lawrence were already in communication and
had ‘proposed’ collaboration. On 19 August 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill were hosted in
conference by the Canadian prime minister, Mackenzie King, in Quebec City. The ‘Quebec
Agreement’ would remain top secret until after the war and outlined key terms of the
relationship between Britain and the United States.39
There are several articles of the Quebec Agreement that are significant to scientific
cooperation and freedoms. The preamble includes the statement, ‘this maybe more speedily
achieved if all available British and American brains and resources are pooled’. The third article
forbade disclosure of information to third parties. Oliphant had already, during the war,
contributed to both British and Australian technology, and uttered atomic secrets to Australian
scientific representatives. The fourth article ceded all commercial endeavour and rights to
postwar atomic energy to the Americans and the British only to have access to it at the
indulgence of the President.
The policy committee was stacked with three Americans, two of which were scientists
(Bush had a Doctor of Engineering Physics and Conant was a Harvard chemist). The British had
two members representing the pillars on which a warring nation stood—a soldier in Field
Marshall John Dill and a politician, the Minister of Supply, the Right Honourable John Jestyn
Llewellin. A sixth member, presumably to act in arbitration should a dispute arise, was a
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Canadian politician.40
The British had, since 1941, provided all information freely to the United States and
even, in the case of Oliphant, taken an element of personal risk to ensure that it was acted
upon.41 In return, the Americans had provided little in the way of scientific data back to the
British. The cost, however, of building the atomic bomb would fall mainly on to the United
States; and for that Churchill conceded that the Americans would also have control of postwar
atomic energy.

Oliphant and the Manhattan Project
Anticipating a successfully negotiated agreement between Britain and the United States,
Oliphant returned to the United States as Roosevelt and Churchill shared a bottle of brandy on
the evening of 19 August.42 Oliphant, Peierls and Francis Simon were the advance guard of
British physicists who soon assisted the Manhattan Project. They were joined by many others,
including the head of the British mission, James Chadwick, and several colleagues from
Oliphant’s department in Birmingham: Frisch, Ernest Titterton and Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs had
played a relatively minor role to this point in developing the allies’ atomic bomb; he was later
famous for assisting the Soviet’s nuclear program, when found guilty in Britain of espionage.43
Titterton, on the other hand, would eventually join Oliphant at the Australian National
University in 1951, where he then played a key role in British atomic tests in Australia.44
On arrival in the United States Oliphant was whisked to Los Alamos to meet with Groves
and Oppenheimer. It was two years since Oliphant and Oppenheimer had last met, and when
Oliphant had implored him to take the bomb seriously. In those two years, Oppenheimer had
gone from being a shadowy figure in the wings of research and had now proven himself as a
scientific leader. Oppenheimer desired for Oliphant to join him in solving the many problems of
ordnance and theory that confronted the team in Los Alamos.45 But the high-mesa and plankwood shanty town held no allure for Oliphant. He instead recommended that Fuchs and
Titterton bolster the ranks at Los Alamos. Oliphant yearned, instead, for the hills above San
Francisco Bay, and desired to join Lawrence at Berkeley where he might stand, again, beneath
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the mighty cyclotron.
For the remainder of 1943 to early 1945 Oliphant and Lawrence split their time between
Berkeley and Oak Ridge, working on the electromagnetic method for separating uranium235. If
Oliphant was in any doubt that the Americans would suffer from lack of resources to complete
the project they were soon allayed. When Oak Ridge needed 14,000 tonnes of copper to wind
the giant electromagnets they were met with refusal—the war effort meant that red-metal was
in short supply. The scientists quipped that ‘silver will do’, after which 400 million ounces of
silver was emptied from the West Point Bullion Depository of the Treasury Department and
shipped to Oak Ridge.46 In order to put that into context, the same volume of silver would have
been worth $22 AUD per ounce in 2017, or $8.8 billion, and it would have taken the world’s
largest silver mine, BHP’s Cannington Mine in Queensland, a staggering 15 years to produce.47
The silver at Oak Ridge was loaned to the project, and it was returned to the Treasury
Department after the war. Nevertheless, to empty such a store of bullion, transport it from New
York to Tennessee, draw it from bars into wire, and wind the magnets for a machine that was
not yet even proven to work, is indication enough of the resources that the Americans were
willing to put into the Manhattan Project.
When Oliphant arrived at Oak Ridge the partially constructed calutrons had hit some
roadblocks. The first of the alpha tracks had operated for only a few days before the magnets
started to lose power.48 The problem was in the oil used to cool the units and each magnet had
to be stripped and cleaned. Oliphant and Lawrence worked together on the project and the
techniques applied to gain operational success would be referred to as the ‘Lawrence-Oliphant
electromagnetic method’.49 Groves was losing patience and favoured the gaseous diffusion
method. Oliphant wrote to the general in November 1943 to defend the electromagnetic
method,50 forthrightly pointing out that he had considerable experience in war projects and
these delays were to be expected. Despite not being involved in the gaseous diffusion method,
he proceeded to defame its progress and dismiss the issues of the electromagnetic method as
being mere teething problems.51
In the final paragraph of the letter Oliphant had a dig against the security protocols of
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the Manhattan Project which compartmentalised working parties and minimised the exchange
of research. Knowing it was unlikely to occur, he challenged the leaders of gaseous diffusion to
an intellectual duel in which he had already declared his electromagnetic method the ‘easy
winner’ (Figures 12 and 13).
The compartmentalisation of research teams was one of the key security pillars at the

Figure 12 Mark Oliphant, 'Letter to General Groves, 27 November 1943', page 1, National Archives UK
AB1/690
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Figure 13 Mark Oliphant, 'Letter to General Groves, 27 November 1943', page 2, National Archives
UK AB1/690

Manhattan Project.52 Groves was a practical military man and his ability to build things had a
driven heuristic approach. Given that the project required the involvement of several research
components, he chose to locate each in its own compartment—thereby minimising the impact
on the whole project if a portion of it experienced a leak or infiltration. Researchers were
therefore not able to communicate with any other member outside of their own compartment.
52
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The project’s scientists, however, came from a completely different environment in which
freedoms, critique and discourse were key extensions of the scientific method. Their pre-war
invisible colleges had transcended borders and enabled collaborations between institutions,
leading to great achievements in atomic science.53 The Manhattan Project scientists tackled the
problems as they would normally— hypotheses were drawn, experiments conducted and the
results were concluded. Given that peer-review was also an important extension of the scientific
method, not being able to enter into a conversation with others was a great source of
frustration.54 The scientists themselves saw compartmentalisation as a challenge to be
overcome and had little respect for the constant presence of military police, intelligence, and
the FBI. In later years, Richard Feynman joked that he learned how to crack safes and pick locks
whilst on the Manhattan Project, thus giving himself access to other scientists’ work.55 Oliphant
also boasted of similar exploits by dismantling his own allocated cabinet locks and then
reassembling them with a new combination after he discovered the FBI rummaging through his
documents.56 At Los Alamos, Oppenheimer himself hosted the ‘colloquium’, which was a regular
social gathering of leaders from the various compartments, to listen to an esoteric topic or
problem.57 This was not for Oppenheimer’s benefit, as he had open access to all compartments.
Rather, he saw it as his duty to assist his fellow scientists’ desire to communicate. The British
had a freer run than the Americans and would communicate regularly within meetings hosted
by Chadwick.
On New Year’s Day in 1944 Frisch wrote to Oliphant in Berkeley from Los Alamos. His
letter was sent by post, as evidenced by his original signature, and with the customary unnamed
letterhead that simply read ‘PO Box 1663, Santa Fe’.58 The letter involved a scientific query
about determining the weights of isotopes. On 8 January 1944, Oliphant returned mail to Frisch
at Los Alamos59 but made the mistake of using the electronic teletype writer which was, as some
53

Refer Chapter Two.
Goldberg, "Groves and the Scientists: Compartmentalization and the Building of the Bomb."; Hewlett
and Anderson, The New World, 1939–1946: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1;
Keeble, "The End Is Terrific!... I Prefer the Middle: Badiou, Beckett and Oliphant's Atomic Bomb."; Thorpe,
"Violence and the Scientific Vocation."; Peter J. Westwick, "Secret Science: A Classified Community in the
National Laboratories," Minerva 38, no. 4 (2000).
55
Richard Feynman, "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!": Adventures of a Curious Character, 1 ed. (New
York: W W Norton, 1985), 136-85.
56
Oliphant, "Engineering History: Interview with Mark Oliphant," 120; Ellyard, "Interview with David
Ellyard, science communicator and Oliphant biographer, by Darren Holden."; Cockburn and Ellyard,
Oliphant.
57
Else, "The Day after Trinity."
58
O. R. Frisch, "Letter from Otto Frisch to Oliphant (Copies to Lawrence and Oppenheimer) 1 Jan 1944,"
(Kew, London: National Archives (UK), Reference AB 1/690, 1944).
59
Marcus L. Oliphant, "Letter from Oliphant to Otto Frisch, 8 Jan 1944," (Kew, London: National Archives
(UK), Reference AB 1/690, 1944).
54

111

Chapter Four
modern electronic communications are, able to be hacked and read by the FBI. This was a
breach of the Manhattan Project’s compartmentalisation policy and resulted in the first entry
into Oliphant’s FBI file.60 Years later, in 1956, Oliphant recalled events of another breach of
security when he commented on a radiation report during the Manhattan Project. Oliphant
wrote an empathic letter to Hedley Marston of the CSIRO, who was suffering a similar level of
investigation on blowing the whistle on the fall-out from the Maralinga tests in Australia:
The coded teleprinters between Berkeley and Washington were
clacking, the telephones with scramblers were running red hot, the FBI
security boys were in my office, and there began three very
uncomfortable days of ‘enquiry’. Under the compartmentalization
system of security, I should never have had conversations with the
fission chemists or the biologists and they were guilty of criminal
laxness in giving a copy of their findings.61
It is an irony that Oliphant’s first Manhattan Project security breach had been with Frisch—the
man who co-authored the discovery of fission that was shared so freely and rapidly with the
world. Furthermore, Frisch had been welcomed by Oliphant as a refugee-scientist into his
Birmingham laboratory, where he derived the secret formulas on an uranium235 bomb that
Oliphant had given freely to Lawrence to bring Americans into the bomb project in the first
place.62
By June 1944, Oliphant was breaking the rules again. He had received Royal Air Force
surveillance photographs of possible atomic facilities in Germany, had reviewed them, shared
them with others for comment and wrote to Webster at the British embassy in Washington
asking for more information.63 This once again resulted in an investigation and sanctions, and
Oliphant grew tired of the accusations. He wrote to Groves to complain, but whilst not accepting
guilt, nor pleading innocence, he considered the security provisions as a restriction on progress:
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I would like to say that I am rather tired of these veiled accusations of
carelessness or evasion of security rulings. These considerations seem
to matter far more to some people than does getting the job done.64

Figure 14 Mark Oliphant, 'Letter to General Groves, 21 June 1944', National Archives UK AB1/690
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Oliphant’s priority was clearly progress over discretion (Figure 14). 65 There is no record of a
response from Groves in the archives.
By August 1944, however, Oliphant was still actively defending his project at Berkeley.
The progress on the alpha tracks had been poor and it seemed that some allies, including
Lawrence, were losing interest in the electromagnetic project. Rather than delivering his
complaints via Chadwick, Oliphant wrote again to Groves to state his faith in the science and the
need to persevere with it.66 He blamed General Electric for mistakes at the plant and said that
their past performance on other technology, such as radar, was poor. Perhaps as an indication
of his stress, he took an unusual swipe at Berkeley. He complained about the empiricism of the
work, that Berkeley was a ‘physical school of gadgeteering’, and that it had ‘no spirit of scientific
enquiry’.67 This was a vastly different view compared to that which he had after his first visit in
1938.68 Oliphant concluded his rear-guard action with a desperate attempt to ensure that his
research was not shut down, and that even if the alpha tracks failed to deliver material for the
war (meaning the gas diffusion method for uranium235 and the plutonium from the Hanford
reactor would be used instead), he sought to ensure the continuation of his research for the
future use of atomic energy in electricity generation.69
Reassuringly, Groves responded on 31 August, telling Oliphant that there no plans to
halt the development of his research.70 Groves could not take risk the risk of cutting any
prospects of fissile product development, and therefore allowed the bellicose Anglo-Australian
scientist to continue his efforts. Groves informed Oliphant that we would visit him in Berkeley
soon.71

The indiscretion of General Groves
On 29 and 30 of September 1944 Groves met with Oliphant and Lawrence in Berkeley. Groves
and Oliphant had communicated frankly throughout 1944 and Oliphant had earned the trust of
the general. Groves was famously hyper-sensitive on secrecy and would rarely talk anything
resembling bomb politics or the big picture with the scientists.72 His compartmentalisation policy
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was, after all, designed to keep scientists in their boxes. It seemed, however, that in late
September 1944 Groves was more talkative than usual and divulged the United States postwar
intentions of an atomic monopoly. To Oliphant this information was deeply troubling and
threatened Oliphant’s own plans as well as open scientific research. Oliphant was not prepared
to risk the monitored teletype writer again and headed to Washington to file a report from
inside the security of the British Embassy. The report was a two-page summary on American
bomb motivations, who they considered the real enemy of the state was, and how the United
States military was above politics and intended to dictate postwar bomb policy.
TOP SECRET: RECORD OF PART OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN
MAJ. GEN. L.R. GROVES, E.O. LAWRENCE and M.L. OLIPHANT
Gen. Groves visited Berkeley on Friday and Saturday, September 29th
and 30th. The conversation in question took place in Lawrence’s office.
Groves began by remarking that moving of all possible personnel
to Site X in order that the Alpha 2 and beta plants should be made to
work and to utilise enhanced feed, was exactly what he wanted,
though he had ceased to expect anything too reasonable from “longhaired Ph.D.’s”.
After further remarks about the nature of the work to be done at X
he said that he doubted whether he could be at the site on
Wednesday, as arranged, as he feared he would have Lord Cherwell in
Washington. He expressed grave concern about the proposed visit of
Cherwell especially as he had requested to be permitted to see parts
of the project such as “W”, which have so far not been seen by any of
the British.
At this point Lawrence broke in to ask “what was this nonsense
about parts of the project which were not revealed to the British?” He
expressed contempt for the way in which American and British
scientists were restricted on this job. Groves replied, “As you know, in
neither case that is my doing. I am merely carrying out my orders. You
are as able as I am to name those who are to blame.”
A discussion followed on the possible motive for Cherwell’s visit.
Groves was particularly anxious to know whether it meant that Great
Britain was contemplating an early effort to proceed with the project.
His views on the subject (which are well known to some of us) were
then put forward.
Groves said that whether America liked it or not she was bound to
make a military alliance with Britain after the war. Such an alliance
would entail material contributions from the two countries, America
contributing 70% and Britain 30% of the total. The preponderance of
American contribution and the fact that the alliance was military in
nature rather than political would enable the American Army and Navy
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to dictate policy on such questions as the new weapon.
American policy would be to insist that no manufacture of the
materials or storage of the weapon should be permitted outside the
central portions of the North American continent. He pointed out the
danger of capture of a manufacturing or storage centre by paratroop
attack and the grave results of the use against us of our own weapon.
Pressed to give his idea of the source of attack he named Russia.
Groves went on to say that U.S.A. and U.K. could hope to retain
ascendancy in the field of nuclear weapons for about ten years
following the collapse of Germany. So as normal communications
between America and Europe are resumed he believe that Russia
would have full information about the project, either through her
agents or through “Communist sympathisers among the American and
British scientists on the project.” He believed that given the
information Russian scientists were fully capable of seeing it through,
but that they would be handicapped by the deficiencies of the Russian
engineers and technologists—welding, metallurgy etc.. Even though if
they choose the simplest of the processes, thermal diffusion, it would
require about ten years to achieve production. He felt therefore that
U.S.A.-U.K. would have ten years in which to prepare for the inevitable
war with Russia.
In this conversation Groves insisted that he spoke for the armed
forces and for every thinking man and woman in U.S.A. He said that
any effort U.K. might make must be confined to central Canada. He
excluded specifically Australia or any other part of the Empire. Every
possible source of supply of raw materials would be monopolised and
controlled by U.S.A.-U.K.
M.L.O, October 3rd, 194473

The second paragraph of the report is evidence that Groves was frustrated with progress and
seemed resigned that he would not get action and discipline from the ‘long haired PhDs’. The
third paragraph relates to a visit by Lord Cherwell (Frederick Lindemann) who was Churchill’s
most senior scientific advisor and confidant. Cherwell was to visit the United States to review
progress and to report back to Churchill as per the Quebec Agreement.74 Site ‘W’ refers to
Hanford in Washington State, where the reactor was built for the production of plutonium. The
use of plutonium as a fissile element was purely an American discovery and the British scientists,
who were focused on uranium235, had very little involvement with its development. Lawrence’s
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interjection was in the spirit of scientific cooperation between the two countries as
contemplated under the Quebec Agreement. Groves deflected Lawrence’s protest by blaming
higher orders in the United States administration for not disclosing all the research to the
British. Groves was most likely pointing the blame towards Bush of the Combined Policy
Committee and the Office of Scientific Research and Development, who had been reluctant for
British involvement in the first place. The complaints of Lawrence (and likely Oliphant) regarding
security touched a raw nerve for Groves.
The remainder of the document outlined the country’s intended postwar policy on
atomic collaboration. The United States military obviously resented the British rights under the
Quebec Agreement and intended to control and monopolise the postwar development of
atomic science. Groves was convinced of an enemy infiltration of the Manhattan Project and
that the Soviets would develop a bomb themselves. As a result, Europe was too risky to house a
weapons manufacture or storage facility. The United States military sought to ensure that any
British bombs would be housed, if they must exist, in Canada—far from the geographical risks
associated with Europe.
It is not known what drove Groves to be so vociferous in this meeting. Maybe his
frustrations with the scientists, their self-important protests against security, and the slowness
of progress caused him to blow up and point out how much bigger than them this project was.
The scientists were self-absorbed in their work and the compartmentalisation policy also
delivered a certain disconnection from the big picture. The statements made by Groves on
Russia, however, are an insight into the thinking of the American military and illustrates their
very wary and uneasy relationship with their ideologically opposing eastern ally.
Groves would have been aware that Oliphant was particularly loose with secrets. There
lies the potential that Groves was being calculating, and it may have been his intention that the
information would make it back to the British government. Perhaps, Groves was intentionally
leaking information reminding the British that the Americans did not consider them to have
equal rights to their joint venture.
The report that Oliphant sent back to Britain briefly escalated activity. Oliphant, as his
rebellious nature dictated, did not push this information through the correct channels, such as
the head of British mission, Chadwick. This information was less important to the outcomes of
the Manhattan Project and more important to Britain’s future as a nuclear nation. As a result it
was sent from the British Embassy in Washington to Akers at the Directorate of Tube Alloys.
Oliphant and Akers had a strained relationship after Akers hijacked the MAUD Committee in
1941 when Oliphant was in the United States (Chapter Three). Oliphant, whilst reluctantly a
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member of the subsequent Tube Alloys technical committee, spent most of 1942 in Australia
and was seconded to the Manhattan Project in 1943, and had little direct involvement with
Akers. As the chief technocrat at the largely ineffectual Tube Alloys project, Akers ran a small
contingent of scientists based out of Old Queen Street in Westminster that tried to keep up with
progress in the United States.
Akers passed Oliphant’s report straight over to W.L. Gorrell-Barnes at the Privy Council
Offices, with the note ‘I enclose a copy of a remarkable document received from Oliphant.75
Akers also scoffed sententiously at either the American or even Oliphant’s uncouth and less
imperious nature with ‘I expect you will notice for yourself, the distinction drawn in the last
paragraph, between members of the American armed forces and ‘thinking men’ in the USA.’ 76
Gorrell-Barnes passed it to Sir John Anderson (the Chancellor of the Exchequer and architect of
the Quebec Agreement).
Britain’s War Cabinet had, until that time, regarded Oliphant as little more than a senior
scientist on the British mission to the Manhattan Project. However, this communique was
escalated rapidly to the top. The pencilled footnotes to the copy of Aker’s note obtained from
the National Archives (UK) include a first response from Gorrell-Barnes to Akers—‘what channel
did this come?’ expressing a concern that the document was possibly not submitted through
secure channels and that Americans could learn of its existence and content. The second is from
Sir John Anderson himself, ‘It is dangerous stuff’. The follow-up communication on the report
was from Gorrell-Barnes to Anderson on 13 October, confirming that Oliphant’s report was
written and sent from the British Embassy in Washington. Hence, it was less likely that the
Americans knew of its existence.77 The 13 October letter revealed also that Gorrell-Barnes was
not particularly happy with Oliphant’s behaviour and that he took a risk by writing the report. He
stated, ‘As you know Professor Oliphant is expected here soon, and we will issue suitable
warnings to him then.’ To which Anderson’s footnote response states ‘Yes, lock it away in the
meantime.’78
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Oliphant attempts to revive the British Bomb Project
On 25 October 1944, Sir David Rivett, the head of the Australian Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research (CSIR) wrote to Oliphant in Berkeley.79 The two had previously connected
face-to-face on radar business when Oliphant visited Australia in 1942. Earlier, on 17 September
1941, whilst frustrated in Washington and only a week before Oliphant’s Berkeley meeting, he
had provided Australia’s ambassador in Washington, R.G. Casey, a note on the MAUD
Committee and memorandum on uranium which had been passed on to Rivett with a warning:
‘it may be desirable for Australia to do some homework, when possible, on the energy machine,
so that if and when she wished to exploit, she will have something with which to bargain’.80
That, in itself, is yet another example of Oliphant providing state secrets to others.
Rivett’s letter of October 1944,81 revealed that Australia had sent some scientists to the
Tube Alloys project and the British mission to the Manhattan Project and Rivett had made
enquiries to London whether anymore were required. The tacit absorption of knowledge by
scientists had seemingly become very important and governments were possibly viewing
scientists as the vessels to carry competitive knowledge home. Rivett wrote that ‘Mr Bruce82 had
a talk with Sir John Anderson and a reply and come which makes one feel quite definitely that
recent developments make it inadvisable to attempt to introduce any more Australians into the
USA team.’83 In Rivett’s closing paragraph he states ‘There is no real information available in
Australia about the progress of the work with which you are concerned, and that is making it
difficult in some quarters to handle questions in relation to prospecting and possible (though
improbable) production here.’ This sentence is clearly suggestive that Oliphant had previously
and more recently reached out to Rivett with enquiries about exploration for uranium ores in
Australia. If this is correct, Oliphant would have once again been in breach of secrecy provisions
in the United States and Britain, and also breached the conditions of the fourth article of the
Quebec Agreement. However, Oliphant was undoubtedly concerned about postwar freedoms
and following the outburst of Groves in October, he would have been keen to ensure that he
had access to postwar research whether in Britain or Australia.
At the end of October 1944, the Oak Ridge plant was still having difficulties. Oliphant
had learned from the mistakes of commissioning and had designed a whole new and probably
cheaper method for electromagnetic separation. There was no chance that they would start
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over in Tennessee, so he costed the new plant in sterling rather than dollars and sent it through
to Chadwick. In a spirit of cooperation, he also provided a copy to Groves.84 Within days, Akers
had received a copy and sent it on to Metropolitan Vickers, the British industrial powerhouse, to
consider manufacturing new parts.85 Oliphant, via his urgency when providing Groves’ views to
the British government in early October, seemed to have spurred action in Britain to revitalise
their own project. Akers wrote to Oliphant on 6 November saying that he felt his costings were
too low, but they were keen to push on with it and had grown the London directorate which
now totalled three scientists,86 a paltry number compared to the 1000s who were working on
the project in the United States. Akers did, however, state that he would like Oliphant back in
Britain soon so that they could discuss the plans going forward. It seemed that Akers had finally
resigned himself to the fact that Oliphant, despite his bombast and indiscretions, was a key cog
in the machinery of the atomic bomb. On his way to Britain, on 11 and 12 November 1944,
Oliphant attended a meeting at Chadwick’s office in Washington to discuss the British Tube
Alloys project and its revitalisation.87 Also in attendance were other members of the British
mission, including Webster from the Embassy; Peierls and Frisch; John Cockcroft and John
Skinner (Cavendish old boys); and Harrie Massey (also a Cavendish alumnus, but an Australian
originally from the University of Melbourne). Oliphant read a prepared statement which
explained his plan which included:
b.) The Director of the establishment of be a competent scientist
familiar with T.A. The superintendents to be drawn mainly from men
at present working in North America…
d.) Fundamental academic work should be in University laboratories,
but not development work. Universities should be subsidized for T.A.
work except by the provision of scholarships and certain small items of
equipment. Big items should be in the T.A. laboratory.
e.) Discussion of the work between scientific staff should not be
limited: there should be colloquia and adequate discussion at all
problems.
f.) Fundamental work should be published as far as possible. Secrecy
ban on a whole subject should be avoided, and questions of security
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should be reviewed periodically to ensure that only essential
restrictions, imposed on the grounds of security, are maintained.
g.) The British Dominions to be invited to cooperate as free partners. 88
.
Oliphant’s second point (b) was clearly a dig at Akers, whom Oliphant had blamed for the end of
the MAUD Committee and for the Tube Alloys project lolling around in bureaucracy since late
1941. His fourth point was an attempt to ensure that a military weapon project did not interfere
with day-to-day university activity. Oliphant’s points d to g were in response to the frustrations
he had experienced with the zealots of secrecy on the Manhattan Project. He drove his desire to
ensure that science would always remain open and particularly referenced the ‘British
Dominions’ to ensure Australia was included. The next entry in the meeting’s minutes was from
Chadwick, who stated he believed ‘that most of Oliphant’s statements be taken as agreed, but
that we should avoid discussion of political matters’.89 This is where Oliphant and Chadwick
differed considerably. Chadwick was an establishment scientist and focused on his task at hand
and did not want to consider the overall ramifications of the work. Oliphant, on the other hand,
saw that the interplay of politics and science threatened restrictions on their research.
The remainder of the meeting discussed the scale, equipment and manpower needed
for an initial restart of Britain’s atomic programs. They estimated an initial 410 people were
required, which was vastly lower than what was working on the Manhattan Project but far
greater than what Akers had at his disposal already. The costings for Oliphant’s new
electromagnetic plant design were £7.5 million, a significant difference to the hundreds of
millions that had been spent in the United States. Oliphant wrote one more cursory progress
report on Oak Ridge to Groves on 13 November 1944,90 and then boarded a flight home to
Britain for Christmas.

88

Ibid.
Ibid.
90
Marcus L. Oliphant, "Letter from Oliphant to General Groves, 13 November 1944," (Kew, London:
National Archives (UK), Reference AB 1/690, 1944).
89

121

Chapter Four

Figure 15 James Chadwick, 'Letter to Wallace Akers, 22 December 1944', National Archives UK
AB1/581

On 15 November 1944, Francis Simon, at the directorate of Tube Alloys on Old Queen
Street in Westminster received a report from Peierls.91 At the time Peierls was in United States
and he sent the letter directly from the security of the offices of the British Supply Council within
the embassy in Washington. It contained an updated set of plans and a review of Oliphant’s
design for the new kind of electromagnetic plant.
By December, Tube Alloys was once again in design mode and a memorandum was
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circulated with technical content ahead of Oliphant’s visit.92 Shortly before Christmas, Akers sent
a secret telegram via the embassy in Washington to Chadwick. In its brevity the intent is clear—
that Oliphant, along with other staff, as requested by Oliphant, are to finish their work and
return to Britain by April 1945.93 On 22 December, Chadwick responded to Akers in no uncertain
terms that he firmly believed Oliphant and the rest of the crew should remain in the United
States until they were released (Figure 15).94
Chadwick and Oliphant were clearly not seeing eye-to-eye on the early repatriation of
the British mission. Oliphant was worried that the United States would take and monopolise
British technology, whereas Chadwick felt that Britain’s duty was to remain as the understudy
and to toe the line with the American military, even if it meant sacrificing the future of their own
scientific endeavours. Chadwick alluded, in his final sentence, that the Chancellor of the
Exchequer should be consulted, therefore clearly assuming that Britain’s political leaders shared
his view. Oliphant found no ally in Chadwick on this matter. An impatient Oliphant wrote to Lord
Cherwell in the prime minister’s office to request a meeting and to complain about the lack of
progress on Britain’s bomb project. Oliphant addressed the letter to ‘Lord Cherwell, Dear
Professor’ as an attempt to appeal to one of Churchill’s closest confidants by using his pre-war
title,95 and as an equal rather than the lofty peerage with which Cherwell was bestowed.96 This
address was also to appeal to Cherwell’s academic background with a duty-bound requirement
to protecting openness in science. A hand-written note at the top of the letter, presumably in
Cherwell’s hand, states that he met Oliphant on 4 January (Figure 16).97
On 2 January 1945, Chadwick forwarded the monthly report on uranium235 production
to Akers and Oliphant.98 There was progress and improvement but the Oak Ridge plant was still
not achieving nameplate capacity. Chadwick included a footnote in which he once again
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asserted his view on seeing the
project in the United States
through to its conclusion: ‘This
confirms my opinion which I
emphasise again, that the
proper place for investigation of
improvements and for
development is here [in the
United States], and further, that
this is not the time to make
decisions about future plans.’99
After the 4 January
meeting, Lord Cherwell set up a
meeting for Oliphant with the
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Ahead of the meeting Akers
prepared an aide memoire for
the Chancellor. In this
document, Akers detailed
Oliphant’s increased
belligerence for the British
scientists to be repatriated from
the United States to Britain as
soon as possible. Akers

Figure 16 Mark Oliphant, 'Letter to Lord Cherwell 21 December
1944' National Archives UK CAB126/181

presented a balanced view and
stated both Chadwick’s and Oliphant’s arguments. Akers also noted that Oliphant had received
requests for information from Rivett in Australia and that the Chancellor was to caution Oliphant
on not providing any information to the Australian government. Akers, who had clearly started
to warm to Oliphant, completed his note with ‘I may say that we have found this visit of
Oliphant a most valuable one as he seems now to be much less impetuous and more balanced in
his judgment. He continues to be entirely convinced of the importance of TA [Tube Alloys] and
hence that a proper development effort should be made in this country.’100
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Oliphant approached the door of 11 Downing Street on the morning of 9 January 1944
to meet face to face with Sir John Anderson—the architect of the Quebec Agreement and AngloAmerican atomic bomb cooperation. It was a Sunday morning, and there would have
undoubtedly been other matters distracting the Chancellor at that time. The Germans had
launched a counter offensive and pushed the Allies back at the Battle of the Bulge in the Low
Countries, whilst the Soviets had continued to liberate Ukraine and were marching for Poland.
Nevertheless, Anderson made an hour available for a one-on-one with Oliphant. Once inside the
famous terrace house Oliphant implored the Chancellor that the British government should
make a clear statement to the Americans on development of its own atomic programs.101
Without a clear declaration of intent, Oliphant argued, the Americans would remain suspicious
of the activity of Britain. Oliphant expressed his fear of a postwar monopolisation of atomic
energy by the United States and that as soon as possible there should be a repatriation of the
great minds of Britain. The United States, he declared, cared little for anyone but themselves.
The Chancellor listened intently. Oliphant had, since his distribution of the secret
intelligence arising from his meeting with Groves, been cajoling those more senior to him that
Britain must resume a full flight towards its own atomic technology, or risk forever being the
understudy to the United States’ programs. The Chancellor, however, had most likely made up
his mind on what action to take before the meeting. He reminded Oliphant that, whilst the
Germans were losing power, the Allies had not yet won the war. Anderson stated that Britain
was to continue to provide America with all the scientific brain power that it needed, and that
he did not believe that, should atomic energy have postwar industrial application, the
technology could be monopolised by a single nation. In addition, Oliphant was told he must
refrain from engaging with Australia on the topic and that His Majesty’s government would hold
appropriate discussions directly with the member states of the Empire. The meeting concluded
with the Chancellor recognising that Oliphant had been away from the United States for long
enough, and he authorised RAF transport to get him back quickly.102
Oliphant’s return to the United States on 19 January 1945 was recorded in his FBI file.103
He had spent almost seven weeks in Britain, where he had attempted to bypass the correct
channels and once again take his concerns and desires to those directly who could sway
decision. But this time his persuasive manner failed and it seemed that he had been told, frankly
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and directly by the Chancellor himself, that it was not his business to dictate policy. Instead, he
was told to concentrate on the science.
Oliphant threw himself back into the task at hand at Oak Ridge and the electromagnetic
plants started to hum. The great calutrons, formed from the theories of Oliphant and Lawrence,
spun with the silver of the United States treasury104 and, primed with uranium from Canadian
mines,105 were accelerating particles and separating uranium isotopes one atom at a time.
Around half a kilogram a day was being produced and Oliphant was in a triumphant mood when
writing to Lawrence on 30 January 1945, ‘the military weapon is nearer than I had dared to
hope’.106
Oliphant had now completed the task for which he was sent back to the United States.
With a few loose ends to tidy up he prepared to return to Britain. On 16 March he wrote a letter
of resignation from the Manhattan Project to Lawrence from Oak Ridge:
It is difficult to express our admiration for the achievements of the
Laboratory. The genius which gave birth to cyclotron and which made
of it the most powerful tool of nuclear physics…has made Berkeley the
Mecca of every imaginative scientist. In this scientific and
technological war, we knew that Ernest Lawrence and his colleagues
would do great things. We expected to see the solution of difficult
problems. In fact we have seen a miracle.
The great plant in Tennessee is witness of the faith of those
responsible for America’s technological effort in the ability of the
Laboratory to achieve the impossible. The success of the plant in
operation, and the growth stockpile of material it produces, have
justified that faith, and have earned the admiration and envy of all….
There is no doubt we have been associated with a birth of a new
industry. This is not a passing phase in the intensive development of a
new military weapon but a permanent contribution to science and
technology of the future. It will not be long before we demonstrate the
first fruits of our labours. Although war has brought the opportunity to
do these things, and although the immediate results will be
incalculable destruction, we know that the in the ultimate analysis this
aspect will be overshadowed by the benefits wrought for mankind….
Mutual respect and understanding have always characterised scientific
men, for the literature of science is the first real world language.107
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Trinity and Hiroshima
From April 1945, just after Oliphant left the United States, the assembly of a test site at
Alamogordo in New Mexico began. On a desolate prairie, previously known to the locals with
the prophetic name ‘Jornada Del Muerta’ (Journey of Death), a new site was cleared. A 100-foot
tower was constructed to hoist the test bomb and at a distance of 20 miles the observer posts,
concrete bunkers and cameras were erected.108
On 8 May, the last pockets of resistance in Berlin fell and the war in Europe was over. A
primary motivation of the scientists to build the bomb—that Germany was building one too—
was removed. Indeed, in secretly recorded transcripts of German scientists who were brought to
England after Germany fell, Werner Heisenberg declared that the Nazis had shelved the German
bomb project in 1942.109 The activity on the Manhattan Project, however, did not slow down.110
In the early hours of 16 July 1945, one of Oliphant’s Birmingham students, Titterton, hovered his
hand nervously over a dial.111 Titterton’s role at Los Alamos had included the development of
the trigger mechanism for the test shot. The millions of dollars, the work of thousands of
scientists, and persistence through failure, converged into this one moment. Even though the
work involved innumerable calculations, laboratories, reactors, and calutrons, the mathematical
proof deduced by Frisch and Peierls in Oliphant’s Birmingham laboratory in 1940 had not yet
been practically tested. An atomic weapon works on critical mass and hence it is not possible to
produce a mini nuclear explosion in a laboratory from a few grams of material. The scientists ran
a book on what the yield of the test would be. Pessimists bet it would be a fizzer, while Fermi
took side bets that the atmosphere was going to be ignited, and that the state of New Mexico—
and possibly the planet—vaporised.112 The collaboration of scientists had been demonstrated
and tested like no other time in history. Titterton turned the dial, and an electric current was
sent flashing through wires to the bomb suspended a hundred feet above the desert.
In a blinding flash, a contrived atomic sun rose. The fire of the gods had been stolen by
these modern Prometheans and placed into the hands of humanity—or the American military at
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least. At this moment Oppenheimer said, simply, ‘it worked’.113 It was only later that he recalled
his thoughts of that moment with the lyricism that lionised him as a twentieth-century scientific
anti-hero.
A few people laughed, a few people cried, most were silent. I
remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita;
Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he should do his duty and,
to impress him, takes on his multi-armed form says, “Now I am
become Death, the destroyer of worlds”. I suppose we all thought
that, one way or another.114
Oliphant was well away from the Manhattan Project and was, perhaps, not even aware of the
successful test of an atomic bomb in New Mexico. If he had been there, he may have felt
disappointment that the material chosen for the test was not the uranium235 from Oak Ridge,
but plutonium from Hanford. Oliphant’s uranium was, however, already on its way to Tinian
Island near Guam in the Pacific. At 2 am on 6 August it was loaded inside the Little Boy bomb,
and winched into a B29-Superfortress for the six-hour flight to Japan. There had, to this point,
never been an uranium235 explosion. Over Hiroshima the bomb was released and fell silently for
43 seconds before its barometric trigger started the firing sequence. A uranium bullet was shot
into a uranium cylinder and, thus, formed the critical mass. A single bomb, unlike any ever used
before in war, detonated. Only 1% of the 65 kilograms of uranium was converted to energy, but
it yielded the equivalent of 20,000 tonnes of TNT and 80,000 residents of Hiroshima were
instantly killed—some incinerated to the extent that only a ghostly shadow remained on the
steps where they had been sitting.115
Oliphant was holidaying with Rosa and the children on the Denbighshire coast when the
news reports of Hiroshima broke.116 The front-page articles of the Manchester Guardian wrote
of the ‘Rain of Ruin’ that had fallen on Japan and that the weapon was a product of the ‘greatest
scientific gamble in history’.117 A second article detailed the intent and contribution of the British
scientists and, due to the newspaper’s provenance, the contribution of the ‘Manchester’ men,
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naming Chadwick, Rutherford and Cockcroft.118 The article also drew on the efforts of Lawrence,
the ‘atom-smasher’, and early knowledge of fission from Germany. The Birmingham Mail
proudly reported the contribution of Oliphant and other Brums, including Peierls, Frisch and the
endowment to the University of Birmingham provided by the locally based motor-magnate Lord
Austin. The front page (Figure 17) detailed the ‘three year secret in Birmingham’, and by
including a photograph of Oliphant thrust his involvement in the secret mission into the light.119
On reading of the destruction of an entire city, Oliphant later recalled his shock—that a
bomb, conceived in the hearts and minds of empire men to beat Germany in an arms race and
preserve the sovereignty of Britain, was now used on a city that lay in ruins, so foreign and
distant.120 The destruction of Hiroshima was, as war follows winding paths, a result of the
hushed tones heard in London’s MAUD Committee meeting in 1940. Oliphant, however, never
spoke negatively of his contribution to the emergence of the age of mass destruction. With

Figure 17 'All out Atom Bomb Attack' The Birmingham Mail, 7 August 1945
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pride he would recall the great scientific endeavour, the camaraderie of the scientists, the
problem solving and challenges, and the winning of a war with a bomb, born from the equations
penned in his laboratory and armed with uranium from factories of his design.121

Conclusions: for the sake of the state or the science?
‘The greatest scientific gamble in history’122 claimed by journalists was almost an
understatement. The resources and collaborative effort of the Manhattan Project were so
immense that they are almost unfathomable—the project and its materials cost over forty
billion dollars in today’s money. The gathering of the greatest minds of the allied world brought
forth a remarkable conversion of mathematics into the blinding death of hundreds of thousands
of people at Hiroshima and then Nagasaki, and accelerated the surrender of Japan and the end
of World War Two.
It cannot be said for sure what prompted Churchill and Roosevelt to renew collaboration
on the Manhattan Project in 1943. It seems, however, that Oliphant was named as the first
priority scientist to collaborate (with Lawrence) in the initial plan laid forth by Sir John Anderson,
ahead of the signing of the Quebec Agreement.123 This infers that Lawrence desperately needed
help on the electromagnetic method and that he most trusted Oliphant. Oliphant and Lawrence
renewed communication in early 1943, and it is even possible that the Quebec Agreement was a
response to a request for help from Lawrence.
Oliphant attempted to bypass the rules of secrecy on several occasions. This resulted in
him being investigated by the FBI, who thereafter continued to monitor his activities. Oliphant’s
panicked report on the meeting with Groves in October 1944124 explained the American desire
for postwar monopolisation of bombs and energy, and was sent through secure channels via the
British Embassy in Washington to prevent interception by the FBI. In this incident, Groves had let
his guard down and spoke of a desired American military control of the atomic bomb—to
‘prepare for the inevitable war with the Russia’.125 Whilst the United States was meant to share
all information with Britain, they clearly were not. This resulted in Oliphant’s realisation that he
must bridge the Atlantic not just on the technical knowledge but also on the political too. So
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when Chadwick attempted to block his actions, Oliphant escalated his protests up the command
chain until he eventually met with Churchill’s closest confidants: Lord Cherwell and Sir John
Anderson. Oliphant used this incident with Groves to attempt to gain traction on the British
bomb project. If America was not going to share, he urged Britain to bring home its scientists so
that they could not further delay their own research. Oliphant was reminded, however, that the
first goal was to win the war, and it was for this reason that he was returned to the United
States to complete his work with the Manhattan Project.126 He did not wait for the Trinity Test,
but at the earliest opportunity, after his obligations were fulfilled, he repatriated himself to
Britain. His individual contribution was, whilst part of an enormous team, also remarkable. For
that he remained ever proud. Oliphant escaped serious sanctioning from his multiple
indiscretions in communicating information to British, United States and Australian
governments. His contribution was of greater importance to the mission of war, than the risks
posed by his constant looseness with secrets. Groves knew that the Manhattan Project had
potentially been infiltrated anyway, but the risk of plugging all the leaks would mean a delay of
progress, and that he had to just keep the boat afloat long enough to reach the destination—a
working atomic bomb.
Was Oliphant’s sole motivation, when whistle blowing on the United States’ atomic
ambitions, to protect Britain’s military interests? Oliphant’s higher motivation seems a dutybound requirement to serve science and scientific freedoms—that knowledge be the preserve
of no single state or person. Whilst we may applaud this noble mission, Oliphant was also
sending secrets to the Australians who had only received snippets of information from Britain.
This contrives a different motivation to the cause, in that Oliphant was thinking possibly
selfishly, about his own postwar research. In a push to secure scientific freedom and prevent an
American monopolisation of atomic research, he was pushing for himself and his research to
find a suitable home, in Britain or even in Australia. This was a mission of Oliphant’s that became
clearer in the postwar environment.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Optimism of Mark Oliphant, 1945–1950

But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy,
nor its cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in putting
together infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in
different fields of science into a workable plan. And hardly less
marvellous has been the capacity of industry to design, and of labor to
operate, the machines and methods to do things never done before so
that the brain child of many minds came forth in physical shape and
performed as it was supposed to do.1

Suddenly World War Two was over. This worst of all conflicts ended not with the anticipated
field by field and street by street battle that had been fought to oust the Nazis, but with the
dropping of two bombs from the height of 30,000 feet. Atomic scientists were propelled on to
the front pages of newspapers and, emerging from the shadows of their secret mission, they
were made the ‘pin-up boys’ who won the war.2 On 12 August 1945, only three days after the
dropping of the Nagasaki bomb, the United States government released a 264-page report on
the Manhattan Project written by Henry De Wolf Smyth.3 The publication of Atomic Energy for
Military Purposes eponymously became better known as the Smyth Report and was a best-seller
by Christmas 1945. Whilst some of the scientific detail was omitted for security purposes, the
basic science, the structure of the project, the location of the industrial facilities and most
importantly the names of the scientists were published. Oliphant is mentioned six times in the
Smyth Report. The first reference mentions his meeting with Lawrence in September 1941,
which is referred to as one of ‘the many less formal discussions held’.4 The other references
focus on his leadership on the electromagnetic separation method and construction of the Oak
Ridge plant in Tennessee.5 Oliphant was now famous.
Perhaps, with the publication of the Smyth Report, Manhattan Project scientists felt
they were free to more openly discuss their views on the future of atomic science. Dr Reuben
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Gustavson, a chemist from the University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory, was interviewed
for the Chicago Tribune only six weeks after Hiroshima.6 Gustavson declared to the journalist
that the United States should work to stay ahead in the arms race:
It is still true that the country which can produce the best weapons,
and use them with the greatest skill has the best chance for survival.
That is as true today as it was the hour before the attack on Hiroshima.
We must make very sure that we have the most atom bombs and the
best airplanes in which to deliver them. If we are so armed we can face
the new era without dread.7
In the same interview Gustavson referred to Oliphant. He used Oliphant as an example of a
scientist who held dangerous opinions on the openness of atomic science. As a foreign scientist,
who had worked intimately within the Manhattan Project, his words caught the attention of the
FBI. In the agency’s report on the article Oliphant’s name was underlined.8 Oliphant was,
however, back in Britain and keen to get his research back on track. He was now famous and
sought to use this increased profile to serve his science.
Britain struggled economically in the years which followed the war’s end, as it
attempted to rebuild its infrastructure. No longer could the country maintain its vast empire.
Former dominions, such as Australia, had understood their own vulnerability in the war, and
knew they could no longer rely on historic ties to Britain for their own survival. Australia turned
to the United States for additional protection, and threw itself enthusiastically into the United
Nations project. The Labor government led by prime minister Ben Chifley and his mercurial
Foreign Minister, Herbert Evatt, sought to assert independence. As Christopher Waters wrote in
The Empire Fractures, ‘Australian nationalists were not simply nationalists, for nationalism was
an ideology available to all points of the political spectrum. More significantly, they were
political groupings of the centre-left’.9 Indeed, Evatt was an early influence on the formation of
the United Nations and also Australia ratifying the United Nations charter.10 The United Nations
provided some cause for optimism and internationalism and one of its first roles was to tackle
the issue of atomic energy with a conference on the subject in New York in 1946.
Oliphant became formally involved in Australian politics at this time when he was
appointed an advisor to Evatt at the United Nations in 1946. In this context, this chapter
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appraises Oliphant’s search for the moral use of atomic science in the immediate post-war years
and investigates his interactions with Chifley’s government. With the war over, he hoped to
rekindle international scientific collaboration. He attempted to reforge the links of the invisible
colleges and started to use his connections not just for scientific endeavour, but also to
participate in collective, trans-national political messaging.

Optimism: The Picture Post, 27 October 1945
On 27 October 1945, only 83 days after Hiroshima was bombed, an article titled ‘An Atomic Plan
for Britain’ appeared in one of Britain’s most popular photojournalism magazines, the Picture
Post.11 This weekly was the British equivalent of America’s Life and had a circulation of nearly
two million copies; it was read by an estimated 80% of adult Britons.12 The article spanned four
double-sided pages and was written by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) journalist

Figure 18 'Oliphant in Picture Post', photograph, Clifford Troke 'An Atomic Plan for Britain.' Picture Post, 27 October
1945
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Clifford Troke, who reported on his two-hour long interview with Oliphant in Birmingham.
Oliphant, then aged 44, was photographed leaning back in his chair, looking straight at the
camera. His distinctive white curly hair was caught in autumnal sun that was streaming through
the windows. A plume of smoke from his cigarette curled upwards, recalling the topology of a
mushroom cloud. In another photograph he is pictured looking away, his hands are open wide
and his fingers are spread—he is gesticulating his hope for the future of atomic energy in Britain,
and welcoming the reader to join him in this brave new world. Beneath the photographs are
quotes from Oliphant: the first detailed the stages of the construction of atomic power stations;
the second was more prescient of the real challenge that would face atomic scientists caught in
the machinations of a new world order. ‘War chiefs,’ he declared, ‘think of atomic energy as a
secret weapon; business men as a secret process; politicians as the secret of world power. Utter
disaster faces us unless we realise it can be none of these things.’13 Yet the optimism of Oliphant
for British atomic energy was evident:
Professor Oliphant probably knows much about the atom-bomb. “But
I’m not interested,” he told me as we sat in his office at the University
of Birmingham. “That all belongs to past; the job is done. It is the
future we should be thinking of. People show anger with Science for
developing nuclear power. How soon they ask, before this terrible
force annihilates us? They should instead be asking how soon can it be
made to serve us, end our drudgery, lift our loads.”14
The article detailed the various capabilities of atomic energy and how Britain needed to loosen
its purse strings in order to fund this new promising energy. Oliphant is presented as a
progressive scientist but also a social-progressive as he sought to convince the masses of Britain
of the potential of limitless energy: ‘Whatever plans for social betterment our Government may
have, the key to them must lie in atomic power, for in it lies the potential for increasing the
wealth-producing power of every worker—on which, in the long run, all social progress
depends.’ He highlighted the need to increase the number of trained personnel and to develop a
major new research establishment. Oliphant used the interview to deliver a message to
politicians and bureaucrats that science, as natural philosophy, cannot be contained:
“Confused thinking exists as to the nature of the ‘secret’ which is
being withheld. In fact, the matters not disclosed fall into these three
categories: (1) Technical details concerning the preparation of and the
handling of the components of present sources of atomic energy. (2)
The actual structure of the bomb. (3) Recent industrial developments.”
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Oliphant clearly was intent on disclosing matters ‘not disclosed’. He also went on to state that
there was ‘no part of the basic theory of process [making a bomb] that is not the common
property of all physicists’. In attempting to preserve open science he clearly considered that, in
the absence of secrets, the scientific fraternity should swear an oath to share knowledge:
“Were the new discovery an addition to medical science the doctor’s
code laid down by Hippocrates we would demand that it should be
shared with all mankind. Why not a Hippocratic Oath for science? By
ensuring the use of all first rate brains of the world, none too
numerous at any time in history, the pooling of atomic knowledge
would immensely accelerate its proper use. Such a course would also
give an immense stimulus to international goodwill.”

In the interview Oliphant saw there were three possibilities on what to do with the secrets, even
though he had already declared that secrets do not exist:
“So we have three choices. (1) Share our secrets with Russia. (2)
Withhold them and start on a race which Russia is almost bound to
win. (3) Use our temporary advantage to destroy Russia so that she
cannot start the race. The third possibility is unthinkable, so only the
first remains as a practical good sense.”

Troke concluded his piece with a message of hope. Oliphant’s optimism was clearly contagious
and Troke wished to leave the reader with the same indelible prophecy of the future that
Oliphant had left with him:
We had talked for two hours. The cold, unexcited prophecies15
Professor Oliphant had made filled me with a new hope. The hope of a
world materially enriched beyond dreams, in which an International of
scientific planning and achievement made out-of-date the national
rivalries and misunderstandings which politicians have failed to
compose. And a world, too, within our immediate reach.16

15
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The Picture Post article is a remarkable insight into the new attention that Oliphant and other
atomic scientists had received after Hiroshima. He was dismissive, not wanting to engage on the
topic of the atomic bomb and the war (‘that is in the past, the job is done’). Oliphant placed
Birmingham at the leading edge of atomic
research and he used the interview to
proselytize a view for open science and that
there were no atomic secrets worthy of
protection anyway. He spoke of the inevitability
of an arms race with the Soviet Union and
stated that this could be avoided if the doors of
scientific cooperation were opened in a spirit of
good-will. The title of the article, An Atomic Plan
for Britain, recalled a 1941 issue of the Picture
Post which famously dedicated all its pages to ‘A
Plan for Britain’.17 As John Stephenson argued,
‘total war forced government to make
concessions to organised labour’,18 and the
planning for a new Britain was not just
something for after the war, but was an aim of
the war. The 1941 article resulted in a
committee on planning for social-change with
members including writer J.B. Priestly, and

Figure 19. 'A victim of Hiroshima', photograph,
Clifford Troke 'An Atomic Plan for Britain.' Picture
Post, 27 October 1945

evolutionary philosopher Julian Huxley. They laid out a vision for the postwar social welfare of
Britain that included minimum wages, a national health service, and national insurance
schemes.19 By the time October 1945 came around, the war had been won and a new Labour
prime minister, Clement Attlee, had been elected by those who also sought the social gains
espoused in the Picture Post in 1941. Troke had selected the title of ‘An Atomic Plan for Britain’
carefully, intending to recall the socialist message of the earlier issue. In Oliphant he found a
comrade that knew the secrets to the energy that would, for the worker of Britain, ‘end our
drudgery, lift our loads’.20 But with this hope there was also a warning. Troke included, amongst
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the multiple pictures of Oliphant, the Birmingham laboratory and the other physicists at
Birmingham, an extra photograph: the burned scarred face of a Hiroshima woman, a direct
product of uranium that had been enriched by the design and leadership of Oliphant. The
caption beneath the photograph reads, ‘the science which made this horror possible is now
available for enriching all humanity’. Recalling Oliphant’s letter to Lawrence upon leaving the
Manhattan Project—in which he predicted that the ‘incalculable destruction’ of atomic bombs
would be ‘overshadowed by the benefits wrought for mankind’21—the incongruent photograph
was placed as if to say that the sacrifice of the Japanese people was collateral damage, perhaps
a down-payment, which was necessary for the benefit and future of all peoples in the bright
new atomic age.
The optimism of the atomic age was shared throughout the scientific community with
scientists getting the jump on governments and pushing the promise of almost limitless energy
to rebuild the war-shattered world. The potential application, it seemed, was enormous. Vast
tracts of desert could be made fertile with atomic-powered desalination, enabling an end to
starvation;22 the years of excavation of the Panama Canal could be repeated in a matter of
weeks;23 atomic explosives could even push back the advance of bush-fires or halt the advance
of hurricanes;24 nuclear medicine would cure the cancers;25 and trade would pass freely across
the oceans in nuclear-powered ships.26 With energy put to good use, and world poverty and
starvation eradicated, the human race could dedicate its lives to the enrichment of arts and
philosophy. The atomic age gave promise to a war-weary world that a new utopia beckoned.27
Science, it seemed, was out to educate a wide-eyed public on what the future could look
like; but the vested interest of governments and the clashing of ideologies would cloud the
outlook of even the most optimistic prophet.

‘There are bound to be risks in letting him loose in Australia’
Despite Oliphant’s optimism, the pace of activity in Britain was not anywhere near what he
thought it should be. If Britain was to secure its future it needed atomic energy and in that he
required political action. In October 1945, Oliphant approached his local member of parliament,
21
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Captain Raymond Blackburn.28 As the new Labour parliamentarian, Blackburn had successfully
taken his seat following the defeat of the Conservative member in the 1945 election that had
also put Clement Attlee into power. The Quebec Agreement was still secret, and Churchill had
lied in parliament about its presence in 1945.29 Blackburn was a back-bencher, but he listened
attentively to Oliphant complain about inactivity and how the Americans were holding back the
British from meaningful work. The Quebec Agreement meant that the British could only access
atomic energy at the pleasure of the President of the United States.30 Rickett, of the British
Cabinet Office, provided a detailed memorandum on Oliphant’s discussion to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton. The former Chancellor, Sir John Anderson, who was still involved at
the Directorate of Atomic Energy inside the Ministry of Supply, also received a copy.31
The Quebec Agreement referred to above is, of course, a top secret
official document and if the professor has given the gist of it to a
member of parliament he has committed an indiscretion of a more
serious kind than, for example, discussing the kind of scientific
background which might be reasonably expected to be known to most
physicists.32
The action recommended was that Anderson as well as Chadwick should meet with Oliphant to
provide stern warnings. Anderson replied with a footnote on correspondence on 30 October,
‘This is a monstrous abuse and a clear breach of the Official Secrets Act.’33 On 31 October,
Anderson’s office wrote to Chadwick to deal with the matter:
Sir John Anderson would like you to see the attached note which sets
out the facts, so far as we know them of Oliphant’s recent activities.
This matter was discussed by Ministers not long ago, who agreed that
as soon as you had arrived in this country you should be asked to see
Oliphant and to impress on him the importance of observing proper
discretion in regard to the very secret information with which he has
been entrusted. I think Ministers felt that an injunction of this kind
would come best from you, since it was under your direction and
supervision that Oliphant worked when he was in America.
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The Prime Minister also mentioned the matter to Sir John Anderson,
and as you know he referred to it at the meeting of the Advisory
Committee yesterday. Sir John feels this affair really is rather a serious
matter and he is wondering whether we ought to tell Oliphant that in
the circumstances it would be better that he should not remain a
member of any of our Committees. Before taking this step, however, I
know that Sir John would like to have a further word with you about
the whole matter.34
Oliphant’s indiscretion began a scaling back of his involvement in British government work and
for the remainder of 1945 he wisely kept a low profile on such matters and continued on his
plans for the Birmingham synchrotron.35 David Ellyard, in his 2012 PhD thesis on Oliphant’s
Birmingham synchrotron,36 provided considerable detail on the last months of 1945 and the
cycle of committee meetings that were required to approve funding for Oliphant. Despite
Oliphant’s vociferousness with politicians, he still held a vision of atomic research that could not
be completely sidelined. On 5 November 1945 Oliphant presented his design for a particle
accelerator to a research committee that included Chadwick. His request for the princely sum of
£250,000 from the British purse was met with favour. It is likely that at this point Chadwick also
pulled Oliphant to one side to provide the warning that Anderson had asked him to deliver. Yet
the plans for the new machine were revolutionary, and from a scientific aspect Oliphant still had
so much to contribute.37
After six years of war, 1946 held a certain promise. Soldiers had returned home and had
re-entered the workforce; rebuilding efforts in Europe and the Far East had begun. The recently
formed United Nations was designed to stand guard over the peace and prosperity of the world.
On the first working day of the new year, 2 January 1946, John S. Duncan, the Official Secretary
at the Australian High Commission in London, called in to see John Wilmot at the British Ministry
of Supply. Wilmot wrote to Attlee on 7 January to report what Duncan had to say.38 The
Australian prime minister, Ben Chifley, had telegrammed Duncan over Christmas to inform him
that they wished to have Oliphant visit Australia to advise their laboratories on atomic energy.39
Wilmot advised Attlee that they could not prevent such a secondment, and implied that
Chifley’s request to the British government had been made as a matter of courtesy. Wilmot sent
34
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a copy also to Anderson at the Directorate of Atomic Energy inside the Ministry of Supply.
Anderson, one of the architects of the Quebec Agreement was not happy. Attlee asked for the
opinion of Lord Addison, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, ‘urgently!’40 The Secretary
of State for Dominion Affairs was a Cabinet level position that ensured appropriate working
relationships with the Commonwealth countries and Attlee had held the position himself from
1942 to 1943 in Churchill’s coalition war-time cabinet. This was not a diplomatic post, and sat
more akin to a modern Foreign Affairs role, but was specifically for liaison with the dominions of
the Empire, including South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. On 11 January, Attlee
replied to Anderson that the Dominions Office, the Ministry of Supply, the prime minister’s
Office and the Cabinet Office should make a coordinated effort to prevent Oliphant from leaving
for Australia.41
Britain, in the immediate years after the war, was close to bankruptcy and relied heavily
on American aid.42 The United States also held the Quebec Agreement over the British and could
prevent any form of British work on the atomic bomb and energy.43 President Truman had
expressed to Attlee that he had no intention of releasing atomic control immediately to any ally,
even their main collaborator on the Manhattan Project. Truman even, reportedly, threatened to
disrupt American aid to Britain if they pursued their own atomic ambitions.44 Britain had, in a
small way, restarted its atomic project and had even considered negotiations for collaboration
with France.45 Yet the Quebec Agreement forbade either party disclosing details to another
country.46 Oliphant, despite having spent the best part of the past 20 years in Britain or
representing Britain in the United States, was an Australian.47 He was also a free agent and an
employee of the University of Birmingham, not the government, and could not be prevented
from returning to Australia. Anderson concocted a plan and ran it by Attlee: an invitation should
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be made to Australia to send one of their own to review progress in Britain.48 This seemed like a
solution that was both amiably polite but which also controlled the dissemination of
information.
On 21 January 1946, Duncan was invited to a discussion on the topic at the Dominion
Office.49 This was more of an attempted ambush than a meeting, and Duncan was confronted by
the Under-Secretary of State Sir Eric Machtig, Secretary of State for the Dominions Lord
Addison, the Minister of Supply John Wilmot, Mr G. Archer of the Ministry of Supply, and Mr
D.H.F Rickett of the Cabinet Offices, representing Prime Minister Attlee. The suggestion to bring
an Australian representative was tabled and the advantage to Australia of having access to the
wider British expertise, rather than just Oliphant, was offered as a carrot. Duncan did not bite.
Minutes of the meeting recorded that:
Mr Duncan asked, somewhat pointedly, if there were any objections
on personal grounds regarding Professor Oliphant, to which the
Minister replied that our suggestion would have been made regardless
of whom the Australians had wanted to go out.50
It was clear that Duncan was to get nowhere against the phalanx of Lords, Knights and
Ministers of Britain’s high office, and he left the meeting agreeing to take the suggestion to
Chifley. Shortly thereafter the British received a response from Chifley with an insistence that
the visit should be by an Australian and that there was no one in Australia available to visit
Britain as an alternate.51 On 2 March, Mr Lindsell of the Ministry of Supply wrote up a
memorandum on Chifley’s response.52 He also briefed the British High-Commissioner for
Canada, Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, likely due to the potential compromising of the Quebec
Agreement on which the Canadians were named as an arbitrator. The British bureaucrats
considered that Chifley’s reasoning was somewhat lacking, but given that they had already
stated that this was not about Oliphant as an individual, with a collective sigh, they conceded
that there was no reasonable avenue that they could effectively use to block the request and
Lindsell’s report included the footnote:
It may be desirable, if Professor Oliphant is to make the visit, that
before he leaves he should be given a tactful intimation concerning the
48
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need for discretion on the subjects he discusses while in Australia, in
order to ensure that there will be no disclosure of secret information
and Franks has suggested that Sir John Anderson may wish to have a
word with Professor Oliphant at the appropriate time.53
Clutterbuck responded three days later:
Neither of us feel that the Australian reply is v. convincing, and having
regard to Prof. Oliphant’s indiscreet behaviour in this country, there
are bound to be risks in letting him loose in Australia. But in this
circumstance, we do not see that the UK government can do otherwise
than agree. Though opportunity should be found for giving him a
friendly caution before he goes.54

By this stage Oliphant was clearly considered a security risk and it appears that he had been
placed under surveillance, presumably by intelligence officers of the British government. On 11
March 1946 Rickett, of the Cabinet Office, wrote to Lindsell of the Ministry of Supply with an
intelligence report on the continuing indiscretions of Oliphant. Oliphant’s utterances in several
public forums included disclosure that the United States was preparing to test a new bomb; that
the British and American government were hampering development of atomic energy for
peaceful uses; and in a report to the socialist newspaper, the Daily Worker, he said ‘the atomic
bomb was now out of the hands of the scientists and in the hands of the fire-eaters’. 55

Oliphant had rapidly become personae non grata in the upper echelons of the British
government and was in increasing danger of losing all the privileges he had enjoyed as a senior
member of Britain’s scientific elite.
In April 1946, Oliphant was invited to dine with Chifley in London, who was in town for
the Commonwealth heads of government meeting. In an account of the history of physical
sciences at the Australian National University, Trevor Ophel and John Jenkin suggested that it
was Harrie Massey that nominated Oliphant to attend the dinner, and that this was potentially
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the first Chifley knew of Oliphant.56 This view is shared by Stephen Foster and Margaret
Varghese. They noted that Chifley desired to establish a new national university, and that
Massey recommended to the senior public servant, Herbert ‘Nugget’ Coombs, that Oliphant
should be approached to lead its physics department.57 Contradicting this view of Oliphant being
unknown to the Chifley government are the discussions between Australia’s High Commissioner
to Britain, Chifley and the British government dating back to the beginning of 1946.58 Yet it
seems, however, despite the hard-won permission for Oliphant to visit Australia to advise on
research, he did not go at that time. Chifley, instead, had other plans for Oliphant: he was to join
the Australian delegation to the United Nations Conference on Atomic Energy and he was,
instead, sent to New York.59 Anderson wrote to Oliphant with a further warning of his duties and
responsibilities to Britain, and of Britain’s responsibilities to the United States:
I can quite understand that to discharge this function adequately while
continuing to be associated as closely as you have been with work
which is being done in this country, may be a matter of some difficulty.
You, I am sure, agree that it is of the utmost importance at the present
stage in our relations with the Americans that there should be no
departure from our understanding with them about disclosure of
information to other Governments. Under this, we are bound not to
disclose any information about atomic energy to any other
Government (even to another member of the Commonwealth) except
in accordance with agreed common policy, or after consultation with
the United States government.
I realise that this restriction may make it difficult at times for you to
carry out your task as adviser to the Australian representative on the
Commission, but you will, I feel sure, agree that no other course is
possible in the circumstances.60

Oliphant responded with brevity two days later: ‘thank you for your letter. I am very glad to
have your views, and I will do my best to fall in with suggestions you make.’61 Judging from
Oliphant’s 1945 and 1946 actions around secrecy, he had little intention of falling into line.
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The ‘highway without signs’
As the British government was wrestling with Oliphant’s independence of mind, the United
States government, having used their three wishes, Trinity, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was
wrestling to put the atomic genie back into the bottle. In October 1945 a bill was tabled in
Congress that proposed that the military retain control of the Manhattan Project’s atomic
secrets. The Interim Committee62 testified that monopolised government control was the best
insurance against misuse of the atom. The May-Johnson Bill, as it was eponymously named for
the two representatives who tabled it, proposed significant academic restrictions on atomic
science and disallowed even the Quebec Agreement allies to have any kind of say in the
research.63 In December 1945 Congressman Brien McMahon tabled an alternate bill (the
‘McMahon Bill’) that still had tight controls but a more liberal view on atomic research in
academia and free enterprise.64 Congress debated the bills during the first half of 1946. The
fledgling United Nations, in January 1946, formed the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission and called a conference. The atomic bomb project had been a six-year secret
shared by scientists and select members of their governments. For the rest of the world, the
dawn of the atomic age had risen very rapidly, and both polity and the public were confused and
fearful. A former state department official, Bernard Bechhoefer, described that the world was
on a ‘highway without signs’.65
Atomic scientists, and particularly those that had stood witness through the discoveries
of the 1930s, and had squirrelled away on the bomb during the war, had a greater sense of the
portent and felt that they also held clues to future policy. In the United States, the Federation of
American Scientists (FAS) formed as a liberal pseudo-socialist collective of scientists with the
goal to support each other and debate the future of the world and science in the atomic age.66
In Britain, the Atomic Scientists Committee of Great Britain (ASCGB) emerged as an academic
collective. Both the FAS and the ASCGB saw the horrible potential if atomic weaponry was to
proceed unchecked and used by naïve governments.67 A dichotomous scenario occurred:
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scientists feared another use of the weapon of their making, but recognised that arms control
would limit their ability to research and collaborate scientifically with others. The United Nations
was then in its infancy but held the potential to be an organisation that could enable both the
control of weaponry as well as being internationalist with the science. The ASCBG wrote a
memorandum to the United Nations ahead of the mid-1946 conference on atomic energy.68
Whilst this was a British association of academics, the cohort had a distinct international flavour
to it with five émigrés who had fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s (Max Born, Rudolf Peierls, Otto
Frisch, Edvard Guggenheim and Friedrich Paneth) and two Australians (Oliphant and Massey).
The signatories also included Sir George Thomson, who had recently been knighted and had
chaired the MAUD Committee in the early 1940s.
The recommendations of the ASCGB pushed for global control of atomic science to
become the responsibility of the United Nations. A total of eight propositions were forwarded:
a. That the United Nations to gain an international agreement so that the
erection and operation of plants designed for producing active
materials would be controlled solely by the United Nations.
b. That the United Nations would have powers of inspection and right to
access any place or institution in any country to confirm that no
country is producing material outside of the United Nations control.
c. That all existing mines of raw materials and all existing plants (e.g. Oak
Ridge) should be handed over to the United Nations.
d. That the United Nations should arrange for the construction of new
plants and those plants to be distributed around the world so that if a
nation was to secure a plant, the United Nations would control the
balance of the atomic material.
e. That the disposal of active waste from the plants be controlled by the
United Nations and the United Nations could use the material to build
their own weapons for the purpose of deterrent against any country
that breaks with the United Nations agreement.
f.

That all the secrecy provisions are lifted immediately.

g. That a free-movement and international exchange of scientists be
encouraged and supported by the United Nations.
h. That there be a distinction between ‘safe’ and ‘dangerous’ activities.69
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Several scientists, including the leader of the British mission to the Manhattan Project, James
Chadwick, did not sign the memorandum. Chadwick, as per his philosophy of not mixing science
and politics demonstrated during his debates with Oliphant in late 1944, opted out gracefully
without providing opinion.70
In the United States, Bernard Baruch, a philanthropist, businessman and former advisor
to Roosevelt, became the American representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission.71 In consultation with his government, Baruch took a report on international
control developed by Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal from the State Department, and
crafted a plan for control. Baruch presented his plan on 17 June 1946 to the United Nations.72
The Acheson-Lilienthal report and the Baruch Plan were not unlike the memorandum from the
British scientists and proposed that the United Nations itself would solely control the worldwide
mining and refining of fissionable material, and be solely authorised to provide permits for
atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Baruch called upon all other nations of the world to agree
to cease any atomic bomb development and the United States, in turn, would destroy its arsenal
and hand control of its facilities directly to the United Nations. Under the plan, all nations would
be subject to the regular inspections of their industrial and research facilities and the United
Nations could maintain its own arsenal of atomic weapons (presumably donated by the United
States) for the sole purpose of policing rogue states. The penalties for breaking the proposed
international law were to be considered as equivalent as crimes against humanity and ‘the
United Nations can prescribe individual responsibility and punishment on the principles applied
at Nuremberg’.73 If a rogue nation was to a build a bomb, its leaders could be rounded up and
put on trial. Baruch called upon the Foreign Ministers, including Lord Brevin of Britain and
Vyacheslav Molotov of the Soviet Union, to join the United States in pushing this proposal
throughout the world and in that a lasting peace was possible:
We find ourselves here to test if man can produce, through his will and
faith, the miracle of peace, just as he has, through science and skill, the
miracle of the atom.74
The Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, also made a similar proposal, which saw any
country holding atomic weapons as guilty of ‘a serious crime against humanity’ and called upon
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all current stocks of atomic weapons (held exclusively at that stage by the United States) to be
destroyed immediately and ahead of the Security Council ratifying the agreement.75 With the
agreement, in principle, of the world powers, peace and a world without atomic weapons
seemed a distinct possibility. The United Nations was holding tenuously to its promise of
becoming a functioning world government and punitive police force to hold apart the
belligerents in the looming ideological Cold War.
Oliphant, along with the Australian scientist George Briggs, sat alongside Australian
delegate Herbert ‘Doc’ Evatt as a scientific advisor.76 Evatt, who had been involved in
establishing the United Nations,77 had been appointed as the first chair of the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission,78 and as such Oliphant embarked on educating Evatt on the whole
gamut of atomic science. Ahead of the conference, Oliphant provided a review of AchesonLilienthal Report to Chifley and Evatt and whilst he applauded the United States potentially
relinquishing the atomic monopoly and ceding control to the United Nations, he saw risks to
Australia being able to control its own uranium mining rights. Chifley reported, in a Cabinet
memorandum, that whilst he considered the international control of atomic energy as being the
best way forward, he was concerned about the willingness of other nations to agree upon the
detail and based on his discussions with Attlee, Australia should push on rapidly with identifying
sources of raw materials (uranium ore deposits). Of all the nations that may not agree to
control, Chifley felt that the United States had the most to lose with its atomic monopoly and
hence would sit most awkwardly at the conference table.79
As much as some of the representatives to the United Nations desired for agreement,
there were a series of factors that clouded the conference. In February 1946, Igor Gouzenko, a
Soviet diplomat in Ottawa, defected. Gouzenko spilled the beans on the Soviet infiltration of the
Manhattan Project and broke open a Canadian spy ring. Within weeks, Alan Nunn May, a
member of the British delegation to the Manhattan Project, who worked in the Montreal
Metallurgical Laboratory (allied with Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory), during the war was
arrested in London. Nunn May confessed to regularly supplying agents of the Soviet Union with
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atomic secrets throughout the latter parts of the war and was sentenced to ten years of hard
labour in a British prison.80 It would have hardly come as a surprise to the United States
government that the Manhattan Project had been infiltrated. Groves himself had told Oliphant
he suspected leaks in 1944.81 Oliphant knew Nunn May as a quiet middle-class undergraduate at
Birmingham before the war and was shocked at the treachery.82 The confession of Nunn May
presented a counter-argument to the scientists’ insistence that there were no real atomic
secrets and the general science was already public-knowledge.83 The tacit knowledge of
construction was, in an arms-race, as important as the theory in the practical pursuit of atomic
weaponry. Certainly from a public perception, the Soviets had penetrated the Manhattan
Project and they were probably already building a bomb.84
At the conference Oliphant advised Evatt, as the chair of the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission, and not one of the larger nations. Oliphant, in 1989, wrote an article for the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists with his recollection of the events.85 Firstly, in the 1989 article,
Oliphant did not reference Acheson’s involvement but suggested that Lilienthal worked most
closely with Oppenheimer on the original report that Baruch based his plan upon. Through the
Manhattan Project, Oliphant and Oppenheimer had developed a friendship and Oliphant trusted
that Oppenheimer had ‘considered the issues of control carefully’.86 But Baruch had altered the
plan to ensure that American dominance ruled. Oliphant wrote, of a ‘Pax Americana’,87 with
Washington being the global policeman with the most powerful weapon in the world in their
hands. This was precisely the intention of the United States military as per the discussion
between Groves and Oliphant two years earlier.88 In reporting on the 1946 conference, Oliphant
wrote that Groves hoped there would be no agreement, so that the United States military could
remain ascendant:
Gen. Leslie Groves, the military head of the wartime atomic bomb
project, went around to those he knew saying gleefully that the
Russians would never accept the Baruch plan. And since America
80
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would agree to no other, America alone would have nuclear weapons
for a long time. General Groves was confident that the Soviets could
not possibly build nuclear weapons in less than 10 or 20 years. 89
In the 1989 article, Oliphant noted that Evatt’s appointment as the chair of the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission further inflated Evatt’s sense of self-importance. He reported how
the minister delayed their aircraft on a stopover to the United States and that Evatt complained
to Paul Hasluck, the head of the Australian mission to the United Nations, and later a politician
and the Governor-General of Australia, that the Cadillac that ferried them from the airport was
too small for a man of his standing in world affairs. Evatt complained that his speeches to the
United Nations were not reported enough in the New York Times. For Evatt, the highlight of the
trip was when Baruch invited him to sit ringside as the boxer Joe Louis defended his world title.90
John Murphy, author of the biography Evatt, shared Oliphant’s view of Evatt as a bombastic
egotist.91
During the conference Oliphant and Oppenheimer communicated closely. Both saw that
the Soviet plan tabled by Gromyko had merit, though it required the United States to dismantle
its bombs first. Oppenheimer told Oliphant that the United States had only three assembled
weapons, which could be quickly rebuilt if necessary.92 This concession, for the United States to
dismantle their weapons, was designed to show American willingness to cooperate, but
according to Oppenheimer, would not cause a material loss of strategic advantage. The United
States military disagreed. Oliphant, with the position as advisor to the chair, ran messages from
Baruch, Oppenheimer and Gromyko to Evatt. On one occasion Oliphant was asked by Evatt to
arrange a meeting with Baruch. Baruch asked them to meet in the morning at a bench in Central
Park, which Evatt considered below his status and did so begrudgingly. On the bench, Baruch
unwound a chord and box and put in a hearing aid whilst Evatt talked to him. When Evatt was
finished, Baruch removed the hearing aid, and spoke forcefully back to Evatt which, according to
Oliphant, incensed him:
I walked back to the hotel with an extremely angry Dr Evatt. Thus it
came as no surprise that this man [Evatt] would reject Oppenheimer’s
advice about Gromyko’s proposal.93
This comment from Oliphant, and the meeting in the park, exemplified the whole United
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Nations conference on atomic energy: as much as the scientific advisors wanted their politicobosses to negotiate, the whole thing ran as a series of monologues rather than dialogues.
Oliphant was dismayed at the apparent ego of the politicians that their machismo prevented an
agreement. Paul Hasluck wrote a more ingenuous view of Oliphant in the foreword for
Oliphant’s 1981 biography:
At that period he was, for me, primarily the eminent scientist received
with respect by other eminent scientists in and around the
Commission, but I also carried away a memory of good humour,
naturalness, even jolliness in developing friendship. At the same time, I
found that he had an almost incredible naiveté in respect of politics. I
remember the way he used to listen and look with puzzlement at the
arguments and the behaviours of our political masters. 94

As an ‘errand boy’95 for Evatt, Oliphant was a witness to the arguments and counter arguments
of the politics around the United Nations and atomic energy in 1946. Hasluck’s interpretation of
naivety is not an uncommon interpretation of Oliphant. Monica Oliphant also used the term to
describe her father-in-law and his interaction with the political world.96 So, was Oliphant naïve?
Or was he possibly frustrated that politicians, compared to scientists, did not necessarily
operate with logic and rationality. Oliphant alluded that the choice of Evatt as the chair of the
commission played a factor in the lack of will to achieve an outcome of arms control. Maybe a
more humble person would have been better able to bring the Soviet Union and the United
States closer into dialogue. The view of Oliphant, that Evatt was not a good choice as a
chairman, was also noted by Hasluck:
Evatt, as chairman tried to take command in his forceful way and
made the situation worse. He appeared to have an ambition to settle
the whole question of international control of atomic energy during his
one-month term as chairman. He seemed to regard the problem
mainly as one of accepting a treaty which he had drafted and, worst of
all he disregarded the basic need for some measure of understanding
and mutual confidence between the Soviet Union and the United
States. He scolded, contradicted and over-ruled their representatives
in a way that made that central problem more difficult.97

In Evatt not accepting the scientist’s recommendation of compromise, there was little hope to
94

Sir Paul Hasluck, foreword to: Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, vi.
Oliphant, "Three Men and the Bomb."
96
Oliphant, "Interview with Monica Oliphant, physicist and daughter-in-law of Mark Oliphant by Darren
Holden."
97
Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941–1947, 279.
95

151

Chapter Five
convince either side. What is not mentioned, however, in the accounts on the 1946 United
Nations meeting,98 or in Oliphant’s summary, is that Evatt and Baruch had their own history.
Kylie Tennant in her 1970 biography of Evatt recorded that Evatt and his wife, Mary Alice, dined
with Baruch and Churchill at Chequers (the British prime minister’s country residence) in 1943
and became friends, which led to other wartime meetings in the United States.99 It is possible,
perhaps, that Evatt, given his history with Baruch, was not as neutral an arbitrator as may have
been expected in his position. At the Paris conference of the United Nations, held only a month
after the atomic energy conference, John Murphy wrote that Molotov argued with Evatt over
the appointment of conference chairs, claiming they were less than neutral.100
The Soviet Union used its power of veto on the United Nations Security Council to reject
the Baruch plan. As historian Jonathon Schell argued, proposed inspections were considered to
be an attack on Soviet sovereignty. Ceding control of uranium mining in Russia to the United
Nations was counter to the centralisation of state required under Stalin’s form of
communism.101 The Soviet plan required the United States to destroy its arsenal of weapons
before an agreement could be reached, though Oppenheimer later described that action as
easily reversible.102 The United States was not prepared to back down, even if its loss of strategic
advantage was minimal. As a result, a stalemate developed between the superpowers which
continued through the Cold War.103 Chifley’s prophecy of the fine-details blocking an agreement
were proven correct and the United States, as the only country that then held atomic bombs,
saw little reason to make concessions. In this moment, the opportunity to abolish atomic
weaponry was lost and the nuclear arms race began in earnest.
In July 1946, with the United Nations conference coming to a close, Oliphant did not
want to lose opportunity to push his own agenda of casual internationalism. The conference and
the delegations had been filled with scientists representing their various countries and old
acquaintances were being renewed. Ernest Lawrence was to host a Physical Society meeting in
Berkeley during July and Oliphant wanted to use it as an opportunity to continue to foster
international relations between physicists. Oliphant telegrammed Lawrence to say that French
physicists, Frederic Joliot-Curie, Lew Koworski, and Pierre Auger, along with Soviet delegate
member Dimitri Skobeltzyn, who were all advisors to their governments at the United Nations,
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were keen to attend but were unsure if they would be welcome. Oliphant asked if Lawrence
could invite them directly. Lawrence promptly returned personal invitations to each of the
scientists.104 Skobeltzyn thanked Lawrence for his invitation and stated there was no need to
book him a hotel as the Embassy of the Soviet Union would do that for him (possibly to protect
security).105 The gathering was Oliphant’s attempts to form a new invisible college of scientific
government advisors. But it would become the last time that Lawrence was able host such a
cohort of international scientists with new legislation looming that would lock out foreign
scientists from American atomic research.
Without a United Nations agreement, the McMahon Bill became the United States
Atomic Energy Act (1946) and passed through the United States House of Representatives in late
July. Scientists had broadly supported the original bill and its preference over the May-Johnson
Bill was seen as a victory for scientific freedom. In essence, the bill was peacetime legislation;
the scientists had voluntarily handed knowledge to the military for war, and they attempted to
wrest it back for the benefit of a greater good. The bill saw the creation of a peak body, the
‘United States Atomic Energy Commission’ that would oversee work and approve academic
programs. In early 1946, however, after the defection of Gouzenko and the revelations of the
spies within American atomic science, the more conservative elements of the United States
government proposed a series of amendments. In particular, Section 10 was amended with
‘Control of Information’ and included, a new legal definition of ‘Born Secret’. This meant that
any discussion, utterance, scientific paper or presentation on atomic bomb technology was
illegal. At the heart of atomic bomb technology, however, is the know-how that is also applied
to atomic energy, and the United States Atomic Energy Commission was to receive far greater
powers on the control of information and issuance of licenses. The act involved the restriction of
‘all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of
fissionable material, the use of fissionable material in the production of power’, with ‘all data’
being classed as ‘Born Secret’.106 Howard Morland, in his 2005 paper on the ‘Born Secret’
doctrine, describes this as ‘a permanent gag order affecting all public discussion of an entire
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subject matter. There is nothing like it anywhere else in American law…if you related a dream
about nuclear weapons, you were breaking the law.’107 Nevertheless, the United States military
controlled only weaponry, and industry and academia were entitled to pursue atomic energy
under programs approved by the commission.108 The McMahon Bill, however, effectively put an
end to international collaboration and drew a line through the Quebec Agreement.
On 25 July 1946, just days after the United Nations conference, the United States
showed the world, once again, its atomic capability. At Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific, the
United States detonated a bomb that was 20% more explosive than the Hiroshima bomb.109
Australia was invited to send observers and Evatt asked Oliphant if he cared to attend. But
Oliphant had already decided that he wanted as little to do with American atomic bombs as
possible.110 In a 1955 letter to his friend and CSIRO researcher Hedley Marston, Oliphant recalled
the events around this time.111 Based on publicly available data he had calculated the risks of
nuclear fall-out and radioactivity from the atomic bomb and had presented them to Evatt. This
caused a stir with the United States security authorities who presumed he had, once again,
leaked secret information. He was subsequently investigated. Oliphant found the secrecy
required in military work to be increasingly tiresome, especially in peacetime, and this
motivated him to move away from the atomic bomb.112
By autumn 1946 Oliphant was back in his laboratory in Birmingham and pushing on with
his synchrotron project. He asked Lawrence to receive some of his ‘boys’ from Birmingham at
Berkeley to discuss the project.113 Lawrence wrote back immediately with the unfortunate news
that due to a ‘technicality’ in the McMahon Bill, he was no longer able to host foreign scientists
in his laboratory. He hoped that the matter would be cleared up once the President appointed
the Atomic Energy Commission.114 It was only two months since Oliphant had arranged for a top
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Soviet physicist and a known French communist115 to visit Lawrence in Berkeley and now the
laboratory doors were locked to prevent even the United States’ closest atomic ally, and
Lawrence’s closest war-time collaborator and friend, from visiting. The invisible college between
Birmingham and Berkeley, which had shared secrets in the early war on radar and atomic bombs
and gathered in the United States to build the first bombs, ended.

Oliphant returns to Australia
Oliphant visited Australia over the Christmas of 1946. On 16 January 1947 he attended a Cabinet
meeting to address the ministers on the subject of atomic energy and its future in Australia.116
The failure of the United Nations to control atomic weapons did not dampen his enthusiasm and
his verve and optimism would have filled the cabinet room. He espoused that, should Australia
wish to be a member of the new age, it needed its own world-class research facility. By early
February the cabinet approved a variation to the funding of a new national university in
Canberra—the Australian National University (ANU). The funding was to include an extra
£380,000 on the sole condition that Oliphant would head its School of Physical Sciences.117 The
increase in funding, predicated on one scientist turning up, increased the original ANU physical
sciences budget by around 400%, and represented nearly 40% of the capital budget of the entire
university.118
Immediately following the Cabinet meeting, on 6 February 1947, Chifley was once again
writing to Attlee to secure the ongoing services of Oliphant for Australian research.119 It seems
that this time, the politeness was driven by a request from Oliphant. His principal residence had
been in Britain for 20 years and he did not want to leave his adopted home to return to his birth
country without the consent and parting respect of the British. He also wanted to ensure he had
time to complete his unfinished business at Birmingham, including the proton synchrotron.
Attlee responded to Chifley,120 pleased that Oliphant would remain in Britain to see the current
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project at Birmingham through and that, as Chifley had offered, any work conducted in Australia
would be part of the general Commonwealth contribution. Attlee also warned Chifley that whilst
Oliphant may leave, there were limits on the knowledge that could be transferred:
There are, as you know, aspects of atomic energy on which much of
our knowledge in this country is derived from the work we did during
the war in conjunction with the American[s] and the Canadians.
Professor Oliphant who played such an important part in that work,
will know that the war-time partnership has placed hitherto certain
limits on our freedom to co-operate on atomic energy with other
countries, even within Empire.
In three years’ time when Oliphant may be leaving us, the position
may well have altered, either because a successful system of
international co-operation will have been worked out under the
United Nations Organisation, or through changes in our relationship to
work being done in America. But I felt bound to mention the point in
order to make it clear that I could not, at present time, given an
entirely unqualified assurance about freedom of consultation and
collaboration.121
With Oliphant now set to be eventually re-patriated to Australia, he was no longer welcome
within any aspects of Britain’s atomic energy and weapons programs. Oliphant had relatively
little to do with the development of the new government research facility at Harwell and was
not included in the British bomb work.122 At Birmingham, with the new synchrotron funding,
Oliphant was able attract his own college of students including several from Australia. He put his
head down and returned to the esoteric aspects of his science.123
In 1947, President Truman approved the conferral of the Congressional Medal of
Freedom to 96 international scientists. Only one, Oliphant, was to receive the highest possible
Order of the Gold Palm.124 Other medal recipients of the British mission to the Manhattan
Project included Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, to whom Oliphant had provided sanctuary in
Birmingham in the late 1930s, as well as John Cockcroft and Charles Darwin. Yet the Australian
government blocked Oliphant from receiving the award, which he did not learn about until the
citation was uncovered by his biographer, Stewart Cockburn, in 1980.125 It is unknown whether
fellow Manhattan Project scientist Leo Szilard knew of the award when he said, ‘if Congress
knew the true history of the atomic energy project, I have no doubt that it would create a
121
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special medal to be given to meddling foreigners for distinguished services, and that Dr Oliphant
would be the first to receive one’.126 Szilard’s quote is a tongue-in-cheek dig at Oliphant’s
‘meddling’ contribution, but is a turn of phrase that Oliphant would have likely taken as a
compliment.
Cockburn and Ellyard, in their 1981 biography of Oliphant, argued that the award was
blocked by the Australian government and vetoed by Evatt on ideological grounds to define the
emergence of Australia’s sovereignty and independence.127 Christopher Waters described
Chifley and Evatt as ‘Australian nationalists’ who presented a ‘centre-left with their own
extensive political, economic and cultural programme’.128 Chifley’s cabinet had, in November
1945, already taken a decision that, in an effort to set the tone for a new independence of
Australia, their civilians were not to receive honours from other countries for their efforts during
the war.129 Yet during the Manhattan Project Oliphant was a member of the British mission and
in 1947 was in his twentieth year in Britain. Many Americans, including Oppenheimer130 and
Henry De Wolf Smyth,131 considered Oliphant to be British.132 It is likely that the British were first
asked by the Americans about conferring the award to Oliphant. Whilst archival evidence to
support this has not been found, given that Oliphant’s continuing indiscretions and breaching of
secrecy had raised the ire of the British government in 1946 and 1947, they possibly passed the
offer directly to the Australians to deal with. From Australia’s point of view there was no obvious
sinister conspiracy against Oliphant at this time, as the Chifley government strove to exert
Australian independence.
At the age of 47, in 1948, the British based Institute of Engineering and Technology
awarded Oliphant the Faraday Medal—one of most prestigious prizes in physics.133 Oliphant was
the first of the new-age, post-quantum crisis physicists and one of the youngest ever to receive
the medal (which Chadwick received in 1950, Lawrence in 1952, and George Thomson in 1960).
Ernest Rutherford received the award in 1930, when he was nearly 60. Oliphant’s fellow
Adelaidean, William H. Bragg, had received the same award in 1936, when aged 79 (in 1936).134
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Oliphant was immensely proud of receiving the Faraday Medal, and although he never won the
Nobel Prize for Physics (despite a nomination and his belief that he probably deserved one),135
he held the Faraday Medal aloft as the pinnacle of his research career.136 In September 1948,
Oliphant proudly organised a conference on atomic energy at Birmingham and invited Lawrence
and Oppenheimer, both of whom joined him.137 It was seven years since Oliphant had met with
the two Americans in Berkeley to collude on kick-starting the atomic bomb project in the United
States. In the intervening years the men had grown from shadows of esoteric research and had,
in the immediate years after the war, held the lantern and hope for a new atomic age. By 1948,
the trio were becoming the old guard; their greatest contributions to science had already been
made.
The British intelligence services kept close watch on Oliphant for his last years in Britain.
In late 1948, for example, Oliphant visited Oslo as part of a lecture tour with the American
Harold Urey. A detailed surveillance report on his conversations and meetings exists in the
National Archives (UK).138 Oliphant had spoken with false-authority that the United States was
not building bombs but would have a ‘dickens lot of plutonium’, to which the spook added a
note to the report that ‘Professor Oliphant seems to have lived up fully to his reputation for
inaccuracy which he enjoys’.139
When the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949 the monopoly on
nuclear weaponry held by the United States ended. The two superpowers embarked on an
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accelerated arms race in pursuit of an even more terrible weapon, the hydrogen bomb.140 In
January 1950, Klaus Fuchs was arrested at the Harwell atomic facility in Britain and confessed to
regularly supplying the Soviet Union with atomic secrets. Fuchs exposed a chain of connections
that would eventually lead Ethel and Julius Rosenberg to the electric chair so causing
international outrage.141 Fuchs had been an underling of Oliphant at Birmingham for the years
before the war and joined fellow Brummies, Otto Frisch and Ernest Titterton, at Los Alamos
during the Manhattan Project. So two of Britain’s most famous atomic spies, Fuchs and Nunn
May, had been with Oliphant at Birmingham.142 Furthermore, rumours of other unnamed agents
that were part of a much larger ring swirled around with Oliphant’s colleague Peierls and his
wife Genia also investigated.143
The Oliphant family left Birmingham in mid-1950, though his synchrotron was not yet
fully operational,144 and returned to Australia. He took his post, as promised, at the Research
School of Physical Sciences at the Australian National University.145

Chapter conclusions: The fall of optimism
From death, new life springs. The six-year long, dark winter of war finally ended with the rising
of the atomic sun which held optimism for a peaceful world with an almost unlimited
abundance of energy. The final sacrifice of Japan, with the destruction of two cities, meant that
the world could begin to heal, replenish and renourish. In Britain, with the election of an Attleeled Labour government, a socialist-driven optimism was in the air and the hard-won gains of the
war and the advances in science could be converted to the utility of peacetime. In his October
1945 Picture Post article ‘An Atomic Plan for Britain’, Troke discovered an eternal optimist in
Oliphant who wanted to leave behind the atomic bomb and use the science for grand projects of
industry. Science was to be made to serve and rebuild a world towards a new era of prosperity.
The United States, however, held a monopoly on atomic know-how and the Quebec Agreement
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meant that, even though much of the science had originated in Britain, the ability for British
science to utilise the new knowledge was restricted. An anticipated immediate flurry of atomic
research activity did not occur and Oliphant became frustrated, prompting him to harry
politicians via his local member Raymond Blackburn. In the process Oliphant divulged too many
details, once again broke the secrecy provisions, and was in breach of the Official Secrets Act. In
ordinary circumstances and with a less-extraordinary scientist, this could have landed an
individual in serious hot-water. A breach of the Official Secrets Act was potentially punishable by
prison-time, particularly for such a sensitive subject. For Oliphant this breach resulted only in an
admonition from Chadwick and came at the time that Oliphant’s designs for the proton
synchrotron showed his scientific vision and hence his continued worth. The British government
were deeply embarrassed by the exposure of the spy ring with the arrest of Nunn May, and
would have likely wanted to avoid any further scandal.
Oliphant’s worth was also obvious to the Australian government and the approach to
the British authorities to have Oliphant visit Australia raised serious concerns with the politicians
in Britain. Oliphant clearly could not be trusted to maintain atomic secrets that were shared only
and exclusively by Britain and the United States. If Oliphant was to breach the protocol he would
also be in breach of the Quebec Agreement which would have an awkward effect on the BritishAmerican negotiations. In attempting to stall Oliphant, the British made up excuses and
presented an alternate suggestion of how the Australians could send people to Britain instead.
Chifley had the measure of this situation, and when he called their bluff the British ended up
tripping over their polite excuses. Chifley had not been entirely truthful with Attlee though, and
his short-term plans for Oliphant were not to advance Australian science but were for Oliphant
to advise the Australian government on the new power.
The Atomic Scientists Committee of Great Britain plan (of which Oliphant was a coauthor), the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, the Baruch Plan and the Soviet proposal all called, in
essence, for the same thing—the United Nations to control all atomic energy and weapons. The
risks were simply too high for individual sovereign nations to have unfettered access to atomic
bombs. In this, scientists could be assured of having access to the international transfer of
knowledge that they had before the war. The United States Baruch Plan and the Soviet Plan
both had the devil in the detail. It seems that both countries lacked the willingness to negotiate.
Evatt, according to Oliphant, also lacked flexibility in negotiating the end of weaponry. So, by
July 1946, the moment was lost. The McMahon Bill offered only a minor concession to industry
and academic research and shut the borders on the United States collaborating with their
previous allies. The invisible college between British and the United States scientists, which at
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one stage included a deep trusting relationship between Oliphant and Lawrence, would largely
cease. The two scientists remained friends and in communication, but the United States
operated its new military industrial complexes and national laboratories with strict security and
non-Americans were not allowed.
Oliphant’s continued public proselytising of atomic politics meant that the British
government reduced his privilege and access to research into the practical applications of the
atom and he was left stranded in his laboratory with only the more esoteric aspects of physics to
pursue. His deemed security risk meant that he came under surveillance and the British and the
United States intelligence dossiers on him started to bulge.146 Even his closest confidants were
required to sanction him. As exemplified by Anderson using Chadwick to admonish Oliphant
over the Blackburn affair, even the invisible colleges that linked British universities such as
Cambridge (Thomson), Liverpool (Chadwick) and Birmingham (Oliphant) started to crumble.
With a diminished influence in Britain, and lack of links to America, Oliphant’s
permanent return to Australia in 1950 could be considered a form of exile. By being excluded
from government research, Oliphant was essentially stranded in academia. However, Oliphant
was planning ahead, and since 1946, had used his reputation and ability to convince the
Australian government of his worth. The remarkable increase in funding to the ANU, provided
on the sole condition that one man, Oliphant, returned to Australia permanently, is evidence
enough to illustrate Oliphant’s influence.
To join the global atomic club was a form of prestige for nations and, since the failure of
the United Nations to instigate global controls, several countries including and especially the
Soviet Union pursued the atomic bomb technology. Oliphant’s status in the Australian political
machine grew considerably in those immediate postwar years and he became a confidant of
Chifley and his government. But in 1949 the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb
heralding the end of the United States atomic monopoly. As the psychological tension of the
Cold War grew, the political mood in Britain and Australia shifted to the right with Chifley
replaced as prime minister by Robert Menzies in late 1949, and Churchill re-elected as Britain’s
leader in 1951. Oliphant’s return to Australia in 1950 coincided with the arrest and confession of
Klaus Fuchs, one of his former students, who was accused of espionage. As the McCarthyist
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attacks on scientists were reaching their fever pitch in the United States,147 Australia’s new
prime minister proliferated his ‘reds under the beds’ scare campaign148 and, in 1950, welcomed
Attlee’s request to use Australia’s wild places as a nuclear testing ground.149
If Oliphant had concerns that Canberra may have been too quiet after the bustle of the
Manhattan Project and Britain in the postwar, they were soon to be allayed. Many of his former
colleagues soon arrived in Australia to start atomic bomb testing and Oliphant found himself,
once again, amongst the din and fray.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Peace of Mark Oliphant, 1950 – 1965

World war with atomic, chemical and bacteriological weapons, waged
as all-out conflict, could well provoke a response from science and a
return to the primitive bliss of ignorance. Men of science could be
wiped-out as they are socially dangerous and the accumulated wisdom
of three hundred years destroyed overnight.1

In 1950 the Cold War reached a crescendo of high tension and psychological drama. With the
Soviet Union acquiring its own atomic bomb in late 1949, and other nations scrambling to join the
atomic club, America’s monopoly on nuclear weaponry ended. Whilst the United States had bases
in the Japanese home islands, the Soviet Union and China held sway over large parts of eastern
Asia formerly occupied by Japan during the war. On 25 June 1950 the Soviet Union backed the
invasion of forces from North Korea to South Korea, which was then under the United Nations
command. Western allies, including the United States, Britain, Australia and France, entered a
theatre of war again. Truman actively considered the tactical use of atomic weaponry, and bombs
were deployed to bases in Japan in readiness.2 Europe was generally at a wary peace, as the
western allies and the Soviets peeked at each other from either side of so-called iron curtain. Yet
the new front of armed conflict was in a coincident time-zone to Australia and as the Oliphant
family headed home, the Australian voting public shifted to the right side of politics with the
election of Robert Menzies as prime minister.3
Though he had made occasional visits, Mark Oliphant had not lived in Australia for more
than 23 years. In those years he had risen from a postgraduate student to one of the most
respected scientists of the day. First he had been understudy to one of the greatest of the age,
Rutherford, inside the 700-year old halls of Cambridge; then at Birmingham, Britain’s second
largest city, he had sourced considerable endowments to build large machines; and, finally,
during the war, he was seconded to Berkeley, where ‘the spirit of the old Cavendish’ had
1
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flourished under Ernest Lawrence.4 Elected to the world’s oldest scientific society, the Royal
Society when aged 36, Oliphant became part of the traditions shared with Isaac Newton, Francis
Bacon and Michael Faraday. He had, at times, sat at the high table with some of the finest
scientists of the age, alongside generals, prime ministers, diplomats, lords and knights. But in July
1950 the Oliphant family arrived in Canberra: a town of merely 20,000 mostly bureaucrats, tucked
in a cold high valley nearly 2000 feet above sea level.5 Howard Florey, the co-discoverer of
penicillin and a fellow Australian scientist resident in Britain, had actively discouraged him from
leaving Britain, stating that, in Canberra, Oliphant would only find a ‘hole in the ground with lots
of promises’.6 It is likely that the deterioration of Oliphant’s relationship with the inner circle of
atomic research inside the British government played a part in his decision to leave Britain, but to
his family the move represented a return home.7 It may have been worrisome that the close
working relationship he had built with the Chifley government, in which he had attended cabinet
meetings and sat as an advisor to the Australian delegation to the United Nations, meant little as
a new and more conservative prime minister, Menzies, came to power.
As David Lowe argued, Menzies placed Australia on a Cold War footing with the twin
objectives of economic development and planning for war.8 Throughout the 1950s Menzies
became increasingly interested in atomic weaponry and even actively considered developing an
Australian nuclear weapons program.9 As well as hosting British atomic tests in the 1950s,
Menzies signed the ANZUS Treaty, securing Australia’s alliance with the United States (and,
initially, New Zealand).10 Geopolitical relationships in this period of Britain, the United States and
Australia were invariably tied to atomic weaponry, which conflicted with Oliphant’s agenda for
pacifism and open science.
Academically at least Oliphant left Britain lauded with praises and an honorary Doctor of
Sciences from Birmingham. The estimable journal Nature lamented the departure of one of
Britain’s finest, but softened the loss with the hope that migration would provide a bridge of
knowledge between Britain and this part of the Commonwealth.11 Lord Cherwell, Churchill’s war4
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time scientific advisor, later described Oliphant’s move as ‘one of the most unselfish acts of any
physicist he knew in the postwar years’.12
The Oliphant family disembarked from the SS Orcades in Sydney in August 1950, but the
ship carrying many ‘ten pound poms’ also called into Fremantle, Adelaide and Melbourne, where
the local press interviewed Oliphant.13 This was a homecoming tour of sorts and Oliphant was
portrayed as the Prometheus that carried the stolen fire of the gods for the benefit of humankind
and Australia. The non-weapon applications of atomic energy seemed limitless, and Oliphant
visioned that the Australian desert could be made into a verdant fruit bowl with water
desalinated by power ‘too cheap to meter’.14 Oliphant encouraged investigation into many other
applications of atomic energy. These included the possibility of nuclear explosions for civil works,
where engineers could remove a mountain, or excavate a harbour with the push of a button, and
a proposed nuclear power station at Jervis Bay.15
Despite the trepidation of leaving a country which had actively researched atomic science
for forty years, for a partially-constructed promise, there remained potential for renewal and a
fresh start. Australia’s population was growing with a flood of migrants from war-ravaged Europe
and the government was thinking big with projects like the Snowy Mountains Scheme near
Canberra that started construction in the same year that Oliphant arrived home.16 Australia had
joined the atomic age through the late 1940s with a renewed vigour for the exploration of
uranium ores and was on its way to becoming a major player in uranium production.
A key part of Chifley’s late 1940s plan was getting Oliphant home.17 So whilst it was
certainly not yet hallowed halls filled with tradition, the partially constructed Australian National
University was an ultra-modern blank canvas and afforded the potential facilities and budgets on
which Oliphant could paint his new vision.
He left behind the tradition of the Royal Society. In order to form a new tradition,
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Oliphant petitioned for Royal Charter to establish the Australian Academy of Science in 1954.18
The Academy was designed to be the Australian equivalent of the Royal Society with the Royal
Charter necessary to maintain its affairs independent of the government. Election to become a
Fellow of the Academy, as designed by Oliphant, followed a similar strict peer assessment and
nomination process as that of the Royal Society and is reserved for those scientists who have
demonstrated an unwavering commitment to natural philosophy for the sake of knowledge.19
Oliphant was knighted as Sir Mark in 1959.20
The 15 years that Oliphant spent as the head of Physical Sciences at the Australian
National University saw the establishment of Australia’s first specialist particle accelerators. There
were, however, difficulties in construction of the homopolar generator and synchrotron and
Oliphant’s finest contributions to science were, by this stage, behind him.21 In leveraging off his
association to Rutherford, as well as his own fine contributions to science, Oliphant became a
conference-circuit speaker and ambassador for the Australian Academy of Science. He started to
broaden his horizons with international travel beyond his previous destinations of Europe and
North America, and in 1953 he attended a conference in Japan where he used the opportunity to
tour the growing industrial facilities and physics laboratories. Oliphant’s diary notes on this trip
reveal that he was enamoured by the kindness of the people and charmed by the melding of a
growing efficient industrial power with the ancient eastern cultures: a hidden kingdom of Shogun
palaces, beautiful water gardens and tea poured ceremonially by Geishas.22 Other than in
recognition of the resilience of the people, his Japan diary makes no reference to the war or
Hiroshima even though he had reported to the Canberra Times, before his departure that he
intended to visit the cities devastated by the atomic bombs eight years earlier.23 In 1955 he
travelled to India to deliver the Rutherford Memorial Address at the University of Madras; in 1956
and 1959 he visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR;24
and in 1964 he travelled to China.25
From a science and administration perspective, this period of Oliphant’s academic
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contribution is covered well in Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard’s 1981 biography;26 Trevor
Ophel and John Jenkin’s history of physical sciences at ANU;27 and Stephen Foster and Margaret
Varghese’s 2009 The Making of the Australian National University.28 Furthermore, Elizabeth
Tynan’s Atomic Thunder: The Maralinga Story29 and Roger Cross’ Fallout: Hedley Marston and the
British Bomb Tests in Australia 30 cover Australia’s hosting of Britain’s bombs in fulsome detail and
are modern retellings, importantly from an Australian point of view, of that which was
documented by Margaret Gowing’s Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy
1945 – 1952.31 The backstory that I cover in this chapter, however, is that of Oliphant’s vociferous
contribution to the political discourse on atomic weaponry, the grave fears he held for humanity,
and his unwavering stewardship in protecting international scientific freedoms. Cockburn and
Ellyard also cover this period and the political themes, principally in their Chapter Thirteen (‘The
light that failed’)32 and Chapter Fourteen (‘Political smear’)33 of their 1981 biography. However,
since the publication of the biography in 1981, many of Oliphant’s security files from the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) have been declassified. New insights into his
relationship with the state are now achievable.
Oliphant’s involvement in the discourse of peace is considered, in this chapter, alongside
the wider atomic scientists’ peace movement. From the mid-1940s many scientists, including
those that had worked on the Manhattan Project, presented a growing concern on the
proliferation of atomic weapons. Oliphant was involved in this movement in both a singular and
collaborative way and contributed to periodicals such as the Chicago based Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, and conferences such as the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
(Pugwash conferences). Oliphant’s efforts through this period included the formation of new
invisible colleges. These were collaborations that were not for the distribution of scientific
knowledge, but for the contribution of rational argument to geopolitical discourse.
Oliphant’s protests, like those of many of his fellow scientists, often clashed with the
authorities and this is presented in this chapter, and is discussed further in Chapter Seven.
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One of the first senior appointments that Oliphant made at ANU was that of Ernest Titterton as
chair of the Nuclear Physics department. Titterton was the third Ernest in Oliphant’s life. If Ernest
Rutherford was like a father, and Ernest Lawrence like a brother, then Ernest Titterton might be
considered like a son to Oliphant—albeit, at times, a wayward one. Titterton’s Master of Science
and PhD had been supervised by Oliphant in Birmingham. Due to the pressures of war, Titterton’s
1941 PhD was squeezed out in rapid time and included research on modulators for the cavity
magnetron to aid with the continued development of radar.34 Oliphant later recalled the tireless
work ethic of Titterton at this time.35 In 1943, Titterton was drafted into the Manhattan Project
where he worked on the explosive lens for the ‘Fat Man’ bomb (which fell on Nagasaki). Titterton
was an expert in telemetry and was in charge of the trigger mechanism for the Trinity test in July
1945. It is a remarkable piece of trivia that, fittingly, it was a Birmingham man,36 who later
became a naturalised Australian, who pressed the button on the world’s first atomic explosion.37
After the Manhattan Project, Titterton remained in the United States until 1947 and returned to
Britain to work in the government research institution at Harwell.
Titterton, on the face of it, was a perfect choice for Oliphant when he wanted a chair for
the nuclear physics department at ANU: he was young and ambitious (he was only 35 in 1950),
extremely bright, and had inside knowledge of the latest advances in nuclear physics from his
time at Los Alamos and Harwell. Titterton agreed to Oliphant’s offer to head nuclear physics at
the ANU in 1950, and would make plans to travel to Australia in 1951.38
With the McMahon Bill essentially ending the Quebec Agreement, the British pushed on
to build their own atomic arsenal. As the program advanced, they needed some wide-open
spaces on which to test their bombs. The first choice was the Nevada test site, but since the
McMahon Bill came into effect in 1946, all international cooperation on weaponry with the
United States was put on hold. The British then considered the Canadian sub-arctic, but the
Canadians started to get cold feet after the arrest of Klaus Fuchs in early 1950. On 16 September
1950 Clement Attlee sent a top-secret cable to Menzies to enquire if Australia would consider
Britain’s use of the Monte Bello Islands, off the northwest coast of Western Australia, for atomic
tests. Without even seeking permission of his cabinet or the Western Australian state
government, Menzies agreed.39
34
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Menzies was in London in January 1951 when he was approached by the Commonwealth
Relations Office and the physicist John Cockcroft. The British hoped for Titterton’s involvement in
the British bomb tests in Australia, though he had not yet arrived to take his post at the ANU, and
Cockcroft asked Menzies for assistance in persuading Oliphant to release him from his proposed
duties. Oliphant, it was hoped, would be unlikely to refuse a request from his own prime
minister.40 Tynan suggested that the British took advantage of Menzies’ excessive loyalty to
Britain.41 Yet whilst Menzies was a notable patriot of the empire, his motivations to lay out the
welcome mat to the British also related to the security of Australia and, as investigated by Erin
Ison, his distinct anti-communist views. In Menzies’ perspective, the risk of an east-Asian variant
of communism presented a clear threat to Australia’s region.42
The agreement of terms for the first British atomic bomb test in Australia was reached in
December 195143 and the first test, Operation Hurricane, was held on 3 October 1952 on the
Monte Bello Islands.44 British physicist William Penney, who had also been with Oliphant as part
of the British mission to the Manhattan Project, was in charge. Operation Hurricane was a closely
guarded secret until shortly before the test was to begin. When the project’s support and supply
vessels passed through Fremantle, they aroused little suspicion. Menzies even kept it from his
own cabinet to the extent that the Minister for Supply, Howard Beale, unwittingly denied the
likelihood of such tests to parliament in June and October 1951.45
Australia provided the desolate places, but made little scientific input into the first of
Britain’s tests. The 1985 Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia,
also known as the McClelland Report, investigated the whole gamut of circumstances in the
Anglo-Australian relationships ahead of and during the tests.46 Titterton testified to the Royal
Commission that it was on a personal request from Menzies in 1952 that he became first involved
in the tests. The Royal Commission, with the evidence of the earlier 1951 approaches to Menzies,
disputed that interpretation of the facts:
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‘It is inconceivable, especially in the light of Titterton’s cavalier
treatment of the truth throughout his testimony that he did not know
that he had been planted on Menzies’.47
Oliphant later stated to his friends and colleagues that he had not wanted to be involved in the
British atomic tests.48 Given that he had objected, in 1946, to the proliferation of atomic
weapons, this seems plausible. The McClelland Report, however, documented a 1 April 1952
cable from the Commonwealth Relations office to the British High Commissioner in Australia that
stated that Oliphant had approached his old friend Cockcroft with the hope that he could be
involved in the first test.49 To have such a grand series of experiments operating in his own
backyard may have seemed like an opportunity not to be missed. In the same cable to British High
Commissioner, the potential involvement of Oliphant was blocked:
He [Oliphant] is Titterton’s superior and he has written to Cockcroft
indicating that he expects to be present. But apart from other
considerations it is certain that if he took part in the test the Americans
(who regard him as a doubtful security risk) would react very
unfavourably. This would make it more difficult to use the test as a
means of securing better co-operation from the Americans in the
future. Oliphant is unquestionably talkative and would give the
impression (whether true or not) that he was in possession of all the
secrets. It is therefore in the general interest that he be kept away.50
Other than Titterton, the only two Australians present on Britain’s first atomic bomb test were
low-level security technicians.51
Whilst Oliphant may have known about the potential of tests on Australian soil as early as
1950 (when Menzies asked for Titterton’s involvement); whether the tests were going ahead and
their schedule was kept a closely guarded secret. There is no record, in Oliphant’s archive at least,
of him communicating with Cockcroft in early 1952, but the two scientists were good friends
having worked together at Cambridge in the 1930s,52 and sat on the MAUD Committee together.
It is plausible that Titterton may have told Oliphant of the upcoming test in order to secure leave
of absence from Oliphant’s team at the ANU. But given that Titterton did not carry Oliphant’s
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same ‘talkative’ reputation, it is unlikely that he would have discussed detailed reasons that any
absence from the university would take. The excuse used by the British, that Oliphant was
deemed a security risk to the Americans, it seems, may have been a ruse. The United States and
Britain at this stage did not have a research relationship on atomic weapons and the involvement
of Oliphant in tests would not have been declared to the United States anyway. Whilst Oliphant’s
FBI files includes a number of newspaper clippings that suggested Oliphant’s reluctance to
contribute to more atomic weaponry,53 he was not suspected by the Americans of leaking atomic
information until an investigative report in 1954.54 As discussed in Chapter Four, he had been
interrogated on his rather relaxed approach to security while working on the Manhattan Project.
The British clearly did not want Oliphant involved in the tests and, as discussed in Chapter Five, it
was most likely that it was the British (not the Americans) who deemed him a security risk. Years
later, in a letter to the historian Sir Keith Hancock, Oliphant recalled seeing a letter from Titterton
to Penney that treacherously suggested that Oliphant was a security risk.55
The Atomic Weapons Technical Safety Committee (AWTSC) was an Australian body
formed in 195456 that oversaw the tests with a responsibility to protect the Australian
environment and people.57 It would seem logical that such a committee would be made up of
Australian scientists that had an intimate working knowledge of atomic physics and a motivation
to protect Australia. There were few more qualified than Oliphant himself, but he was
overlooked. Titterton was a member of the original 1954 committee and he took the AWTSC chair
in 1956.58
Titterton’s involvement in the British atomic tests and Oliphant’s exclusion is credited as a
catalyst that resulted in a breakdown of their relationship.59 However, during the early ANU years,
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other than Oliphant’s annoyance that Titterton was frequently away in the Monte Bello Islands or
Maralinga, Oliphant’s exclusion from the tests did not change the warm professional regard the
two scientists had for each other. In 1956 Oliphant wrote in favour of Titterton’s certificate for
the Royal Society and wrote to other society members to petition their support.60 Oliphant, when
travelling overseas, received warm and cordial ANU updates from Titterton, saying how much he
was supported in his valiant efforts and that they looked forward to his return.61 In a letter
written in May 1954, Titterton attempted to jolly along Oliphant, who was sick of a bitter feud
with the University of Sydney head of physics, Harry Messel.62 Titterton provided effusive
compliments on his fine contributions to science, and how Lord Cherwell, one of the senior
scientific advisors to Churchill, had been complimentary of the courage of Oliphant in returning to
Australia.63
Whilst Oliphant was a signatory on the cautionary warning to the United Nations issued in
1946 from the Atomic Scientists Committee of Great Britain, by 1954 he had only made a few
public comments on the threat of atomic weapons to the media since his return to Australia.64 His
involvement in the peace message was delivered singularly and not part of a wider movement.
Cockburn and Ellyard suggest that Oliphant chose to have virtually no involvement in
Britain’s bomb tests.65 The McClelland Report66 and Cross’ Fallout: Hedley Marston and the
British Bomb Tests in Australia presented evidence that Oliphant played only a supporting role in
opposing the tests through third parties such as the CSIRO. In 1956 Titterton published his tome,
Facing the Atomic Future, which presented the necessity of atomic weaponry in maintaining
peace. It included his appraisal of the low cost of atomic warfare in a macarbely titled chapter
‘The Economics Of Slaughter’.67 Oliphant wrote the foreword for Titterton’s book.68 This
perception of Oliphant as a conflicted atomic man, both for and against atomic advancement, is
presented no more eloquently than in Kathryn Keeble’s scripts, Mark Oliphant's Adventures in
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Atomic Wonderland and The End Is Terrific!... I Prefer the Middle: Badiou, Beckett and Oliphant's
Atomic Bomb.69 Keeble compared Robert Oppenheimer’s ‘despairing’ comments at the dropping
of the bombs on Japan to Oliphant’s response. Oliphant was, rather, angry at the apparent
throwing aside of ‘moral scruples’ by the United States in the decision to drop the bomb.70
In 1955 the CSIRO scientist and head of food nutrition research, Hedley Marston, was
invited by the British to provide animals, and design experiments on the effects of radiation of
livestock placed in the vicinity of the Maralinga tests.71 The documentary Silent Storm painted
Marston as a dogged opportunist who took credit for other people’s work on cobalt deficiency in
livestock that suffered ‘coast disease’: a breakthrough that elevated him to fellow of the Royal
Society.72 Cross also detailed the ‘coast disease’ story, and painted Marston as an egotist who
made the ‘cobalt story’ his own.73 Marston was a renegade who, not unlike Oliphant, was a
raconteur who could hold an audience with an engaging yarn.74 Oliphant and Marston’s
relationship goes back to childhood when they first met at Unley High School in Adelaide.75 When
Oliphant founded the Australian Academy of Science in 1954 he supported Marston as one of the
handful of founding fellows.76
Marston’s involvement at Maralinga was the result of a lapse in concentration by the
British. With minimal Australian scientific input until this point, and Titterton controlling the flow
of information on safety issues, to introduce Marston into the research proved troublesome. For
four years the British had relatively free access to the Australian environment. Yet Marston was
to become the whistle-blower extraordinaire on the environmental implications of the sustained
atomic tests.77 Marston chose to monitor not just animals in the vicinity of Maralinga, but across
the whole continent of Australia. From the testing of cow’s milk and the lymph nodes of abattoirsourced sheep, he soon discovered that the radiation risks to Australia in hosting Britain’s atomic
tests were more widespread than originally purveyed. It was not just the rural areas that came
under threat, with Brisbane and Adelaide both receiving a dose of downwind radioactive rain.78
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Marston’s efforts to inform Australia of such risks collided with those of Titterton, who felt that
Marston’s work was exaggerated and his results inconclusive. Titterton’s safety committee even
went to lengths to have Marston’s scientific publications submitted to the Australian Journal of
Biological Sciences removed.79
Whilst Oliphant was asked to edit international magazine articles outlining the risks of
fallout from atomic tests in 1955,80 his involvement in the domestic tests included attempts to
encourage and jolly along Marston, who came under increasing pressure from the AWTSC and the
Menzies government.81 The correspondence between Marston and Oliphant is a series of heartwarming letters of encouragement to stand firm against the political censorship of science being
surreptitiously carried out in the name of national interests.82 Marston became paranoid in
January 1955 that their correspondence was being opened and read by others, and Oliphant had
to calm him down with the logical explanation that a secretary at the Academy lacked experience
in handling letters marked ‘personal’. One letter in particular, dated 12 September 1956,
illustrates the contempt that Oliphant felt for the secrecy provisions and risks to scientific
freedom. [83] ‘What really riles you,’ he wrote to Marston, ‘is that the b---s have caught you in
their net, using their lure [of] the national importance etc. line of argument.’ Churchill misled
parliament, he lamented, and politicians in Britain, the United States and Australia lied to the
public for the sake of political expediency. Restrictions on scientists precluded them from
declaring truth to the world, which he bitterly resented:
I sent a copy by special courier to Chadwick in Washington, not realizing
that though U.S.A. and U.K. were “collaborating”, this was information
which was to be withheld from the British! Chadwick, in similar
ignorance took the report to Pentagon to discuss it with General Graves
[sic], and casually mentioned that he was sending a copy to Whitehall.
The code teleprinters between Berkeley and Washington were clacking,
the telephones with scramblers were running red-hot, the FBI Security
boys were in my office, and there began three very uncomfortable days
of enquiry. Under the “compartmentalisation” system of security I
should never have had a conversation with the fission chemists or the
biologists and they were guilty of criminal laxness. In giving a copy of
their findings to me, the leader of a ‘foreign’ group of physicists,
engineers and chemical engineers not in their ‘compartment’.
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And, so, Oliphant removed himself from military science on his return to Australia. He declared
his intention to act as a ‘free agent’, and to speak publicly on matters where his past access to
classified information allowed. ‘We are in a bad spot,’ he concluded, ‘morally, ethically and
nationally.’
Oliphant’s letter to Marston declared some of his most difficult anti-establishment
moments. It was written in Oliphant’s 55th year and he was, by this stage, calmer and wiser as he
reflected upon the travails of his past. It is clear that those earlier events, such as accusations of
secrecy breaches, took their toll. He was disdainful of the leader of the British atomic bomb tests,
William Penney, though it is clear that Penney also reflected, to Oliphant, the higher echelons of
the scientific polity. Evoking content of his 1945 interview with the Picture Post, Oliphant even
said there should be a scientific equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath wherein science was for the
benefit of all humankind.84 His disdain in the Marston letter was reserved, at this point, for the
‘patronizing and prevaricating’ men of science who had forsaken the unwritten ethical code—in
which science should be free. Oliphant acknowledged the Official Secrets Act and that it now
muzzled Marston as it had once muzzled him. Insofar as I have been able to establish certain
breaches of the Official Secrets Act (discussed in chapters two to five), Oliphant’s musings in the
Marston letter indicate that there may have been other events in which he was silenced.

Protecting the Patch: the Harry Messel Feud
Oliphant was the public face of physics in 1950s Australia. No longer involved in weapons
research he turned his attention to some of the wider applications of atomic science. In his first
years back in Australia, he enjoyed the limelight of being the go-to person for media comment.85
His own research at the ANU, however, did not go according to plan, as his homopolar generator,
a massive machine for generating high voltages to power the cyclo-synchrotron, rapidly went
from being an ambitious project to a dead weight of hundreds of tonnes metal.86 Further funding
became harder and harder to source and the shine of the postwar physics boom that had been
fuelled by advances made in wartime, was beginning to lose its lustre.87 This period of scientific
misadventure is presented in detail by Cockburn and Ellyard in their 1981 biography, in which
they describe the grand ambition which failed to achieve the expectations as ‘The White
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Oliphant’.88 Foster and Varghese, in their history of ANU, also detailed the disappointment and
failure of Oliphant to get his expensive machines working.89 Whilst Keeble re-addressed
Oliphant’s scientific contribution in 2018,90 his prophecy that Australia would embrace atomic
energy producing electricity ‘too cheap to meter’, and powering desalination plants to make
verdant vast tracts of desert, missed the mark.91
Oliphant’s lack of involvement in meaningful atomic research and his failing projects
meant that his position as doyen of Australian physics was under threat. In 1952 a brash
Canadian, Harry Messel, was appointed to the head of physics at the University of Sydney.
Messel, when he took control at Sydney, was only thirty and full of oratory skill and boundless
energy. He was a showman, not unlike Oliphant himself when he was aged in his thirties. The
press began to take note as Messel made great claims that cosmic ray research would further
unlock the atom’s secrets; that he was able to attract the brightest minds to Sydney; and belittled
the ineffectual work being undertaken at the ANU.92 And so began a feud that played out in the
media and lasted a decade. Oliphant may have been passed his scientific peak, but he was still
armed with philosophical wit and brains, which was pitted against the young ambitious Messel.93
The form and mode of this dispute is detailed in Cockburn and Ellyard’s biography.94 However, in
a hitherto unpublished letter sourced from the Library of Congress in Washington, Oliphant
summarised the affair when he attempted to enlist the help of Oppenheimer in April 1954
(Figures 20 and 21).95
It is clear, in the letter to Oppenheimer that Oliphant’s principal concern was not just the
scientific claims made by Messel but the method with which Messel sought funding. Oliphant
emphasised how Messel was prepared to hand all findings to private enterprise, and thus he was
a clear danger to the open science that Oliphant had long attempted to protect. Oliphant had
been closed out of science by military and governments, and did not want the same to happen on
his own research patch. Oliphant had led the foundation of the Australian Academy of Science
and petitioned the Queen for Royal Charter to protect against meddling governments that same
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year, 1954. Even though the Australian Academy of Science was in its infancy, Oliphant wanted it

Figure 20 Mark Oliphant, 'Letter to Robert Oppenheimer, 13 April 1954', page 1, Library of Congress, MSS35188,
Box 53
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Figure 21 Mark Oliphant, 'Letter to Robert Oppenheimer, 13 April 1954', page 2, Library of Congress, MSS35188, Box
53

year, 1954. Even though the Australian Academy of Science was in its infancy, Oliphant wanted it
to become an exclusive society of natural philosophers, to channel open-science in Australia.
Oliphant clearly wished to find Messel’s flaws to allow him to be blocked from nomination to the
Academy.
Oppenheimer, who was busy defending his own reputation against the McCarthyist-style
security hearings, appears not to have responded to Oliphant’s request for help. Possibly feeling
that he had been a little insensitive in asking Oppenheimer for help, as he suffered the
humiliation of investigation, Oliphant wrote again to Oppenheimer in June 1954 offering moral
support and also sanctuary at the ANU should the famous American wish to leave the United
States.96
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Oliphant was successful in never allowing Messel to become a Fellow of the Australian
Academy of Science.97 In the year before Messel’s death in 2015, however, he was awarded the
Academy Medal for his contribution to Australian science.98 Oliphant and Messel’s frosty
relationship did thaw a little in old age when Oliphant contributed an essay and lecture to one of
Messel’s summer-schools held at the University of Sydney in 1970.99

The rise of the atomic science peace movement
When it came to understanding the ferocity and potential of the atomic bomb, the atomic
scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project had a jump start on the rest of society. During
the war, they had been deployed on a secret mission to delve into the inner recesses of the
atom.100 As the war ended they were released from their duty and could return to their
universities to continue with their research. Whilst discussion of some aspects of their war work
was confidential,101 scientists’ ability to philosophise and apply critical thought to the use of
atomic bomb was not. Those who opposed the military use of atomic energy did not, however,
start to march down the streets and chain themselves to the gates of army bases. Instead they
wrote journal articles and essays, formed collectives, held conferences, and lobbied government.
In October 1946 a book of essays was released by Julia E. Johnsen, simply titled The
Atomic Bomb. In her preface Johnsen wrote ‘statesmen, world leaders and others of public note
have stated or implied that in default of wise control of this tremendous force the world might
face a possible destruction of civilisation’.102 Yet, in this preface, she failed to mention scientists
as a sociological group, despite the book principally consisting of essays by scientists. Johnsen
compiled scientific articles from Lise Meitner, the discoverer of fission, and Arthur Compton, the
head of physics at Chicago and section head on the Manhattan Project, and sat them alongside
philosophical contributions from Albert Einstein, Oppenheimer and other scientists. The book
placed the scientists amongst public discourse on the use of the atom.103
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Einstein, the most famous scientist in the world, provided an essay titled ‘The Real
Problem is in the Hearts of Men’ and wrote of the lack of political will in the United States to
prevent the proliferation of atomic weapons. Despite the knowledge others would get the bomb,
Einstein saw it as a weapon in which there was no real defence, ‘rifle bullets kill men, but atomic
bombs kill cities’ and ‘while we distrust Russia’s secrecy and she distrusts ours we walk together
to certain doom.’104 Arnold Dresden, an American professor of mathematics, wrote an essay
called ‘Scientific Spirit in International Relations’105 in which he saw the ‘scientific spirit’ being the
collaborative environment of open discourse. Dresden saw that a ‘basic element of science is
cooperation’ and considered that the ‘finest illustrations of scientific team work is perhaps
furnished by the story of the researches in nuclear physics, a procession in which humanity
should take pride and whose high objectives must be guarded at making them subservient to
selfish aims.’106 He intertwined the ‘selfish aims’ of control of the atomic bomb as something
beneath scientists who should aim to protect the freedoms of their natural philosophy. This
philosophy is further expanded upon in Louis Ridenour’s essay titled ‘Scientific Secrecy’, in which
he suggested ‘if you lock the laboratory door, you lock out more than you lock in’.107 Ridenour
studied the development of radar, which he and Oliphant were amongst the war’s leading
experts, and detailed how it was hidden under a cloak of secrecy at the beginning of the war, but
by the end of the war the Army published a magazine on the topic. As soon as the Germans
realised that the radar technology explained their submarine and aircraft losses, Ridenour wrote,
they varied their strategy and effectively withdrew from certain positions in the theatre of war:
the threat of radar was enough to reduce attack.108
Throughout the pages of Johnsen’s edited volume we see a consistent theme in which the
risks of the atomic bomb, and the competing interests of secrecy and transparency, are
interrogated by the authors. Open science, they argued, was the best protection against
proliferation, for if any nation could build an atomic bomb, then none would. Transparency of
science, they concluded, was not just a mark of a peaceful world, but its cause. This message,
however, was lost on military and political strategists, and particularly the United States military,
which was reluctant to give up a technology that was hard-won.109
Near the end of the war James Franck and other fellow scientists wrote a report for the
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United States secretary of war and the president on why the United States should not use the
bomb on Japan.110 One of the signatories of that report was Eugene Rabinowitch, a Chicago based
biophysicist who had worked as a section chief in chemistry on the Manhattan Project. Originally
from the Soviet Union, and having studied in Berlin before the war, Rabinowitch, like many
others, was a refugee scientist.111 In late 1945 Rabinowitch founded the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (the Bulletin). Importantly this was a journal for atomic ‘scientists’ rather than atomic
‘science’ and rapidly became the leading voice for their political discourse. The Bulletin is still
published today, and its front cover famously includes a doomsday clock on which the hand ticks
closer to midnight as the risk of a human-made catastrophe increases.
In 2012 Patrick Slaney wrote of the Bulletin’s role and, particularly, the means by which it
weathered the anti-communist fervour of the McCarthyist age.112 The Bulletin had hoped to
publish articles from scientists across the international divide, but a postal ban prevented its
distribution to subscribers on the eastern side of the iron curtain. This was, Slaney suggested, an
ineffective strong-arm approach by the CIA. Any United States resident, including diplomats and
spooks from the Soviet embassy, was able to pick up a copy at their local newsstand.113 In those
early years, the Bulletin, published articles on atomic control,114 issues relating to visas of
scientists visiting foreign countries,115 censorship of science,116 and the protection of open
science.117 Scientific ‘loyalty’ also received considerable attention in several articles chasing the
same theme—that scientists should be loyal not only to themselves and their nation, but also to
the higher aims of science.118
When the anti-communist witch hunt affected science119 and infected the reputations of
some researchers, the Bulletin ran articles that provided a balance to right-wing mudslinging.
Oppenheimer’s security clearance investigations, for example, were documented in detail in an
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article by Harry Kalven.120 In what was not so much an effort to balance, but possibly to mock, the
findings of the commissioner in charge of the Oppenheimer investigation, General Nichols, were
published in full. Perhaps, this was done so that the community of readers could collectively
shake their heads at the languid investigation and laughable conclusions of a military man in
charge of the sanctioning of one of the war’s greatest scientific contributors.121

The gentle Oliphant
As discussed later in Chapter Eight, many aspects of scientific discovery have questions of
morality. Oliphant, from the late 1940s and into the 1950s became increasingly involved in the
atomic science peace movement. At times this was a populist movement with a large cohort of
scientists participating in the political dialogue. And whilst the exigencies of war was a factor in
his involvement in creating a bomb, this section argues that we can understand Oliphant’s peace
activism through a growing self-awareness and maturity. In addition, perhaps his family
background and his compassionate disposition meant that he was predisposed to becoming, as
he described, ‘a belligerent pacifist’.122
Oliphant was 13-years old when the Great War broke out, and the four years of war
coincided with his last years of school—a formative period for any young man. The Great War,
presented in the dominions the defence of King and Empire, rallied many a schoolboy, ‘ardent for
some desperate glory’.123 Yet this was not the case at the Oliphant house in Adelaide, where both
his father, Harold ‘Baron’ Oliphant, and his mother Beatrice Oliphant, were theosophists.124
Theosophy, a comparative study of religion, philosophy and science, forgoes a higher divine-being
to see that divinity is held in the heart of oneself. This teaching, founded by Helene Blavatsky in
New York in 1875, has a strong credo of pacifism drawn from the non-aggressive protests
preached by some eastern religions. Theosophy is a path and a search for truth that promotes the
unity of all people through holism.125
Baron Oliphant was a mild-mannered public servant and occasional lecturer in economics
with the Worker’s Education Institute. Beatrice Oliphant was an artist. The Oliphant family was
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vegetarian and Baron and Beatrice guided their five boys (Mark was the eldest) with a pacifist
outlook in which scholarly pursuits were held above competition.126 Despite young Mark
Oliphant’s sturdy athletic frame he did not participate, as many boys did, in competitive sports.127
Baron and Beatrice were pacifists who objected to the war.128
The gentleness of Oliphant, perhaps shaped by this upbringing, was evident to physics
graduate Monica Kammer when she later married his son, Michael Oliphant. The fierce
reputation of one of Australia’s greatest physicists meant that the young Monica was in awe, and
a little scared, of her fiancé’s father when they first met in Melbourne. But on that first day, in
1961, Oliphant’s gentleness put the nervous young Monica at ease and he took them shopping
for a ring. Michael died from cancer aged 36 in 1972, only weeks before the birth of the couple’s
second child.129 Mark and Monica Oliphant remained close for the rest of his life. In describing her
father-in-law, Monica painted a picture of a man with great presence who, larger than six foot tall
and with wide shoulders and a booming voice, filled a room with his presence. But underneath
there was a gentle person, who ‘loathed suffering and killing things’. He was a devout
vegetarian.130 In later years, when Rosa Oliphant was placed in a care home after suffering
multiple strokes and dementia severe enough not to recognise her husband of sixty years,
Oliphant visited every day. He ensured that fresh flowers were always in her room (as Rosa had
always done in their home), held her hand and patiently read to her. Monica described these
beautiful scenes with tears welling in her eyes. She recalled that such was Mark’s compassion and
distaste for suffering, that following Rosa’s death, he became prominent in the Australian
Euthanasia Society.131 Oliphant clearly had a compassionate and peaceful disposition, and it is
therefore no surprise that he was actively involved in the anti-nuclear peace movement.
In early June 1955, the English philosopher Bertrand Russell called a press conference in
London and tabled a manifesto signed by eleven scientists, including Einstein. This was to be one
of the last acts of Einstein’s life and the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, as it became known, was a
warning to humanity on the dire threats of nuclear weaponry. The manifesto was an ad arma to
scientists around the world to gather themselves in an organised structure—to appraise and seek
solutions to the prospect of a nuclear holocaust.132 In late June of 1955 Russell wrote to Oliphant
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to invite him to participate in the World Congress of Scientists in August of the same year.133 The
congress was scheduled to precede another conference in Geneva on the non-military uses of
atomic energy, to which Oliphant had been invited to lead the Australian delegation.134
Oliphant collected three speeches from the World Congress of Scientists. The first was
Russell’s opening address, which like his manifesto two months earlier, was eloquently delivered
with a graveness on the peril facing humankind, and the responsibility of the scientists to act.
Russell concluded his speech with the tabling of a resolution which Oliphant underlined in his
notes:
Since in any future world war nuclear weapons will certainly be
employed and since such weapons threaten the continued existence of
civilised life and possibly even mankind, we urge the governments of
the world to realise and to acknowledge publicly, that their purpose
cannot be furthered by world war: consequently we urge the immediate
examination of the implications of recent scientific developments for
humanity as a whole and the promotion of peaceful means for the
settlement of all matters of international dispute.135
The second was the speech by Professor Topchiev of the Soviet Union delegation to the
conference, which included some minor proposed amendments of the conference resolution
tabled by Russell.136 The third item that Oliphant stored for future reference was by Dr Reinhold
Furth137 of the University of London titled ‘On the Question of a Hippocratic Oath for Scientists’.
Some ten years earlier, before the postwar arms race really began, Oliphant had also called for a
‘Hippocratic Oath’ for scientists in an interview for the Picture Post.138 Furth argued that scientists
are members of a community not unlike a religious organisation, and should hence follow a creed
that they act in the best interest of science itself. This means that scientists have a duty to protect
science as an international pursuit and to serve the interests of humankind. A code of ethics for
science, relating to protecting openness of the discipline, seemed intertwined with the peace
movement in not just Oliphant’s mind, but also the minds of his fellow scientists.
Oliphant was deeply impressed by Russell and the birth of a scientist-led peace
movement. Cockburn and Ellyard noted Russell’s influence on Oliphant’s involvement in the
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discourse on peace.139 In 1955 Oliphant upped his proactivity on the global menace of atomic
weapons. But Russell was not necessarily the initial catalyst, and before he contacted Oliphant in
June 1955, Oliphant had already started to gather his thoughts. In March 1955 Oliphant took up
an offer to present the Rutherford Memorial Lecture at the University of Madras in India. The title
of his lecture was ‘Science and Mankind’ and the full text was reported in the Hindu
newspaper.140 The lecture commenced with due reference to Rutherford and the early days of
atomic physics at Cambridge. It then launched in to an 8000-word philosophical treatise on how
the war moved science from esoteric natural philosophy, placing it into forefront of the
endeavour of humankind. Nuclear physics, he declared, now received more support from
governments than any other form of scientific research. Importantly, the detonation of atomic
weapons in 1945 ensured that nuclear science was now driven by factors other than ‘pure
research’. ‘It seems that all knowledge is applied sooner or later both for the benefit of man and
for his destruction in war,’ he lamented. Society was therefore faced with a dark choice between
the application of science—and atomic science, in particular—to either improve or destroy life.
Scientists were at risk of being considered socially dangerous, and their shared knowledge
suppressed.141
The ‘Science and Mankind’ lecture was an enlightened moment for Oliphant. At the age
of 53, he had matured from acting like a rampaging bull, charging headlong through the gates of
secrecy, to being a calmer and more philosophical contributor. His lecture detailed the role of
science to humanity and was presented with simplicity and eloquence worthy of twentiethcentury philosophers, such as Russell himself. The work is every bit as mature, lyrical and
contemplative as the Russell-Einstein Manifesto (published three months later), calling on the
scientist to bear the weight of responsibility for human endeavour in the postwar world. The
lecture was, in part, a lament for the bygone days when science had little utility and was
performed with an aesthetic beauty as glorious as art. The scientist sensed this beauty even
deeper than the artist, he wrote. Oliphant interleaves this philosophy with the divine and draws
out contradictions between the dogmatic and the scientific when he addressed the ideas of Ralph
Waldo Emerson, who considered the quest for truth as the ‘highest law’ of being. ‘What matters
most?’ demanded Oliphant of his audience.
The survival of mankind with his precious heritage of culture and
learning, or the victory in war of one ephemeral ideology over another,
139
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a hollow victory from which little value can ever be salvaged. In the
name of a cold war, men commit all the crimes of their adversaries. Is
there any reason to believe that in a shooting war with nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction, men will preserve any moral
scruples whatsoever?142

The closing comments were spoken in the third-person, but seem as if they were outlaying
Oliphant’s own experience and motivations in the actions of war. He, perhaps, reflected on his
younger self, and how he now stood humbled and contemplative on the interaction of science
and humankind. Scientists, he concluded, were as troubled by prejudice and failings as other
human beings. On the one hand, a scientist might defend the freedom of information; while on
the other, he or she might defend the application of secrecy to ensure national security.143
How far this lecture was distributed beyond a southern Indian newspaper is not known,
but a copy at least found its way to Robert Oppenheimer at Princeton and it is plausible that it
may have also landed on Russell’s desk in London. Oliphant also used the ‘Science and Mankind’
title several times again throughout his career, presenting a similar talk in China in 1965144 and to
one of Messel’s summer schools in 1970.145
Following the publication of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto in June 1955 and the London
World Congress of Scientists in August, Russell’s movement started to take shape. The prime
minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, offered to host a conference, though those plans were
scuttled in 1956 by the Suez Crisis and by growing political tensions in the Middle East.146 Russell
wrote again to Oliphant in 1956 to solicit his involvement in a future conference. Oliphant was
uncertain whether or not to be involved, and in a letter to Marston he worried about associated
with ‘known communists’.147
In late 1955 Oliphant penned the foreword to Titterton’s book Facing the Atomic Future.148
Oliphant continued the message of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto by asserting the knife-edge on
which humanity was standing and the role that scientists continued to play in both securing
prosperity afforded by technology and developing weaponry that threatened humankind. He
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wrote that Titterton had ‘courage to write the book’.149 Titterton, who had continued to be
involved in atomic weaponry more than any other Australian resident, had written the book as, in
part, a tool to sway public-perception for future uses of the atom, particularly in defence. His
chapter on weapons control, for example, stated that any proposal to limit atomic weapons
‘bristles with difficulties’ and any proposal of ‘unilateral disarmament’ was effectively ‘nonresistance’ that would lead to the annihilation of nations.150 This would have been somewhat
irksome to Oliphant who had, for the previous ten years, pushed for arms control and mutual
trust between nations.
Indeed, Titterton’s rather vocal stance on the active promotion of atomic weapons
garnered criticism throughout his career.151 It may seem surprising that Oliphant agreed to write a
foreword to a book when he generally disagreed with its message. He and Titterton were,
however, friends and colleagues and despite their differences maintained a professional
relationship. Oliphant used the opportunity, instead, to call again for the collaboration of all
nations in the prevention of war. He assured readers that atomic energy should be developed
with ‘imaginative planning’ by the Australian government, as it could render a ‘pleasant life’ in
Australia’s ‘torrid centre’.
Joseph Rotblat, formerly one of James Chadwick’s researchers at Liverpool, assumed
leadership of Russell’s movement from early 1957. Russell, by then in his mid-80s, was suffering
ill-health. Rotblat proudly held the reputation of being the only scientist to have voluntarily left
the Manhattan Project as a conscientious objector, in spite, perhaps, of having personal reasons
to apply his skills in the war against the Nazis.152 Rotblat’s first communication with Oliphant on
the jeopardy of atomic weaponry came in April 1957 when he wrote to Oliphant, dismayed at
press reports that Oliphant believed the risks of atmospheric atomic testing to be minimal.
Oliphant’s opinion was contrary to the findings of the Atomic Scientists Association, and Rotblat
demanded that he provide evidence to back up his comments. Oliphant responded that he had
been misquoted by the press and provided the detail of his opinion of atomic testing which had,
in part, been informed by his regular communications with Marston.153 A Canadian industrialist,
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Cyrus Eaton, offered to fund a gathering of Russell and Rotblat’s movement and provided a
summer-house in the isolated village of Pugwash in Nova Scotia. The first ‘Pugwash Conference
on Science and World Affairs’ was held in July 1957. The aim of the conference was to bring
together like-minded scientists from all over the world and, in particular, to ensure
representation from both sides of the iron curtain. The delegates included seven from the United
States, three from Japan, three from the Soviet Union, two each from Canada and Britain, and
one from each of Austria, China, France, Poland, and Australia (Oliphant).154 They included Leo
Szilard, who had first informed Einstein, and subsequently Roosevelt, on the possibility of an
atomic bomb in 1939; Eugene Rabinowitch, the editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; and
Dimiti Skobeltzyn, a Soviet atomic physicist who had been involved in the early Soviet bomb
projects and had visited Lawrence at Berkeley with Oliphant in 1946 before the United States shut
out foreign scientists (refer Chapter Five).
The first Pugwash conference was closed to the public with the debate and discussion
kept confidential. The event, however, garnered the public imagination and the scientists stepped
out of the conclave in unanimous agreement. Their post-conference statement discussed risks of
radiation; the desire to work towards the abolition of war; and the responsibilities of scientists to
do all in their power to ‘prevent war and help establish a permanent and universal peace’.155
Oliphant stood true to his Pugwash pledge of the statement and became more vociferous in the
press. A 1957 Guardian article used the weight of the ‘authoritative statement’ by Pugwash
scientists to denounce the immunologist, Sir Macfarlane Burnet, who had quickly made dismissive
statements following his appointment, by Menzies, to the chair of the Australian Radiation
Hazards Committee:
People will ask the reason for this unscientific haste. Could it be a desire
to facilitate the aggressive war policy of the Menzies government by
dampening the strongly rising demand that the scheduled new atomic
tests at Maralinga be called off? Whatever the reason, Burnet’s
sweeping assertions that “there is no evidence” between the rise of
leukaemia and the tests is in decided conflict with an authoritative
statement issued by the World Conference of Scientists, called by British
Philosopher, Earl Bertrand Russell, which met in Canada at Pugwash,
Nova Scotia from July 6-10.156
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Pugwash had credibility, it was a counsel of some of the world’s sagest minds that stood
together irrespective of political borders. Oliphant’s position in the eyes of the media was again
elevated with several newspapers running articles on Oliphant through 1957 and 1958. The
articles in this period show an increasingly frank and combative Oliphant with sensational
headlines such as ‘Greatest Threat to Mankind’,157 ‘World on Brink of Catastrophe’, ‘“Downright
lies” on Nuclear tests: Scientist Launches Stinging Attack’,158 and ‘Prof. Oliphant Set to Blast
Nuclear Set-up’.159 The Sun, in Sydney, even ran a lengthy letter about Oliphant in August 1958
that was headlined the ‘Bravest Man in Australia’.160 These newspaper reports portrayed Oliphant
as a staunch and courageous resistance fighter who was prepared to stand up for principles he
believed in. His pugnacious reputation, in the eyes of the public, grew, particularly as he took on
Menzies’ government. Initially, Oliphant was complimentary of Menzies’ support for atomic
research and development.161 By 1955, however, he was publicly scathing of the shortsightedness of the government.162 His university funding for 1956 and 1957 fell short of what was
requested, but as he noted in his September 1956 letter to Marston, with ‘Bob’ in the way, he
was grateful to receive what he had. These funding changes came at the same time that Oliphant
was involving himself more in the discourse on peace.163In 1958 Oliphant contributed for the first
time to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.164 Oliphant’s position as an elder statesman of
Australian science was confirmed when he was knighted in 1959. He maintained an ongoing
involvement with the Pugwash Conferences for the rest of his life. For most of the 1950s and
1960s he attended in person. The conference presented the opportunity to regularly connect
with like-minded senior members of the scientific community from both sides of the Cold War.
Oliphant was impressed with the utility of science in the Soviet Union, which he first visited as a
guest of the Academy of Science of the USSR in 1956.165 The contact with the Soviet Union
prompted Oliphant to renew communication with Peter Kapitza, with whom he had been friends
at Cambridge in the 1930s. In August 1957 Oliphant wrote to Kapitza, principally to offer support
after a recently published book damaged Kapitza by what Oliphant believed was ‘gross and
vicious slander’. In his letter Oliphant noted that he had recently met with Soviet scientists
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Alexander Topchiev and Dimtri Skobeltzyn at the ‘strange but useful conference in Pugwash’.166
Soon after, Oliphant raised fears by suggesting that the Soviet Union was further advanced than
the west in atomic science.167
Due to his increased profile Oliphant was invited to join various organisations and
conferences. In 1959 he was a signatory to a letter from the World Federation of Scientific
Workers to the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, once again stating the abhorrence of scientists of
the use of their discoveries in forming weapons of mass destruction, and the risks of testing of
atomic devices.168 Oliphant grew his network and became a regular correspondent with Michael
Lindsay, the Lord Lindsay of Birker, who had been for a period in the International Relations
department at the ANU.169 Birker and his Chinese wife had campaigned for peace in southeast
Asia.170 This relationship, and Oliphant’s objection to war meant that his involvement in the peace
movement was not restricted to conferences and articles on the atomic peril, and on more than
one occasion he joined Australian marches against conscription and the Vietnam War.171 In yet
another clash with Menzies, Oliphant was a distinguished guest at the 1959 Peace Conference in
Melbourne. According to a newspaper report, the prime minister allegedly authorised the ‘secret
police’ (ASIO) to open dossiers on the delegates who were ‘liberal busy-bodies’ who want to
attack political opponents.172
Oliphant’s messages of peace did not waver even in light of Cold War investigations of
fellow scientists.173 Though his scientific research at ANU was often hampered by frustrations, he
continued to engage with a community of scientists and be an active pacifist. In the 1950s and
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into the 1960s Oliphant was wiser with a greater power of philosophical thought. Compared to
the youthful Oliphant, however, who had placed himself amongst the maelstrom of war and
politics in Britain and the United States in the 1940s he was no less impetuous or candid. He did
not keep his opinions to himself or check himself with polite euphemisms. He fought fearlessly
with blunt language backed by his own sharpened weapons of wisdom and intellect.174

Retirement and Reflection
Scientists never really retire. It is not the nature of the enquiring mind to cease interest in the
natural world. But in 1965, Oliphant formally stepped down from his role at the ANU. He retained
an office and secretarial assistance at the ANU and stood as a father-figure to the sciences of the
university and the Australian Academy. He continued to avoid major party politics, yet he
endorsed the Australian Reform party in 1969 and 1970.175 The Australian Reform Party
eventually merged with the Democrats and Oliphant provided ad-hoc advice and assistance to its
leader, fellow South Australian Don Chipp.176
In 1971 Oliphant was appointed governor of South Australia. He moved to Adelaide with
his wife, Rosa, and his ANU secretary, Margot Mackie.177 He held the role for five years, which
was not without controversy when Oliphant publicly challenged the premier, Don Dunstan, over
the sacking of the police commissioner, Harold Salisbury.178 In the 1980s, Oliphant renewed
communication with the historian Keith Hancock. They had worked in Birmingham at the same
time in the late 1930s, and again at ANU from the 1950s. The two men wrote gentle and
reflective letters in which they critiqued modernity. They viewed themselves as part of history
and reflected on the halcyon days of their past. Hancock lamented changes to the structure of the
last bastion of enquiry—the university:
I look back with pleasure to the time when you and Florey179 and I were
helping to bring to birth the A.N.U. We did stop the brain drain. Alas it is
starting again, I still attend seminars and keep personal touch with lively
young people; but increasingly the A.N.U, is governed by second-rate
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accountants and clerks. They ask distinguished scientists and scholars to
report on progress of their research! Report to THEM!!!180
In particular they critiqued the Royal Commission into the British Nuclear Tests and in writing to
Oliphant in 1984, Hancock spoke of how Oliphant’s reputation had been slandered by the
commissioner Jim McClelland:
I had already identified that Commissioner as the very worst type of
self-advertising vulgar Australian. Nobody who knows you, and your
record of honourable service in war and peace will pay any attention to
his crude and defamatory spouting.181
In 1985 Hancock wrote to Oliphant to discuss correspondence he had with his friend and historian
Margaret Gowing, the author of several books on the British nuclear programs,182 who was
watching the Royal Commission with incredulity:
She has kept a close watch on the work of the Australian Commission
which will soon be reporting on Maralinga. She anticipates that they will
be pointing the bone at Penney and is well briefed to offer proven
historical evidence if the need arises. Meanwhile little Titterton
spouts.183
Hancock, like others, assumed that there was bad blood between Oliphant and Titterton as their
work had put them on opposing sides of the atomic weapons debate. But, though Titterton had
regularly criticised Oliphant,184 Oliphant had sympathy for his old colleague, who had suffered
under the questions of the Commissioner. Oliphant responded to Hancock:
I am very worried about Titterton. Some background. Titterton married
the girl who was in charge of the radium [at Birmingham], used mostly
for medical purposes. He had been my first research student in
Birmingham, and did well, through dedication and hard work rather
than inspiration. When we began our war-work, I got him recalled from
teaching. He became a very useful member of the team. When we
moved to America, Chadwick agreed he would be most useful in Los
Alamos. Whilst there, the first child was born, a spina bifida cripple. On
return to England he worked at Harwell, under Cockcroft. He kept up a
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cheerful and informative exchange of letters with me. A second child
proved mentally unstable. I invited him to Canberra, where he settled
quickly and seemed likely to prove a good member of the ANU. Then
came involvement in the notorious first test of a US H-Bomb for which I
released him without question when the American team requested his
help. A normal child was born. There followed the request that he be a
member of the Australian Safety Committee, the first chairman of which
was Leslie Martin. Martin soon gave up, overwhelmed by Titterton’s
know-how. From then on, Titterton developed an overwhelming
ambition and extreme self-confidence. He was on first-name terms with
many ministers in the Menzies Government and began to build a large
department obtaining special grants. After retirement, he suffered a
stroke from which he made a remarkable recovery.
The British folk over here to record the enquiry into the nuclear tests,
showed me a copy of a declassified letter to Penney in which Titterton
expressed the view that I was a security risk. That hurt. But you will
understand why I cannot condemn him outright.185

Oliphant inferred that the birth defects of Ernest and Peggy Titterton’s children were a result of
the handling of radium in his department in Birmingham. It is remarkable that Titterton hence
downplayed the risks of radiation at Maralinga. Nevertheless, Oliphant felt some guilt and
understood that Titterton had become beguiled by his working relationship with Menzies’
government. Oliphant’s letter is yet another example of his compassion.
In 2000, aged 98, Oliphant died. According to his family, he had few regrets in his life, but
felt that he had probably deserved a Nobel Prize186 for his work on the discovery of tritium in the
1930s.187 In fact, however, it could be argued that he was a Nobel laureate: as a foundation
delegate of the Pugwash conference in 1957, just one of 22. The Pugwash conferences, as a
collective, was awarded the Peace Prize in 1995.188 Oliphant’s obituary in Nature was written by
Rotblat who had five years earlier accepted the prize on behalf of the Pugwash conferences.
Rotblat described Oliphant as one of the last of the ‘Rutherford’s boys’ and outlined his fine
contribution to science. Rotblat chose, however, not to leave the reader with a forceful reminder
of Oliphant’s scientific contributions. Rather, he closed the obituary by painting Oliphant as a man
of peace, and as a ‘belligerent pacifist, he advocated his conviction that war itself is evil and must
not be tolerated by humanity’.189
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Did the scientific peace movement achieve anything?
The United States military advantage of an atomic monopoly was over by 1949, and even its
invention of the hydrogen bomb in 1951 was matched by the Soviet Union in 1953. This
prompted the United States president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, to address the United Nations with
his Atoms for Peace speech.190 Eisenhower called for all nuclear armed nations to gather in
conference, to appraise the risks, and start a dialogue that may result in the end of the atomic
arms race.191
To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that
two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other
indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there would be to accept
hope—helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed, the
annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to
use generation from generation, and the condemnation of mankind to
begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery toward
decency, and right, and justice. Surely no sane member of the human
race could discover victory in such desolation.
The President also argued that global research could be linked by peaceful uses of the atom and
that the climate of mistrust could be removed. This seemed to mirror the message of the
scientists in the late 1940s such as Einstein,192 Oppenheimer193 and Oliphant.194 As Walter
Patterson argued in his 1986 paper ‘In Search of the Peaceful Atom’, Eisenhower’s hope fell short
of the mark and he struggled to get the heads of government to come together in a decisive
way.195 It seems that Eisenhower had to convince his own military, industry and government first
before he was able to open dialogue. He did manage, however, to inspire the scientists and there
is language in warning of peril to mankind from the ‘Atoms for Peace’ address that appears
similar to Oliphant’s 1955 ‘Science and Mankind’ address196 in India and the Russell-Einstein
Manifesto.197
Eisenhower in his 1961 presidential farewell speech alluded to the domestic influences
that may have prevented the international atomic diplomacy that he so desired. The president,
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seemingly, did not necessarily get his own way on restricting atomic weapons development. He
warned of the domestic influences placed on government by the alliance of military, industry and
science. It was no longer enough to rely on the improvisation of industry to defend the nation, he
declared. Instead, the United States had formed a permanent armaments and defence industry,
which had ‘total influence’ on the economies, politics and faith of all American communities. Yet
such profound change produced grave implications, of which the state must be mindful. ‘In the
councils of government,’ warned Eisenhower, ‘we must guard against the acquisition of
unwarranted influence…by the military-industrial complex.’ Civil liberties must be protected;
knowledge must be harnessed to ensure the moral core of a society and its industries. Science,
declared the president, had changed:
Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been
overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing
fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the
fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a
revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs
involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for
intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds
of new electronic computers. The prospect of domination of the
nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the
power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded.198

It is clear in Eisenhower’s address that he felt he had lost control of aspects of government due to
the influence that had been asserted by the machinery of the military industrial complex. He
referenced how even the ‘free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas’ had itself
been overcome by undue influence. This is precisely what Oliphant campaigned against in his
feud with Harry Messel—the influence of government and industry-funded research in
universities. Of course it is unlikely that Eisenhower was influenced directly by Oliphant. Oliphant
did, however, play his own role in the movement to protect open science and the message of that
movement seemingly influenced the president.
As Eisenhower left the presidency in 1961 the Soviets were already considering ways to
match the geographic advantage of the West’s atomic weapons stationed in Europe and Turkey.
They sought to establish their own bases in communist Cuba.199 In 1962 John Kennedy threatened
a blockade of Cuba and the world came close to atomic war.200 A secret deal for the withdrawal of
United States atomic weapons from Turkey caused the Soviet fleet to turn around and the world
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exhaled again. Armageddon had come too close, and Kennedy started to negotiate limits to
atomic weapons with Nikita Khrushchev.
Peace promoting scientists played a significant role in bringing Kennedy and Khrushchev
together to sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963.201 As Paul Rubinson discussed, ‘scientific
activism in the United States formed a bridge between advocates of disarmament and the
state’.202 Rubinson traced the Test Ban Treaty to the Russell-Einstein manifesto some six years
earlier and the Pugwash conferences from 1957. In particular, the 1958 Pugwash conference at
Lac Beauport in Canada resulted in the discussion of a specific mission of the scientists to place
themselves as diplomats. In Rubinson’s paper, Oliphant is pictured with 24 other scientists
standing alongside Linus Pauling at Pugwash in 1958. Pauling would go on to lead the 1958
American delegation in those first negotiations at the ‘Conference of Experts’ where American
and Soviet scientists met for ‘a specific negotiating task in vital diplomatic negotiations’.203
Pauling won the Nobel Peace Prize 1962.
In leading by example, scientists proved that international cooperation was possible and
they were organised enough to garner media attention and hence likely swayed public opinion.
Ultimately, however, with Eisenhower and Kennedy (and Khrushchev) accepting scientists as
advisors they also accepted those scientists that were pro-atomic weapons. So whilst we see may
portray some scientists, such as Oliphant, with a hagiographical lens for their unwavering
commitment to peace, Rubinson concluded that their actions may have even accelerated the
arms race.204 Yet, since 1945 the world has not (yet) detonated nuclear weapons in anger.
Perhaps the warnings of an Armageddon scenario proliferated by atomic scientists prevented
world leaders from ‘pushing the button’. The Pugwash conferences and the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists still endure today and provide ready platforms where scientists can still offer
impassioned and rational argument to geopolitical debates.205

Chapter conclusions: The search for the paradigm shift of peace
Stephen Cole observed that scientists often make their greatest contribution when aged in their
thirties.206 Oliphant’s scientific coming of age in Cambridge in the late 1920s and 1930s coincided
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with the golden age of quantum mechanics, when atomic science could be considered a noble
pursuit of natural philosophy for the sake of pure knowledge. Yet World War Two and the
subsequent Cold War ruined the innocence of atomic science and wrested hitherto unknown
technologies from the laboratory and placed them into hands of competing states and industry.
Scientists, who as a collective had played an ace hand in the victory of war, felt that they too
could operate collectively in times of peace and politics. The rise of the atomic science peace
movement saw previously laboratory-entrenched boffins present their views on the risks of their
science if it is misused by paranoid and powerful governments and military. Their movement
perfectly mirrored sociology in science, with the commencement of journals and conferences as
the way to proliferate their message. Only rarely did they march on the streets.207 The scientific
networks formed before and during the war are seen here with a new application—activism.
Indeed, when Oliphant reached out to Oppenheimer in 1954 he was essentially using an invisible
college formed originally for science, for activism.
Oliphant did not make the transition to the postwar age of science particularly well. He
protested the utility of science in military or commercial endeavour. He remained an academic in
the endless cycle of seeking funding for projects that would have been readily funded in a
military-industrial application. Oliphant’s years at ANU from 1950 to 1965 were not his best years
in science and his grand vision of massive atom smashers at the ANU fell short of their promises.
When challenged by the likes of Harry Messel for the moniker of the Australian superhero atomman, he defended himself as best as he could. But he then moved from science towards
philosophy in which he critiqued the new world order and recalled the halcyon days. These years
saw his own growing maturity and wisdom and as such found a new role that translated into a
considerable contribution to a humanist philosophical discourse on peace.
Oliphant rode his reputation to become an ambassador for the Australian Academy of
Science and he started to geographically expand his horizons. In 1953 he visited Japan and in his
diary of the trip, likely written only for his own use, he paused to view the multiple layers of
humankind. Oliphant saw a new side to the previously faceless enemy: peaceful gardeners
steeped in a tradition of folklore, honour and tea-ceremonies, who also had the drive and desire
to grow scientific endeavour. These were the same people he had helped to vanquish with
elegant science, but in the end he saw the atomic bomb for what it was: a clumsy and
indiscriminate weapon. The world, he believed, would have to do away with the curmudgeonly
bomb and replace it with engineering that did justice to the poise and elegance of the atom.
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Oliphant’s ‘Science and Mankind’ lecture, delivered to media and academics in Madras in
1955, revealed an older and wiser Oliphant who sought meaning of the human world and the
position of science and himself within it. Whilst existential in nature, this was not a mid-life crisis,
but ‘a calling’ in which he allowed the creed of pacifism that he took from his theosophical
parents to rise once again into a voice for peace. He loathed killing and suffering and beneath his
bombastic personality there was a compassionate and kindly man.
As his profile grew so did his public utterances through the media. He was frequently
critical of the Australian government and Menzies. Oliphant’s truculent approach to national
affairs was clearly problematic for the government. This combativeness coincided with reduced
funds for research at ANU, which may not be unrelated. Certainly, as was argued in Chapter Five,
Oliphant’s scientific and public reputation allowed him a voice in the media and public forums,
and those opinions he espoused reduced his influence of, and access to, government-funded
research. It is plausible that his clashes with the opinions of the Menzies government had a
similar effect. However, unlike Messel, Oliphant was unwilling to accept funds that came with
secrecy provisions. As noted by Keeble, the technological difficulties that tarnished Oliphant’s
scientific reputation at ANU were a function, in part, of the small budgets, which were a fraction
of those available in military funded projects.208
Oliphant was unwavering in his stewardship of scientific freedom. Oliphant saw that
scientific freedom was essential to ensure a peaceful world. He saw that scientists had a duty and
responsibility to operate as agents of peace, knowledge, and progress. He desired that all
scientists should be sworn to their own equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath. The problem was that
governments in Britain, Australia and the United States perceived scientific autonomy, and
particularly the transnational exchange of research that the pre-war invisible colleges had
fostered, as a clear threat to their ability to gain an upper hand in the Cold War. As I discuss in the
next chapter, a scientist who campaigns contrary to the message of governments opens
themselves up as a target for investigation and censorship.
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PART THREE
Science and the State

Part Three of this thesis considers conceptual issues arising from my discussion in Parts One and
Two regarding the invisible colleges of mid-century atomic scientists; Oliphant’s work; and the
relationships between science and government. Each chapter in Part Three considers a unique
issue that, importantly, arises from this understanding of scientific, sociological networks. First, in
Chapter Seven, I argue that western governments of the 1950s had at least some understanding
of the sociological networks of scientists, and, on the grounds of national security, frequently
engaged in activities designed to suppress them. In Chapter Eight, I argue that the invisible
college and sociological networks were altered during the war years, influencing the moral
debates of scientists involved in the Manhattan Project. Finally, in Chapter Nine, I return to the
concept of small-world network mapping that I introduced in Part One, arguing that the
methodology can be used to trace changes in the operations of atomic research from the 1930s
to the 1950s, and which was influenced by the military-industrial complex of the Cold War. I
conclude that small-world network mapping provides an innovative and meaningful tool for
historical research.

CHAPTER SEVEN
Censorship and the communist question

One high official in an American embassy shouted at me when I
mentioned that a certain visa applicant on whose behalf I was
interceding was once a scientist, ‘Oh, that’s it! He’s a scientist! We’ve
had some experience with them. We’ve been bitten by them.’1

The German physicist, Klaus Fuchs, found sanctuary from the Nazis in Mark Oliphant’s
department at the University of Birmingham in 1941.2 From there he moved to the Manhattan
Project and, after the war, to the British government’s atomic research centre at Harwell, where
he headed its theoretical division. In January 1950 Fuchs confessed to providing the Soviet
Union with atomic secrets. Fuchs’ confession broke open a spy ring that eventually resulted in
the execution in the United States of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg.3 When working on the
Manhattan Project, Fuchs had been at Los Alamos, but under interrogation he spoke of another
spy that he had heard of inside the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley during the war. The
Berkeley spy supposedly provided the Soviets with knowledge of the electromagnetic separation
method for uranium.4 British authorities, who were interrogating Fuchs, may have had cause to
suspect Oliphant as the Berkeley spy, for the degrees of separation were decidedly short. The
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), however, believed Fuchs’ evidence pointed
to Martin Kamen, an experimental physicist who had been ejected from the Manhattan Project
after it was discovered he was a member of the Communist Party of the United States of
America (CPUSA). During the war, Kamen had dined with Soviet consular officials who were later
discovered to be KGB agents.5 Kamen, like many scientists, was black-listed during the fervour of
McCarthyism and the associated Internal Security Act/Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950
(commonly known as the McCarran Act). For his 1985 memoir Kamen chose a title that elevated
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science and denigrated the politics of the age: Radiant Science, Dark Politics. Kamen referred to
Oliphant as an ‘old friend’, having worked with him at Berkeley during the war. In 1951 Oliphant
offered Kamen sanctuary from the mudslinging of McCarthyism, with a job at the Australian
National University (ANU). Kamen, though, was unable to obtain a passport to leave the United
States.6
Censorship of science and scientists is a familiar trope in history. For example, from the
fourteenth to the twentieth century the Catholic Church attempted to prohibit scientific texts
that were labelled heretical, including those of Nicolaus Copernicus, Paracelsus, and Johannes
Kepler.7 Scientific censorship continues in the modern day and particularly when new scientific
evidence conflicts with a political agenda.8 But the attempts to control free science in the
aftermath of World War Two and into the Cold War sought to not only halt the proliferation of
scientific concepts, but to silence scientists from debating politics.
Many western atomic scientists were suspected of being affiliated with communism or
associated with the Soviet Union. This resulted in political censorship and restrictions of
scientists, including Oliphant, in the 1950s and 1960s. Much has been written on the political
witch hunts of McCarthyism and particularly on the experience of scientists, such as Robert
Oppenheimer, in the United States.9 This chapter considers the censorship of science as it was
experienced in Australia, and discusses how Oliphant’s role in scientific administration was
steered by security interests. Most of the security investigations into Oliphant were performed
without his knowledge, and he was usually oblivious to the extent to which he was placed under
surveillance. Yet it is clear that the invisible hand of political manipulation shaped his career in
Robert Menzies’ Australia.
In particular, it is also clear that the activism of left-leaning and peace-loving scientists
caused western governments, including that of Australia, concern. Governments attempted to
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muffle those increasingly noisy activists who presented their contrarian opinions with a growing
political maturity, scientific rationalism and intelligence. Oliphant was among them.
This chapter provides insight to the perception held by security services of scientists in
the atomic age. Oliphant’s interaction with governments in the early 1950s reveals much about
broader fears of communism and activism within the scientific colleges. FBI and ASIO dossiers
reveal the degree to which Oliphant and others were surveilled, sanctioned and censored by
governments, often without their knowledge. It soon became clear that outspoken scientists
were often considered as dangerous by government, which sometimes conflated intelligent
activism with communism. As the Cold War deepened, members of Oliphant’s invisible college
of the 1930s and 1940s were restricted in their movements between countries, while their
opportunities for open communication were suppressed. Indeed, agencies such as the FBI and
ASIO appeared to have an understanding of the sociological networks of scientists, and actively
intervened to control them.

Visa Issues
Oliphant was first denied a visa to enter the United States in 1951. When he made enquiries to
the United States’ consulate in Canberra, at the time, he was told that ‘administrative delays’
had held up his application. The American consul-general assured Oliphant that he was not
being accused of ‘subversive activities’, but did caution him that his public speeches were
‘providing bullets for the Russians and other enemies to fire back at the United States’.10 The
same ‘administrative delays’ seemed to have an uncanny effect on a large number of scientists
who desired to travel to the United States during the early-to-mid-1950s.11 In 1954, Oliphant
was again denied an entry visa to visit the United States with a more concerning reason given:
he was ‘inadmissible under law’.12 Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard wrote that this perplexed
Oliphant, though he put the matter down to the general concerns about the security of the
time.13 In all, more than 50 scientists were blocked from entering the United States in the early
1950s.14 Warren Unna, a staff reporter at the Washington Post, received feedback from the
State Department on the Oliphant matter:
Commented one State Department official: “He still is
10
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inadmissible…(he is) a do-gooder, one of the boys who monkey around
with pinkos…. Oppenheimer case…that sort of thing.”15
Oliphant had been opposed to the American atomic monopoly and the potential for the
international proliferation of atomic weapons in 1946, and had spoken out against atomic
weaponry in several media reports.16 Yet by 1954 he had not yet been actively part of a wider,
collective peace movement.17 He could hardly have been considered a ‘do-gooder’ by a
reasonable investigation. Yet he was not alone. In July of the same year Oppenheimer was

Figure 22 Warren Unna, 'Visas Cleared for 2 Savants - but Too Late.' The Washington Post, 24 September
1954
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humiliated, in a very public forum, at his security hearings. Oppenheimer’s wife, Kitty, and his
brother, Frank, had both been CPUSA members. Oppenheimer had neglected to tell security
authorities of an approach made to him during the war by the KGB, via his close friend and
fellow Berkeley academic, Haakon Chevalier.18 But in the hysteria of the time, investigators
accused and harangued those that appeared guilty by association, and it seems that some of
Oliphant’s associates, including the Oppenheimers, were labelled ‘pinkos’.19 The polarisation of
this era of the Cold War left little room for blurred lines: if an individual voiced opposition to the
state they were considered, in effect, a supporter of the enemy.20 In a 1952 article for the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Edward Shils investigated the visa travails of scientists wishing
to travel to the United States from a social science perspective:
The fundamental errors of our present visa policy are not the byproducts of a legitimate concern with security, but are, instead,
manifestations of an underlying xenophobia and misology, of an undue
sensitivity to criticism.21
As described by Shils, the United States was fearful of reasoned debate and indeed, of foreign
influence or criticism.
Oliphant found the visa issue tiresome, but did not question under which law he was
considered ‘inadmissible’. It is likely that he assumed he was under no more of a cloud of
suspicion than the many other scientists whose travel to or from the United States had also
been restricted.22 Oliphant’s FBI files, which I obtained under freedom of information provisions
in the United States, imply a more sinister reason for the United States’ wariness of Oliphant in
1954—he was suspected of espionage.

The FBI Files
Oliphant’s FBI files are heavily redacted and incomplete.23 The first entry is from 1944 and
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detailed how Oliphant had communicated with Otto Frisch,24 and thus breached the
compartmentalisation security protocols on the Manhattan Project. The second and third
entries are newspaper clippings referencing Oliphant’s promotion of open science in 1945 and
1949.25 It is the fourth entry, a report from September 1954, which indicates there were deeper
suspicions of Oliphant. An informant had then recently revealed that an Australian scientist at
the Manhattan Project had leaked information to Soviet agents in 1945.26 The report names
eight Australians who were on the Manhattan Project as initial suspects: Harrie Massey, Maurice
Wilkins, Eric Burhop, George Page, Robert Nimmo, Philip Starling, William Allen, and Oliphant.
Four were recommended for further investigation. The report I received described the
suspicious activity of two of them: Oliphant and Burhop.
In an earlier thesis Jean Buckley-Moran provided insight into Burhop, a radiophysicist,
who in 1939 was a founding member of the Victoria branch of the Australian Association of
Scientific Workers (AASW).27 The AASW had a radical left-wing core, but overall was a nonexclusive community-based organisation (not a trade union) that strived to promote science and
to offer scientific input into national affairs.28 In 1942 Burhop was with the Council of Science
and Industrial Research (CSIR).29 He worked on establishing short-wave radar technology in
Australia and was likely to have met with Oliphant, who was seconded home to Australia for
most of that year to transfer the knowledge of the cavity magnetron.30 It is hence plausible that
in 1944, when Burhop was seconded to the Manhattan Project to work at the Radiation
Laboratory at Berkeley, it was done so with the knowledge, or even at the request, of Oliphant,
who was the head of the British mission for that section. On the face of it Burhop was not a
logical choice for the uranium work, given that his experience was more inclined towards radar
and radio waves. After the war, Burhop found it impossible to secure employment in Australia
and was rejected in his application for the chair of Physics at the University of Adelaide. BuckleyMoran argued that this was most likely not on academic grounds, and suggested that Burhop
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had been black-listed due to his affiliations with the AASW and its left-wing core.31 Philip Deery,
in 2000, provided further evidence to support Buckley-Moran’s theory at the University of
Adelaide that suggested Burhop’s ‘political colour might raise difficulties’.32
The identity of the FBI’s informant is not revealed, but given the timing of the report in
1954, shortly after the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for espionage, a whole network
of former Manhattan Project scientists and technicians had been made vulnerable.33 In addition,
also in 1954, Petr Deriabin, a KGB agent, defected to the United States and started working with
the CIA. He revealed his knowledge of Soviet atomic intelligence activities.34 The FBI report
detailed that Oliphant was on friendly terms with the suspect Martin Kamen, with whom he had
been in communication in 1945. It also detailed how Oliphant, in 1946, had met with Soviet
physicist, Dmitri Skobeltzyn. As noted in Chapter Five, the Skobeltzyn meeting was not
clandestine, was most likely innocuous, and had occurred immediately following the gathering
of scientific advisors at the United Nations conference on atomic energy. Oliphant had arranged
for Skobeltzyn and other international physicists, including Frederic Joliot-Curie (later revealed
as a communist),35 to take the opportunity, whilst in the United States, to attend a Physical
Society meeting in Berkeley.36
The final entry in Oliphant’s FBI files is a 1957 report from the Havana (Cuba) Field
Office, in which an underground pro-revolutionary magazine had claimed Oliphant’s
involvement in the Pugwash Conference was an indication of his growing anti-American
sentiment.37 By the late 1950s, however, it seems that suspicions of Oliphant had been
dispelled, and he thereafter travelled regularly to the United States without hindrance.

ASIO Files: A communist network at the ANU?
In 1943 the United States security services commenced a four-decade long counterintelligence
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project called Venona.38 Its aim was to intercept and decrypt communications between the
Soviet intelligence agencies and the KGB’s international field offices at their embassies and
consulates. In 1948, Britain’s prime minister, Clement Attlee, sent a MI5 intelligence officer to
Australia to meet with Prime Minister Chifley. The officer explained to Chifley that at least two
secret communiqués between Britain and Australia had fallen into Soviet hands. Venona had
identified that spies were operational in the Australian capital.39 Chifley responded by rapidly
setting up Australia’s own team of spooks—the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO).40 In 1954, Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, KGB agents at the Soviet Union embassy in
Canberra, defected and carried a large amount of Soviet embassy documents with them. The
Petrov Affair resulted in a Royal Commission to investigate the form and targets of Soviet
espionage in Australia. David Horner documented the Royal Commission in detail but he only
provides a scant reference to an atomic physicist, William Berry-Smith, who was one of
Oliphant’s researchers at the ANU.41 Historian Tim Sherratt also investigated the 1954 Royal
Commission on Espionage and he noted the particular interest that the KGB had with Australian
scientists.42 A snippet of a document handed over by the Petrovs included several references to
a ‘Don Wood’ and this was linked to another document as the ‘secretary of technical adviser of
Doctor E on Enormaz’.43 Evdokia Petrov believed the code word ‘Enormaz’ related to the British
atomic tests in Australia, but in more recent times David McKnight suggested that the term was
also used by the KGB in reference to the Manhattan Project and other atomic projects in
general.44 ‘Don Wood’ was possibly Donald Woodward, who worked with the physicist George
Briggs at the CSIRO. Sherratt described how this link was tested in the 1954 Royal Commission
when both Briggs and Woodward were called to testify.45 Briggs had sat alongside Oliphant as a
technical advisor to Herbert ‘Doc’ Evatt (‘Doctor E’?) on the Australian delegation to the 1946
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission conference. Despite the cryptic references to Briggs,
Woodward and Evatt, the Royal Commission found that Woodward and Briggs did not have
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access to vital secrets, and hence it was unlikely that either were informants of interest to the
Soviets.46
As David McKnight and David Horner have documented, ASIO was suspicious of leftleaning academics operating in Australia’s largely conservative universities.47 The ANU, however,
was less conservative and had been founded by Chifley’s Labor government in the late 1940s as
a wellspring of contemporary thought in Australia. In 1952 prime minister Robert Menzies was
alerted, by ASIO director Charles Spry, to a group of nuclear physicists at the ANU. As Wayne
Reynolds noted, Spry had been tipped off by MI5, which had made a link between the ANU and
the University of Birmingham. Several scientists whom Oliphant had recruited from Birmingham
had communist connections.48 In alerting Menzies, Spry focused on the influence of left-wing
academics on the fertile and the impressionable minds of students:
[I] am sure that you will readily appreciate the advisability of
employing, in any university, lecturers who are likely to infect students
with subversive doctrines. Also difficult diplomatic problems may arise
when such persons travel abroad. When they are justifiably refused
entry into foreign countries, an adverse reflection is cast upon the
university and the government.49

Menzies arranged to meet with Douglas Copland, the ANU vice chancellor. Copland reminded
the prime minister, probably to quell the government’s growing interference, that there was no
political test to enter the workforce at the ANU, and that its academics had the same rights and
freedoms of speech as other members of the public.50 Copland’s intervention did not prevent
ASIO from continuing to monitor the activity of Oliphant and his colleagues. The monitoring
extended past ANU’s physicists, and a review of all academics in Australian universities was
undertaken.51 Yet, as David Horner explained, despite the protestations of ASIO, a formal
security clearance process was not initiated for academic staff at the ANU or any other
Australian university.52 Yet ASIO maintained files on any academics it suspected of left-wing
sympathies.53
Oliphant’s ASIO file, sourced from the National Archives of Australia, amounts to over
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300 pages of documents, surveillance reports, newspaper clippings, and intelligence from
informants. The file spans the period of 1947 to 1965 and, in effect, covers Oliphant’s return to
Australia and his vociferous years campaigning for peace and scientific freedom.54 Most of the
files relate to Oliphant’s public remarks in the media; his involvement in world-wide conferences
on the peace movement; his campaign to protect open-science and internationalism; and his
positive views on science in the Soviet Union. There remains, however, scattered amongst the
mundane, other documents that point to a clear concern that ASIO had with the security risk
posed by Oliphant and several of his researchers at the ANU.
Oliphant’s involvement with the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) is
commented on repeatedly in his ASIO files.55 The WFSW was formed in 1946 to lobby
governments for nuclear disarmament and world peace. It promoted the concept of world
federalism for this purpose. As Buckley-Moran demonstrated, the AASW followed the lead of
the WFSW in political lobbying.56 The WFSW provided links throughout the world’s other
communal scientific organisations such as the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). Jessica
Wang argued that, in the United States, any association with a union or organised quasi-political
group, such as the FAS, was considered a threat to government.57
The first entry in Oliphant’s ASIO file was made by Major General Frederick Galleghan
who, in 1947, was the Deputy Director of the investigative branch within the Australian Army.58
The report, dated 17 January 1947, received evidence from an informant who had attended a
private meeting of physicists in Australia, which had included a talk by Oliphant. At the meeting,
Oliphant was reported to have been pessimistic about the control of atomic energy, and was
said to have declared:
Knowledge of the scientists, even of nations down to the smallest,
would make it very easy for them to get to know the final result of
atomic research and that unless something was done in the near
future, which he doubted, to control the use of atomic energy, a very
bleak future existed for the world.59
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A follow-up report was made at the start of surveillance on Oliphant. It quoted Oliphant’s
statements regarding scientific freedom made to reporters as he departed Australia for Britain
in 1947. Galleghan was concerned at Oliphant’s view that ‘world security and peace are
impossible if free exchange of scientific discoveries be barred for military purposes’.60
In November 1950 a report was written by the director general of ASIO and sent to the
officer-in-charge at the Australian Capital Territory. It noted that Oliphant had written to the
Peace Council in Melbourne, and then referenced John Stanley Gooden, who had recently died
but had been a member of the Communist Party of Australia.61 Gooden was an Adelaidean, who
had travelled with his young wife, Claire, to Birmingham in 1946 to write a PhD supervised by
Oliphant. In 1948, when Oliphant confirmed that he would leave Birmingham for Canberra, he
offered Gooden a position at the ANU.62 Gooden accepted a role, making him the first
appointed member of Oliphant’s new team. In 1950, as Gooden was making plans to leave
Birmingham, he fell ill with a kidney complaint. Oliphant arranged for the ANU to pay for
Gooden, his wife Claire, and child to be repatriated from Birmingham to Adelaide where he died,
within weeks, on 9 June 1950.63 Claire Gooden, following the death of her husband, continued
on to Canberra to become Oliphant’s secretary; a role that, at times, she had also taken in
Birmingham. Claire Gooden remained at the ANU until at least 1953.64 As Oliphant’s secretary in
Birmingham and then Canberra, it is possible that she may have also fitted the description of
‘secretary to the technical adviser of Doctor E.’, and at this time she seems to have been of
interest to ASIO.
In early 1953, Claire Gooden is mentioned again in Oliphant’s ASIO files. Her name, and
that of her deceased husband, were listed with those of close associates from Birmingham in a
notebook seized during a raid of the Communist Party of Australia’s headquarters.65 Others
named included Leonard Ulysses Hibbard and William Berry-Smith, both of whom had travelled
to Birmingham to work with Oliphant, and had followed him to the ANU. The ANU physicist,
Kenneth Inall, was also named. Oliphant intervened when it seemed that vetting was going to
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prevent Inall’s appointment to ANU in 1951.66 ASIO was clearly concerned at the network of leftleaning scientists developing at the ANU. A 1953 ASIO document noted that:
Of the fourteen scientists appointed to the School of Physics at the
Australian National University, ten studied at or were otherwise
associated with Birmingham University.
Our current research therefore tend to support your initial opinion
that there may be some pattern of security interest in recruitment
policy and practice of the School of Physics at the Australian National
University.67

Surveillance of Oliphant increased. The ASIO files noted keenly that his vehicle had been parked
in the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra on 25 May 1953, at the time of a film evening
hosted by the Soviet Ambassador.68
Members of Oliphant’s family were also investigated. His brother, Keith, was cited for
pro-communist comments made when he was an electronics specialist and flight sergeant in the
Australian Air Force in 1945.69 The records on Keith are, however, inaccurate. They refer
occasionally to him as ‘Kenneth’, and claim that, of the five Oliphant brothers, he was the only
full brother to Mark with the remaining three brothers being half-brothers to Mark and Keith.
Monica Oliphant, and the biographers Cockburn and Ellyard disagree with this analysis and note
that all five sons of Harold and Beatrice Oliphant were full brothers.70
By mid-1953, the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) started vetting
prospective board members and sent a request for background checks to ASIO.71 Oliphant was
one of four academics on its short list for a position on the board. ASIO provided a detailed,
four-page response, which was kept on his file. They also sent copies of an assessment made in
January of the same year. The report detailed many of Oliphant’s associates and their
66
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communist affiliations, along with his continued vocal commentary in the media on atomic
weaponry and scientific secrets. Yet in the end, the conclusion of the ASIO officer was that
Oliphant was of little risk.72
Despite receiving security clearance, Oliphant was not invited to join the AAEC.73 At this
time Oliphant was clearly the most senior atomic scientist in the country, yet, as with Burhop,
his ‘political colour’ may have been enough to prevent his appointment.
By December 1953, new suspicions of Oliphant were raised. The Tasmanian field office
of ASIO sent a report through to headquarters that an informant had advised them of Oliphant
being an undercover agent of the Communist Party. The informant was deemed credible and
knowledgeable of political matters, but refused to provide details of their source of the
information. The informant only divulged that their source was a reliable academic on the
Australian mainland. The director general of ASIO deemed the accusation unsubstantiated.74
The defection of the Petrovs in early 1954 provided a whole slew of new information for
ASIO. The agency clearly had sources placed within meetings of the Communist Party of
Australia (CPA) and there was a particular concern reported amongst party members that
Petrov’s defection might bring unwanted attention to their membership base. In a report of a
CPA meeting in April 1954, Oliphant’s name was mentioned:
N.S. Saunders said Petrov will no doubt disappear into smoke, Menzies
will see to that. There would be nothing to stop Professor Oliphant or
someone like him disappearing in the same way if Menzies could put
him on the spot too. Sharkey said that people like Oliphant are the
type of persons who will be referred to in documents handed over by
Petrov.75

Yet Oliphant was not implicated in the Petrov papers and only one scientist from the suspected
ANU ‘ring’, Len Hibbard, was asked to be a witness at the Royal Commission on Espionage.
Hibbard answered questions on his former membership of the Communist Party, which he had
relinquished in 1947. The Royal Commission was also interested that Hibbard was an officebearer at the AASW and that he may side with the Soviet Union if Australia was the aggressor in
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a war against them. Yet whilst Hibbard was subjected to uncomfortable questions, the findings
of the Royal Commission found that he had done nothing illegal.76 Even so, according to an ASIO
report dated 26 November 1954 Oliphant was infuriated with Hibbard:
1. On the 23rd November, a reliable informant advised Regional
Director, A.C.T. that Professor Oliphant had remarked after Leonard
Ulysses Hibbard had appeared at the Royal Commission on
Espionage—‘This is a very bad business; this chap promised me that he
would not have anything to do with Communism when he was
approached for enlistment by me at Birmingham. I knew he was
connected with this sort of thing, and trusted him to hold to his word
not to have anything further to do with it.’
2. The informant was of the opinion that Professor Oliphant was
genuinely upset regarding Hibbard’s actions.
3. It will be recalled that the same informant advised this Office that
Professor Oliphant had been warned not to accept Hibbard on security
grounds at the time of Hibbard’s appointment to the Australian
National University in approximately 1953.77

Based on this evidence, it appears that there was, indeed, an ASIO informant within ANU’s
School of Physical Sciences who had been there from at least April 1953, when the informant
was first introduced to Oliphant:
I called on Prof. Titterton to discuss certain matters <redacted>. Later
he suggested we have tea with Prof. Oliphant. I was introduced as Dr.
<redacted>. The conversation turned to the subject of the willingness
of the British manufacturers to adopt scientific ideas and grew a little
heated. I gained the impression that Prof. Oliphant was an extreme left
wing socialist of the un-reasoning type. This, taken in conjunction with
his unquestioned academic eminence, is, to say at the least
disquieting.78
The identity of the informant is redacted throughout the ASIO files. Given they were first
introduced with the title ‘Doctor’, it is likely he or she was an academic. Some intelligence
provided by the informant relates to social events where the wider school and guests gathered
and Oliphant was found to be guilty of ‘loose talk’.79 The informant presented not only the left
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Figure 23 'ASIO Brief No. 25 Professor Marcus Laurence Elwin Oliphant, 10 January, 1957'. Canberra:
National Archives of Australia, Reference A6119

leaning tendencies of Oliphant, but also noted that Oliphant was upset at Bruno Pontecorvo’s80
defection to the Soviet Union and trade union strikes in Australia.81 This was balanced in the
report with acknowledgements that Oliphant did not seem outwardly upset at the death of the
king, and that whilst he was ‘left’ he did ‘not appear to have a very great love for politicians in
general’.82
Other intelligence that came directly from within the School of Physical Sciences
includes details of Oliphant’s correspondence received from the WFSW as well as detailed
80
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information on his travel itineraries. References to his trips to the Soviet Union were frequently
underlined.83 It is entirely possible that secretaries or personnel inside the administration of the
school were also providing information to ASIO. In one particular report, which seems to have
escaped the redactor’s pen, Barbara Shanahan, Oliphant’s secretary who replaced Claire
Gooden in 1952 or 1953, is named and it seems that she possibly, knowingly or unwittingly,
provided the guest list of a party at the Oliphant residence in 1956.84
Throughout Oliphant’s lengthy ASIO files there are frequent reassessments of his status
and apparent risk to Australia. The repeated conclusion seems to be the same: that whilst he
had left-leaning tendencies, had a department filled with associates of the CPA, that his
comments in the media were considered annoying and even potentially dangerous to the
government, and that he was friendly with the Soviet ambassador in Canberra, he was not
considered to be an agent of the Soviet Union. In 1957, when the Petrovs were again
interviewed by ASIO on Oliphant, Evdokia Petrov speculated that Oliphant may have been
approached by the KGB in Moscow. This could have only happened during his visit in 1956. This
is after the Petrov’s defected and it is unlikely they would have had information on the inner
workings of the KGB at this time.85
If Oliphant was ever approached by the Soviets to become an agent on their behalf, it
seems he failed to report it to the Australian authorities. It is likely that he was aware of at least
some investigation and surveillance.86 Monica Oliphant, however, described her father-in-law as
potentially a little naïve on the long-armed reach of security and state intelligence, and hence
continued on his work, befuddled as to the reason why he was sometimes stymied in travel or
overlooked in appointments. Furthermore, despite several of Oliphant’s associates at the ANU
having previously been members of the Communist Party, it appears there was no spy-ring in
operation.

Censorship and the peaceful atom
Joseph McCarthy was the ranting United States senator who shall be forever associated with
anti-communist American paranoia in the early Cold War.87 But even before McCarthy, the
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Congressional ‘House Un-American Activities Committee’88 (HUAC), which was granted
permanent status in 1945 and endured for 30 years, led the charge of public investigations.89
The elation at the end of war quickly subsided in the United States, and as Jessica Wang argued,
the end of World War Two brought a rise of the left, with a nation-wide strike born out of
‘domestic economic hardship and labour unrest’, and ‘on top of these immediate economic
crises, the newly perceived peril of the atomic bomb cast an even gloomier pall over the
postwar peace’.90 Immediately after the war, the United States, controlled the technology and
the only arsenal of atomic weapons in the world. Yet Josef Stalin and the Soviet Union was
perceived as a new enemy and those that held the secrets of the atomic bomb inside America’s
borders were considered a risk. Oppenheimer’s security clearance investigation in 1954 is the
most famous of all the witch hunts and has been well researched and documented by others.91
The investigation, and subsequent sanctioning took an immeasurable toll on Oppenheimer and
he carried the scars for the rest of his life.92
Perhaps a closer parallel to Oliphant is not Oppenheimer, but Edward Condon, who first
collided with the HUAC in 1947. Condon had worked on both secret radar projects and the
Manhattan Project where he was, at one point, associate director to Oppenheimer. As Wang
discussed, Condon cited the compartmentalisation policy as one of the main reasons for
resigning from the project and, like Oliphant, had believed that security was a hindrance to
scientific progress.93 Condon, similarly to Oliphant’s involvement in the Australia-Russia society,
was a member of the American-Soviet Union Science society and believed that internationalism
in science would result in ‘world friendship and cooperation and not atomic war and the
destruction of civilisation.’94 In his 1946 article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Condon
was dismayed at the growing military influence on science and how secrecy caused mistrust. He
was prescient on how scientists would become increasingly distrusted as the inevitability of
other nations acquiring the atomic bomb became apparent:
It is sinister indeed how one evil step leads to another. Having an air of
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suspicion and mistrust, there will be persons among us who think
other nations can know nothing except what is learned by espionage.
So, when other countries make atom bombs, these persons will cry
“treason” at our scientists, for they will find it inconceivable that
another country could make a bomb in any other way except by aid
from Americans.95

Condon was not a communist, but his involvement in several societies perceived as socialist or
sympathetic to the Soviet Union was enough for him to be considered guilty by association. He
was targeted by the HUAC and publicly lambasted as being a communist sympathiser. The
evidence was, however, poor and eventually the HUAC gave up their pursuit of Condon. As
Wang argued, withdrawing accusations rather than proving innocence can still cause harm.
There is an associative assumption of guilt in light of inconclusive findings and mere insinuation
was enough of a shadow that followed Condon.96 He was, however, a notable scientist and held
public positions such as on the board of the National Bureau of Standards. Thus, given his
standing in the scientific community, he was still able to gain employment following the
investigations. This was also the case for Oppenheimer who continued his career at Princeton
after the loss of his security clearance. Wang attached significance to how well-known scientists
suffered less than more obscure scientists. In some cases, lesser-known scientists were blacklisted and unable to gain employment, even in the liberal environment of academia.97
Similarly to the United States security services, ASIO’s reviews of academics throughout
Australia’s university system resulted in several individuals, such as Burhop, being cut from work
or overlooked for positions.98 Yet in Australia there was no equivalent to the HUAC, with the
closest analogue being the Royal Commission on Espionage in 1954. The greatest impact that
these politics had on Oliphant was a denial of entry to the United States, which restricted
collaboration. Unlike Condon, Oppenheimer or the many others that were tarred and feathered
with the red brush of paranoia, Oliphant did not need to endure public investigation. In the
background, however, were the sly tactics of the security services, which in the United States, as
well as Australia, became more cavalier as the 1950s progressed. Oliphant was short listed but
not offered a place on the AAEC despite previously acting as an advisor to Evatt at the United
Nations conference in 1946 and receiving a security clearance. Similarly he did not have any
official involvement in the British atomic tests in Australia. These censorships seemed to matter
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little to Oliphant, and having suffered this indignity in private rather than public, meant he could
continue his work at the ANU and his involvement in the wider discourse on peace.
It is important to make a distinction between the censorship of science versus the
censorship of scientists. The censorship of science involves the blocking of the distribution of a
scientific or technological concept, whereas the censorship of scientists involves restrictions
placed upon an individual or a group of scientists. In Oliphant’s case, this seems to have been
more the censorship of a scientist rather than a censorship of science. Perhaps the United States
security services were acutely aware of the power of the social networks of scientists when they
blocked his entry to their country.99 By blocking the visits of overseas scientists, the United
States attempted, in effect, to prevent the function of the invisible colleges. The co-mingling of
overseas and American scientists may have been deemed a risk whereby American knowledge
would be carried out from their national borders into the rest of the world. It is perhaps, for this
same reason, that scientists such as Kamen and the Nobel laureate, Linus Pauling,100 were
denied passports and thus blocked from leaving the United States. Pauling, who was denied a
passport in 1952, continued his vocalisation against his government throughout the 1950s, and
in 1960 was ordered to appear before a United States senate security committee.101 Pauling won
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1963 and became only the second person, after Marie Curie, to win a
Nobel in two different fields.102
In the early-to-mid-1950s, the atomic science being carried out in universities in the
United States, and Australia was not considered to be particularly sensitive. The real secrets of
atomic bomb technology were being developed inside the insulated environment of the military
industrial complexes and restricted government research institutes. Certainly in the case of
many scientists mentioned throughout this chapter, including Oliphant, Oppenheimer, Pauling
and Kamen, there appears to have been a political motivation in the restriction of their work. All
of these scientists had a growing political maturity during the 1950s and had made public
utterances against governments. The censorship of the scientists with travel restrictions was,
perhaps, driven by a motivation to prevent the rallying of large numbers of politically motivated
intelligentsia.
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Chapter conclusions: spying or seditious?
Some outspoken scientists offered intelligent argument, logic and a message that was often
contrary to that of governments. The American State Department official who commented on
Oliphant’s inadmissibility to the United States provided an insight that ‘do-gooders’ and
‘monkeying around with pinkos’ was really the same thing to security services. Rabble rousing
scientists were not in the best interest of their governments trying to protect themselves in a
Cold War, in which the key weapons were propaganda, communication and subterfuge. In the
1930s Oliphant offered sanctuary to European scientists fleeing the persecution of Hitler; and in
the 1950s he offered a safe haven to Oppenheimer103 and Kamen who were being persecuted by
their own government.
With tightened security and Cold War paranoia, scientists were no longer seen as
saviours in war, but were portrayed publicly as high-risk and often careless intellectuals who
carried important technological secrets. These years saw a ‘struggle for the soul’ of science,104 in
which the ideological clashes of capitalism and communism consumed the notion of freedom in
science.105 The 1950s were a high-pitched crescendo of tension and suspicion of atomic
scientists, including Oliphant.
In heading for Australia in 1950, Oliphant left a trail of security indiscretions in Britain.
His reputation, however, followed him to Australia. The British, using the excuse of Oliphant
being perceived as a security risk to the Americans, blocked him from joining in the British
atomic tests, and in so doing highlighted him as a risk also to Australian interests.106 This
perceived security risk meant that he was also overlooked for the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission and the Atomic Weapons Safety Committee. Some scientists, such as Harry Messel,
played with more gamesmanship and sought industry and government funding that accepted
caveats of secrecy into the university system. This was even more maddening to Oliphant where
the last bastion of the freedom of knowledge came under-threat.107 In their public feud it is
possible that Messel or one of his associates was the mainland academic that uttered the
slander that Oliphant was a Soviet agent, as reported to ASIO in 1953.
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Oliphant’s exclusion from state science108 was a form of censorship. Oliphant cared little
for secrets, and if he had been involved it is almost a guarantee that he would have belligerently
harried the government on its failings to protect its people. If he had been a state scientist on
the atomic bomb tests, it is possible that the cover-ups instigated by Titterton and the Atomic
Weapons Safety Committee would have been unveiled a lot earlier. This censorship protected
both the British government (and its bomb tests) and the Australian government from undue
public questioning, but exposed the people and the environment of Australia to unnecessary
radiation.
There was not a spy ring operating at the ANU and Oliphant was not a communist nor an
agent of the Soviet Union, but this did not stop security agencies from attempting to make such
links. After all, Oliphant’s direct first order connections ranged from the convicted spies Fuchs
and Nunn-May, defectors such as Pontecorvo, to those suspected of being sympathetic
communists, such as Oppenheimer, Kamen, Burhop, John Gooden, Claire Gooden, Inall, BerrySmith and Hibbard. Oliphant was also at Cambridge with the infamous ‘Cambridge Five’ in the
1930s,109 though there is no evidence to suggest that he knew any of them, and that link has not
been made.110 The thought, however, that universities were the fertile breeding grounds of
closet reds was probably in the forefront of the minds of ASIO agents when they suspected a
spy-ring had emigrated with Oliphant from Birmingham to the ANU. Oliphant fanned the flames
of this supposition by praising the science in the Soviet Union, criticising western governments,
and making friends of the Soviet ambassador in Canberra. But in the end there is no evidence
presented that confirms an ANU spy-ring. It is possible, as per the insinuation of Mrs Petrov,
that Oliphant was approached by a Soviet intelligence agency. Yet if he was approached he did
not report it. Oppenheimer was sanctioned because, in part, he failed to report an approach
and hence any unreported approach may have also cost Oliphant if it was later to be found
out.111
Both ASIO and the FBI seemed to have an understanding on how scientists interacted
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and how their sociological networks operated.112 Indeed, the concept of the invisible college,
that forms to explain much of the sociological structures of science, is just simply what Oliphant
referred to as scientific interaction ‘in the normal way’.113 It is true that these networks were
used, at times, to transfer secrets and sometimes secrets of the state,114 and it is likely that
atomic spies such as Fuchs and Nunn-May also exploited these trust-based networks in
gathering secrets of the atom for the Soviet Union. But by being an established node in a
network of scientists does not necessarily suggest a compromised security of the state. As
quoted by Edward Shils, a United States embassy official said ‘He’s a scientist! We’ve had some
experience with them. We’ve been bitten by them.’115 Therein is a clear implication that all
scientists, who occasionally uttered a message that is contrary to the message of the
government, were painted with the same red brush.
Oliphant and other scientists renewed the invisible colleges in the 1950s through
conferencing. The greatest attempts at censorship appears to have been the efforts of the
United States government, which blocked scientists from visiting its shores and prevented their
own scientists from visiting others. Scientists, however, still communicated via personal letters,
conferences such as Pugwash, and through publications such as the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists. Such connections were also used to provide moral support to each other and offer
advice on how to defend against the attacks of censorship. At times, Oliphant sought help from
others; and on several occasions he offered sanctuary to others. His dealings with
Oppenheimer, Titterton, Marston and Kamen are salient examples of the invisible college in
action.
The resources that ASIO seemed to invest in their scrutiny of Oliphant and his team
were considerable. The agency’s files indicate that hundreds of hours of surveillance were
conducted, which included the monitoring of mail and the placement or recruitment of
undercover informants to spy on Oliphant from inside his own school. Yet its investigations
always seemed to reach the same conclusion: there was no reason to restrict Oliphant from his
domestic academic efforts. It appears that through the 1950s ASIO bumbled their way by
chasing loose connections and monitoring of activities without really seeming to have a clear
mission or to make headway. The Royal Commission on Espionage in 1954–55 included of a full
review of the Petrov papers and evidence presented by Petrovs from the witness stand. The
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commissioners pushed the same message that ASIO did: that anyone associated with
communists or communism must be an enemy of the state. In the end they failed to
substantiate that any subversive spying activities were taking place in the university system.116
In his later years, and after retirement, Oliphant achieved the status of an elder
statesman when he was appointed governor of South Australia. This esteemed role could be
seen as incongruous for such a renegade, anti-establishment, and impetuous man as Oliphant.
Though premier Don Dunstan was also renowned for being somewhat unorthodox. Yet Oliphant
saw science as its being own estate beyond politics. This is evidenced by his petition for a Royal
Charter for the Australian Academy of science. Being governor, as the representative of the
Queen, is a role that is meant to be neutral to political division to ensure that governments act
in the interest of the citizenry. In some ways, Oliphant’s view of the responsibility of science and
scientists, to rise above the political noise, was the same.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Moral dilemmas and atomic science

The dehumanizing effects of war were apparent in the days of the
sword, or of bows and arrows. They have been multiplied enormously
by the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction, all of which are the fruits of scientific endeavour. There
was room for bravery and individual skill in ancient times. It is the
impersonal killing, by remote control, which makes of modern war the
most degrading activity of man.1

Moral dilemmas, as part of the human condition, have long been examined by the fields of
philosophy and ethics. The 2002 publication of collected essays by Philippa Foot, for example,
demonstrates the complexity of such topics through the discussion on virtue and immoralism.2
Foot contends that Nietzsche’s Übermensch (superman) is an ‘ascending’ type of man, and that
his ambition to achieve higher status, through knowledge or control, will ultimately clash with
virtue and moral-nature.3 Notwithstanding the use of Nietzsche’s doctrines by Nazi ideologues,
it might be argued that scientists—and, particularly, atomic scientists of the mid-twentieth
century—were such ‘ascending’. As the ‘supermen’, scientists discovered new knowledge and
they were placed in an enviable position in society—as the torchbearers holding the light to the
future. As we know, and as Oliphant complained about in his ‘Science and Mankind’ lecture, the
dark potential of atomic science was revealed.4 Societies, he declared, were forced to choose
between moral and immoral use of science. Scientists had to make similar judgements.
Science is the enterprise of rationally minded people. It is a pursuit of logical reasoning
and disciplined methods of experimentation or mathematical proof. Through its history, science
has contested religious and social dogma and has been a bastion of free thought. Charles Thorpe
argued that ‘experimental philosophy’ before the twentieth century was ‘recommended by its
practitioners as a means of securing assent without recourse to coercion or violent conflict’.5
The tension in the applications of science and engineering is perhaps most evident in war. In the
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twentieth century, for example, war-time science was used to apply the previous century’s
breakthroughs in chemistry to explosives and gases of astonishing power to destroy and kill;
while it was also used to create anaesthetic and penicillin, which eased suffering. Yet before
World War Two, the path of atomic science was trodden by peaceful people in free-thinking
academia, in which open discourse had transcended notions of nationalism. But from 1939, and
with the intervention of the state, science became secretive and powerful.
The morality of any weapon can be called into question. Oliphant, himself, recognised
this, and argued that ‘impersonal killing by remote control…makes of modern war the most
degrading activity of man’.6 Oliphant spoke proudly of what the Manhattan Project7 achieved
though, like many other atomic scientists, publicly questioned the morality of atomic weaponry
after Hiroshima. Despite being unwavering in their pursuit of revealing the secrets of the atom
and atomic energy, the Manhattan Project scientists had to wrestle with the morality of their
work: the development of a bomb that could destroy humanity. The creation of the first
weapon of mass destruction played out as a paradoxical dilemma in which science held both the
possibility of destruction and also the promise of a better future.
In considering the utility of science in both war and industry, the German philosopher
and sociologist, Max Weber, wrote his essay Science as a Vocation in 1919.8 Weber argued that
science, through early history, had a purpose that was driven firstly towards utility:
Hellenic antiquity, mathematical experiments were made for the
purposes of war; and in the middle-ages for the purposes of mining.
But to raise the experiment to a principle of research was the
achievement of the Renaissance.9
As Weber suggested, due to the Renaissance, science became like art in which nature’s
knowledge was developed purely for the sake of the esoteric and the aesthetic. Weber viewed
how science, and as such how scientists, had developed an awkward relationship with utilitarian
vocation. This view of non-utilitarian science was echoed by the sociologist Robert Merton.10
Yet it was seemingly some post-Renaissance and pre-war pure scientists, with an open view on
knowledge, who readily stepped out of academia and into the secret conclave to forge the
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atomic bomb.
Much of the literature regarding the moral philosophy of the Manhattan Project has
focussed on Oppenheimer, including his tension-riddled career after the war’s end.11 Charles
Thorpe, in a 2004 essay for Theory, Culture and Society,12 for example, traced Oppenheimer’s
position in violence and science, seeing the relevance of Weber’s essay.13 Thorpe wrote that ‘an
adequate formulation of responsibility has to go beyond vocation to encompass a deeper ethical
commitment based the empathic experience of interdependence and shared humanity’.
Thorpe’s suggestion is clear: scientists can separate their work (vocation) from their ethical
questions and are, after all, still a member of society and as such have a similar moral topology
to ordinary citizens.
Oppenheimer was an eccentric character. He famously recited the Hindu scripture ‘I
am become Death, the destroyer of worlds’ after witnessing the first atomic test explosion.14
This lyrical polymath was able to write Sanskrit and poetry,15 as well as quantum mechanics. It is
hardly surprising that he was perceived as the quintessential scientific beatnik of the postwar
world, espousing moral philosophy when potential apocalypse loomed. Thorpe and Steven
Shapin, on writing about Oppenheimer’s charismatic leadership at Los Alamos, saw the heroism
of the age being exemplified both by Oppenheimer and his vast team:
The final judgement of history on the matter has yet to be rendered
but, as things presently stand, that judgement has undoubtedly been
affected by the volubility of Los Alamos’s scientific inhabitants; the
public eminence to which they—and especially the physicists—rose
after Hiroshima; the general individualism of our culture (if not its
academic sociological sector) and its receptiveness to heroicallyindividualistic stories; and the sensibilities held in common between
academic scientists and academic historians.16

In a 1949 article Oppenheimer sought to place the atomic bomb in the context of history and
affairs of the state.17 He argued, similarly to Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘big stick diplomacy’,18 that
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atomic bombs are best used for coercion, rather than destruction.19 However, scientists could
not absolve themselves entirely of their responsibility in bringing forth such power. Atomic
scientists of the 1930s and 1940s had stepped progressively towards the bomb and even lobbied
their governments to fund its development. There are few excuses to defend the unleashing of
such a weapon, other than the prospect of an arms race with the Nazis.
Joseph Rotblat, one of the British mission to the Manhattan Project, was working with
James Chadwick at Liverpool as the war started. Rotblat held the reputation of being the only
scientist to voluntarily resign from the Manhattan Project on moral grounds.20 Lucy Veys, in her
work on Rotblat, suggested that many scientists felt compelled to progress atomic weaponry,
despite its potentially horrific outcomes. She argued that each, to a varying degree, held moral
concerns about their work.21
This chapter examines the motivations to build and use the bomb, and the moral
dilemmas faced by such scientists as Oliphant. His contribution to the atomic bombs that killed
so many in Japan and his peaceful disposition undoubtedly generated his own internal torment.
Yet we can also make comparisons between Oliphant and other scientists, such as
Oppenheimer, who also struggled with the implications of his contribution to atomic weaponry.
These dilemmas become a chassis on which the postwar interaction of science and government
can be understood, including the postwar scientific peace movement in which Oliphant placed
himself. It is entirely possible that scientists, like much of the rest of the civilian population,
entered the war voluntarily, and out of a combination of national loyalty and a fear of being
overrun by the enemy. Whilst this is both noble and plausible, it is does not necessarily explain
the contemplation of such a carnage-misery-wreaking weapon that is peculiar in its theoretical
scientific invention. Strikingly, national loyalties, in the case of the Manhattan Project, led to an
international project, as it was perceived that interests of individual states were best advanced
through collaboration. Further, American scientists pressed to start the project even before
their country had entered the war.22 This suggests that an alternative interpretation may be
read: that the involvement of Manhattan Project scientists was driven by motivations other than
war-time national loyalty—that it was as much, if not more so, for the pursuit of science, itself.
In order to understand the motivation of scientists I use this chapter to review the
scientific reward system. Drawing upon aspects of the sociology of science, I argue that the
usual scientific reward system was suspended during the war, and thus scientists were drawn
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into the atomic bomb project as means to continue to advance their scientific research. In
addition, I review the social and organisational structures of the Manhattan Project to assess
whether they served to assist in disconnecting (or connecting) scientists from the wider moral
implications of their work. By analysing the changing role of science in war it is possible to
evaluate scientists’ motivations, both as individuals and within a social and/or professional
network. These motivations provide clues to understand the juxtaposition of peaceful people in
war. Indeed, atomic scientists have been portrayed with a macabre ghoulishness and others
have compared them to literary figures such as Faust and Frankenstein.23 Perhaps, by seeing
Faust and Frankenstein’s thirst for knowledge through the lens of the scientist we can better
understand their desire to create destructive weaponry. Greater questions are, however,
raised, such as whether scientists have the resolve and moral obligation to curtail scientific
progress, even if it may result in technology capable of inflicting harm to humanity?

The Nazi arms race: scientists’ early motivations to build a bomb
Minutes from early MAUD committee meetings indicate that the most important motivating
factor of Britain’s hunt for an atomic bomb was its weapons race with Nazi Germany.24 The
survival of Britain—even of Europe—was thought to be at stake. The Germans had the brain
power and the raw materials to build an atomic bomb. The extended logic of wartime defence
was that, if the Nazis were working on an atomic bomb, then so should Britain. A certain fear
would have gripped Oliphant and the rest of the MAUD Committee that, in 1940, they were
already lagging behind progress made by German scientists. Through the Blitz of 1940 and the
Battle of Britain, the British only just retained their tenuous grasp on independence as their
vulnerability to attack from the air became self-evident. If Hitler had a bomb capable of
destroying an entire fleet, obliterating a whole army base, or even levelling a city such as
London, then it would surely hand him the rule of Europe.
It is a platitude to suggest American scientists had the same excuse. On 6 December
1941, when American scientists decided to proceed with the bomb project, the country was not
yet at war.25 American atomic research had, up until the autumn of 1941, wandered almost
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aimlessly between numerous university laboratories working on theory and experimentation of
fission, with little attention to the fanciful and almost science fiction-like concept of a super
bomb.26 The sage were content in their natural philosophy for the sake of science and would
not have considered themselves likely to become armourers of war.27 The day after the decision
was taken to advance towards an atomic weapon, the United States’ Pacific fleet was attacked
at Pearl Harbor.28 On 8 December 1941 the United States declared war on Japan. Three days
later, Germany honoured its pact with Japan and declared war on the United States. It is little
wonder that the history of these days became intertwined with that of the start of the
Manhattan Project.29 But as Oppenheimer confirmed in his interview with Stephane Groueff in
1965, the decision to build a bomb was made before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and therefore
before the United States had officially entered the war.30 Yet even though late to the war, the
American government was still preparing for its inevitability. So as Oppenheimer found
Oliphant’s idea to be compelling—‘whichever nation is first to succeed in this quest will
undoubtedly be master of the world’31—the United States government was perhaps already
receptive to the inventiveness and application of science to the military.
The morality of wartime atomic science leads us to an uncomfortable question: what
causes peaceful individuals to become aggressors, capable of inflicting harm? In the 1990s a
debate raged within Holocaust histories, questioning why ‘ordinary’ people committed violent
acts. Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen argued different positions why ordinary
Germans inflicted heinous atrocities.32 Browning believed that obedience is inherent in all
people and in certain circumstances they will do what they are told, no matter what it is. 33 He
took, as an example, a psychoanalytical model presented by Stanley Milgram, who found that,
when placed in a group setting and subject to orders, people experienced a suspension of moral
beliefs—even if it meant they become cruel and violent.34 Goldhagen, on the other hand, argued
26
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that Aryan-Germanic society had a deep cultural anti-Semitism born through centuries of
hatred. This racism was brought from the sub-conscious by Hitler’s rhetoric: so, he argued, it
became clear that ‘ordinary Germans’ were, in fact, already prepared to kill.35
The Holocaust debate may inform our understandings of scientific motivation for
engagement in the Manhattan Project. The model presented by Browning and Milgram to
explain wartime atrocities may help explain the engagement of scientists within the Manhattan
Project: that they participated in a weapon of mass destruction program, because it had become
a normalised response to do so. Some scientists agreed to join the project knowing only that it
had a wartime military application; they did not realise what the project was for until they
reached Los Alamos.36 Yet other than Rotblat, no scientist is reported to have resigned their
commission on moral grounds, even when the project’s purpose became clear.37 Furthermore,
before the war a disproportionately high number of physicists that filled Europe’s university
laboratories were Jewish, and some had sharply felt the sting of anti-Semitism.38 Leo Szilard,
Eugene Wigner, Enrico Fermi, Edward Teller, Otto Frisch, and Hans Bethe were all refugee
physicists who had fled anti-Semitic persecution in Europe, and were involved in the early
research of the atomic bomb. Whilst sanctuary was provided in Allied countries, they each
would have held grave fears for their own peoples in Nazi-occupied Europe. Some nonrefugees, such as Oppenheimer, were also Jewish. It might be argued that, as Jewish people,
they were already at war with Hitler—regardless of the status of the United States or its allies.39
So perhaps for reasons of history and culture, in a similar argument to Goldhagen’s, some may
have felt compelled to engage in weapons research in order to counter the threat of Hitler’s
cultural ideologues.40 Yet many other non-Jewish scientists also engaged in the Manhattan
Project, so perhaps it more relevant to delve deeper into what motivates and rewards scientists
in their pursuit of knowledge.
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The Scientific Reward System
In times of peace, many scientists pursue their craft of natural philosophy simply to advance
their knowledge and that of humankind.41 Each generation carries the torch and follows a long
line of scientists before them. It is the duty of a scientist to pass on knowledge to the next
generation.42
On University campuses the rewards of discovery are rarely material—it can be
considered crass to operate that way.43 The invention of the cavity magnetron in Oliphant’s
Birmingham laboratory provides us with such an example. The cavity magnetron has the ability
to generate high-energy short-wavelength radio waves. In World War Two, its invention enabled
the British to develop superior radar, and thus gave an advantage in the protection of Britain
from the Luftwaffe. After the war, the cavity magnetron was soon replaced in radar by more
advanced technology.44 The cavity magnetron soon became freely available for use in civilian
ventures. Now, in the twenty-first century, most households have a cavity magnetron in their
kitchen—inside the microwave oven. If Oliphant’s team or the University of Birmingham had
received a small royalty from the magnetron, they could have made millions. The discovery of
nuclear fission 1939 is now used to generate a significant proportion of the world’s electricity.
Yet knowledge about fission was passed into the public world for publication within days of its
discovery.45 It is true that some engineers, scientists and/or universities may dream of an
invention that will make them rich, yet many scientists pursue their craft for the reward of
knowledge.
Sociologists such as Joseph Ben-David and Teresa Sullivan have analysed how scientific
academic reward systems are structured.46 For university scientists the reward system is based
on the security of tenure and sufficient resources to carry out their research. Many forego the
lure of large industry salaries in order to remain in the free-thinking academic world. In order to
demonstrate advancement, publication is required in peer-reviewed journals. If an academic’s
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work is combined with an element of chutzpah, external endowment can also be sourced.47
Publishing is the pillar of protection for a scientist’s intellectual property and serves to recognise
the scientist responsible for a new theory rather than to commercialise the outcome.48 BenDavid and Sullivan, in analysing earlier work by Merton, noted that:
The proper recognition of discovery is a necessary condition for the
maintenance of communality since, without recognition, scientists
could not defend their intellectual property. There would be no
incentive to publish and science would not be maintained as an
institutionalized public activity.49
Hence publication and recognition by peers drives a powerful boost to the ego, and that remains
a requirement for social interactions in science.50 Scientific prizes such as the Nobel Prize further
provide rewards of prestige but also deliver considerable monetary prizes. Some scientists, who
receive funded prizes, do not spend it on themselves, but use it to endow their department’s
work.51 The ultimate recognition, beyond even becoming a Nobel Laureate, is to have a theory
eponymously named after the discoverer and thus forever places one’s name in immortality.52
In times of war, however, it may be necessary to suspend conferences and limit
scientific publications—due to security and secrecy provisions. The publication of the
breakthrough of fission occurred in the same year as war broke out in Europe. With knowledge
that the atom may have utility in war, it appears that publication of fission experiments was
suspended. This was, in essence, a suspension of the scientific reward system. Some scientists
could, however, remain in their universities for the duration of the war and work on nonutilitarian projects.
Research scientists in Britain and the United States during World War Two were exempt
from military service. This was a decades-old policy that had been prompted by Ernest
Rutherford, who had forwarded his ‘Memorandum on the utilization of the services of scientific
men during the period of the war’ to both the British and American governments in 1917.53
Rutherford’s appeal to the polity was in direct response to the death of Henry Moseley, one of
his most promising Manchester students. Moseley discovered x-ray diffraction and populated
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large gaps in the periodic table of elements. He was killed, aged 27, at Gallipoli in 1915.54 Yet this
caused its own problems. The Manhattan Project scientists were not in uniform—they were
civilians, and were hence free to join the project and free to leave at any stage. The Manhattan
Project, though, was one of the largest scientific efforts ever, and it was therefore an easy
decision for many scientists to leave the university system for it. The Manhattan Project, after
all, afforded vast budgets and the ability to collaborate with some of the brightest minds of age.
Engagement in the project was enticing in its own right, and provided sufficient reward to
replace the usual scientific reward system.

Manhattan Project structure: the first of big science
Though the Manhattan Project was a military project, it had an unusual interaction with civilians
and private enterprise. The highest non-military committee in the chain of command was the
Combined Policy Committee established under the Quebec Agreement. American committee
representatives included Vannevar Bush and James Conant.55 Both Bush and Conant had strong
engineering, physics and chemistry backgrounds and had been previously involved in the
National Defense Research Council’s Uranium Committee.56 The Combined Policy Committee
reported directly to Henry Stimson, the secretary of war, and President Roosevelt. General Leslie
Groves, being the highest-ranking military officer on the project, also reported to Stimson.
Reporting to Groves were the various military divisions and scientific groups. Oppenheimer was
the head of the weapons program and the theoretical groups and was stationed at Los Alamos.
Other scientific leaders included Ernest Lawrence, who was in charge of the experimental
investigations for the electromagnetic method for uranium separation at Berkeley. This work
was converted from the laboratory to the large industrial scale at Oak Ridge in Tennessee.
Arthur Compton headed the Metallurgical Laboratory at Chicago; he directed Enrico Fermi and,
ultimately, the Hanford Reactor in Washington state for the separation of plutonium. Harold
Urey, at Columbia University, directed research into gaseous and thermal diffusion isotope
separation.57 James Chadwick oversaw the whole British mission and directed the resources to
where they best fitted. The leadership structure of the project was relatively flat and Oliphant,
54
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Figure 24 'Small-world network map of the scientific parts of Manhattan Project (simplified)', illustration by
Darren Holden.

for example, from a technical perspective worked alongside Lawrence, but he also reported to
Chadwick as the head of the British mission. In addition, Oliphant had a direct line of
communication to General Groves.58
The United States Army Corp of Engineers and private enterprise built the large-scale
industrial complexes as the scientists were still working on the immense theoretical problems.
This meant that the scientists, for the first time in history, had large-scale industry as their
laboratory. As Michael Hiltzik stated, the Manhattan Project was the birth of the military
industrial complex.59 Groves instigated a strict policy that dictated how each group, or
compartment, of scientists could interact with other teams. Only a select few could
communicate between the various groups. This compartmentalisation policy was designed by
Groves to act predominantly as a security measure.60 However, it also forced scientists to apply
themselves to a specific task only. The combination of the large-scale industrial equivalent of the
laboratory, combined with multi-disciplined teams working on specific aspects of a problem
gave birth to a modus operandi now referred to as ‘Big Science’.61 As shown in Figure 24 the
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structure resulted in geographically dispersed groups that interacted through dictated and
formal channels. Within each group, however, the communication flowed more freely. By mid1945, as each component was completed, the technology converged on Los Alamos for
construction of the atomic bomb.
Compartmentalisation also prevented scientists from interacting with the wider political
and military committees that surrounded the Manhattan Project. As such, scientists were
separated from much of the discussion on the broader implications of the use of the bomb. The
concept of cognitive dissonance is useful here. This psychological state, first described by Leon
Festinger in 1957, allows an individual to separate their actions and environment from their
moral views.62 Joanna Bourke, in describing weapons scientists in general, showed that: ‘the
disconnect between the white-coated scientists working in prestigious laboratories and their
‘outputs’ (weapons designed to harm others) is compounded by the obvious pleasure they take
in their work’.63 The compartmentalisation policies, which focused scientists on discrete and
specific tasks, perhaps also enabled such cognitive dissonance.
Many of the scientific leaders of the Manhattan Project would have known each other
due to their previous work. It is likely that several of them, just like Oliphant and Lawrence, had
communicated previously as members of invisible colleges. I have already made note of how
close Oliphant and Lawrence were in age (see Chapter Two) and in 1943, when they assumed
very senior and leading roles on the Manhattan Project, they were just 41 years old. The
project’s other leaders were aged similarly: Cockcroft was 43, Fermi was 41, Oppenheimer was
38, Frisch was 38, Teller was 36, Peierls was 36, and Bethe was 34. Of the scientific section
leaders and heads, only Chadwick and Compton were aged in their 50s. Of the leading members
of the Manhattan Project there were only two that had attended the 1927 Solvay conference
(Compton and Chadwick) but five who were at the 1933 Solvay conference (Chadwick, Fermi,
Peierls, Cockcroft, and Lawrence).64 The old-guard of Bohr and Einstein did not meaningfully
contribute to the Manhattan Project, even though they had sought and found sanctuary in
Britain and the United States. Perhaps, then, to view the Manhattan Project through a
sociological lens—as a long conference with the Allied world’s greatest minds at the peak of
their careers—allows the interpretation that scientists could indulge themselves without
needing to acknowledge the implications of their work.

62

Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, Ill Row Peterson, 1957).
Joanna Bourke, "Theorizing Ballistics: Ethics, Emotions and Weapons Scientists," History and Theory 56,
no. 4 (2017).
64
Refer Chapter Two.
63

236

Moral dilemmas and atomic science

Frankenstein and Faust: They came for the science and stayed for the party
This thirst for knowledge, regardless of its outcomes, is hardly unique to the twentieth century.
Mary Shelley, for example, explored such complex ethical and ideological questions of scientific
research in her classic nineteenth-century novel, Frankenstein: or, the Modern Prometheus. It
has particular resonances with the Manhattan project. Hans Bethe, the theoretical division head
at Los Alamos said, ‘you may well ask why people with a kind heart and humanist feelings,
would go and work on weapons of mass destruction’.65 Yet Bethe’s impression of kind-hearted
atomic scientists differs somewhat to popular tropes. The scientists of the atomic bomb are
sometimes portrayed as the crazed and eccentric savants who carelessly brought the potential
of self-destruction to the human race.66 Add to that a smattering of a European accent,67 such as
those of Bethe, Szilard, or Teller,68 and they can be possibly cast as twentieth-century
Frankensteins. Indeed, several commentators have compared atomic scientists to Shelley’s
remorseful Victor Frankenstein and his quest to tame the beast of his careless creation.69 In
addition, within the pages of the novel, first published in 1818, we see other clues to
Frankenstein’s motivations that bear some relevance to modern scientists. Shelley wrote
Frankenstein at a time when science was starting its divergence from the Renaissance innocence
of natural philosophy focused on the aesthetic70 towards technological manipulation of the
natural world. Shelley referenced, for example, Isaac Newton whose work was only about a
century old at the time:
Sir Isaac Newton is said to have avowed he felt like a child picking up
shells beside the great and unexplored ocean of truth….
The untaught peasants beheld the elements around him and was
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acquainted with their practical uses.
The most learned philosopher knew little more. He had partially
unveiled the face of Nature, but her immoral lineaments were still a
wonder and a mystery. He might dissect, anatomise, and give names;
but, not to speak of a final cause, causes in their secondary and
tertiary grades were utterly unknown to him. I had gazed upon the
fortifications and impediments that seemed to keep human beings
from entering the citadel of nature….71

The ‘secondary and tertiary grades’ that were unknown to Newton possibly relate to the steps
from the observation of nature, to the ability to manipulate nature. To observe and describe
nature from the outside was the role of the Renaissance natural philosophers. But to delve
deeper and to break into the ‘citadel of nature’ was something that became more apparent over
time. Newton’s laws described how nature operated, whereas the rise of chemistry in the
nineteenth century started to isolate substances not found in nature and mixed them together
to make new artificial substances. An analogy to this, in the atomic age, would be Rutherford’s
deduction of the structure of the atom in 190972 as the ‘primary grade’. The use of the atomic
structure in creating artificial radiation by Fermi et al in 1934;73 the transmutation of hydrogen
isotopes (nuclear fusion) by Oliphant et al also in 1934;74 and the discovery of nuclear fission in
1939 are ‘secondary grade’.75 The application of fission to atomic weaponry was, perhaps, the
‘tertiary grade’. Using Victor Frankenstein’s motivations, achieving ‘tertiary’ grade—to
manipulate nature for the use of people—is perhaps an ultimate goal of science. And to be
credited with such discovery brought fame beyond material gains. ‘Wealth was an inferior
object,’ wrote Shelley, ‘but what glory would attend discovery.’76
Perhaps, the motivations of Victor Frankenstein can be seen as prescient to those of the
atomic scientists, in which the goal was to delve deeper into what was, at that point, possible
and to tame nature for use by humankind. There are striking parallels. Frankenstein, for
instance, did not experience remorse or regret until after his science had created a monster. As
the novel’s subtitle suggests, Shelley’s Frankenstein is understood with reference to the Greek
hero, Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods and provided it for the use of humanity.77 Zeus
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was angered and believed that mortals should not have access to such power. Prometheus, in
Greek tales, was then caught and punished with eternal torment for his theft. Similarly, atomic
scientists have been portrayed as being tormented by the ghosts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.78
Others have made similar comparisons to atomic scientists of the twentieth century and
Prometheus. For example, Martin Sherwin and Kai Bird in the title of their biography of
Oppenheimer, American Prometheus, use this tragic hero and his sacrifice for humankind, to
evoke something of Oppenheimer’s history.79 In the original Prometheus story, Zeus also
punished the human race, for willingly receiving the stolen fire. Zeus placed Pandora, the
epitome of beauty, upon the earth and gave her a box, but she was told not to open it. Curiosity
overcame her, she opened the box and let out great ills upon the world. Perhaps, if
Oppenheimer is Prometheus, then Pandora could be parallel to the beauty of nature and the
curiosity of scientists. To explore the unknown world of atomic science was irresistible. But
trying to close the box quickly, as Pandora and the scientists attempted to do, could still not
prevent the unleashing of the menace.
As well as Frankenstein and Prometheus, we also see another cultural and literary trope
being used to illustrate the morality and motivations of knowledge-hungry scientists. The term a
‘Faustian Bargain’, for example, has been regularly used to describe scientists’ motivations to
work on the bomb.80 Kathryn Keeble, in her 2013 publication in Double Dialogues, framed the
Faustian Bargain in discussing theatrical portrayals of the scientist as a tragic figure.81 Keeble
also wrote:
Arguably the most well-known, Bertolt Brecht’s Life of Galileo,
transformed through re-envisioning in 1938, 1947 and 1957,
emphasises the historical, political and social relationship of the
scientist to society. The nuclear scientists in the race to the atomic
bomb as symbolised by Brecht’s Galileo, were to blame for bringing
the world to its apocalyptic midnight.82

In picking apart the term ‘Faustian Bargain’, we find the historic figure of the German
Renaissance, Doctor Faust—an alchemist and necromancer popularly dramatized by Johann
Wolfgang Goethe.83 Faust, in exchange for unlimited knowledge on earth, bequeaths his post-
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mortem soul to the devil. A Faustian Bargain refers to this satanic pact in which the moral
conscience of the individual is put to one side in exchange for short term material or intellectual
gain.
The allusion to Faust is, however, not just a product of postwar analyses of scientific
motivations. Indeed, there are earlier references made of Faust by scientists themselves. In
1932, Niels Bohr, for example, hosted a quorum of theoretical physicists in Copenhagen to
debate quantum mechanics. Gino Segrè, the son of the Italian Manhattan Project scientist Emilio
Segrè, wrote of the meeting in Copenhagen at which a group of scientists closed their session by
performing a comedic parody of Goethe’s Faust.84 In the scientist’s own interpretation, God was
personified by the wisdom of Bohr. Mephistopheles (the devil) was portrayed by the strange
and obsessed Wolfgang Pauli. Paul Ehrenfest was a man of deep personal anguish and was
haunted by a struggle for recognition in the shadow of his close friend Einstein, and as a result
was portrayed as the Faust of the parody.85 At the 1932 Copenhagen meeting, a central theme
of the Faustian Bargain was played out. The scientists were obsessed in finding true meaning in
the bizarre contradictions of quantum mechanics and would give just about anything, including
their souls, for the reward of knowledge. This was seven years before the discovery of fission
and those at the Copenhagen meeting may not have foreseen the future irony that their parody
presented.
After the war, Oppenheimer’s lyrical recollections of the devilish incarnations, taken
from Sanskrit scriptures, served to fortify his portrayals as the archetype of the scientist with a
tortured soul.86 To a degree, he is the epitome of the tragic atomic scientists and is possibly
portrayed in popular culture as the closest to Doctor Faustus.87 Oppenheimer, however, was not
necessarily putting his morals to one side by entering the bomb project. As was common with
many intellectuals on campuses in the 1930s, Oppenheimer was a leftist academic and held firm
views that were distinctly anti-fascist.88 Gregg Herken similarly defends scientists from the
selfish aims of a Faustian Bargain, when he quoted the physicist Isador Isaac Rabi:
Those who compare the making of the atomic bomb to a Faustian
bargain, physicist I.I. Rabi used to say, have never read Faust. What
Rabi likely meant was that those who worked to stop an evil, worldthreatening dictatorship by building the first weapon of mass
destruction were not scientists who sold their souls to the Devil. But
there can be no question that the prestige of physicists, and that of
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Figure 25 Jazan Wild and Jonathan Elias, 'Atomic Dreams- the Lost Journal of J. Robert Oppenheimer'. Courtesy
of Carnival Comics, 2009

scientists generally, was elevated by invention of the Bomb; in its
aftermath, some of those who worked on the weapon would be
invited to sit at power's high table in Washington.89
Herken, while attempting to defend scientists, did indeed outline the accolades and prestige
that scientists received after the war. The writings of Shelley and Goethe attempted to make
the reader pity the remorseful Frankenstein and Faust respectively. But can we fully understand
whether it was only the receipt of knowledge that kept scientists on the Manhattan Project, or
were there other indulgences?
On the Manhattan Project scientists were offered truly an outstanding opportunity—to
advance a brand new field of science that was previously considered fantastical alchemy. What
could be more of a utopia for scientists? They were insulated from the violence of war, in a
three year long conference of gathered international intelligentsia. The Manhattan Project was
attended by no less than seven Nobel laureates, and a further 25 scientists that would gain the
knowledge to go on to win one for themselves after the war.90 Yet were scientists’ motivations
driven purely by the pursuit of knowledge? The closed sites (Los Alamos, Oak Ridge and
Hanford), in particular, were operated with a commune like atmosphere. Inside the security gate
existed a social idyll of apparent bliss. With every resident somehow related to the project there
was a commonality that enhanced the social experience. Parties were held where new cocktails
involving laboratory grade alcohol were invented; musical and comedic theatre troupes were
formed; and on the weekend there was horse riding, hunting, hiking and skiing.91 Furthermore,
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the division, department and group heads were in their late 30s to 40s, at the peak of their
careers, and many team members were even younger. This added considerably to the social life,
joie de vivre and a fine spirit of camaraderie. By 1943 Los Alamos had a baby boom and the
crèche was overflowing.92 This commonality and sociality would have further fostered the intercommunication on scientific matters, and those that had permission to peer into the next
compartment would have been tempted to use their exclusive knowledge as currency amongst
the redundancy of knowledge within a compartment itself.93 Needless to say, the
compartmentalisation of the work did not apply to social life.
The combination of extreme science, insulated environment, spirit of collaboration, and
vibrant social life, of young scientists at the peak of their careers, meant that the Manhattan
Project was, simply, a good time.94 Whether the project had the goal to beat the Nazis and
deliver a weapon of violence seemed to matter little to the scientists on a daily basis. Indeed the
invisible colleges forged before the war were cemented and new friendships enable further
collaboration after the war. This intertwining of the sociology of science with the sociality of
scientists likely kept scientists engaged on the Manhattan Project—they came for the science
and stayed for the party.

Oliphant and the moral sacrifice for a greater good?
Where can we place Oliphant’s own pacifism among the moral questions of the Manhattan
Project? Certainly his motivations were, seemingly, to advance science, and he was even
prepared to bypass rules and secrecy provisions in order to do so. To achieve these aims and
protect postwar science he was even prepared to forego the vast resources available in the
United States with his attempted rebellion and repatriation of British scientists in 1944.95 So
whilst we can readily place him as a vociferous contributor to messages of peace in the 1950s,
can we trace this postwar regret to an event or a moment of enlightenment in the closing
months of the war?
‘On 6 August’, wrote Cockburn and Ellyard, when Oliphant heard the news from Japan,
‘He could hardly believe the early reports of the incineration of Hiroshima by the first atomic
bomb attack, for he had not really come to grips that a civilised and reputedly Christian nation
was capable of such a deed.’96 This interpretation of Oliphant’s post-Hiroshima shock is
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consistent with how many of his family and friends recall his view on his own role in the
Manhattan Project—that he did not really believe that such a horrible weapon would be used.97
Archival records, however, suggest an alternative interpretation. Oliphant seemed acutely
aware of the potential use of the weapon, as evidenced in his letter to Lawrence in January
1945: ‘the military weapon is nearer than I had dared to hope’.98 In March 1945 Oliphant’s
contribution to the Manhattan Project was largely complete. His work with Lawrence on the
electromagnetic method had been a monumental scientific struggle full, at times, of
technological difficulties and self-doubt.99 As he was getting ready to leave the project on 16
March 1945, he wrote a letter of gratitude to Lawrence:
There is no doubt we have been associated with a birth of a new
industry. This is not a passing phase in the intensive development of a
new military weapon but a permanent contribution to science and
technology of the future. It will not be long before we demonstrate the
first fruits of our labours. Although war has brought the opportunity to
do these things, and although the immediate results will be
incalculable destruction, we know that the in the ultimate analysis this
aspect will be overshadowed by the benefits wrought for mankind.
Mutual respect and understanding have always characterised scientific
men, for the literature of science is the first real world language.100

Oliphant realised that war had brought immense opportunity to the scientists, even though the
‘immediate results will be incalculable destruction’. He possibly saw, in this moment of scientific
triumph, the power of what they had achieved and the imminent threat it presented. Yet to
Oliphant, the creation of the weapon and the inevitability of its use was a sacrifice made for
knowledge: ‘incalculable destruction…will be overshadowed by the benefits wrought for
mankind’. This also draws allusion to Faust and the Faustian Bargain. In Goethe’s work, Faust’s
first thought was to use his new powers to access forbidden knowledge, but eventually his
thoughts turned to political power. Faust did, however, resist megalomania and saw that his
new powers could be used for the greater-good of society.101 Faust presents a humanist and
egalitarian benefit of individual power, and Oliphant’s closing remarks in the 16 March 1945
letter to Lawrence are similar. Oliphant’s words hold a great hope for the future of the new
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knowledge, and the birth of new industry. Even in the darkest hour of science his eternal
optimism was most likely abundant and he hoped that the irrationality and futility of war could
be relegated to history. Oliphant had, however, left the Manhattan Project in early 1945 and
was not witness to the Trinity Test, when the scientists saw an atomic explosion for the first
time. Indeed, the United States government consulted several scientists on whether to deploy
atomic weapons into the Pacific theatre of war, but the ultimate decision rested, of course, with
the president.

Moral questioning and the decision to drop the bomb
On 12 April 1945 Franklin Roosevelt died. On arriving at the White House that evening, the vice
president, Harry Truman, was greeted by Eleanor Roosevelt. He kindly asked the widow, ‘is
there anything we can do for you?’ to which the indomitable Mrs Roosevelt responded, ‘Is there
anything we can do for you? For you are the one in trouble now.’102 Ever since receiving the
letter from Einstein in 1939,103 President Roosevelt stayed close to the developments on the
bomb project. He responded to Oliphant’s visit in 1941 with an offer of help to Churchill,104 and
signed the Quebec Agreement in 1943 that brought in British scientists but also secured some
postwar rights to atomic technology.105 By April 1945, Truman had been vice president for only a
few months and had generally stayed out of the way. He did not even learn of the concept of an
atomic bomb until after Roosevelt had died.106 For several years Roosevelt had been
familiarising himself on the potential of the atom: but for Truman this new technology was a
surprise.107 Given that there were Soviet spies inside the Manhattan Project, it is likely that Josef
Stalin knew more about the atomic bomb than the newly sworn-in Truman.108 Truman promptly
set up an advisory committee simply known as the ‘Interim Committee’ to assess if, where and
when the bomb was to be used. The committee consisted of senior bureaucrats including
Stimson, Bush and Conant as well as military men such as General Groves. In addition, the
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committee had an attached scientific advisory panel that included Oppenheimer, Lawrence,
Fermi and Compton.109
Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945. The principal motivation to build a bomb had
been to beat the Nazis in an atomic arms race; this was no longer relevant. The activity on the
Manhattan Project, however, did not skip a beat.110 The amount of separated and refined
fissionable material was growing daily and a working bomb was near. The years of hard graft,
thousands of computations, problem solving, and millions spent on this grand experiment was
nearly ready to test its ultimate hypothesis. The scientists would have been eager to see the
product of their work and to prove wrong the naysayers in the United States government.
Indeed, as Stimson later wrote, many believed that Roosevelt had been ‘sold a lemon’.111
The scientists were, however, beginning to grow concerned that, should the weapon be
successful and introduced into warfare, the geopolitical power of the world would lose balance.
On 11 June, a cohort of scientists from Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory, led by German Jewish
émigré, James Franck, presented a report to the Interim Committee.112 This was the first
collective caution to the United States government on a postwar arms race and the future
development of much more powerful nuclear devices. The report recommended a remote
demonstration of the atomic bomb to which the United Nations and Japanese leaders were to
be invited. It was a moral stand, in which Japan would be warned of the true scale of disaster
that could now be unleashed. Scientists, alone, understood at this point the ‘staggering’
potential for destruction created by atomic weapons. They then found themselves ‘cognizant of
a grave danger for the safety of this country as well as for the future of all the other nations, of
which the rest of mankind is unaware’. They urged an international agreement on the
prevention of nuclear war, recognising that its outcomes would be both repulsive and divisive.113
Importantly, Franck’s committee recognised the moral imperative of scientists’ own
engagement with research and politics. Their complaints, that scientists ‘have often before
been accused of providing new weapons for the mutual destruction of nations, instead of
improving their well-being’. Scientists of the past, argued Franck,
could disclaim direct responsibility for the use to which mankind had
put their disinterested discoveries. We cannot take the same attitude
now because the success which we have achieved in the development
of nuclear power is fraught with infinitely greater dangers than were
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all the inventions of the past. All of us, familiar with the present state
of nucleonics, live with the vision before our eyes of sudden
destruction visited on our own country, of the Pearl Harbor disaster,
repeated in thousandfold magnification, in every one of our major
cities.114

Ultimately, Franck’s committee urged that the atomic bomb should not be used on Japan.
The report incensed Groves and other members of the Interim Committee when it was
tabled in mid-1945. Before it was later published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 1947,
it had a number of key paragraphs censored.115 As far as the military men were concerned, it
was inappropriate for scientists to meddle in the politics of war. The Interim Committee pushed
the Franck report back to the scientific panel. The scientific panel debated the Franck report’s
ideas including the potential for holding a demonstration to which representatives of the enemy
would be invited. The issues that confronted a potential demonstration included the
embarrassment of the possibility of it not working and the loss of tactical surprise. Furthermore,
whilst the great factories for enriching material were in operation, there was only enough
material for three bombs and one was going to be used on a scientific test. It would be months
before further material was concentrated sufficiently for more bombs. The Interim Committee’s
scientific panel vacillated on the use of the bomb and struggled to reach unanimity on the
whether the bomb would be used against Japanese targets. In the end they felt that the
decisions on this matter should lie with the main Interim Committee. The Interim Committee
concluded that the atomic bomb was a potentially decisive weapon, and hence its use and
expediency in war was a military matter. Upon authority of the president, the army could
prepare to fire at will. As per the terms of the Quebec Agreement, Truman sought the advanced
approval of the British, which was readily granted.116
On 17 July 1945, the day after the Trinity Test, Szilard forwarded a petition signed by 70
scientists from Los Alamos that implored Truman not to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. They
asserted a similar suggestion to the Franck Report and requested that a demonstration of the
power be undertaken before dropping a bomb on an unsuspecting Japanese city.
In view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned, respectfully petition:
first that you exercise your power as Commander-in-chief, to rule that
the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this
114
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war unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been
made public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to
surrender. Second, that in such an event the question whether or not
to use atomic bombs be decided by you in light of the considerations
presented in this petition as well as all the other moral responsibilities
which are involved. 117
Given the timing between the Trinity Test and the Szilard petition, it would seem possible that
Szilard had prepared the petition ahead of the testing of the gadget. But on the early morning of
16 July, in the blinding flash of light and billowing sphere that reached a hundred million
degrees, they saw the horror of the weapon and the terrifying fate that awaited the people of
Japan.
Truman was at Potsdam with Churchill and Stalin when the news on the successful
Trinity Test came through. He was in a triumphant mood with little desire to consider the moral
responsibilities exalted by Szilard and his fellow petitioners. The tension at Potsdam, as Walter
Schoenberger described, was in a large part an outcome of the attempt to remap the borders of
European states. Stalin was already reneging on the earlier Yalta agreements.118 The western
allies such as Britain, France and the United States, had serious concerns that war may have put
down fascism, but allowed the Communists to capture ceded ground and expand their
empire.119 Stalin volunteered his army to assist with also winning the war in Japan, and the
atomic bomb was, as Schoenberger put it, Truman’s ‘ace in the hole’.120 By July 1945 the
Japanese navy and air force were largely neutralised, but their army was still estimated to
number over five million and had demonstrated its ability to fight to the death. Following the
sacrifices required for victory at Okinawa and Iwo Jima,121 the United States estimated a casualty
count of a million American lives in an all-out invasion of the Japanese home islands.122 The use
of Stalin’s forces would have been tempting but would have come also at a cost of further
concessions to Soviet expansionism. On 24 July, at Potsdam, Truman sidled over to Stalin to tell
him that they had a new weapon with enormous power. He inferred that the military
contribution of the Soviet Union was no longer required. Stalin seemed unsurprised, as he likely
already knew about the successful Trinity Test from his spies.123

117

Szilard, "A Petition to the President of the United States Signed by 70 Scientists."
Schoenberger, Decision of Destiny, 232-84.
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid., 238.
121
Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 1939–1946: A History of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, 1, 348.
122
Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb."
123
Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 1939–1946: A History of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, 1.
118

247

Chapter Eight
The Potsdam Declaration was issued to the Japanese government on 26 July 1945. Its
final article read:
We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the
unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide
proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The
alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.124
The Potsdam Declaration was a warning and is possibly not unlike the form recommended by
the Szilard petition and the Franck Report. There was, however, no reference to a new super
weapon and the declaration simply stated that Japan must surrender or suffer ‘prompt and utter
destruction’. The Japanese government chose to ignore the declaration, and likely considered
the ‘prompt and utter destruction’ to be similar to the conventional fire-bombing of Tokyo of
March of that year, which resulted in 100,000 deaths, but had little effect on the Japanese
ability to make war.125 Despite their lack of comment on the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese
were, nevertheless, preparing for surrender. They attempted to broker a peace that saw
protection of their Emperor from war crimes charges. The Emperor is, to the Japanese people,
not just a figurehead or member of royalty—he is divine. The people of Japan could not bear the
thought that their living deity would be put on trial and even executed. In the American psyche,
however, as historian Peter Kirstein noted quoting William Laurence (an observer on the
Hiroshima mission), the Emperor was the one who authorised the destruction of the fleet at
Pearl Harbor and was complicit in such events as the Bataan death march.126
The Japanese reached out to the Soviets to assist with negotiations on the terms of
surrender. The atomic bombs fell on the 6 and 8 August. On the 9 August, the Soviet Union
declared war on Japan and invaded occupied Manchuria. Japan surrendered. The war ended.

Chapter conclusions: post-party regrets, or necessary evil?
It seems that there was not a single cause that enabled scientists to overcome moral complexity
in their pursuit of an atomic bomb. The reasons are varied and nuanced, and individual
participants would have been motivated differently. At the beginning of the war the potential
application of the new field of quantum mechanics and the journey into the atom was esoteric
but exciting research. But with war suspending the scientific reward system, the Manhattan
Project offered an outstanding alternative—to conference with some of the greatest minds of
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the age. Like Frankenstein, as the scientists drank deeper from the well of knowledge they
became even more beguiled by its power. And with allusion to the Faustian Bargain, scientists
were, perhaps, prepared to do anything to attain new knowledge.
The Manhattan Project’s structure, particularly of the closed sites like Los Alamos and
Oak Ridge, saw not only hard work and science, but also an idyllic utopian life driven by a
congregation of people of a similar age and background. Similarly to Oliphant’s experience, for
many scientists the Manhattan Project was a rewarding conference of intellentsia and was
isolated, to a degree, from war.
To create a weapon capable of inflicting such heinous suffering requires a separation of
task from one’s belief system. This ‘cognitive dissonance’ is also a common human trait, which
was made even easier through the compartmentalisation policy on the Manhattan Project.127
Whilst the compartmentalisation policy was often breached by scientists,128 it did also mean that
scientists generally only engaged with one aspect of bomb research, thus preventing them from
contemplating the bigger picture. Only in mid-1945, as all the components started to come
together, scientists could see clearly the product of their work. The weapon became a reality
and, from the utopian environment of the project, there started to appear a dystopian future for
humanity. It was only at this point, that some scientists started to collectively organise
themselves and spoke up against the use of the atomic bomb in the war. The scientists were
troubled by the belief that those who wielded the weapon may not fully grasp the power that
they were being handed.
The protestations of scientists, however, was viewed by the Interim Committee and
Groves as just a late and inappropriate whimper that carelessly escaped the box of
compartmentalisation. The scientists who scrambled to contain the weapon expressed a similar
remorse to that of Victor Frankenstein—once their invention was released they were unable to
regain control. It is only after the scientifically proven hypothesis has been achieved, that the
moral outcomes become real. The scientists had willingly and knowingly entered their alliance
with military and government, had consumed enormous budgets, and soaked up the knowledge
that they desired. Their moral judgement was only exercised right at the very end with an
attempt to warn rather than hinder. None of Franck’s or Szilard’s signatories stepped away from
the project despite protesting against its ultimate use.
Oliphant, unlike Oppenheimer, has not been portrayed as a conflicted and anguished
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anti-hero.129 His association with the atomic bomb, however, is clear.130 Yet, despite his
involvement in the peace movement, he remained proud rather than remorseful of his time at
the Manhattan Project. He concluded that it was not possible to deny a contribution to a
weapon just because it is used in a manner that conflicts with personal approval.131 He was,
however, naïve to assume that the gains of science in war would be utilised in peacetime only
for the greater good. Nevertheless, with World War Two over, Oliphant looked towards the
new-age with great hope and optimism. He believed the carnage at Hiroshima was a historic
sacrifice that would prove to be less significant than the discovery of almost limitless energy.
Oliphant’s optimism, as noted in Chapter Five, fell at the first hurdle as the atomic arms race
was invigorated in the Cold War.
It is overly simple to consider that it was scientists’ remorse—of the part they played in
creating atomic weaponry—that drove them to enter the postwar atomic science peacemovement. Certainly Oliphant was not particularly remorseful, and it seems that other scientists
of the peace movement also looked proudly at what they had achieved in war. So whilst there
are some consistent themes between the atomic scientists and the literary examples presented,
perhaps the regretful and tortured Frankenstein/Faust/Prometheus-like scientist, is a myth.
Even if they hypothesised what was in Pandora’s Box, the naturally curious scientists, like
Pandora herself, could not bear the thought of leaving it closed. It is impossible to uninvent
science, and it is impossible to stop curious people seeking new knowledge. We can, therefore,
see some scientists’ participation in both the atomic bomb project and the peace movement as
not so much of a contradiction after all. These two historic collaborations, indeed, can be
separated. The postwar peace movement rose from scientists wishing to educate governments
on the power of the bomb. In the immediate postwar period, scientists such as Oliphant
campaigned for all atomic secrets to be released. He did this to not enable proliferation, but to
create trust and peace. The secrets were, however, already out and any well-resourced nation
could build a bomb. Thankfully, an atomic bomb has not been used in war since 1945. The
power of coercion, as suggested by Oppenheimer in 1949, has been more powerful than an
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atomic explosion.132
Oliphant stated that ‘it is impersonal killing, by remote control, which makes of modern
war the most degrading activity of man’.133 He was most certainly talking about atomic warfare
and missile technology. In the twenty-first century we have new remote-control weapons such
as unmanned aerial vehicles, popularly known as drones. These robots have further separated
the warrior from the killing. As some authors have suggested, drones have seemingly thrown up
new moral dilemmas of disassociated killing.134 As this chapter has demonstrated, however, the
ability to disassociate oneself from killing is not a novel concept. Nevertheless, it remains as
degrading as Oliphant said it was nearly 50 years ago.
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CHAPTER NINE
Social networks from the ‘Golden Age’ to the ‘Gilded
Age’ of atomic science

The conflict between the totalitarian state and the scientist derives in
part, then, from an incompatibility between the ethic of science and
the new political code which is imposed upon all, irrespective of
occupational creed.1

Before World War Two, atomic scientists were squirreled away in laboratories where they
sought to unveil nature’s secrets, with only a passing regard to its potential functionality. Most
scientists were content in their universities and did not venture out into the world of utility. In
1938 Robert Merton, arguably one of the first sociologists of science, prophetically wrote that
with looming war, scientists would be required to give up their ‘apocryphal toast; to pure
mathematics, and may it never be of any use to anybody’.2 They risked, he argued, losing the
social support of the public. In this way:
The exaltation of pure science is thus seen to be a defence against the
invasion of norms which limit directions of potential advance and
threaten the stability and continuance of scientific research as a valued
social activity. Of course, the technological criterion of scientific
achievement has also a positive social function of science. The
increasing comforts and conveniences deriving from technology and
ultimately from science invite social support of scientific research.
They also testify to the integrity of the scientist, since abstract and
difficult theories which cannot be understood or evaluated by the laity
are presumably proved in a fashion which can be understood by all, i.e.
through their technological applications. Readiness to accept the
authority of science rests, to a considerable extent, upon its daily
demonstration of power. Were it not for such indirect demonstrations,
the continued social support of that science which is intellectually
incomprehensible to the public would hardly be nourished on faith
alone.3
The usefulness of atomic science now surrounds us, and as such we accept its application. The
obvious functions of atomic energy and atomic weapons causes anxiety for some, but serve as a
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defence and power to others. Other applications of the atomic science include x-rays, radiology,
and radiotherapy, which visualise, diagnose and treat medical conditions. Furthermore the new
age of computing is thanks to the development of the transistor and the semiconductor effect
for which William Shockley shared the 1956 Nobel Prize for physics.4 Shockley had met with
Mark Oliphant in 1941 when Oliphant was waving the Frisch-Peierls Memorandum around and
trying to convince the Americans of the feasibility of the bomb.5 In the twenty-first century we
continue to push the boundaries of atomic science and knowledge with, for example, scientists
looking to quantum entanglement, a theory first devised by Werner Heisenberg in the 1920s, for
instant high-speed communications and data storage.6
The contribution of science, and particularly atomic science, surrounds us entirely in the
modern day. This came not only from the breakthroughs of the 1920s and 1930s, but also from
the mode in which scientists operate. Michael Hiltzik described the Manhattan Project as the
first example of ‘big science’. A big science project illustrates what can be achieved when
scientists are given a substantial budget, are isolated in large multi-disciplined groups beyond
the previous scale of universities, and focused on specific tasks or even singular goals.7 This view
is echoed by others including Gian Francesco Giudice who documented the international effort
for the large hadron collider (a variation of the synchrotron pioneered by Oliphant), which is
housed in a giant loop beneath the border mountains of France and Switzerland.8
This chapter examines how the social interaction of scientists varied from the 1930s to
the 1950s. I argue that, during the tumultuous 1930s, the scientific social networks responded
to the increased influence of the state by forming latent and less formalised structures. I also
demonstrate that war-time experiences influenced the structure of postwar scientific
collaborations and networks. The small-world network maps first presented in Chapters Two,
Three, Four and Eight are re-presented in this chapter, and are compared to a series of known
network models to establish the efficiency of this form of mapping to demonstrate knowledge
transfer. This chapter intentionally leaves Oliphant’s history and instead focuses on the informal
structures of science and compares it to more organised scientific endeavour such as the
military-industrial complex, which had an increased influence in the Cold War. In testing the
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practice of small-world network mapping, this chapter determines that the methodology
provides a meaningful tool for historical research and that it reveals, in our case, valuable new
understandings of mid-century atomic science.

Changing pattern of social interaction in science
Nick Crossley, who referenced the work of Duncan Watts and Laszlo Barabási, presented two
small-world models that show different structures.9 The first model (Figure 26) shows a formal
structure where information is shared only via key hubs. This model represents a formally
organised network and, as explained in the caption of Figure 26, is less efficient at the
transferral of knowledge than the second model. The second model is the Watts’ Clumps and
Weak Ties model which shows that all information is automatically shared within a group
(clump) and hence flows readily to other groups via the weak ties. This second model is less
formal (less hierarchical) and more efficient than the Barabási model.
The 1927 Solvay Conference was dominated by the brightest, but aging minds of the
early atomic age. The 1933 Solvay Conference on physics saw a gathering of some of the old
guard of the various European national traditions, including Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr, Erwin
Schrödinger, and Marie Curie. Rutherford was the leader of the British groups with a focus on
experimental physics. Bohr and Schrödinger, a Danish and German respectively, focused on
theoretical and quantum physics, whereas Curie’s French colleagues worked principally on
nuclear chemistry. But at Solvay in 1933 this old guard also brought with them an emerging
generation of scientists. The structure of this network, with the national leaders and their
protégés, appears comparable to the Barabási model10 discussed by Nick Crossley.11 This
Barabási model is illustrative of a formal network where only select hubs control the flow of
information. We can therefore deduce that, when mapping the inter-war scientific colleges, the
leading scientists (as hubs) link to each other, but also to emerging scientists within their
spheres of influence. As I have discussed earlier in the thesis, the connections therefore
transcended national and institutional boundaries initially in a formal way. The leading
individuals, such as Rutherford, having attended previous Solvay Conferences and already
formed relationships with other national scientific leaders, in turn offered two to three degrees
of separation, requiring three or four paths of knowledge, for a junior scientist to the wider

9

Crossley, "Small-World Networks, Complex Systems and Sociology."; Barabasi, Linked: The New Science
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community of science.12 Yet, these scientific leaders operated with a level of dictatorial
authority and controlled the research to create formal channels of collaboration at this time.13

Figure 26 'The Barabasi Model versus the Watts’ Clumps and Weak Ties Model', illustration by Darren
Holden. Underlying images reproduced and modified courtesy of Nick Crossley and the journal Sociology

Figure 27 'The organisation of the invisible college of atomic science in 1933; compared to Barabási Hub
Model', illustration by Darren Holden. Right image reproduced with permission of Nick Crossley and the
journal Sociology

(Refer to Figure 6 in Chapter Two for expanded detail of the left image)
12

Refer Chapter Two.
An example of this is Oliphant’s request to reach out to Lawrence in 1936, which was blocked by
Rutherford. Refer Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, 60.
13
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Figure 28 'Sociological model comparison of the discovery of fission in 1939 and bomb-concepts in 1940/41
compared to the ‘Watts’ Clumps and Weak Ties’', illustration by Darren Holden. Right image reproduced with
permission of Nick Crossley and the journal Sociology.
(Refer Chapter Two and Three for full detail of the images on the left).

After 1933 the links between the universities, particularly with the German schools, started to
deteriorate, despite the best efforts of leading scientists to maintain contact with their
associates. The migration of physicists from the Axis countries, such as Germany and Italy,
particularly to Britain and the United States, meant that when nuclear fission of uranium was
discovered, the knowledge spread not via formal networks (as the Barabási hub model would
suggest), but between clumps of physicists who were forming less-formal invisible colleges.14
Rutherford died in 1937, and thus a key hub in the British network was removed. Hence the
knowledge of fission initially bypassed Britain and went straight from continental Europe to the
United States via physicists such as a Leo Szilard and Niels Bohr who had previously collaborated
in Germany.15 Similarly, when Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls deduced the formulas for an atomic
bomb in 1940, the spread of knowledge required a conduit. It is argued that Oliphant, who had
spent the late 1930s building an invisible college with Lawrence at Berkeley, filled the hub left
vacant on the death of Rutherford and provided pathways of knowledge within his invisible
college to the United States.16 This spread of information bypassed formal channels dictated by
scientific administration and the state. At this point there was a distinct risk of scientific
information also spreading to Germany via the same social networks. When Frisch and Peierls
penned their now famous memorandum in 1940 on the properties of a radioactive super-bomb,

14

Refer Chapter Two.
Refer Chapter Two.
16
Note, this model is of the Solvay Conference in 1933 only, and does not necessarily take into account
colloquiums organised in Cophenhagen by Niels Bohr, for example. Refer Chapter Three.
15
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they knew full well the relevance of their work.17 Jeremy Bernstein, in his 2011 paper on Frisch
and Peierls, argued that the idea came originally from Christian Møller, who was a member of
Bohr’s group in Copenhagen.18 Frisch and Peierls could have hence reached back towards Bohr
and Møller to check their work, but Denmark was by then occupied by the Nazis. Similarly, Lise
Meitner, Frisch’s aunt with whom he co-authored the first paper on nuclear fission in early 1939,
was in exile in neutral Sweden, but still maintained some contact with her former scientific
partner, Otto Hahn, in Berlin.19 In 1940, the concept of an atomic bomb was so fanciful it did
not have a high-security classification, unlike Oliphant’s other wartime research on radar. It
appears that Frisch and Peierls self-censored their work and were conscious of the security risks
when presenting the work initially to Oliphant. Indeed, Frisch and Peierls stated that risk
explicitly in their memorandum.20 It seems, in the face of war, scientists themselves regulated
the flow of powerful knowledge.
The models of connectedness for 1939 to 1941 (refer to Chapter Two and Chapter
Three), more closely resemble the theoretical sociological model devised by Duncan Watts,
identifying ‘clumps’ of activity that were connected by ‘weak ties’. The ‘weak ties’ within this
model are considered to be as important, if not more so, than strong ties. As Mark Granovetter
demonstrated in 1973, the strong ties of a group are common to all members, and hence have
some redundancy. Weak ties to neighbouring groups, on the other hand, provide the
opportunity for the diffusion of knowledge.21 Weak ties are formed between separated
individuals/groups who share a similar outlook and set of interests—in essence, forming an
invisible college. Both Watts and Crossley therefore show that small-worldliness is a function
more of a network’s weak ties.22 Clearly, under these models, Oliphant played a key role in
bridging the ‘clumps’ of researchers with the invisible college, notably those of his own group in
Birmingham, and that of Lawrence in Berkeley.
The distribution of knowledge between Oliphant and his peers in the 1930s and 1940s
clearly fits Crane’s definition of an invisible college (discussed in Chapter Two).23 To scientists,
the free exchange of knowledge is a key component of research practice. Scientists themselves
are not necessarily conscious of the sociological structure in which they operate, and Oliphant

17
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simply referred to professional communication, in a memorandum to the MAUD Committee, as
‘the normal way’.24

Secrecy and sociological models
The Manhattan Project was the gathering of an invisible college of the allied world’s leading
scientists. At the peak of its activities, thousands of scientists were working across multiple
project sites in the United States. The compartmentalisation policy of the Manhattan Project
was designed to protect its security.25 It also shaped the form of the network that emerged:
each compartment can be understood as a hub of strong relationships, which were weakly tied
by the few people allowed to connect with others. As Stanley Goldberg described, the scientists
found the whole process frustrating:
Most scientists working in the laboratories of the Manhattan Project
found such rules onerous and totally out of step with the kind of
openness and free exchange they believed was required for the proper
operation of any scientific establishment. Anything less, they felt,
would result in needless duplication. Strict compartmentalization
would also suppress the possibility of heuristic inspiration from one
part of the project to another.26

The compartmentalisation policy, as designed by General Leslie Groves, made the United States
feel that the Manhattan Project was impenetrable.27 Some scientists, including Oliphant, saw
the rules as a disruption to normal processes, and hence flagrantly disregarded them. In fact, as
indicated in the similarity to ‘Watts’ Clumps and Weak Ties’ model, this suggests that potentially
the Manhattan Project retained the capacity for the dissemination of information. The
compartmentalisation policy may have had, indeed, the opposite effect to the intended
restriction of secrecy. By defying attempts at censorship, scientists ensured there was rarely
more than two degrees of separation across the entire scientific component of the Manhattan
Project. The delegates of the British mission had an extra level of freedom in reporting their
progress via James Chadwick. As illustrated in Figure 29, even the working knowledge of parts of
the project that were closed to the British, such as the Hanford Reactor, could have leaked
through weak ties. When the British re-started their own bomb project in the late 1940s, they
did it by building a reactor to produce plutonium, rather than attempting to separate out
24

Oliphant, "Letter to G.P. Thomson, Chairman M.A.U.D Committee, September 25, 1941: Notes of
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25
Goldberg, "Groves and the Scientists: Compartmentalization and the Building of the Bomb."
26
Ibid.
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Figure 29 'Sociological model of the Manhattan Project compared to the Watts’ Clumps and Weak Ties
Model', illustration by Darren Holden. Right image reproduced courtesy of Nick Crossley and the journal
Sociology

uranium isotopes. Even though British scientists were largely excluded from the research at
Hanford, and that the United States shut down atomic collaboration in 1946 (refer to Chapter
Five), the British still managed to repatriate scientific knowledge from the United States to
Britain. The compartmentalisation policy of the Manhattan Project was therefore
surmountable, due almost certainly to the success of invisible college relationships.
Significantly, one of the scientists that worked on the British bomb project at Harwell
after the war was Klaus Fuchs, who had been in the theoretical division at Los Alamos. He was
convicted in 1950 of providing the Soviet Union with atomic secrets from a whole range of
topics, even those outside his compartment.28 Whilst the compartmentalisation policy was
ineffectual at preventing leaks—indeed it may have enabled leaks—it did serve other
inadvertent purposes. First, scientists could learn of activity in other areas through exploiting
the strong ties in their own group, and the weak ties to neighbouring groups. Yet they could not
leap between compartments. As a result, they stayed focussed on the task immediately in front
of them. Second, military and political plans for the bomb, including its potential military and
civilian targets, were not shared with the scientific network. It is likely that political discourse
and debates of moral complexity were therefore suppressed amongst the scientists.29 In 1944,
when Oliphant learned of the United States’ goal for a postwar atomic monopoly30 he essentially
leapt beyond the constraints of his compartment to force debate in Britain of its own atomic
plans. This move had the potential to derail the production of enriched uranium at Oak Ridge
and affect the success of the Manhattan Project. Oliphant was quickly told by Sir John Anderson
that he must return to Oak Ridge to complete the task at hand, and with that the order and

28
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29
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structure of the Manhattan Project was restored.
After the war, the scientists who had gathered on the Manhattan Project radiated back
out in to the world. Some, such as Oliphant, resumed academic research within a collaborative
structure that was similar to that which existed before the war. In that model, university
departments were commonly headed by a leading scientist who provided juniors with
connections to other institutions. By then, Oliphant was a key hub within a small-world network,
and he retained effective relationships with significant leaders to exchange knowledge. The
postwar invisible college structure in academia, therefore, more closely resembled the Barabási
model, just as it had before the war. The effectiveness of the structure of the Manhattan
Project, however, was noted by government and industry. In the postwar years, Los Alamos was
declared a national laboratory and expanded its weapons research. Lawrence campaigned for an
annexed research facility at Berkeley, which saw a large multi-disciplinary approach to atomic
development. In the early 1950s, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory was established.31 Los
Alamos and Lawrence Livermore were government-controlled facilities that were involved with
the development, amongst other things, of the hydrogen bomb. Britain set up a similar
institution for its own bomb project at Harwell in Oxfordshire. Private industry also saw the
advantage of taking scientists from academia and started to build large multidisciplinary teams.
Bell Laboratories, for example, established a research facility at which the discovery of the
semiconductor effect ultimately led to the development of the microchip, giving birth to the
digital age.32
The defence industry requires secrecy in order to protect the security of nations,
whereas commercial enterprise requires secrecy in order to protect the investment of its
shareholders. With a common need for secrecy, the military industrial complex grew as an
alliance. Those that protected the spirit of open science in the university system were left out in
the cold.33 The postwar universities continued to be a breeding ground for scientists and new
ideas, but many scientists were lured to join the military industrial complexes and commercial
enterprises.34 The military industrial complexes and commercial enterprises generally restricted
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the return of advantageous knowledge to the public domain. In 1961, the outgoing United
States President, Dwight Eisenhower, proudly spoke of the expansion of the military industrial
complex and the generation of a new private sector.35 Yet in the same speech he cautiously
criticised the vast secret alliances and how they had the capability to influence policy and
government.36 Eisenhower even spoke of the influence of increasing funding inside universities
that was changing the model of research:
The free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and
scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of
research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government
contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For
every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic
computers. The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by
Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is
ever present—and is gravely to be regarded.37

In this context, university science schools, and particularly those led by such antagonists against
secrecy as Oliphant, had to re-form their invisible colleges. Oliphant even went to great lengths
to foster ties with scientists on the other side of the Iron Curtain.38 He visited China and the
Soviet Union,39 whilst still attempting to maintain close links to Berkeley. In turn, Berkeley had
links into the United States government/military national laboratories. Therefore, links between
sensitive research inside government facilities in the United States and Britain, for example,
were only two or three degrees of separation from their counterparts developing nuclear
weapons in the communist east. It is little wonder that security services were therefore
watchful. Those who attempted to exercise academic scientific freedoms, and who wished to
exchange knowledge irrespective of political ideology, were seen as the weakest links in national
security. They were purposefully excluded from sensitive government research. It took the
Soviets four years to develop an atomic weapon of their own after the Americans performed the
Trinity Test in 1945; yet it took them just two years to successfully test an even more
devastating weapon, the hydrogen bomb, after the Americans did so in 1951.40 The crosspollination of knowledge is a natural mode of operation for scientists and, even before a
working hydrogen bomb was developed, scientists were writing openly about its possibility in
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the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.41
The scientific-led peace movement42 was made up of a number of groups, including the
Pugwash Conferences, publications such as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and leftist
organisations such as the World Congress of Scientists and the Australian Association of
Scientific Workers. As Crossley explains, the Watts’ network model is a perfect means to
understanding mass social movements in which ‘individual activists are usually affiliated to local
and dense groups or cells (‘clumps’), and these clumps are often ‘weakly’ tied to one another in
a manner which facilitates information dissemination and communication’.43 Under this model,
Oliphant can be understood as one of the key hubs of communication between disparate, global
peace organisations. After all, he had links into the early Pugwash conferences, the World
Congress of Scientists and the World Federation of Scientific Workers, and the Australian
Association of Scientific Workers. He was also known for his philosophical monologues such as
his Science and Mankind lectures. As reported in Oliphant’s FBI file, his vociferous presence in
the peace movement was used for propaganda by Fidel Castro’s Cuban revolution.44 Indeed, the
formation of social networks and the tying of disparate groups has been cited as a key
component in rebellion and revolution.45

Figure 30 'Postwar structure of atomic science research, illustration by Darren Holden

41

Robert F. Bacher, "The Hydrogen Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 6, no. 5 (1950); Hans Bethe et
al., "The Facts About the Hydrogen Bomb," ibid., no. 4; Harold C Urey, "Should America Build the
Hydrogen Bomb?," ibid., no. 3; Gordon Dean, "The Hydrogen Bomb," ibid.10, no. 9 (1954).
42
Refer Chapter Six.
43
Crossley, "Small-World Networks, Complex Systems and Sociology."
44
"FBI Reported Leak of Atomic Energy Information in 1945 by Australian Scientist, Report (Redacted)
September 2, 1954."
45
Butler, Leiby, and Morales, "The Evolution of Rebellion: Social Networks and Civil War."

262

Social networks from the ‘Golden Age’ to the ‘Gilded Age’ of atomic science
Oliphant’s transnational links within the peace movement meant that, for the most part,
he was kept from military and even commercial networks. Yet Oliphant’s degree of separation
from major research, such as the British atomic tests in Australia, remained decidedly short.
Ernest Titterton, who reported to Oliphant at the Australian National University, was also the
head of the safety committee for the Maralinga bomb tests. In addition, in the mid-1950s,
Oliphant was in regular communication with Hedley Marston of the CSIRO, who was, at the
time, whistleblowing on the fallout from the British atomic tests. Yet Oliphant, despite having
close links into the British tests, was not formally involved and was not bound by secrecy rules
and was thus enabled to freely express his views in the media.46
The network maps presented in this thesis are fundamentally important in
understanding the operation of science. Unsurprisingly, social interaction and secrecy are often
incompatible. So therefore, science and secrecy may also be incompatible—a message purveyed
by Oliphant throughout his career.

The usefulness of network mapping
Small-world network mapping is a useful tool with which to visualise connections and can
produce surprising insight into the function of a group. For atomic scientists, the environment in
which they collaborated became increasingly diverse and widespread from the 1930s. There are,
however, limitations in using network mapping in historical studies. To understand the full
network of connectivity and avoid bias, the data relating to each individual’s connections must
be entered independently. Undoubtedly, my study is biased on Oliphant, and I have mapped
particular moments in time to understand his connectivity to others. But due to the exponential
increase in data that results from mapping every individual, through multiple events or time
periods, it is beyond the scope of my work to fully map the entire network of the atomic age.
Perhaps, as other researchers are doing, to build full historic social network maps, the data must
be crowd-sourced and contributed to by a community of historians. For example, in a novel way,
the Six Degrees of Francis Bacon project is mapping the connections of the fifteenth century
philosopher, Francis Bacon. The sheer scale of the project and the thousands of nodes and
connections already established serves to prove the complexity of data required to build such

46

There is no evidence to suggest that Titterton told Oliphant any direct secrets that were then divulged
by Oliphant in the public domain. Oliphant would have been acutely aware of a need to protect those that
were on the inside.

263

Chapter Nine

Figure 31 'A screen from the Six Degrees of Francis Bacon Project', Accessed 1 November 2018.
http://www.sixdegreesoffrancisbacon.com

networks. Given that Bacon was one of the founding members of the first ‘invisible college’, and
the Royal Society, it seems historically consonant that he was chosen as the first hub in the
project.47 Whilst Six Degrees of Francis Bacon was seeded by researchers at the Carnegie Mellon
University in Pittsburgh and George Mason University in Virginia, it is possible for any researcher
in the world to contribute to the project. The Six Degrees of Francis Bacon project illustrates that
to build a comprehensive historical social network map, one indeed requires a social network of
historians.48
Insofar as small-world network mapping has contributed usefully to this study, it is by no
means a panacea. Mapping and visualising networks and connectivity is just one tool with which
a historian can work. We must remain cautious of its limitations and the sources of its data.
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Chapter conclusions: Changing patterns of collaboration and why it matters
When one considers the history of scientific breakthroughs and paradigms we often associate
them with individuals. In many instances there have been individual thought leaders who have
generated their own theories. The understanding of the movement of our solar system was
given to us by Nicolaus Copernicus, and is now referred to as the Copernican Revolution. The
forces that dictate the path of the planets and the fall of a feather were linked by Isaac Newton
in what we refer to as Newtonian Mechanics. In the early atomic age, Einstein, Rutherford, and
Curie became household names with their respective discoveries. Emerging, however, from the
early atomic age were the quantum mechanics breakthroughs of the late 1920s and 1930s
which are, in the context of modern technology, more important than—but not as famous as—
Einstein’s Relativity. Yet we do not directly associate the quantum mechanics breakthroughs
with a single individual. Rather, it is with a network of scientists, including Werner Heisenberg,
Wolfgang Pauli, Paul Dirac, and Niels Bohr who worked collaboratively across various
institutions. Whilst individually their scientific breakthroughs were acknowledged within a
community of science as outstanding and via prizes such as the Nobel Prize, their names are not
as readily recalled by the wider non-scientific community. Even for the discovery of fission in
1938–39, which resulted in a mode of energy that now powers vast electricity networks, we do
not popularly hold a single scientist responsible. The early work by Enrico Fermi and his team in
Rome was followed up by Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann in Berlin, and subsequently explained
by Otto Frisch and Lise Meitner in Stockholm. Quantum mechanics and atomic science however,
are extremely complex subjects and even those deeply entrenched in it seem to struggle to
visualise its contradictions. Collaboration, it seems, was a response to this increasing complexity.
There was an increase in transnational collaboration through the late 1920s and into the 1930s.
It seems that perhaps this transnational collaboration went ‘underground’ with invisible colleges
due to the portents of war. Scientists who professionally came of age in this era started to
communicate independently within the invisible college, and often without the necessity of a
formally centralised leader. Many layers of communication occurred directly between
equivalent peers in other institutions. The migration of refugee scientists out of the Axis
countries and into the western Allied states further fostered a new community of science. This is
demonstrated well by the contagion of knowledge that rapidly spread from Germany to Sweden
to Denmark and to the United States upon the discovery of nuclear fission.49
The Manhattan Project, with its formalised compartmentalisation policy, produced a
model of collaboration and integration of multi-disciplinary teams. The compartmentalisation
49
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policy had only a modest effect in protecting security, but made great strides in keeping
scientists focussed on the task at hand. This mode of scientific structure resembles a Watts’
Clump and Weak Ties model: an effective way to distribute information. Before the war, physics
research was confined almost exclusively to the university laboratories. However, after the war
the military industrial complexes and commercial enterprise aggregated large budgets and
teams of scientists. The rapid technological breakthroughs of these ‘big science’ environments
meant that individuals could no longer compete with the power of team-driven research for
new discoveries. The 2017 Nobel Prize for physics went to three named scientists. Yet they
represented thousands of scientists working around the world to detect gravity waves that one
man, Einstein, had theorized to exist more than a hundred years earlier.50 Furthermore, the
detection and measurement of the Higgs-Boson sub-atomic particle in 2015 resulted in a paper
being published by the journal Nature, which had more than 5000 authors.51
Oliphant was not involved in the big science projects of the postwar era despite his
wartime leadership of the design and construction of the Oak Ridge calutrons. He would have
been a perfect candidate for a military industrial complex or to lead a big budget industry
project. His indiscretions and meddling in the communion of military and industry, however,
resulted in his exclusion. As discussed previously in chapters six and seven, he had little ambition
to join projects that were constrained by secrecy requirements. As a result, he operated his
science from within academia—a structure that had not evolved considerably since before the
war. With the backing of his university, Oliphant was still able to attract relatively large grants,
but these were a pittance compared to the scale of the postwar military industrial complexes,
government projects and commercial enterprise laboratories.52 When other universities sought
to bring in funding for secret projects he objected vehemently.53 As a result, Oliphant’s
achievements in postwar science are considered, by some, to be limited.54
Sociological connections are not just interesting observations but also serve to inform
how an individual scientist may be positioned in his or her career. In the case of Oliphant, his
doctoral supervisor, Rutherford, was a key hub in collaboration of academic communities in the
early atomic age. When Rutherford died, Oliphant partly filled the gap and became a key hub
himself for the distribution of atomic knowledge in the early 1940s. However, after the war he
50
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did not make the leap to the new big science models of military or commercial research. As a
result, and in order to retain relevancy and connections he found a new community for
collaboration—one which better matched his pacifist creed—the global movement for peace
and scientific freedoms. Oliphant recalled fondly the ‘Golden Age’ of atomic science in the 1920s
and 1930s in his 1972 book Rutherford: Recollection of the Cambridge Days.55 Yet he was
excluded from, and could not make the leap to, a more gilded age when the large budgets and
big science projects of commercial enterprise and militaristic governments formed a shiny
veneer in which natural philosophy was hidden by utilitarian function.
Undoubtedly the great leaps in new technology over the past 60 years were a result of
not just the breakthroughs of science in war, but also the changes to the structure of science
learned in war. With graduate employability and salary now used as a metric by which
universities judge their performance,56 there is a push to focus on vocational training rather than
pure academic research. The university system risks being relegated into a mere training ground
for industry. Yet it is the pure and esoteric academic projects, documented in this work at least,
that led to some of the greatest technological breakthroughs of the twentieth century. Perhaps,
should pure research, for the sake of knowledge rather than utility, continue to come under
threat in the university system, we can expect that all future technologies will be controlled by
governments and private enterprise—a situation that would have met with the disapproval of
Oliphant.57
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Oliphant and his place in the atomic age

Sometimes history seeks to place the heroes and villains along the milestones of time. Indeed, in the
history of science, we can all recall names and discoveries from scientists such as Aristotle, Isaac
Newton and Galileo. In the early atomic age Marie Curie and Albert Einstein became household
names and their reputations endure. But non-historians of science or the general public sometimes
struggle to name any famous physicist since Einstein.1 It appears the postwar decades of the
twentieth century—a period that included the most rapid growth in science and technology in
history—has not given us new scientific heroes to hold high. Perhaps this is because the role of
scientific advancement in society has become normalised and somehow diminished in our minds. Or
perhaps this is for other reasons, such as the rise of science as a social activity, where the role of the
individual has been surpassed by the contribution of groups. Often these groups form latently, as
invisible colleges, but nevertheless produce a collective contribution in absence of a figurehead or a
notable leader.

New knowledge provided by this work
In this work I have placed Mark Oliphant within the context of the scientific networks of mid-century
atomic science. Oliphant transcended not just national borders to advance science, but he also
played an important role within a network of scientists as their craft moved rapidly from esoteric
investigations inside university laboratories to powerful technologies used in war. With the
realisation that power could be wielded by the atom, it was inevitable that politics would interfere
with the scientific networks in which Oliphant worked.
The application of small-world network analysis and the sociological lens used in this thesis
applies a new methodology to studying the history of the atomic age, and particularly to Oliphant.
Application of these techniques, borrowed from other disciplines, has rarely been used by historians
and never before been applied in a rigorous way to the history of the atomic age. Sociological
concepts such as moral trust and formation of generations of scientists provides support to
1

I have often asked this question of friends and fellow history researchers. There is a distinct lack of recall of
any notable physicist since Einstein. An exception to this, perhaps, is Stephen Hawking, whose death in 2018
received world-wide media attention. Hawking’s contribution to the studies of the cosmos were immense, but
also he is perhaps most best known as the genius that continued a contribution with a sharp mind despite his
considerable physical challenges.
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Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions. The framework of the invisible
college and the strength of ‘weak-ties’, again concepts used primarily by sociologists, further
enhances this work to provide a novel methodological basis to explain actions such as Oliphant
breaching security provisions to advance science.
Importantly, this work has made a contribution to new knowledge of Oliphant. Through
analysis of scientific networks in which he was engaged, we better understand his effect on war-time
and post-war politics. The same analysis reveals the degree to which the trans-national invisible
college of the atomic age advanced science through the exchange of ideas and knowledge. Oliphant
is revealed not just as a scientific leader, but a key hub in a strong network of Australian, British and
American scientists who doggedly fought censorship and security provisions, transcended national
interests, and debated political and military decisions. Indeed, by visualising Oliphant as a key-hub in
a network, we achieve an authentic reading of his influence.
Whilst much of Oliphant’s activities are familiar to historians of the atomic age, the evidence
presented in this work shows a number of distinct variations to previous scholarly understandings.
The first is the alternative interpretation I offer regarding Oliphant’s important meeting with Ernest
Lawrence and Robert Oppenheimer in September 1941. This meeting was a clear breach of secrecy
protocols. It is convenient to blame Oliphant’s pugnacious character for his indiscretion in meeting
with Lawrence and Oppenheimer, but, as I have argued, it can also be explained by the effectiveness
of the invisible college: Oliphant confidently brought forth the work of Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls
from his Birmingham laboratory, and placed it on the desk of two civilian scientists whom he trusted
at Berkeley. Furthermore, by placing Oppenheimer at that meeting I have demonstrated that the
American scientist entered the atomic bomb project earlier than previously documented by others.2
Bringing to light the letter written by Oliphant to Oppenheimer in the days after the Berkeley
meeting is conclusive evidence of Oppenheimer’s presence. In this letter, Oliphant perceived
Oppenheimer to be a potential advocate for political action when he urged, ‘whichever nation is first
to succeed in this quest will undoubtedly be master of the world’.3
There are other new understandings of Oliphant arising from this work. His role as a leader
of the scientific effort at Oak Ridge has been previously documented in other written histories of the
Manhattan Project. However, Oliphant’s attempt at instigating a British rebellion and repatriating
the British scientists home in late 1944 has not been previously analysed in detail.4 My research has

2

See, for example, Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert
Oppenheimer 175-77
3
Refer Chapter Three.
4
For example, Graham Farmelo’s recent Churchill’s Bomb, focused on James Chadwick’s communications with
the British project in late 1944 and though he described Oliphant as a ‘gabby critic’. Farmelo, Churchill's Bomb,
280-85
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demonstrated Oliphant’s volubility as he attempted to convince politicians such as Lord Cherwell of
the need for renewed activity, and has also revealed his great desire to secure openness in science.5
Oliphant’s virtue in the postwar peace movement allowed him to use the excuse that he never
thought the atomic bomb created during the war would be actually used. Indeed, his own family
state that he frequently made such a statement. However, archival records uncovered in this work,
such his departing letter from the Manhattan Project, state explicitly he expected the use of the
bomb in the war. Such application of weaponry was, to Oliphant, an inevitable sacrifice for the gains
made by science.6
I have also documented the attempts made by Ben Chifley to bring Oliphant to Australia in
1946, as well as the attempt by the British government to block that. My findings differ considerably
from the order of the events as produced in Oliphant’s biography and the various histories written
on the formation of the ANU. Chifley desired for Oliphant to advise the Australian government on
atomic geopolitics long before he pushed for Oliphant’s inclusion at the ANU. This is relevant to the
Chifley-Evatt nationalist push for an Australia that was more independent of the British Empire.7
Furthermore, Oliphant’s role as a member of the Australian delegation to the 1946 United Nations
conference can be viewed as a reformation of the invisible colleges as he, and others such as
Oppenheimer, attempted to secure scientific freedom whilst restricting the atomic bomb.8
Communications between the invisible college members, who were advising their governments at
the 1946 United Nations conference, illustrate a common goal—to secure freedom in science and
prevent the proliferation of weaponry. The scientists, such as Oppenheimer, Oliphant and even
potentially Dimitri Skolbetzyn, were holding their own off-conference discussions to develop
strategies to convince their political bosses. Ultimately arms control failed, but to place the invisible
college in such a potentially influential position has, in this work, been documented for the first
time.9
New knowledge of Oliphant presented in this work has arisen, in part, from my use of
archival and oral history materials that have not previously been accessed. In the first instance, I
have made use of archival records in the United Kingdom and United States, many of which have not
previously been referenced by scholars. I have conducted several oral history interviews that have
provided new information which I now place on the public record. Significantly, Oliphant’s security
records have been interpreted closely for the first time in my research. At the time that Oliphant’s

5

Refer Chapter Four.
Refer chapters Four and Eight.
7
Refer Chapter Five.
8
Refer Chapter Five.
9
Refer Chapter Five.
6
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biography was written by Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard, Oliphant’s Australian security files
were not yet on the public record. By documenting those archival records in detail in this work, it is
possible to compare the rather public humiliation of scientists in McCarthyist America to the moresly, though often bumbling, activities of ASIO. Once again, we can draw from the sociology of science
concepts such as invisible colleges, and use such notions to understand how scientists involved
themselves in non-scientific-specific activities such as the peace-movement, political discourse, and
resistance to censorship.10

Small-worlds analysis
An aim of this work has been to assess if small-world network mapping and the use of sociological
frameworks could enable a better interpretation of the actions of Oliphant and other atomic
scientists. Whilst not a panacea, the use of the such network analysis has resulted in tools that help
understand the history and changing structures of the atomic age and particularly how they varied in
the decades that preceded and followed World War Two.
The social structure of science started to change around 1933 as scientists began to
organically form their invisible colleges in response to the political influence of the state. This
coincided with a Kuhnian paradigm shift of quantum mechanics that was driven by a new generation
of bright young scientists that emerged from the stuffy structure of hierarchical academia. Certainly
for most of the 1930s, universities and the connectedness of invisible colleges saw a happy exchange
of information and a desire to research for the greater good of understanding nature’s philosophy.
Yet, perhaps the discovery of fission and the outbreak of war in Europe in the same year was not so
much of a coincidence after all. It is plausible that these breakthroughs, including the concept of an
atomic bomb, were a product of the transnational invisible colleges that were formed as scientists
were driven underground or exiled in response to centralised state-restrictions on science imposed
by political ideology.

Invisible colleges and moral dilemmas
A further aim of this work has been to evaluate how critical issues faced by scientists shaped their
response to political interference, notably the moral dilemmas of atomic science and the risks posed
to scientific freedoms.
During the war, atomic science became secret and powerful. The Manhattan Project and its
compartmentalisation policy did, indeed, set a new mode of operation for ‘big science’. It is an

10

Refer Chapters Six and Seven.
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apparent paradox that peaceful free-thinking scientists, who entered a secret wartime conclave,
overcame acute moral dilemmas to construct weapons of mass destruction. In the immediate days
after the first bombs fell on Japan these scientists were held up as heroes whose intellects and
multinational effort brought a rapid end to a long and bloody war.
Yet some scientists were politically naïve to consider that after the war they could return to
their universities and continue to advance science in an open way. Postwar, the new military
industrial complexes and private enterprise attempted incursions into the university system and thus
the fountainhead of free-thought came under threat. Those scientists, such as Oliphant, who
resisted this changing mode, found themselves to a degree, isolated. This provoked a new response,
and as I have argued in this work, new transnational invisible colleges were formed with a growing
political maturity to warn humanity against the threat of secret science being wielded by
governments. The moral dilemmas of peaceful scientists creating weapons of mass destruction no
longer seems paradoxical. Indeed, much of their wartime motivation was driven to advance atomic
science irrespective of whether it be for peaceful purposes or to destroy. To conduct pure research
to advance a new science and to bring technologies to bear, including a new weapon capable of
ending a current war, cannot necessarily be viewed in the same way as building weapons that
threaten to bring war to a world supposedly at peace.
The trope of tortured scientists, drawing parallel to Frankenstein, Faust and Prometheus, is
also perhaps a myth. These depictions or public perceptions were perhaps created by others who
wished to discredit increasingly noisy activist scientists. Some scientists, particularly those that
promoted openness in science, were indeed censored and their careers and reputations affected.

Placing Oliphant amongst the networks and maelstrom of the atomic age
Mark Oliphant was born in the first year of the twentieth century and died in its last. The arc of his
life carried him through both the light and dark times of the century. As one of the last of Ernest
Rutherford’s students he experienced the joy of being part of a great-era of esoteric scientific
discovery. Following the death of Rutherford in 1937, Oliphant spread his wings and started to form
new invisible colleges to advance science.
During World War Two Oliphant frequently broke secrecy rules imposed by governments
and the military. He did so because he firmly believed that science restricted by secrecy would be
less effective. Much of the written history of the Manhattan Project, from Henry Smyth11 to

11

Smyth, "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes (The Smyth Report)."
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Margaret Gowing12 to Stephane Groueff13 to Richard Rhodes14 to Tom Zoellner,15 note that Oliphant
was the physicist whom, with Lawrence, got the great calutrons at Oak Ridge humming to make the
payload for the Hiroshima bomb. Yet it was Oliphant’s impatience and willingness to transcend
secrecy provisions by using his scientific network that perhaps had a greater influence on historical
outcomes.16 Oliphant’s personality played a role here and his roguishness, bombast, impatience and
directness meant that secrets clawed at him, desperate to be let out. In the context of scientific
networks, Oliphant’s personality only served as an extra engine in the further carriage of knowledge
in the invisible college.
The 1941 indiscretion to bring Ernest Lawrence and Robert Oppenheimer into the bomb
project was, perhaps, Oliphant’s most impactful. His subsequent attempts to bypass secrecy to push
an agenda—such as his attempts to repatriate British Mission to the Manhattan Project before
completion—failed to gain the momentum he desired.17 For a brief few years the United States held
a monopoly on atomic weaponry. If Oliphant had been successful in the 1944 quest to re-start the
British bomb project early, then Britain may possibly have beaten the Soviet Union to the atomic
bomb. However, if the British scientists were evacuated from the Manhattan Project before its
completion, the atomic bomb may not have played a decisive role in ending World War Two.18
Other than during World War Two, Oliphant remained within the university system where
he fought to protect the bastions of academic tradition and openness in science. The non-university
research in the military and commercial enterprise still required large numbers of scientists but
required them to avoid the casual internationalism. Oliphant seemingly accepted that the postwar
organisation of science needed to suffer some restrictions. Yet he was content at the university level
where ideas were relatively unrestricted. This desire to protect academia also explains why he
vehemently protested any incursion made by external enterprise into the university system.19
If the scientific advisors, such as Oliphant, had their suggestions at the United Nations in
1946 accepted, could the Cold War have been averted? Many scientists felt that a sharing of
technology would breed trust and would reduce the need for anyone to actually construct a
weapon. Whilst at times, such as when the doomsday clock ticked perilously close to midnight
during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the promise of mutually assured destruction seemed to keep a
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nuclear conflict from occurring. After the failings of the United Nations’ 1946 conference the
scientists did not scurry back to their laboratories silently, but many of them, including and
especially Oliphant, became even more vocal protagonists in the fight for peace. Even when told to
desist by the British and Australian governments, Oliphant did not stop in his public utterances on
the threats posed by the arms race and restrictions placed upon science. He continued to share what
information he had with fellow scientists and in public forums. Despite a lack of evidence to
implicate that Oliphant was anything other than a loyal citizen, he never again played a role in a
government-run atomic project, advisory committee or organisation. Compared to the situation in
the United States, where Robert Oppenheimer was publicly stripped of his credentials by a paranoid
investigation, Oliphant endured his restrictions of government in private and often without even
realising the reasons why he had been censored or overlooked for positions.
To Oliphant the sharing of knowledge was a key part of what it meant to be a scientist and,
in that, comes a duty to protect such freedoms. Internationalist movements, such as the Pugwash
conferences, still allowed him to participate in transnational conversations as he had done before
the war. The scientific peace movement was organised, after all, in a very similar way to the
distribution of scientific discovery with conferences and journals being the main forums to
proliferate knowledge. The global scientific peace movement of the 1950s and 1960s fitted perfectly
with a man whose career was moving towards a more philosophical twilight.20
During the Cold War the notion of ‘national loyalty’ became a testable premise on which to
investigate scientists. ASIO attempted to identify a communist spy ring at the Australian National
University (ANU). Yet other than Ernest Titterton, very few ANU scientists had access to anything
that could resemble confidential or strategically valuable information. Hence the chances of an
effective spy ring, distributing detailed secret science, was minimal. ASIO nevertheless continued to
put a large amount of resources into the surveillance of scientists including Oliphant. The real risk
the peace-loving scientists posed, however, was not their security risk—where secrets of state may
be divulged to the enemy—but their appeal to reason on the threats of atomic bombs. Indeed, when
we heard George W. Bush utter, ‘either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’ in 2001,21 we
saw the same black and white philosophy that framed how McCarthyist politics and paranoia of the
1950s shaped the investigations into the loyalty of citizens.
Scientifically Oliphant’s name is not as well recalled as, for example, those of Ernest
Rutherford, Marie Curie, or Albert Einstein. His philosophical contributions to the discourse on
reason, peace and politics has not garnered the same critique as such scientists as Robert
20
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Oppenheimer and Bertrand Russell. Within Australian scientific circles, and particularly those in
physics, Oliphant is recalled as a founding father, a patron, and one of the greatest we have
produced. Yet even in Australia, his remarkable scientific achievements are not well known. So that
when asked what he really contributed, some struggle to recollect his early contributions to artificial
fusion of hydrogen isotopes, for which he was nominated for the Nobel Prize, and focus instead on
his collaborative efforts on radar and the atomic bomb.22 So where do we place Oliphant in the
atomic history of the twentieth century? His obituary in the journal Nature was provided by Nobel
Peace laureate Joseph Rotblat and focussed more on his contribution to peace rather than his
science. Yet, Oliphant advocated that science was its own estate that should rise above the
prevaricating world of domestic and international political ideology. Given his public utterances
against governments and his willingness to ignore secrecy rules it is not surprising that he
occasionally fell suspect of security services. Having investigated Oliphant’s motives, however, we
must recognise that despite attempts at censorship, he effectively exploited transnational networks
to guide his own agenda and his stewardship of natural philosophy. Above all things and interests,
Mark Oliphant, was an agent of science.

The significance of these findings and potential further work
The use of sociological frameworks, to chart the path of an individual and his network in history, has
revealed new insights into the atomic age. The coinvestigation of sociology and history of science
along with political history and moral philosophy, has provided a new lens with which to view the
importance of networks in instigating historical outcomes.
In the introduction to this work I offered Oliphant’s international transcendence as the par
excellence of examples with which to explore how atomic scientists moved from esoteric ivory
towers of science, through utility of war and into peace. Oliphant, as he bustled about in Britain, the
United States and Australia, not only found himself amongst the turbidity of atomic science and
geopolitics, he seems to have been a catalyst of its most controversial moments. In his laboratory in
Birmingham Oliphant fostered an environment of free thought and offered sanctuary to refugee
scientists. This environment provided the Allies with advanced radar technology and the feasibility of
the atomic bomb. Yet this wellspring of open-science also fostered the atomic spies Klaus Fuchs and
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Alan Nunn-May. Oliphant spearheaded the thrust of British scientists to accelerate atomic weaponry
in the United States, but his attempted 1944 rebellion very nearly derailed the project. Even his
return to Australia where he hoped to bring Australia into the atomic age with power ‘too cheap to
meter’, coincided with Australia’s hosting of British atomic bombs. Once again, with the freedom of
speech available to academics, and despite attempted censorship, Oliphant supported the whistle
blower Hedley Marston as the impact of atomic testing was revealed. In turn Oliphant spoke freely
about the preservation of open-science to foster peace. So amongst the paradoxes, contradictions
and occasional self-serving aims of Oliphant’s life we see an honesty with which to map the contours
of the history of the atomic age. A key significance of this is, that as well as in Isaac Newton’s third
law of mechanics, we see that every (historic) action also generates an opposite reaction: we cannot
generate free-thought without generating censorship or other unexpected consequences.
This work sought to understand the impact of politics and ideology in science and on
scientists who were involved in trans-institutional and transnational networks. In order to achieve
this, I only opened government archives and the personal archives of scientists. I did not attempt to
see how the administration of universities, for example, were also affected by political interference
during the atomic age and how they may have attempted to place rules on academic staff. So
perhaps, as further work, it may be useful to open the archives of the vice chancellors,
administration departments to assess university politics at Berkeley, The University of Birmingham
or the Australian National University during the same period.
Furthermore, I only used one example and primary case-study, the atomic age and Oliphant,
to investigate how science and politics have interacted. Additional work could include investigations
into how politics has interfered with other science and scientists. For example, as we now face a new
doomsday prophecy of human created climate-change, we see similar attempts by politicians and
others, to discredit scientists.23 Yet a uranium atom, as it ruptures, knows nothing of its impact on
the city below; and nor does the weather care for people as it brews a wild storm, creates a heat
wave or melts an ice cap. Politicians make laws for society. Politicians, however, need perhaps
reminding that scientists are not nature’s lawmakers—they are nature’s lawyers who merely
observe, reveal and interpret the laws of nature. The laws of nature were coded at the Universe’s
moment of creation, and long before human pettiness evolved upon the earth. So whilst sometimes
ignorance is bliss, and we may regret some of the laws of nature being revealed, scientists are not
the enemy of the state. But they can potentially provide a special insight that prevents us from
walking to our doom.
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